The Distinction Between Religion and Politics in France - Assignment Example

In December, 2007 French President Nicholas Sarkozy met with Pope Benedict XVI and shocked the French press with his apparent acquiescence to what hethought the Pontiff might want to hear regarding the Church’s role in French politics. “There has probably never been a French president who defended his country’s Catholic heritage so vigorously,” wrote the French Catholic daily La Croix as quoted by Reuters (2007). Given France’s long history of laicite, which since 1905 has affirmed the country’s political status as the most secular state in Europe, the remark seemed out of context. Laicite—In History, Meaning and Practice The French concept of laïcité while generally viewed as the separation of church and state goes much deeper into the French consciousness, history and law. Laicite, or secular society, dates back to the French Revolution and its bloody attempt to eliminate the Catholic Church’s influence over its newly formed Republic, the notion which so disturbed the French in Sarkozy’s remarks. It has held that definition and confirmed it in the Law of Separation of 1905. Yet, if interpreted fully, laicite includes provisions to protect the rights of the church and all religions and individuals under those rights, while giving the state the power to enforce “the strict separation of public and private, with all forms of secondary associations placed firmly within the latter domain” (McKinnon & Castiglione, 2003). During the twentieth century the term evolved to mean equal treatment of all religions, although a more restrictive interpretation of the term has developed since 2004 in response to the controversial Stasi Commission Report. The Stasi Commission In 2003 then President Jacque Chirac commissioned “a group of scholars, government officials and educators to study laicite (and its application) in France” (Choudury, 2007). Its findings, incomprehensible to many outside of France, led to the widely controversial 2004 law prohibiting the wearing of any obvious religious or political symbols in primary and secondary schools. Adrian quotes Elaine Sciolino writing in the International Herald Tribune, “The debate has little to do with the usual reasons for school dress codes and everything to do with the French state’s historical impulse to impose its republican value system on an increasingly diverse nation.…” (Adrian, 2006). Choudury summarizes the official state position: The Commission found that the mere presence of Islamic headscarves in public schools threatened laicite and its concomitant values of state neutrality towards religion, equality between citizens, and tolerance of religious difference. It also deplored the coerced covering of Muslim girls by their fathers, brothers, communities, and political Islamists, proclaiming that "The Republic cannot remain deaf to the cries of distress from these young women." Deploying the rhetoric of protecting students from proselytism and saving Muslim girls from their families and other members of the Muslim community, the Commission called upon the Republic and its public schoolteachers to safeguard human rights--those of students in general (of other faiths) and Muslim girls in particular” (Choudury 2007). Charges of discrimination were widespread and vociferous. Wieviorka writes that on one hand there is a strongly held French view that “...minorities... pose a challenge to the republics universalist values-to law and to reason. He includes examples as “the (Muslim) rejection of some secular forms of instruction under the pretext that they are not in keeping with the Quran...” (Wieviorka, 2004). Stasi officials were not reluctant to admit their position on the prohibition of headscarves was somewhat influenced by fears surrounding the growing unrest and separation from French society by certain segments of Muslim population “The affair has proved to be an impassioned debate about the integration of Muslims in France, the influence of political Islam on French soil, (and) gender equality in Muslim communities...”(Choudhury, 2007). In short, the affair has become a question of whether Muslim communities and their Islamic beliefs are counter to French laicite in its fullest interpretation. “The Commission found that the mere presence of Islamic headscarves in public schools threatened laicite and its concomitant values of state neutrality towards religion, equality between citizens, and tolerance of religious difference” (Choudhury, 2007). Charges by anti-discrimination groups were expectedly met with denial and justification of France’s right to impose secular law. In 2008, despite the controversy over human rights, the European Court of Human Rights in Stasbourg struck down charges by two Muslim women, eleven and twelve, that in forbidding the wearing of headscarves in school France was violating “their freedom of religion and their right to an education” (DW-World. DE, 2008). In their decision the court ruled the expulsion of the girls did not violate their rights on the basis that alternative means of education was offered through correspondence courses. "It was clear that the applicants religious convictions were fully taken into account in relation to the requirements of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and public order..." (French Headscarf Ban...2008). It is interesting on an international level to note that the court sided with the French government in its right to enforce laicite and “the requirements of secularism” (French Headscarf Ban...,2008). European Secularism and Integration Generally secularism is a growing force in Europe as evidenced in the 2003 European Rally for Secularism. Speaking to a gathering of 32 associations from 14 countries, representatives expressed their displeasure with “anti secularist provisions of the draft of the European constitution” (European Rally..., 2003). Speaker Christian Eyschen in interpreting a specific Article 51 pertaining to religion suggests "... the European Union will respect ‘the various forms of relationships between the Churches and the States’, that means that it will protect them by integrating them in the Community Law which is superior to the  various national regulations” (European Rally...,2003). Eyschen cautions, “When the ratification of this constitution is achieved,  all forms of relationship between religions and the States, i.e. the concordats, established Churches and State religions, the clerical statute of Alsace - Moselle, the Church taxes, the offence of blasphemy,  all that will be integrated in the Community Law” (European Rally...,2003). Apparently Sajo agrees in theory. “Constitutional arrangements, today, are facing the challenge of new forms of strong religion that have the apparent goal of reconquering the public space” (Sajo, 2008) a stricture forbidden in French laicite. Countries including Poland, noticeably missing from the conference, have a very different view of secularization, undoubtedly due to its highly Catholic and pro-Papist history.  Holc writes, “Poland challenged the document (European Constitution) most directly and most vehemently. Both its president and its main bishop had already argued for the incorporation of the word “God” in the preamble during enlargement negotiations in 2002” (Holc, 2007). As a consequence, “Anticipating the threat of secularization, the integralist sectors of Polish Catholicism have adopted a negative attitude towards European integration" (Casanova, 2004), while Church officials and infact the Pope himself has encouraged Poland’s integration into the EU as “a great aposotlic assignment" (Casanova, 2004). Turkey is perhaps a more interesting and complex study when it comes to the topic of secularization described by Mertes (2005) as Turkey’s “stage management of Islam”. While Turkey employs strict separation of religion and state in its governmental policies guided by Kemalist elites, Mertes writes, “A fixation on the opinions and lifestyles of the urban Kemalist elites in Turkey occasionally distorts how we see the convictions of Turquie profonde. Of the Turks surveyed, a majority of 84 percent affirmed a link between religion and morality” (Mertes, 2005) compared to 13 percent of French people, which explains Turkey’s unique view of secularization and its definition as it sees it. Former German Constitutional Court judge Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde explains the apparent inconsistency. “The laicite practiced in Turkey is in no way the same as the laïcité in France, the latter defined by the complete removal of controls on religion in return for its restriction to the private, personal sphere” (Mertes qtg. Böckenförde, 2005). A quasi secularism in reverse, religious worship in Turkey is a highly organized and regulated activity, with a Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet) of over “100,000 employees including prayer leaders, preachers, callers to worship, etc. It administrates 70,000 mosques...A kind of state-mandated Sunni Islam is practiced under its aegis, and provides the foundation for all religious education and training” (Mertes, 2005). Quoting Böckenförde Mertes cites “...the shameful state of the [c. 100,000-MM] Christians in Turkey” (Mertes, 2005) despite Turkish government pretense that such irregularities and prejudices do not exist. Much of the discussion of secularization in Turkey and for that, in France involve apparent struggles to keep their nations Islamic or Christian respectively. It is a kind of nationalism that perceives its culture as somehow affiliated with a specific belief system while not admitting that its sense of nation requires it. This may or may not be true of France, which has welcomed the largest Muslim population in the world. And what of Europe in general? Casanova found, “An increasing majority of the European population has ceased to participate in traditional religious practices... In this respect, one should perhaps talk of the unchurching of the European population and of religious individualization, rather than of secularization“ (Casanova, 2004). Casanova quotes Davie. “...large numbers of Europeans even in the most secular countries still identify themselves as "Christians..." (Casanova, 2004), a fact that while true even in France apparently has little to do with country’s overwhelming support of secularization. Conclusion Assessing the French commitment to secularization, then, we must compare it to other countries and their attitudes. Given current political animosities between the Muslim world and the effectively Christian west, a case can be made that the decision, though rationalized through French laicite, is suspect in terms of motive—fear of unrest within the population and public safety rather than the motives expressed by the Stasi Commission. Whether the nation is merely attempting to preserve its long held principles of a secular society in the public interest, or whether other political considerations come into play is irrelevant. As the European Court on Human Rights affirmed, France is well within its rights under laicite in restricting the religious symbols for the public good and in the interests of keeping the public peace. Yet comparing the practice of secularism in France with other countries it is not unreasonable to assume that it is committed to maintaining a secular society under laicite, Sarkozy’s remarks notwithstanding. As offered by Sarkozy himself regarding the controversy, one can express the positive outcome on a society of religious values without in any way intimating that those specific values, Christian or otherwise, should dictate political policy. The fact that 69 percent of all Frenchman agree with laicite as practical policy under its constitution indicates the country’s devotion to secularism as it benefits the nation. One has only to look at the theocracies currently at work in the middle east, and for that, the Christian faith driven politics of the United States to understand its importance in maintaining a civilised political equilibrium in a world ever more violent and ever more fragmented by religious dogma. Bibliography Adrian, M. (2006) ‘Laïcité Unveiled: A Case Study in Human Rights, Religion, and Culture in France’. Human Right Review:Oct-Dec. Retrieved from http://harvard.academia.edu/documents/0029/9347/07Adrian.pdf Casanova, J. (2004) Religion, European Secular Identities and European Intregration. Eurozine Web Site. Retrieved from http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-07-29-casanova-en.html Choudhury, N. (2007). ‘From the Stasi Commission to the European Court of Human Rights: Laffaire Du Foulard and the Challenge of Protecting the Rights of Muslim Girls’. Columbia Journal of Gender and Law. Vol.,16 (1) 199+ Retrieved from www.questia.com. DW-World.DE. (5-12-2008) French Headscarf Ban Not Discrimination, Says European Court. Retrieved from http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3850797,00.html International Humanist and Ethical Union. European Rally for Secularism. (2003) Submitted by admin 6 December. Retrieved from http://www.iheu.org/node/277 McKinnon, C. and Castiglione, D. (eds) (2003). The Culture of Toleration in Diverse Societies: Reasonable Tolerance. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press. Retrieved from www.questia.com. Mertes, M. (2005) Religion, Secularism and Sovereignty. IP Global Web Site. Retrieved from http://www.ip-global.org/archiv/volumes/2005/fall2005/religion--secularism--and-sovereignty.html Sajo, A. (2008) ‘Preliminaries to a Concept of Constitutional Secularism’. International Journal of Constitutional Law Advance Access originally published online on July 29, 2008: 6(3-4):605-629; doi:10.1093/icon/mon018. New York: Oxford University Press and New York University School of Law. Retrieved from http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/6/3-4/605 “‘Sarko the American’ Does Godtalk French-style”. (2007). Reuters, 22, December: 03:57. Retrieved from http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2007/12/22/sarko-the-american-does-godtalk-french-style/ Wieviorka, M. (2004). The Stakes in the French Secularism Debate. Dissent Web Site. Summer. Retrieved from http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=338 Read More