Why does the Chinese Government publicly denounce Falun Gong - Research Paper Example

?Kevin Chang Falun Gong: Why Does the Chinese Government Persecute It? Introduction The Falun Gong movement is an on-going movement in China. However, even though other religions are tolerated in China, Falun Gong is not. The reasons for this are complex, but the underlying reason, in a nutshell, that the movement is not tolerated is that it is a threat to the Chinese government. This paper will examine the movement, how the government is cracking down on it, and why the government is cracking down on it. Explanation of the Falun Gong According to Zhao (2003), the Falun Gong movement is an outgrowth of the Chinese practice of qi, which harmonizes physical and spiritual health. What this means is that the adherents to the movement attempt to align their qi, through stretching and meditation, and this balances the energy in the body. These exercises, which balance the energy in the body are accompanied in the Falun Gong religion with moral and spiritual commitments. This is contrast to the Western vision, which keeps religion and physical exercise separate. The religious aspect of Falun Gong encompasses Taoist and Buddhist beliefs. This was the basis for the movement, but it was developed by Li Hongzhi in the late 1980s, and it went public in 1992 (Penny, 2003). This is all not unusual, in that the ancient Chinese have always believed in balancing energies and in Buddhist and Taoist beliefs. However, the Falun Gong goes a step further, according to Zhao (2003), in that this religion also has supernatural beliefs. For instance, they believe that there are supernatural ways of curing diseases, that people can levitate, and that people can be clairvoyant through their “third eye.” Lu (2005) also states that Li believes that everybody has bad karma, either from their previous life or from the bad acts that they performed in this life. Therefore, everybody must pay for this bad karma. This karma manifests itself in illness and bad fortune (Fisher, 2003). Li believes that this karma disappears when one practices Falun Gong, according to Lu (2005). Zhao (2003) states that Falun Gong is popular, and that it is necessary, because China has been rapidly moving into the 21st Century, but the adherents of the Falun Gong movement have more of a slower-paced lifestyle. Moreover, as the society becomes increasingly isolated, Falun Gong has been helpful in that it has brought people together, as through the physical exercises performed by Falun Gong members. The physical exercise itself is also good for the Falun Gong followers, as the state-run healthcare has been collapsing since the early 1990s, which means that health care has become increasingly unaffordable to the masses. Keeping healthy is therefore a priority, and Falun Gong, with its emphasis on physical exercise and qi balancing meets this need. The movement became very popular, with millions practicing it, and Chan (2004), gives some reasons why this is. Chan (2004) regards the Falun Gong as coming under the rubric of a New Religious Movement (NRM), which is marked by obedience to a central figure who claims to have all the spiritual answers desired by the followers. The central figure is seen by the followers as being privy to sacred power. Chan (2004) thus begins his analysis with other NRMs, which have sprung up, all over the world, partially as a response to modernity’s spiritual vacuums and moral disturbances. The political and economic institutions have failed to solve the people’s problems, states Chan (2004), so the people turn to religious salvation for help. Chan (2004) then extrapolates this scenario to China. Specifically, Chan (2004) states that China was experiencing, at the time that the Falun Gong attained popularity, impressive economic growth that also led to unresolved social problems. This was because, although the country was becoming wealthier, the people were not. Unemployment was high, and the state industries were collapsing, which was causing more people to fall below the poverty line. Income inequality became more pronounced as well, while the welfare state was shrinking, so those in poverty were found with less of a government social safety net. Meanwhile, Chan (2004) states that there was even more disillusionment because Communism had fallen. At one time, Chan (2004) argues, the people were able to look with hope towards the Communist ideology. When that collapsed, more people turned to religion. The Falun Gong, with its emphases on non-material needs, and love towards the fellow man, thus became popular. How China Treats Organized Religion In General The treatment of Falun Gong should be contrasted with how the Chinese government treats religion, in general. According to Potter (2003), the Maoist period eschewed religion and actively attacked religion. In the post-Maoist period, however, this lessened, as the Chinese government started to tolerate religion much more than it did under Mao. That is, unless the religion threatened obedience to the state. Because, over anything else, the Chinese government demands fealty and loyalty to the state. Potter (2003) also states that the Chinese government officially recognized five religions – Daoism, Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam, as it did not encourage folk religions in general. It apparently did not recognize Judaism, either. That said, according to Potter (2003), the official party line was Atheism, and this was what the party stressed. It even went into schools to spread the message that there is not a higher power. This was because, as noted above, the party was only concerned that the people were loyal to it, and religious leaders had to adhere to the party’s ideals of socialism and ethnic unity. To this end, Potter (2003) states that the party attempts to steer religion towards its own values, and stated that all religions must find a way to fit in with society and to reflect the beliefs of the party system. Ownby (2003) states that it was not difficult for the popular religions in China, Buddhism and Daoism, to be subsumed by the state, as they were weak, institutionally, and have been for centuries. In particular, Buddhism was a powerful religion during the Han Dynasty (202 BCE-220 CE) and the Tang Dynasty (618-909) . Just like with the Catholic Church, the religion was land-rich, and was influential in that it wielded a great deal of power. It set the norms for the Chinese people during this age. However, this was changed during the Song Dynasty (960-1279), in that the Confucians who were popular during the Song Dynasty targeted the Buddhist religion for its wealth. Moreover, the state started instituting control over religions during this period, which weakened the Buddhist religion further. The Buddhist monasteries were stripped of their land, and, although the religion continued be popular amongst the people, it did not set the orthodoxy. The government set the orthodoxy instead, according to Ownby (2003). This analysis provides another possible explanation as to why the Chinese government treats Falun Gong differently from other religions. The state was generally tolerant to religions if they were willing to toe the party line, so to speak, and not make waves and threaten the leadership of the party. Religions who were not so willing to toe the party line and adapt to the socialistic society created by the Chinese government were not treated so tolerantly, explains Potter (2003). These religions are seen by the government as being dangerous, because they cause people to not live a normal life and to turn away from productive activities, according to the attitude of the state. Ownby (2003) concurs with this, stating that cults sprung up from time to time, and, if these cults got too big, they were suppressed by the government. The Falun Gong therefore just represented the latest example of this occurring. This is not to say that Falun Gong alone was singled out for prejudicial treatment. Potter (2003) states that the official party line was that any religion which posed a threat to party unity was destroyed by the state. This would include religions which were proselytized by people from other countries, as these kinds of missions from other countries were seen as spreading imperialism. When people from other countries attempted to go to China to spread their religion, it was seen as no different from a foreign country trying to interfere with the autonomy of the Chinese government. Potter (2003) contrasts the patterns of compliance that organized religion engages in, with the patterns of resistance that the Falun Gong movement displayed. For instance, the standard religions, the five religions recognized by the Chinese state, complied with the regulations put forth by the state. Many of them registered with the state, and these religions provided teachings that preached that the family should be strong, and this, in turn, made the adherents of these religions more likely to comply with the dictates of the state. On the other hand, the Falun Gong did not comply with the state. It did not register with the state, and, instead of complying with the state and not making waves, it conducted protests. Even more threatening to the state is the fact that the group, with their ability to use technology and grass roots to get attention, attracted attention to their cause throughout the world. Keith and Lin (2003) provide another explanation for why the group is treated differently from religious groups – the group itself sought to distinguish itself from other religious groups, and attempted to portray themselves as a political group. It does not have a temple, does not have formal rituals, and it does not collect fees from its followers. In 1999, it asked the government to not recognize it as a religious system, but, rather, as a state-organization system, independent from religion. That said, the United States apparently recognizes the group as being a religion, stating that the crackdown on the Falun Gong has had a detrimental effect on more established religions, as the crackdown has had a spillover effect on these other religions. The Anti-Falun Gong Campaign However China treats religious groups, in general, it is clear that it treats Falun Gong differently. While the country recognizes and tolerates other religious groups, including Christianity, Buddhism and Islam, it does not treat Falun Gong with this kind of respect. In fact, as of July of 1999, the religion has been banned in China (Penny, 2003). Edelman & Richardson (2003) state that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) ostensibly has given the people the freedom of association, speech and religion. However, the rule of law is subverted, just as Keith and Lin (2003) asserts, in the governmental crackdown of the Falun Gong. The rule of law supposedly means that the state is constrained by the rule of law, in that, if its actions run afoul of the constitution, the courts are supposed to step in and stop this from happening. However, in the case of the Falun Gong, the state is able to crack down on the group, and the courts have not been performing their checks upon this power. This means that the rule of law, at least in the case of the Falun Gong, is not in effect. One of the ways that the state has cracked down on the group is to monitor their Internet activities. As explained below, the group uses the Internet in a variety of ways that help them build collective action. The state has counteracted this, according to Bell and Boas (2003) by controlling the Internet infrastructure so that the people of China do not have access to the Falun Gong website. The site is blocked domestically, and internationally through firewalls. Those who try to circumvent the blockade are put under surveillance. Moreover, those who use the Internet for disseminating information are arrested. The government has also employed a number of people to go to chat rooms and delete messages about the group. Finally, the government has used the Internet for its own gain to disseminate propaganda about the group, portraying it as dangerous cult. When some protesters self-immolated, the government showed gruesome photographs of the burn victims in an attempt to discredit the group. The state has also used the media as a way to discredit the group. Zhao (2003) states that the Falun Gong movement initially was portrayed positively in media, at least it was prior to 1999. However, after 1999, the media increasingly waged a campaign against the movement. Ironically, it was the movement followers themselves which caused the media attack, according to Zhao (2003). This is because the media did run some negative stories about the movement, and each of these negative stories were met with counterattacks, which consisted of demonstrations by exercising in front of the media building, to threatening individual editors of papers running unflattering stories of the group. The group then resorted to censorship, demanding to the government that they censor any news organization who criticized them. In addition to this crackdown, the practitioners have also been subjected to a variety of indignities.Lu et al. (2002) describes the psychiatric abuse that Falun Gong practitioners have suffered in China. Among the abuses is the fact that mentally healthy practitioners have been forced into mental institutions against their will. Also, members of Falun Gong have been tortured and beaten, raped, and subjected to sleep deprivation. At least 320 members have died in police custody. The government has also demanded that the Falun Gong followers be brainwashed, and, to this end, there have been a number of facilities set up in China to accomplish this. Moreover, members of Falun Gong have been denied pensions, lost their apartments and jobs, and fired from universities. Lu (2002) states that the goal of these procedures is to make the practitioners renounced Falun Gong, and condemn the practice of Falun Gong. Lu (2002) states that the practitioners often end up in the mental hospital, having been diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder, or some other disorder. The practitioners are then forced to renounce the religion while they are in the mental hospital, and, if they do not, they are given medicine so powerful that they no longer function at all. This also is true if the practitioners continue to practice their physical exercises while they are hospitalized. They are also tortured, and they are not let out of the hospital until they have stopped performing their exercises, voluntarily, or they have verbally renounced the practice. Keith and Lin (2003) state that many of the practitioners were also sentenced to labor camps. Some the practitioners were given three years of re-education. Matas and Kilgour (2006) stated that there are even more gruesome practices afoot, as there were reports that the Chinese government has harvested the organs of live Falun Gong practitioners, killing them in the process. Why the Chinese Government Cracked Down on the Falun Gong Zhao (2003) states that one of the reasons why Falun Gong became unpopular, with regards to the Chinese government, is that it represented a link to the past, and eschewed modernity. On the other hand, the Chinese government, during the time that the movement became popular, in the early 1990s, was emphasizing modernization and wanted to take the country into the future. The government was interested in new technologies and wanted to encourage its citizens to embrace commercialism and material wealth. However, the adherents to the Falun Gong movement, according to Zhao (2003), were interested in finding life’s meaning outside of material rewards. Zhao (2003) also states that the values taught by the movement – benevolence, truthfulness and forbearance – offer a critique to the modern Chinese government ethos of corruption, materialism, greed, wealth and power. In other words, the movement is a critique of capitalism, and emphasizes moral norms which are incompatible with capitalism. Keith and Lin (2003) would concur in this analysis. They state that part of the reason why the Chinese government cracked down on the group is because it represented feudal superstition. This would imply that at least part of the reason why the Chinese government singled out the group for persecution is because the group represented a throwback to a time before modernity, and this would be a threat to the state that was trying to modernize. That the movement was so popular therefore posed an even greater threat, because a movement with millions of people, with the ethos of returning to the superstitions of the past, would prevent Chinese modernity from going forward. Palmer (2003) states that the movement was a way of reconciling traditional teaching with modernity, which further bolsters the notion that the religion was threatening to the government, who wanted to emphasize only modernity, in that it was attempting to bring back the past. Since the government was only focused upon the future, this emphasis on the past would naturally be discomfiting. Zhao (2003) further states that Falun Gong initially had the support of the government, which controlled what information was disseminated to the masses. Falun Gong creator Li was able to get several books published, despite the fact that the Chinese government was keeping an eye on both left and right factions. Falun Gong would be considered to be a left movement, as it was anti-capitalist. However, the relationship between the government and the movement soon soured, and one of the main reasons was that it was becoming too powerful. There were more Falun Gong believers than party members, which would mean that the anti-capitalists were outnumbering the capitalists (Zhao, 2003). Lu et al. (2002) states that, by one count, there were 70 million practitioners of Falun Gong, compared to 56 million for the party itself. Therefore, according to Lu et al., (2002), there had to be a crackdown on the movement, as this was such a large group, and it would be difficult for the government to control so many people. Moreover, there were Falun Gong members in the military, education and security establishments. However, Lu (2002) states that there was another reason why the Chinese government began to crack down on the movement, and this was that the leader of the party at the time, Jiang Zemin, wanted to make sure that the people in his party pledged allegiance to him. As there were high ranking members of the government who were a part of the Falun Gong movement, this undermined his power. He therefore had to consolidate his power, and one way to do this was by cracking down on the competing movement of Falun Gong. Keith and Lin (2003) concurs with this analysis, in part, stating that the Chinese government, in its current state, acts as a way of combatting enemies of the state, both real and imagined. They refer to this as state instrumentalism, and contend that the crackdown on the Falun Gong movement is a continuation of this state instrumentalism. This extends to the court system, which is not, according to Keith and Lin (2003), independent of the state. In this way, the rule of law is subverted to the will of the government, as the criminal courts are just another arm of the government’s will, and is used by the government to carry out the government’s means. Keith and Lin (2003) further used this analysis in the context of the Falun Gong movement, and why the movement itself is threatening to the government. According to them, the movement is seen as no different from other “legal” movements who are seen as independent from the state. Any kind of group which has the purpose of organizing around religion, politics, human rights, or protecting workers is seen as a threat to the state. Falun Gong would fit into the rubric of threatening groups in this analysis, which means that the state needs to “regulate” it, the same as if it was another group which has organizing ideas which run counter to the state’s ideas. Chang (2004) states that the Chinese government had good reason to be wary of collective action. This is because, at the time that the movement gained popularity in the early 1990s, the government had fresh memories of the pro-democracy students who organized a movement in 1989. This movement led to the Tianamen Square incident. Just as the student movement had threatened social stability, according to Chang (2004), the Chinese government was increasingly seeing that the Falun Gong potentially threatened the same sort of instability that the student movement posed. And, as noted above, the movement has the ability to amass collective action on a large scale, because of its technological savvy and because its followers are true believers. This makes the movement even more threatening, according to Chang (2004). Further, according to Keith and Lin (2003), Falun Gong is seen by the state as nothing but a heretical cult. These cults are problematic to the Chinese government, historically, as they were places where counter-revolutionary thought was birthed. To this end, the state prosecuted counter-revolutionary crimes, such as those found within heretical cults before Falun Gong. Therefore, according to Keith and Lin (2003), the state crackdown of the Falun Gong is a vestige of the days when the state would crack down on heretical cults by using the law as an arm of its persecution of these groups. That said, Keith and Lin (2003) state that, ostensibly, there has been Chinese reform in its legal system to where there is not supposed to be punishment or crime without law, and, since the Falun Gong has not been affirmatively established by independent legal circles as being a heretical cult, the crackdown on the group is seen as a problem by many. This is because there is not really a law against the Falun Gong if it is not really a heretical cult, so this is the question that needs to be answered. Chan (2004) partially concurs with this analysis. According to Chan (2004), the Chinese government has problems before with NRMs, which is what Chan considers the Falun Gong to be. The problems go back to the Han Dynasty, who fought the Yellow Turbans in the year 184. The White Lotus Sect, which is another NRM, according to Chan (2004), caused problems for the Chinese government periodically, beginning during the Yuan Dynasty, and flaring up again in the 19th Century. Another NRM, the Kingdom of Heavenly Peace, threatened the state during the Qing Dynasty, and led to 20 million deaths. Therefore, part of the reason why the Chinese government treats the movement so harshly, according to Chan (2004) is that the movement threatens to become as powerful as other NRMs which have threatened China throughout the years, therefore the state needs to crack down on it before it attains this level of power. Chan (2004)further states that China was in a period of spiritual decline, around the period that the Falun Gong exploded in popularity. Specifically, the leaders had failed the people, and the people were losing faith in the government. The people were beginning to see that the government was not an answer to their needs. The Falun Gong, however, was filling the vacuum left by the government and the Communist ideology. Therefore, the government was fearful that the movement would supplant their rule, and this was threatening to the government, so this led to the crackdown, according to Chan (2004). It did not help that the leader Li preached to his followers that they were to oppose the government, and that Li was said to harbor political ambitions. Lu (2005) provides another possible reason why the movement went afoul of the Chinese government. According to Lu (2005), the adherents began to see Li as a kind of god or supernatural being. This was partially because Li stated to his followers that he was a descendent of Buddha himself. He also claimed to be omniscient, in that he was supposedly able to see his followers even when he was not physically around his followers. He claimed to be superior to Buddha, as he was bringing Buddha law to the masses. He also promised to bring salvation to the masses. He finally claimed that he was the creator of the universe (Lu, 2005). Therefore, it was a threat to the Chinese government that a man would be considered to be the creator of the universe and is revered as a god. This would naturally undermine the leadership role of the government, in that these people are worshiping a man, and going to a man for all their answers, as opposed to find these answers in the government, as the Chinese government would no doubt prefer. Another reason why the government cracked down might be explained by the movement leaders themselves. As explained below, the Falun Gong, as a movement, attempted to engage in censorship in that it asked the Chinese government to intervene upon media outlets which criticized them. However, this backfired, and, in July 1999, the Chinese government outlawed the movement, according to Zhao (2003). At this point, Zhao (2003) explains that the movement went global, soliciting international concern for its persecution from the government, combining global technology with a grass-roots effort which means that there were local networks of people who had local leaders, and these groups stayed in touch with one another through various means. At any rate, the fact that the group was willing to take collective action in the form of protests was the major reason, according to Tong (2002), that the government cracked down on the movement. As Tong (2002) noted, the fact that the movement was large, as large as 80 million members, was not as threatening as the fact that the group was able to amass collective action to defend its interests. This includes a protest in which 10,000 members demonstrated in front of the party offices between the hours of 4 AM and 11 PM. Bell and Boas (2003) further states that the group uses the Internet in the proficient way, which makes it even more threatening to the Chinese government. The Internet has been used to disseminate Li’s teaching to the masses. The Internet has also been used as a way for the group to bring pressure against the Chinese government by using the power of the Internet to rally the international community to their cause, and against the government. The Internet has also been used among the Falun Gong members as a way to counter the governmental crackdowns on the group, as the group members have used the medium to warn one another of coming governmental interventions, and has also used the medium to rebut the propaganda put forth about their group. And, perhaps most threatening to the government, is that the group has the ability to use the Internet to organize mass protests, such as the 10,000 practitioners who protested in front of Zhongnanhai in April of 1999. Burgdoff (2003) provides more anecdotal evidence that the movement has used the Internet to its advantage. Burgdoff (2003) became a practitioner of the religion in the United States. He states that the diaspora that he met, who were from China, were interested in spreading the word throughout the United States what was happening to the group. In doing so, they were seeking international censure on what China is doing to them. This further shows the power of the Internet in spreading the group’s word, which makes them even more dangerous to the Chinese government. Conclusion The practice of Falun Gong seems to be a harmless practice, and very beneficial to the practitioners. The practice combines physical exercise with a spiritual ethos that emphasizes love and tolerance. Moreover, the practice combines traditional Chinese teachings into its fold. What could go wrong? Apparently a lot can go wrong. There are a multitude of reasons why the Chinese government has cracked down on the practice of Falun Gong, and the crackdown has been both swift and brutal. The government has outlawed the practice, and censored websites that carry news about the practice. Anybody caught trying to disseminate information about the religion, or about the state’s crackdown of the religion, is subjected to arrest and incarceration. Individuals are sent to mental hospitals, and not allowed to come out of the mental hospitals until they renounce the Falun Gong. People oversea know about the governmental crackdown, and they have sought to publicize what is happening, in an effort to rally the international community. The reasons why the government is so threatened by the Falun Gong are multitudinous, but they all have to do with the fact that the government feels threatened by them. The government has good reason to feel threatened, since the group has shown that it has the ability to act collectively, which has culminated in mass protests. The Chinese government has been down this road before with other religious groups who have caused problems, and these other religious groups have caused entire wars. Not wanting to go down this road again, the Chinese government has opted to try to nip the Falun Gong movement in the bud. The Chinese government also has shown that it can be tolerant of religions, and this is apparently because most religions do not have much power in Chinese society. Buddhism probably is the most popular religion in China, but this religion has long ago lost its vestiges of power, in that it does not shape social doctrine. The government does this. Buddhism thus is a weak religion. Other religions in China are also tolerated, including Christianity, Daoism and Islam. None of these religions cause problems, however, as they, by and large, toe the party line. They register with the state and they do not make waves. However, the Falun Gong has seemingly been unable to become a quiet part of the party, as other religions have. Indeed, before the crackdown and before the state made the practice of Falun Gong illegal, the group has shown that it is willing to use collective action to protests any kind of negative information about it. This showed the Chinese government that this religion, in particular, was one that was not going to silently tolerate being ruled by the government. Moreover, the movement had grown tremendously in just a few years. The sheer number of these members became a threat to the government, who knows that large groups are difficult to control. Perhaps if the Falun Gong did not have views which were antithetical to the party, it could have peacefully coexisted with the party. However, the Falun Gong was preaching views which were in contrast to modernity and capitalism, and the Chinese government was anxious to move the country forward into the 21st Century. It simply would not do to have a powerful group disseminating views which are in contrast with the capitalistic and materialistic ethos that the party was trying to impose. Specifically, the Falun Gong was preaching a way of life that eschewed materialism in favor of living traditionally. It also used elements of ancient Chinese wisdom which was seen as superstition by the party. In the end, the main problem with the Falun Gong was that it became too big and powerful in too short a period of time. This scared the party elite, in that they want to have total control and power. A group as large as the Falun Gong would be hard to control and would be a threat to the party’s power. Therefore, it had to be dealt with in the only way that the totalitarian government knew how - to make it illegal and to put its practitioners in prisons and mental hospitals. Sources Used Bell, Mark & Taylor Boas. “Falun Gong and the Internet: Evangelism, Community and the Struggle for Survival.” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 6.2 (2003): 277-293. Web. 22 Oct. 2012. Burgdoff, Craig. “How Falun Gong Practice Undermines Li Hongzhi’s Totalistic Rhetoric.” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 6.2 (2003): 332-347. Web. 21 Oct. 2012. 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Web. 24 Oct. 2012. Matas, David & David Kilgour. “Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China.” Web. 23 Oct. 2012. Ownby, David. “A History of Falun Gong: Popular Religion and the Chinese State Since the Ming Dynasty.” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 6.2 (2003): 223-243. Web. 20 Oct. 2012. Palmer, David. “Modernity and Millenialism in China: Qigong and the Birth of Falun Gong.” Asian Anthropology 2 (2003): 79-109. Web. 21 Oct. 2012. Penny, Benjamin. “The Life and Times of Li Hongzhi: ‘Falun Gong’ and Religious Biography.” The China Quarterly 175 (2003): 643-661. Web. 23 Oct. 2012. Potter, Pitman. “Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China.” The China Quarterly 174 (2003): 317-337. Web. 10 Oct. 2012. Tong, James. “An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing.” The China Quarterly 171 (2002): 636-660. Web. 25 Oct. 2012. 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