Questions and Problems Related to the Study of Consciousness - Essay Example

Neurotheology in Review: Consciousness Introduction In her introduction to the 1983 McMaster-Bauer Symposium on Consciousness summary document, editor Sandra Witelson (1986) quotes the following comment from Joyce Carol Oates (1985) on consciousness: “…Something not us inhabits us, something insists on speaking through us…[the]…conjunction of inner and outer forces we try in vain to understand and must hope in the end only to embody.” If Oates’ assessment is correct, then attempts to study consciousness must be futile and one might just as well spend the afternoon basking in the sun and simply being (consciously, of course). Yet it is hard to accept that so many—some reputedly great—minds have ruminated on the subject “in vain.” Does the study of consciousness present a fundamental evolutionary challenge for the human race? Is the task of unraveling the mystery of consciousness the final obstacle to definitive understanding of the meaning of life? Or is it merely a waste of time? This essay attempts to review key developments in the study of consciousness, understand past and current theories and identify directions of further investigations and projects. A Brief History of the Study of Consciousness According to Jaynes (1986), record of conscious reflection first emerged around 600 B.C. with Solon, the Greek philosopher who coined the maxim: “Know thyself,” (also attributed to the Oracle of Delphi). Prior to that, Jaynes postulates that human populations, whose consciousness developed concomitantly with the evolution of language, typically showed evidence of what he calls the bicameral mind. Jaynes’s theory will be discussed in greater detail later, but it presents a tantalizing theoretical starting point for the history of the study of consciousness. Was consciousness never studied before around 1000 B.C. because it did not exist in its present form until then? Witelson (1986) cites Howard Jones (1974) who “suggests that the Greek word phronesis representing inwardly conscious awareness was coined by the Greek philosopher Heraclitus in the 6th century B.C.” Similar developments in China have been studied by Michael Carr (Carr 1983, cited in Jaynes 1986) in a collection of ancient texts, the Shijing, where the internalization of certain words leads to the concept of mind or consciousness. In the late seventeenth century, John Locke initiated the modern debate on consciousness, postulating in accordance with the principles of empiricism, that the mind is comparable to a blank page, a space with free floating ideas, and copies of experiences (Jaynes 1986). Locke introduced the idea of personal identity with consciousness, “the perception of what passes in a Man’s own mind”, as a criterion, and opened the way for the first series of exchanges between scholars on consciousness between 1695 and 1740 (Fox cited by Holt 1999). The first published work on the subject appeared in 1728 with Charles Mayne’s Essays on Consciousness. Ever a controversial topic, the issue of consciousness raised by Locke inspired a huge outcry. Evidence of this is found in works of Samuel Clarke, James Stillingfleet, Joseph Butler, George Berkeley, Alexander Pope and Thomas Reid, who in 1785 maintained that consciousness is “flowing…like the waters of a river”, “transient and momentary, and has no continued existence” (cited by Holt 1999, p. 190). Descartes believed in the existence of res cogitans that supports consciousness and gives it unity, and Locke’s critics sought to ground what they considered the fleeting matter of consciousness in the Aristotelian concept of the substantial self. But by 1740 David Hume asserted that most philosophers accepted that personal identity arises from consciousness (cited in Holt 1999). By proposing the theory of natural selection as basis of evolution in1859, Darwin introduced a new dimension, posing the question of consciousness and its origin in terms of evolution beyond the previous mind-body problem. Huxley expounded his theory of the helpless spectator in1896, suggesting that consciousness although present, had no influence (Jaynes 1986) while Bucke (1925) suggested the concept of Cosmic Consciousness; consciousness, a human potential which when evolved permits us to grasp the meaning of human existence in relation to the cosmos (Cowley, 2001). Lloyd Morgan’s 1923 exposition on emergent evolution, to which Jaynes (1986) refers as a “bandage for ignorance”, presented the view that consciousness emerges from cortical tissue and is not derived from anything that existed before, just as water is wet whereas hydrogen and oxygen molecules are not. However, the process of this presumed emergence is not explained. Whitehead, in1925, applying the analogy of neo-realism, argued that interacting matter can be reduced to mathematical relationships; therefore consciousness originates in matter itself. And Jerison defined consciousness in 1973in Evolution of the Brain and Intelligence as the “highest level of abstraction”, but approaches to consciousness remained vague (Jayne 1986) and unsatisfying. However, if, as Holt (1999) suggests, “the ontological fact of consciousness is not going to be illuminated by history or literature, since these enterprises presuppose the ontology of consciousness” it may be worthwhile to examine current theories on consciousness more closely. Theoretical Proposals and Paradigms The attempt by post-modernist philosopher Richard Rorty to eliminate consciousness, dubbing it a linguistic illusion, and the ensuing debate among contemporary authors about whether or not to “take consciousness seriously” as a sphere of subjective reality is mentioned by Yelina (2004) (Yelina Review). Daniel Dennett’s rejection of the idea that consciousness is “real” can be presented in the context of contemporary philosophical community and his relationship to Thomas Nagel, John Searle, Richard Rorty and Karl Popper, as well as Dennett’s critics David Chalmers and Paul Churchland (Yelina Review). The basic themes of Dennett’s controversial theory are: 1) the heterophenomenological method, whereby the subject’s behavior is constructed as a third person text, 2) a multiple drafts model suggesting the illusory nature of the single Ego as Cartesian theater and an image of consciousness alternative to that illusion 3) the theory of evolution and its products, intentional systems and 4) the teaching on freedom inherent in such systems. Dennett claims intentionality is more fundamental than consciousness and his theory is built on that foundation (Yelina Review). Consciousness is comparable to a software program and the brain the computer (Dennett 1986). The programmer is natural selection. The role of consciousness is to facilitate adaptation. Darwin, Skinner, Popper, and Gregory beings, coined by Dennett, evolve. Humans belong to the latter type, with foresight based on experiences of previous generations. Dennett also sees human consciousness as a cultural phenomenon. Memes, after biologist philosopher Richard Dawkins, are the clusters of genes that are selected. Competition occurs between programs in the brain, and the winners control the organism and its behavior, including the verbal (Yelina Review). No less debatable are the four ideas summarized by comparative psychobiologist Julian Jaynes in his Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, and subsequent development of those hypotheses. Jaynes defines clearly what consciousness is not, arguing that consciousness is neither all of mentality, nor a copy of experience, nor a prerequisite for learning, thinking and reasoning, suggesting that mind space is functional without a specific location (Jaynes 1986). Jaynes cites evidence for the concurrent development of language and consciousness and identifies the change from the bicameral mind comprised of a decider and a follower—neither conscious—to consciousness as we know it beginning around 1400-600 B.C. Jaynes attributes the development of the bicameral mind to changes associated with the emergence of large, agriculturally based towns where rigid, hierarchical structures supplanted more egalitarian hunter-gatherer units of previous eras. People were controlled by the voices of gods, chiefs or other external authorities via verbal hallucinations that involved neither introspection nor consciousness (Jaynes 1986). Overpopulation and migration eventually contributed to the breakdown of the bicameral mind, and consciousness evolved as evidenced in marked changes in the recorded texts of the period. Jaynes hypothesizes a neurological model for the bicameral mind involving the right hemispheral Wernicke’s area, where he proposes that admonitory information (the contents of the voices of gods) was stored to be coded into human language and transferred via the anterior commissure. Interestingly enough, Dennett (1986) rebuts Ned Block’s use-mention criticism of Jaynes which points out that a phenomenon and the concept used to name it are not the same, and applies the metaphor “a software of mind” with replaceable modules to Jaynes’ model. Neurologist Jonathon Miller (1986), on the other hand, objects to the Jaynes model, particularly the in his view erroneous impression that mental structures have somehow undergone significant change over the period mentioned and the idea that hallucination might form “ a representative basis for any stage of human culture” (Miller, 1986). Instead, Miller proposes that the development of writing and political and economic changes were key factors leading to the transformation of human consciousness. From an entirely different perspective, Waldron (2005; cited by Siderits, 2005) examines the complexities of teachings on the Buddhist Unconscious and seems to endorse the claim that “accounting for mental and karmic continuities requires simultaneous reciprocal causation among consciousnesses and mental concomitants”. And Ken Wilber, described by Young (2002) as one of the most important theorists on the subject of consciousness, posits two fundamental approaches to spirituality (translative and transformative) and differentiates between symbolic (based on cognitive manipulation of symbols) and intimate knowledge (direct, non-dual). These different forms of knowledge characterize the six levels of Wilber’s proposed Spectrum of Consciousness (Young 2002), each of which corresponds to a stage of development ranging from egocentric to an expanded sense of non-dual identity. Wilber’s spectrum encompasses the introduction at each level of new dimensions of existence, modes of learning, desires, fears, perceptions, modes of time and space, motivations and moral sensibilities (Young 2002). Objecting to what she interprets as an anti-Christian trend of current research, theologist Kirsten Birkett (2006) argues convincingly in support of abandoning religious biases in the study of consciousness. Birkett summarizes the work of philosopher David Chalmers who favors a non-reductionist approach to the study of consciousness, and mathematical physicist Sir Roger Penrose who argues that the known laws of physics are inadequate to explain human consciousness and critiques the Dennett theory, before iterating views of philosopher professors Mary Midgely (1998) and Nancy Cartwright, who question the relevance of any physical analysis of consciousness. Birkett (2006), describes such theories or explanations that exist as “more heuristics for proceeding with the study of consciousness” none of which, she claims, satisfactorily explains consciousness. Further research is necessary and as a next step, one might consider some of the methodologies, instruments and objectives and how they are addressed. Methodologies, Instruments, Tools and Objectives Neurobiologists and behaviorists have studied animal models in an attempt to draw conclusions about the evolution of consciousness. Indeed, Julian Jaynes originally began in that direction before evolving towards the investigation of human consciousness based on historical and archaeological evidence (Jaynes 1986). One of his projects in later years was the study of the development of consciousness in children as it coincided with language development. But research on forms of animal self-consciousness still offers valuable material of moral theological and scientific relevance (Peterson, 2003). To tackle what David Chalmers has called “the hard problem of consciousness” requires a subjective awareness of “what it is like to be” that thing (Chalmers 1997, Nagel 1974 cited by Peterson, 2003). Exploring neurological and anatomical indications of conscious experience, Ojemann postulates a connection between the thalamocortical reticular activating system and consciousness (Ojemann, 1986). Intra-operative neurosurgical findings, electrocorticogram investigations and study of the effects of brain pathology result in important insights. For example, a correlation has been found between temporal lobe epilepsy and increased religiosity (Ojemann 1986 citing Bear and Fedio 1977) and the speculation that the hallucinations of Joan of Arc may have been due to temporal lobe epilepsy secondary to cerebral tuberculoma holds fascinating implications for the impact of neurological changes on the course of history (Ojemann, 1986). In contrast, Harold Fromm (2006) marvels at the remarkable architecture and function of neuronal networks and the brain, but remains skeptical about whether consciousness is solely the result of the firing of neural impulses and electrochemical messages. Ultimately he professes quite simply that he does not know the answer to the question of consciousness and implies that he strongly suspects he (we?) never will (Fromm, 2006). Nonetheless, others continue to investigate consciousness, alternately postulating the applicability of physics to the consciousness debate, qualifying or refuting such an idea (Winkler 2006; Chalmers; Penrose cited in Birkett 2006; Stenger 1993). Winkler (2006), for example, reasons that “As long as we understand that structural and functional descriptions can never be complete, we can cautiously use them to reason about the level and states of consciousness attached to some investigated system or entity.” The proposed concept of “Psychophysical law” goes beyond the incompatibility of the assumptions of the fundamental existence of the object and of the self (AFEO and AFES) and elaborates on the principles of a “spacetime holism” approach to the world of matter (Winkler 2006). But whereas Chalmers (1996) praises the theoretical virtue of quantum mechanics and the Schrödinger equation in The Conscious Mind, critics advise that “any interpretation of quantum mechanics motivated by the… [peculiar epistemic security of]…mental deserves to be viewed with suspicion” (Byrne & Hall, 1999). Physics professor Victor Stenger (1993) even goes so far as to scoff at the “myth of quantum consciousness” and the “aether from which it is composed”. The lively debate is not limited to the realms of physics. Several scholars emphasize the importance of language as a tool for approaching a better understanding of consciousness, including Havelock (1963), Ong (1982), Jaynes (1986), Abram (1996) and Wilber (1995) all cited by Poletti (2002). In discussing diverse opinions on unconscious, Levy (2003) points out that the meaning of human utterances is derived from social agreements and connected to the individual’s past. Although Wittgenstein’s position on language does not quite manage to completely “demystify consciousness”, it does remind us of the public standard or criteria of correctness for meaningful words without denying the qualitative character of experience, as Mason (2005) points out. Dennett, on the other hand, is accused of “quining the qualia” with the eliminativism that distinguishes his theory from Wittgenstein’s psychological philosophy (Mason 2005). Further grounds for resisting eliminativism are provided by Braddock (2002) who rejects the premise that higher level entities can be reduced to lower level entities. Braddock (2002) subscribes to a realist attitude and the idea that there is a subjective character of experience, content to leave open the questions of the nature of subjective experience and its physical implementation (if any). The burden of proof, he claims, lies with the reductionists. From a historical perspective, Holt (1999) asks why, if consciousness is a text, the philosophy of mind should learn predominantly from cognitive psychology and suggests the debate can be enriched by broadening the scope to include literary and historical supplements. It seems the idea of some form of integration may be a logical next step in the study of consciousness. Projects In a March 2008 Essay on Human Dignity and Bioethics, Daniel Dennett explores the very real threat that science poses to the belief environment (the “manifold of ambient attitudes, presumptions, and common expectations” generally “taken for granted” by everyone). Comparing this to the effects that global warming holds for the physical environment, Dennett addresses the possibility of gradual degradation of the belief environment leading to “taboo trade-offs” and perhaps ultimately the acceptance of the non-sanctity of life. He points out that law and tradition can help to preserve respect for human dignity by prohibiting (law), and encouraging or discouraging (tradition) unwanted attitudes and behaviors (Dennett 2008). Interestingly enough, when Jaynes (1986) raised the issue of ethics and morality which emerged in Greece around the 5th century B.C., he also mentioned Antiphon’s conclusion that it is reasonable to obey guidelines or rules “only when disobedience is likely to be discovered”. One cannot therefore expect that science will regulate itself and Dennett’s suggestion of using an open forum to exress values that “deserve to be preserved” offers a feasible alternative to fearful speculation about what science might do to human dignity. A major new work on Jaynes’s bicameral mind theory, Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes’s Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited, edited by Marcel Kuijesten with a foreword by Dr. Micheal A. Persinger, who recommends it as an essential text for any student of human experience, is available from the website Julian Jaynes Society which was established in 1997. David Chalmers (2008) reports in his weblog, Fragments of Consciousness, on a recent conference he helped to organize in Tucson dealing with topics like consciousness vs. attention, brain imaging as mind-reading, local vs. global neural correlates of consciousness and many more. He recommends Andy Clarke’s book Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension appearing later this year with a foreword written by Chalmers and offers an extensive bibliography and free online papers on the topic of consciousness. Applications of his spectrum of consciousness theory have been tried in psychotherapy (Cowley, 2001) and in a business model focusing on CEOs (Young, 2002), and Ken Wilber’s current emphasis lies in the direction of an integral theory of consciousness based on results of an extensive cross-cultural literature search on the mind (Wilber, 2000). Conclusion And the beat goes on; the rhythm of some distant shamanic drum inspires an endless dance around the unwavering campfire of consciousness. Like moths to a flame we find ourselves drawn to the subject, some get their wings singed, while others maintain a safe distance to avoid falling into the fire. Will we ever solve the questions and problems related to the study of consciousness? Or will we evolve to a higher level where the concept of the problem itself dissolves in one big, bubbling pot of non-dual stew? Who knows? In any event, consciousness remains, at least for the moment, a fascinating field with much room for development. And that development may be toward an ever deeper, more comprehensive integration of the diverse fragments of consciousness into one all-encompassing whole. -END- References Birkett, K. 2006. Conscious Objections: God and the Consciousness Debates. Zygon 41 (2) 249-266. Braddock, G., 2002. Eliminiativism and Indeterminate Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1), pp. 37-54. Byrne, A., Hall, N., 1999. Chalmers on Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics. Philosophy of Science, 66, pp. 379-390. Chalmers, D., 2008. Fragments of Consciousness. Weblog Online Available at Accessed on May 9, 2008. Cowley, A-D., S., 2001. Cosmic Consciousness: Path or Pathology. Social Thought. 20 (1/2), pp. 77-94. Day, M., 2006. Review Essay: Thermostats, Equators and Religion. Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, 18: 189-195. Dennett, D., 1986. Julian Jaynes’s Software Archaeology in McMaster-Bauer Symposium on Consciousness. Canadian Psychology 27 (2), pp. 149-154. Dennett, D. C., 2008. 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