Piaget's Contributions to Psychology - Essay Example

Running Head Piaget's Contributions to Psychology Piaget's Contributions to Psychology Jean Piaget, a Swiss psychologist, made a great contribution to understanding of human development, psychology of a child and cognitive processes. His ideas are widely used by modern researchers and scientists, practical psychologists and sociologies. As he emphasised many times, Piaget was an epistemologist, interested in the nature of human knowledge, and how it changes over time (as in, particularly, the history of scientific knowledge). any Piagetian words are borrowed from other fields of science, and many do not have a meaning specific to psychology alone. Sometimes both aspects prevail in his choice of a particular term. This does not imply that his reasons are superficial ones or only the function of a very eclectic mind. His justifications are clearly related to his concern for understanding the nature of knowledge in a broad sense. The theory of cognitive development built by Jean Piaget over a period of several decades stands as a powerful exemplification of a constructivist approach, and remains the most detailed theory of cognitive development. By this he meant, as had all the philospher-psychologists before, necessary knowledge—knowledge that appears to be “independent of time”, yet conceived by cognitive operations “that are subject to evolution and constituted in time” (Piaget 1959, p.23, quoted Elkind 1976, p. 45). Piaget argued that this could best be understood by studying the development of knowledge in children (he was thus only secondarily a developmental psychologist). The theory stands as a bold alternative to empiricism, and, to a large extent, nativism as accounts of the origins of reliable knowledge. The four stages of cognitive development are “sensorimotor (birth to about age 2), preoperational: (begins about the time the child starts to talk to about age 7), concrete (about first grade to early adolescence) and formal operations (adolescence)” (Langer and Killen 1998, p. 54). According to Piaget, the properties of stages depend on the internalization of coordinations revealed in the world by action upon it. According to Piaget, the actions of the subject on the object reveal simple coordinations. First, the length and the thickness are not independent dimensions. There is a necessary connection between them—as one changes so does the other; that is, they vary together, or covary. But this coordination is itself only part of a wider system of coordinations of which even a simple action like this consists—coordinations between the visual appearance and the motion of the ball, for example, and between these and the sense-receptors in muscles and joints (Opper et al 1987). Most uniquely among theorists o cognitive development, Piaget attempted to describe a detailed developmental process. In addition, it so often happens that secondary accounts of Piaget’s theory offer a description of the “symptoms” of the stages, without seriously considering the mechanism of development and the dynamics underlying the symptoms (Scholnick et al 1999). According to Piaget, the child with sensorimotor intelligence can do things with objects, and the concrete operational child can think about doing those things. But the latter cannot think about propositions and relations detached from particular objects and events. This ability requires another period o development. In the period from 7 years or so, up to adolescence, operatory structures develop from coordinations involving only concrete objects and events to include more general coordinations. In Piaget’s theory, this “liberation of thought from content” involves further “coordinations of coordinations” (Opper et al 1987, p. 45). The most significant of these is a combination of the two most distinct groupings of concrete operations, namely reversibility by inversion and reversibility by reciprocity. These now become combined into a single powerful system (not a mere juxtaposition, but an “operatory fusion”), allowing “operations on operations” or propositional operations which can include inversions and reciprocities together. Again, this occurs through the mechanisms of disturbance and re-equilibration (Scholnick et al 1999). Operativity concerns the former only and thus is appropriately applied to a very small portion of what we know and believe. Critics admit that it does not make much sense to speak of a single Piagetian structura theory, as there are many Piagetian theories of development in various subject matter domains, some with operativity structures as in logic and mathematics, and some without, such as in the morality, perception, creativity, and information-acquisition domains. Piaget made a great contribution to developmental psychology describing the relationships between thought and cognition. Our knowledge of the cognition of the physical or nonsocial concepts can not advance much by the interpretation of them as operativity domains. This is one reason why the implications of Piagetian theory of logical development for curriculum content are so meager. Piaget writes in “The Child's Conception of Physical Causality”, "can give the child the idea of necessity" (cited Scholnick et al 1999, p. 56). It is a major issue in developmental psychology and epistemology to assess the status of our concept that some events are necessary and some aren't. Operativity concerns the former only and thus is appropriately applied to a very small portion of what we know and believe (Opper et al 1987; Piaget, 1977). The moral reasoning is the basis for ethical behavior based on cognitive stages. A similar progression is observed, according to Piaget, in moral behavior, from justification of actions in terms of rules or laws to a more rational justification in terms of mutuality and intentions, rather than blind obedience. This reflects, according to Piaget, the development of a functional unity binding cognitive, social, emotional, and moral behavior. The concrete operational structures furnish the beginnings of “logical” thought. It is, therefore important to consider how Piaget attempted to accommodate his theory within this broader scope of verifiability of knowledge that is called “logic” (Opper et al 1987). According to Piaget, the moral judgment is based on a two-stage model. He divides children into two groups: children before 10 or 11 years and older children. For the first group of children, the moral rules are absolute and unchangeable. The older children understand that it is possible to change rules because they are not sacred or absolute. Piaget’s contribution to the study of intelligence and logic has been to escape the philosophic traps of subjectivity and objectivity. The former makes knowledge a selfsatisfying concoction where, for the sake of consistency, the subject creates concepts of objects and reality. This position tends toward error through failure to come to grips with the facts of reality. It puts the subject in control of deciding what reality is and, in the extreme, allows distortion for the sake of maintaining the subject's version of how things ought to be. Objectivity errs at the other end and, in its extreme, denies self-initiated definition, making the subject only a valid recorder of reality. Distortion can occur either through exposure to odd circumstances or through breakdowns in the subject's recording devices (Elkind 1976). This is why, for example, Piaget argues that space, number, and the like, remain open to redefinition throughout development. Numbers are not things to be grasped but are products from relations abstracted from subject-object interactions. True relations become expressed through numbering operations, which coordinate actions of the subject as well as reactions of objects. Piaget used different models of logic at different times to serve different purposes. But he supposes that logic is the most significant outcome of cognitive development (Elkind 1976). In “The Child's Concept of Physical Causality” and “Judgment and Reasoning in the Child”, Piaget states that logical structures have their roots in the child's need to verify and prove his or her opinions when confronted with the contrary opinions of others. Logical proof and deduction is the outcome of arguments in the social domain, as it were The necessity of law is initially, according to Piaget, entirely moral (Langer and Killen, 1998). The first events that must be the way they are and could not conceivably be otherwise are moral events. Regardless of its ontological status, necessity exists in the social cognition of the moral domain and indeed it may be the critical attribute that distinguishes the moral from the conventional. Insofar as appreciation of necessity is the defining feature of operational thought, operational structures and schemes may not be completely irrelevant to social cognition (Langer and Killen, 1998). Piaget never studied educational science but wrote several articles on this field and explained cognitive processes in educational environment. The main areas of investigation are teaching systems and training of educational staff, methods of education and development of learners. Piaget “thoroughly revolutionized the discipline, explained the existence of stages of development, each of which is characterized by precisely structured, mathematically modelizable properties” (Ducret 2001). The source of the idea of necessity cannot be the physical environment in Piaget’s view, which leaves for him the possibility that the source is social interaction. It is now possible to outline the meaning of relations in the social domain where knowledge is based on interactions between the child and other persons. The following sketch highlights the general points of the theory. (a) Children enter the world as actors, seeking order and regularity. This search describes their inherent motivation for knowledge. (b) Children look for order first in their own actions by attempting to find that which is repeatable. Piaget tries to explain social relations and the impact of cognitive processes on social interaction. Insofar as actions make contact with other things, or persons, effects of actions are not solely under the control of the child. These things react in reciprocity to the actions exerted upon them and together the action and reaction produce effects that differ from those that would result from either alone. Because other agents act in reciprocity to children's actions, children are forced to seek explanations for change and order in the interplay between actors. The foregoing points can be summarized as follows: (1) suppose the child intends that an action have a particular outcome or effect. (2) the child then executes the act in accordance with this intention. (3) suppose also that the act engages another person who adds to the original act with a reaction. The coupling of these actions may have an effect that is different from the child's intention or anticipation in performing the original act (Fowler 1998; Opper et al 1987). It would be futile to seek order either in the child's or the other person's parts, alone. This is why for Piaget, the child is led to seek a solution in the coupling and arrives at the conclusion that the actions of persons are reciprocally related. Thereafter, the child's search for order turns to identifying the forms of reciprocal relations that occur in interpersonal interactions. Piaget suggests that there are two such forms (Opper et al 1987). One is a direct and symmetrical reciprocity where one's action is free to match or counter the other's action. The second is a reciprocity of complement where one's action must conform to the dictates set down by the other's action. These two forms describe the basic relations in which people order themselves as actors with respect to other persons, who are also actors. For Piaget, development proceeds as these relations are structured and restructured. They give rise to social and moral conceptions that pertain to the self, other persons, possible relations among persons, and principles of societal functioning, both practical as well as ideal. For Piaget, the composition of self is social in its establishment (Opper et al 1987). The self constructs and is constructed through relations with others. Sociality is the starting point and individuation is a later product, which comes from membership that has been experienced in relations. Thus, the idea that social interactions involve a problematic encounter between two selves, each trying to penetrate the other's private state of mind, simply does not fit the Piagetian epistemology (Elkind 1976). In sum, he problem of normalization and standardization of principles or areas of cognitive functioning involves a number of issues. Numerous studies have determined at which age a majority of children achieve the understanding of a principle. Such experimental attempts entail the delimitation of an experimental population whose background and features are carefully noted as well as a counterbalanced experimental design. Piaget cannot generally be credited for providing these data and we cannot build any form of strong, statistical standardization. References 1. Ducret, J-J. (2001). Constructivism and Education Constructivism. Retrieved 12 October 2007 from http://www.ibe.unesco.org/publications/Prospects/ProspectsOpenFiles/pr118of.htm 2. Elkind, D. (1976). Child Development and Education: A Piagetian Perspective. Oxford University Press, USA. 3. Fowler, R.C. (1998). Limiting the Domain account of Early Moral Judgment by Challenging Its Critique of Piaget. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 44 (3), 263 4. Langer, J., Killen, M. (1998). Piaget, Evolution, and Development. Lawrence Erlbaum; 1 edition. 5. Opper, S., Ginsburg, H.P., Brandt, S.O. (1987). Piaget's Theory of Intellectual Development. Prentice Hall; 3 edition. 6. Piaget, J. (1977). The Development of Thought, Equilibration of Cognitive Structures. New York: The Viking Press. 7. Scholnick, E.K., Nelson, K., Gelman, S.A., Miller, P.H. (1999). Conceptual Development : Piaget's Legacy. Lawrence Erlbaum; 1 edition. Read More