Korematsu versus the US in 1944 - Case Study Example

Korematsu vs. US (323 U.S. 214 (1944))

The United States’ jurisdiction system in the recent past has faced critical controversies regarding its jurisprudence on fundamental human rights. The victimization arena has for long suffered conflicting loyalty in the pursuit of legal impartiality thereby creating room for biased legal precedents a critical judicial flaw for future litigations. Drawing from as early as the Roosevelt government in the 1940s, the American government has gained perception as a domicile of racial discrimination, especially against the non-European Americans.

Prior to the Pearl Harbor attack on the 7th December 1941, the US's involvement in the European war was only through the supply of war munitions. The attack, however, instigated its direct involvement in the war thereby leading to the executive order of relocating Japanese Americans. An action that the government explained was to safeguard the American-Japanese from the harm of the Americans who possessed anti-Japanese attitudes. Within weeks Americans of Japanese descent regardless of their citizenship status had evacuated their homes and work. The action generated a social-cultural and Economic crunch among the relocated Japanese two-thirds of which were American citizens (National Archive p.2).

In due course, the internment sparked an episode of political and constitutional challenges. Three Japanese-American; Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Endo stood against this perceived racial biased constitutionality. The two men Korematsu and Hirabayashi received negative court results but the lady (Mitsuye Endo) was unconditionally released. Despite the perceived claim of legal misconduct by the government, the Supreme Court commended this internment as an act of military necessity. None the less, Reagan-Bush's congress in 1988 acknowledged the prejudice in this internment and apologized with a $20,000 token for each person that suffered and was confined by this approach (National Archive p.9).

Korematsu vs. U.S. to date stands among the most debated and controversial lawsuit in the country's constitutional jurisprudence that challenged the government’s constitutionality perhaps the epitome origin of its depiction as the American constitutional law’s “anti-canon" (Kende p.203). The case followed the then President’s 9066 Executive order signed two weeks after the inception of the second world war. It particularly demanded the transfer of about 120,000 Americans of the Japanese descent into detention camps despite their citizenship status. The so-called military arear as designated by the order became an off limit for the Japanese Americans and the Japanese aliens.

23-year-old Fred Korematsu of the Japanese descent went contrary to this order on the pretext of taking charge of his job. He replicated himself as Clyde Sarah and undertook plastic surgery claiming to be of Hawaiian and Spanish descent. The Japanese 1942 attack on Pearl Harbor led to his arrest for failing to relocate to the detention camp. He was represented by the American Civil Liberties in the San Francisco federal court where he was convicted of violating the 9066 president's executive order and was given a five-year probation in San Bruno CA an Assembly Centre.

The Federal court's decision was appealed to the US Court of appeal which held the same ruling as the trial court. With less satisfaction at this stage, the US's Supreme Court was designated to give its hearing which brought more negativity following a 6-3 assertion that relocation of the Japanese Americans was a military necessity, not a racial encounter. The pro bono legal team in 1983 re-opened the then 40-year-old Korematsu's case in the same courthouse in which he was earlier on convicted on the pretext that the government exhibited misconduct in the case. Based on the shreds of evidence presented, the federal judge overturned Korematsu’s conviction thereby exonerating him of the crimes faced (United States Courts p.5).

Besides its position on challenging constitutionality, this episode of civil liberties in the US exposes the contradicting jurisprudence of the American court system most notably the Supreme Court. To date, there is no practical let alone comparative evidence as to why Exparte Mitsuye Endo received a different ruling by the same Supreme Court. The lower federal court in the 1983 ruling cleared off Korematsu while the Supreme Court still maintained the appellate court’s ruling and the previous stand of the 6-3 Supreme Court ruling in favor of the government. Not forgetting, the benchmark of this verdict was based on grounds of protection and military necessity (The United States cos 6).

The question remains why Endo was beyond military necessity compared to other affected Japanese. Besides, if they were detained for their own protection, why were the guns at the guard tower pointed at them? in any case, didn’t the non-Japanese Americans also deserve this protection or the Military was only mandated to protect Japanese Americans? Such a legal synergy certainly deserves more constitutional explanations perhaps the reason for this documentation (National Achieves p.6).

Korematsu's option of remaining behind in contrary to the executive order 9066 and his actions of plastic surgery and attempted a change of identity to a Spanish descent generates legal concerns. The Executive order gave the military powers of removing all the Japanese ancestry from the designated regions therein specified as "Military areas." Following his objection, another provision; the Exclusion Order No.34 facilitated his arrest from the hideout in Northern California in objection of the internment. However, the validity for justification of the exclusion order remains an uncertain (United States courts p.3).

Besides Korematsu's hearing as appealed to the Supreme Court. The court had decided on a similar case in 1943; the Hirabayashi vs. the United States. In this legal precedent, Gordon Hirabayashi who was a college student at the University of Washington had been found guilty in violation of a curfew and exclusion orders. The precedent was argued on the 10 -11th of May 1943 and decided on the 21st June of 1943. The Supreme Court consented the constitutionality of applying curfews against minority groups in the event that the nation is at war with the country of origin of the minority groups (NCC p.19).

The majority opinion in the 6-3 ruling had no interest in the entire exclusion order that demanded the internment. The majority only ruled basing on the validity of the particular provision that facilitated the arrest of Korematsu. They held that despite the impermissible conduct of government in excluding citizens from their residents, an exception is provided for the purpose of public safety adding that there was the perceived need of preventing citizens against danger, sabotage, and espionage that demanded that they evacuate their homes (Kenda p.203).

Korematsu, therefore, lost to the US government on account of military necessity and prevention in a 6-3 Supreme Court vote which was argued on the 11th -12-1944 and decided on the 18th-12-1944. Writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black argued for the necessity of the military's decision claiming that Korematsu was simply excluded not because of hostility to him but for the epitome reason that the US was at war against the Japanese (United States Courts pp.8).

On the converse sides the three judges who dissented this ruling perceived Supreme Court's ruling as a clear violation of the Korematsu's constitutional rights. They argued the order needed to be considered as a whole and not circumstantially restricting. Besides, they added that the order should have considered other preceding and contemporary orders all of which should have led to the detention of US citizens in concentration camps specifically basing on their race (United States Courts p.9).

Frank Murphy and Owen Richards were among the three dissenters to this case. Richards dissented on the pretext that the facts of the case exhibited a clear violation of Korematsu's constitutional rights. Justice Frank Murphy also held that the exclusion did not only go beyond the brink of constitutional power but also fell in the racism abyss. Murphy strongly resented the suspension of the provisions by the bill of rights simply because of the existence of a state of war. He added that the government's distinction between citizens on grounds of color, race, and ancestry was inconsistent with the American Ideals (United States Courts p.8).

The 1983 pro-bono decision to re-open the case in the same federal court that had ruled against Korematsu brought a new window of hope for justice. The team revealed the destruction of evidence obtained from intelligence agencies done by the government’s legal team. They reported that the internment had nothing to do with the Military threat to the US adding that some official reports, for example, the FBI's Edgar Hoover were not presented. Based on this, the federal judge overturned Korematsu's conviction. A result that has since then been celebrated by constitutional rights activists. None the less, The Civil Liberties Act (1988) provided for the apology by the Congress on behalf US people for this unconstitutional act of internment and exclusion of the American citizens (United States courts p.6).

Justice Jackson elaborated that the Korematsu case facilitated a dangerous legal precedent that would be invoked in subsequent future cases. The assertion has historically been affirmed in the Hamdi vs. Johnson case despite the difference in the detention scope. Yaser Hamdi a US citizen was captured on an Afghanistan battlefield allegedly fighting for Taliban enemies by the Northern Alliance. He was declared an enemy combatant and placed in a domestic military prison depriving him any family contact and legal advocates but was left without any criminal charges. Constitutional concerns arise as to whether a President has the power to declare an enemy combatant in this circumstance and whether an American enemy combatant in an American prison deserved no meaningful process in the due course of the imprisonment (Kende p.204).

Justice O'Connor in her plurality opinion opines that the Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) following the 9/11 incident authorizes the president's declaration of enemy combatants but ruled that Hamdi had an entitlement to due process, right to a hearing, and the right to be counseled. Justice Thomas dissented that despite American citizenship, government’s determination of Hamdi’s Taliban involvement was in good faith. Thomas dissents that the majority in Korematsu vs. US precedent also relied on the congressional approval of the executive in justifying constitutionality of the exclusion (Kenda p.205)

The controversial Muslim ban as proposed by President Donald Trump certainly echoed the Korematsu scenario. Trump instigated an intense debate that demanded temporarily excluding Muslim entry to the United States to allow authorities determine a general terrorist threat. Borrowing from the Roosevelt regime, Trump holds that Roosevelt despite what he did in the World War II incident remains one of the most respected Presidents in the US. The difference in these two decisions is that Trump proposed excluding a religious group from entry into the States while the Roosevelt administration excluded an ethnic group which was legally entitled to the constitutional rights of US citizens. Temple Law's Peter Spiro in a New York Times op-ed piece asserts that race-based Court decision in Korematsu's case would be technically a good law but it has been overridden by public opinion courts (Bomboy p.5).

In a recent assessment, (Bomboy p.1) affirms the Korematsu case among three Supreme Court's worst cases ever decided. A correspondent to the 2009 Los Angeles Times Supreme Court David G. Savage notes that the Dred Scott, Korematsu, and Plessy are three Court decisions that conservatives and liberals base on and upon which negative historic opinions are built. Many of these contend that the decision was majorly drawn from the political and racial aisle that one took rather than the constitutional ideals of the nation (Bomboy p.2).

Comparatively analyzing the current dynamics of disputes and the then circumstances under which the Korematsu case was decided, it presents many applicability complexities if imposed in the current disputes. The case states out a precedent which to a less extent would apply to the current dynamic and globalized legal systems. The current bill of rights as presented to the US legislatures perhaps brings more hope for public opinions raising its confidence in the government (Constitutional law reporter p.2).

The Korematsu case has had a great impact both on an individual basis and on the entire present-day jurisdiction system of the United States. On a rather individual ground, it instills legal activists with the confidence and patience to take on challenges that involve constitutional rights. None the less the decision against Korematsu has brought many debates. As an advocate of impartiality, it would rather be a commendable precedent for applicability in the event that the dissenting opinions were considered thereby limiting the current day complexities in cases that infer from Korematsu's precedent.

In conclusion, the decisions in this case to some extent had some applicability in the then prevailing environment. In the first place, Korematsu should be commended for his pursuit of constitutional rights. However, the fact that he attempted to change his identity and ancestry claiming to be of Hawaiian and Spanish descent intensifies the debate regarding his innocence. Secondly, the then War environment also presents more ground of defense by the government especially in the event that the internees truly possessed military threats. None the less, for the interest of the Japanese American citizens, the internment authorities should have specifically excluded non-American citizens without compromising on the constitutional rights of the Citizens. Besides, an explanation regarding the property abandoned by the internees was not addressed by either the concurring and dissenting parties. One of the situations that raise concerns is that on how their property was held after their apprehension. In any case, wasn't there any legal procedure of protecting property during the war? Or maybe the destruction of property was also considered as part of the justifications required for serving this group of people justice for their natural belonging.