Al Qaidas Tactics and Techniques: Strengths and Weaknesses - Case Study Example

Al Qaida’s Tactics and Techniques: Strengths and Weaknesses A Critical Assessment Introduction Al Qaida has been successful in terrorising the world. It has fostered concern among global residents and governments through the various terrorist activities it conducted particularly bombings that destroyed a lot of properties and lives. The September 11, 2001 hijacking attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon, the May 2003 suicide attacks in Morocco, the 2002 bombing in Bali, Indonesia, and the 1998 bombings of United States of America embassies in Africa (Global Security, n.d.) are some of Al Qaida linked activities that terrorised the world in the past decade. It created emotional and economic traumas that would further escalate if governments across the globe will not find ways to arrest Al Qaida’s terroristic activities. United States Central Intelligence Agency or CIA considered Al Qaida as the “most serious security threat to America and to U.S interest and …allies overseas” (Panetta 2009 cited in CIA 2009) which make it the CIA’s mission to counter terrorism posted by Al Qaida. Identifying the strengths and weaknesses of Al Qaida’s tactics and techniques in carrying out its terroristic activities is necessary in mapping out counter strategies to arrest its terrorism network. Selected literature was reviewed to critically assess these strengths and weaknesses, if applicable, which will be presented in the succeeding sections. Al Qaida: A Brief Background Usama Bin Laden founded Al Qaida to “finance, recruit, transport, and train” (Global Security par. 1) soldiers for Afghanistan to fight Soviet Union in 1988 under the precept of a holy war. It was highly debated and reported that the United States CIA helped fund the operation of Bin Laden during the war between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. However, such claim has been denied by the CIA and Bin Ladin himself (911 Myths Website). Jason Burke (2004) categorically contradicted the claim that the U.S CIA funded Bin Laden during the Afghan war. He reiterated that the funding from the American government “went exclusively to the Afghan mujahideen groups” (p.59). Bin Ladin’s group got its funding from the Saudi government and other Islamic institutions. Al Qaida allied with groups of Islamic extremist to continue its holy war against western countries and its citizens across the globe as part of its objectives to establish God’s rule, attain martyrdom in the process, and purify practitioners of Islam from elements of corruption (par. 4). The leaders of Al Qaida particularly issued a declaration to kill Americans and its allies in 1998. Currently, its goal is to create an Islamic rule across the world Al Qaida’s Strategies and Tactics A letter of Abu Safyan (2008), a member of Al Qaida, was recovered in one of the raids conducted in New York. It outlined the tactics and strategies followed by Al Qaida which are related below. Relevant information from other references were also cited to give a solid presentation of the strategies and tactics implemented by Al Qaida from the 1990s. Infiltration and espionage Infiltrate the enemy’s base and collect information on the following: (a) decision makers, (b) area and safe havens, (c) military and economic resources, and (d) weaknesses of the enemy (p. 1). These infiltration activities must be carried out by Al Qaida’s most intelligent and loyal followers who are vigilant and skilled in operational security. These spies must project the image that they are loyal to the enemy to gain its trust by appearing to be blatantly against mujahideens and its allies. Analysing the vulnerabilities of the borders of its target country is important in carrying out the infiltration activities of Al Qaeda. It used available public information from “cinematic films, internet and other media sources” (CIA, 2004, p.1). For example, it was able to identify that it is easier to enter into the United States through Mexico using the knowledge of drug smugglers (p.1). Terrorist Attacks Al Qaida organised attacking its enemies in groups individually led by a commander. Sniper, security and martyrs are the composition of these groups which are trained in their individual functions. Most importantly they must be trained on rigid security procedures. The martyrs and the snipers groups aid the commander in gathering information by killing the enemy’s leaders and killing guards at security check points respectively (p.2). Al Qaeda further infiltrates the enemy’s territory by planting weapons for terrorist attack along the process without alerting its enemies. The martyr groups apparently are left behind to do suicide attacks as deemed necessary by Al Qaeda’s group commanders. Public buildings, embassies and military personnel of the U.S and its allies are its usual targets for terrorist attacks (Global Security). Methods of Terrorist Attacks Al Qaeda plans its terrorist attacks by targeting or employing the use of the economy, health and environment, security intelligence, media and technology. It focuses its attacks “gas and oil fields, wells and pipelines” as well as “electric stations and line” (Abu Safyan, 2008, p.2) to hamper its enemy’s economy and military establishments. Fox News (2004) reported that Al Qaeda operatives intensively analyse vulnerabilities in the building constructions of its target infrastructures as well as “potential police and emergency response” (par.1) when these infrastructures are attacked. In recent years, Al Qaeda shifted its targets from politically related institutions to “civilians, residences, hotels, places of religious worships” (Gunaratna, 2003, p.10). It endangers its enemy’s health and environment through the use of chemical, biological agents and nitric acids to distribute illness and kill people. It infiltrates security intelligence of its enemy by bungling intelligence information leading to lost of trust of its own soldiers (p.4) so that they will fight among themselves (p.8) making them vulnerable and unaware of the eventual attacks of Al Qaeda. It uses the media to spread information against Al Qaeda’s enemies which are mostly the U.S and its allies through distribution of information in contained in compact discs, publications, internet and television. Keeping Secret Al Qaeda’s Operations Al Qaeda encourages its troops to defer from its operations among their families and friends to prevent foiling its plans and activities (p.5). Locations, bases and identities of Al Qaeda’s operations must be kept secret by commanders and soldiers so that the enemies will not be able to infiltrate information that will prevent the successful implementation of Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks. Develop Linkage through Surrogates Former CIA Director George Tenet (Global Security) relayed that Al Qaeda has been increasingly linking with other terrorist groups and individuals with large international network such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, International Islamic Front, and Soldiers of Allah to carry out terrorist attacks in order to avoid detection. It therefore do away with the “centralised command and control” (Raman, 2007, par.2) strategy used by Bin Laden. Such cooperation and coordination among terrorist groups developed out of the dispersion efforts against Al Qaeda (Gunaratna, 2003). Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses The greatest strength of Al Qaida’s tactics and strategies lies in its religious connotation in carrying out its war against the infidels to Islamic faith. This propaganda influenced many of the Islamic faith to carry on with the mission started by Bin Laden. However, this same strength eventually became the loophole in the image of Al Qaida to the international public particularly among the Islamic community. Its acts of terrorism across the globe which claimed lives of civilians might lead some of its supporters to question if indeed Al Qaida’s mission is aligned with what Allah and the Prophet Mohammed taught in Islam. Families supporting its ideology might reconsider sending their children to be soldiers of Al Qaida to carry out its mission around the world consequently affecting recruitment of reliable and dedicated commanders and soldiers for its espionage activities that will be instrumental in carrying out another September 11 attacks. Al Qaida’s strength in using modern technology particularly the internet in carrying out its propaganda against the western world is critical in continuing to terrorise the world with its presence as well as provide directives to its soldiers given their decentralised operations. However, along with its internet savvy approach to its operation is its candour in publicly discussing strategies to topple regimes of governments particularly their hatred against the United States weakens its strategy to be secretive of its operations and whereabouts. They risk divulging their training camps and safe havens (Bachman & McCants 2005 p.5) given that their opponents are equally capable of using advance technological methodologies for espionage against its movement. Its decentralised operations made Usama Bin Laden a remote leader in terms of operational planning (Barret 2008 p. 5) detaching him from the soldiers of Al Qaida unlike prior to the September 11 attacks. Thus low ranking fighters do not feel a personal connection (Bachman & McCants 2006 p.15) with him. This impersonal relationship can eventually lead to detachment to Al Qaida’s vision. It will eventually lead them to lay down their arms and be more focused on their personal lives, leaving their ideology behind. After all, the life of a terrorist is not something that will be desired by all men particularly for those wanting to set up their own families and live peacefully. Al Qaida’s alliance with other terrorist groups will eventually undermine its image of ideological fight for the Islamic faith. Some of these groups activities run in contrast with what Al Qaida’s original vision. For example, its affiliation with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi;s group who is know for criminal acts which is outside its political ideology dwindles further support for Al Qaida (Barret 2008). Also, these alliances lose the cohesion that Al Qaida once have (Morgan 2007) given the various leadership that emerges that do not share its original vision when it was founded by Usama bin Laden. Thus, internal disputes and external influences might risk the operation of the movement. Conclusion Arresting the terrorist influence of Al Qaida in the Muslim world particularly among the youth and their parents will only be successful if the impact of its actions to international lives will be highlighted through different mediums that Al Qaida used in reaching out to their potential soldiers. Using the internet, television, publications and radio as a counter measure to arrest the further growth of Al Qaida’s recruited soldiers is an effective strategy to counter the movement’s strength is facilitating the growth of its military base. These tools can be used to educate parents and youth that what they are doing is against the teachings of Islam which is contrary to Al Qaida’s previous claims to justify their actions. The only way that countermeasures will be successful against Al Qaida is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of its tactics and strategies that the have been comfortable with through the years; hence information channelled and gathered through these strategies are very relevant to create a solid strategy in defining how to deal with Al Qaida using the weaknesses gleaned from their strategies. It will be a good opportunity to infiltrate or delve into their networks. The important thing is to identify what are the weaknesses and opportunities in its strengths. It is only through strategic assessment of the weaknesses of Al Qaida’s operations born out of its strengths will there be successful planning of how to deal with the threats of Al Qaida effectively thereby successfully implementing counterterrorism measures against it. References Abu Safyan. 2008. Abu Safyan’s Letter Translated. (Press Briefing Articles) [Online] Available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/stories/Press_briefings/2008/april/aqi_document_translated.pdf (accessed 10 November 2009) Associated Press. 2004. Bulletin Details Al Qaeda Tactics. (Fox News Articles) [Online] Available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,142884,00.html (accessed 12 November 2009) Barrett. R. 2008. Seven Years After 9/11: Al-Qaida’s Strengths and Vulnerabilities. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. Brachman, J. & McCants, W. 2006. Stealing Al-Qa’ida’s Playbook. Combating Terrorism Center Burke, J. 2006. Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam. New York: I.B. Tauris Publisher. Available at http://books.google.com.ph/books?id=DJf2-tf-yKsC&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=Al+Qaida%27s+tactics+and+techniques+since+the+1990s&source=bl&ots=iqkcwzYNRS&sig=1nct5Ck6Iv5LLolvqbHT7jy4MlM&hl=tl&ei=lsf7SrLLGo7xkAXC9cyfBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CCUQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=&f=true (accessed on 12 November 2009) Central Intelligence Agency. CIA and the War on Terrorism. [Online] Available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/ (accessed 11 November 2009) Central Intelligence Agency. 2004. Al Qaida: Looking to Infiltrate the United States Through Mexico. (A Collection of CTC/OTAs) [Online] Available at http://wikileaks.org/leak/cia-alqaida-threat.pdf (accessed 7 November 2009) Global Security.n.d. Military: Al Qaida/Al Qaeda (the Base) [Online] Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm (accessed 8 November 2009) Gunaratna, R. 2003. The New Face of Al Qaeda: Understanding the Generational Gradient in Local and Global Jihad Campaigns. Morgan, S. 2007. Al Qaeda’ Hidden Weaknesses. (Politics Articles) [Online] Available at http://www.articlesfactory.com/articles/politics/al-qaedas-hidden-weaknesses.html (accessed 10 November 2009) Raman, B. 2007. Al Qaeda Changes Tactics: To Rely on Jundullahs more and more-International Terrorism Monitor: Paper no. 258. (South Asia Analysis Group Article) [Online] Available at Bottom of Form http://www.saag.org/common/uploaded_files/paper2303.html (accessed 10 November 2009) Read More