The Use of Conventional Deterrence by Analyzing the Arguments of Different Scholars - Coursework Example

Deterrence The use of deterrence in contemporary life has become common. The use of deterrence is majorly influenced by the possible cost of a military action. The concept of conventional deterrence has been an elusive topic in the contemporary world. Scholars have attempted to shed some light on the successes and failure of conventional deterrence in the course of history. Deterrence is guided by factors like high costs of military action, ethical concerns for the civilian lives and the overall benefits of deterrence in different situations. The paper examines the use of conventional deterrence by analyzing the arguments advanced by different scholars. The research paper seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of conventional deterrence different situations. The proponents of deterrence believe that it has played a significant role in maintaining the peace among the superpowers of the world. In the past, America used nuclear deterrence to prevent the Soviet Union or the Chinese from attacking its allies in the Far East and Western Europe. Once the Chinese and the Soviet Union has the capacity and means to launch nuclear attacks, United States employed deterrence to prevent any form of attack on itself. According to Lebow (25), deterrence is characterized by attempts to influence the way another entity assesses its interests. The aim of deterrence is to convince the other party that a given course of action presents maximum gain, which cannot be realized through any other means. It can be likened to limiting the options of the other party using a threat of force and/or any other applicable persuasion factor. The theory of deterrence explains the necessary conditions, factors and assumptions that characterize the use of deterrence in different circumstances. It relies on a set of assumption, which guide the process of decision-making. Deterrence strategy refers to the application of deterrence strategy in real life situations. Bernard Brodie (1959), Thomas Schelling (1966), and William Kaufmann (1954) are some of the scholars that contributed to the development of the first wave of deterrence theories (Lebow 26). The classical theory of the deterrence advanced by these scholars is founded on the notion that human beings will act based on the benefits or losses associated with an action. The classical deterrence theories were developed to aid in formulating ways to discourage crimes in the population. Milburn, Snyder and Diesing, and George and Smoke sought to improve the classical deterrence theory by claiming the promise of a reward can enhance the effectiveness of deterrence. George and Smoke believe that deterrence should not be associated with cold war. Instead, it should have been applied in a situation that is not entirely political. The scholars that criticized deterrence theory believed that the process fails due to poor implementation. It can also fail because it has been applied in situations that do not match. Janice Gross Stein and Richard Lebow have also developed a strong criticism of deterrence based on political issues, strategy, and psychology. According to the classical theory of deterrence, the defender or the challenger, is likely to act when there is an opportunity (Lebow, A Political and Psychological Critique 26). The lack of an opportunity would lead to inaction because of the cost that might come with such an attack. However, there have been cases where the leader is under pressure to do something. In that case, the leader can act even without an opportunity. It might lead to failure, but still an action to cease the deterrence would have been taken. Janice and Lebow analyze political failings to assess the impact of deterrence. According to Lebow (31), political failings are easy to analyze because of their size and consequences. Stein (38) explains the failure of deterrence that led to the 1967 war. The classical theory of deterrence is not sufficient to explain why Egypt decided to attack Israel even though the cost of attack outweighed the cost of deterrence. It was also clear that Egypt was inferior to the military power of Israel. Janice Gross Stein wrote on the effect of miscalculation on conventional deterrence analyzing the Cairo perspective in the conflict between Israel and Egypt. The author attempts to explain the factors that lead to the failure of conventional deterrence in some cases. It is true that the use of threat of force has become a mainstream issue in the contemporary life. According to Janice (38), the estimate of interest is among the most influential factor that can influence a leader to challenge an existing deterrence. The estimate of interests is based on the cost assessment and the benefits of a probable military action. Prescriptive deterrence theories do not focus on interests at stake. They do not consider the intrinsic interests, which are very powerful. They can motivate action in the face of danger and heavy costs. The sources of failure of deterrence are estimated military capability, bargaining space, likely costs and benefits of the existing alternatives. The miscalculation or correct calculation characterize the failure or success of deterrence. The Israel-Hezbollah conflict is a perfect case in point to comprehend the motivation behind the failure of deterrence. In 2006, a war ensued between Israel and Hezbollah. A deterrence deal had been broken when Israel first invaded Lebanon. Over the years, Hezbollah took over the region and starting abducting Israeli soldiers across the border. The war broke when two Israeli soldiers were captured after an attack on a Humvee. Hezbollah demanded the release of Lebanese prisoners in exchange for the captured soldiers. Instead of negotiations, Israel responded by launching an attack on Hezbollah, which engaged the in a guerrilla warfare. Partisans of conventional deterrence are driven by the calculation of cost compared to the benefits of a given line of action. It is apparent that Hezbollah was in a position to lose more given the military might of Israel. Israel had practiced deterrence since 2004 by increasing border security to limit the guerrilla attacks by Hezbollah. The deterrence in the Israeli- Hezbollah conflict failed because of miscalculation and intrinsic interests of the leaders. Hezbollah used the opportunity presented by the deterrence to prepare. The group attacked Israel after gaining access to launchers. Hezbollah persisted with attacks because they wanted the Lebanese prisoners in Israel released. The leader knew that a move to capture Israeli soldiers might have led to a negotiation or an attack. Conventional deterrence fails to work in situations where leaders are driven by intrinsic factors. Hezbollah had everything to lose in the conflict, but they still launched an attack. The Israel deterrence did not work because they had not taken the needs of the Hezbollah under consideration. Hezbollah’s retaliation seems to have been motivated by the desire to show bravery and assert their independence. A miscalculation of interests and military capability lead to failure of deterrence. The Oslo Peace Process played a significant role in the establishment of two party state, which saw the creation of the Palestinian Authority (Said 24). The process attempted to apply coercion, cooperation and ethics to improve international relations between Israel and Palestine. It took time for Israel and Palestinian Authority to recognize each other as negotiation partners. The Oslo Peace Process succeeded to an extent. The peace process was a success because it pushed both Israel and Palestinian Authority to practice conventional deterrence. The situation shows the success of conventional deterrence where the Palestinian Authority has been unable to control its borders. The Oslo Peace Process succeeded in facilitate the mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel. However, the peace process failed in creating a mutually beneficial solution for both parties. The region still experiences attacks because the Palestinians do not feel free. They are being deterred to act because of the military power of Israel. In comparison, the Israel-Egypt is a perfect example to explain why conventional deterrence fails. Deterrence worked twice in the case of Israel-Egypt conflict. The success of deterrence occurred when Egypt estimated that it did not have enough military power to fight Israel. Egypt had to consider deterrence because the whole world knew Egypt could not win. Surprisingly, after sometimes Egypt launched an attack on Israel. The attack was motivated by the dire need for the leaders to maintain the status quo and the frustration that comes with inaction. Deterrence did not last long for Egypt because the leadership never viewed it as an opportunity. Instead, it was a source of shame for the leaders who felt Egypt had lost is status quo. In conclusion, the use of deterrence can succeed or fail based on the inclusive nature of the deterrence theories that guide the strategy. There have been many instances where deterrence has failed because it is not thorough. A good conventional deterrence theory should consider the intrinsic factors that drive the leaders because they have an impact on the success of deterrence. It is also true that deterrence can be an opportunity for the challenger to prepare and mount another attack. The Hezbollah used deterrence to prepare weapons that could enable them to attack the Israeli border. The group was pushed back again because of the military might of Israel. Works Cited Lebow, Richard Ned. "A Political and Psychological Critique." Stern, P., R. Jervis and Radner. Perspectives on Deterrence. New York: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1989. 25-51. Print. Lebow, Richard Ned and Janice Gross Stein. "Beyond Deterrence. ." New, Lebow Richard. Coercion, Cooperation and Ethics in International Relations. New York: Routledge, 2007. 121-184. Print. Said, Edward W. The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After. New York: Pantheon Books, 2000. Print. Stein, Janet Gross. "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo ." Jervis, R., R. Lebow and Stein Jane Gross. Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 34-59. Print. Read More