Israeli and Palestinians Points of View of the Oslo Process - Case Study Example

Oslo process The Oslo peace accord was a declaration that called for mutual recognition between the two neighbors in the Middle East, Israeli and Palestine. It may be argued that the Oslo agreement was both a success and failure. One of the main achievements of the peace accords were the fact Israel and Palestine met to design a solution for their hostility. Groups such as Hamas and Hez Bolar see the Peace Accord as a failure because it led to the creation of more terrorism. Many political and foreign commentators believe that the Oslo process was a total failure (Barak 719). From Israelis and Palestinians points of view, each side believes that the other party led to the failure of the Oslo process. The two sides think that they are the victims seeking redress of grievances. Israeli point of view of the Oslo process The basic assumption shared by the Israeli is that Oslo helped to create a rational order in the Middle East that was based on reciprocal that may in the future lead to a compromise. Israel believes that the fact the two sides came together and sat down in order to negotiate for peace, that was a milestone in itself. There was a strong debate over the Oslo accords in Israel. While the right wing opposed the accords, the Knesset members strongly accepted them (Barak, 720). After a vote on the issue of the accords, the people supporting the accords won by majority votes. It implied that the people of Israel fully supported the signing of the accords. Israel believes that Oslo marked a step forward in mutual acknowledgment between the two parties. The Oslo process helped to change Palestine from a refugee population and one without direction to a recognized state (Tamar and Ephraim 600). Israel argues that the Oslo process created a historically distinctive circumstance of building Palestine’s governance, administrative, and security capabilities even as it negotiated and fought its way out of statelessness (Tamar and Ephraim 601). If nothing else changed, Palestinians could boast of a nation that has a policing system. The dynamics of the two countries relations since the signing of the agreement confirmed Israelis worst fears that the peace process would give their enemies the tools to attack them. In the preliminary stages of the establishment of the Palestine’s security services, Israel noted that the numbers of Palestinians in arms were going beyond the agreements. The development made Israel believe that Palestine was coming up with an offensive army, not a police force (Pressman 13). Israel’s anger rose when it realized that Palestine was not doing enough to thwart terrorism acts coming from its territory. Palestine refused to take action of dealing with the terrorists, and it allowed terrorists to operate freely within its territory. Palestine authority could only place terrorists in prison for some days, and then release them without charges.   Palestine’s outright refusal of Israel’s proposals at Camp David and the continuation of terrorists’ attacks against Israel are viewed as one of the reasons that led to the death of the Oslo process (Smith 245). Terrorist acts against Israel exacted a heavy toll in people injured and killed. The whole conception presented to Israelis of the Oslo process, creating an effective Palestine security team that will be more efficient than Israeli soldiers in stopping terrorism did not leave to perform its role. The explanations by the Palestine that it could not collaborate in the acts of terrorism while at the same time fight against its people did not make any sense to Israel (Pressman 7). Many Israelites were being killed because of terrorism. Many occurrences led the Israelites to begin wondering if Arafat and the PLO had ever planned to stop fighting and seek negotiations rather than through confrontation methods. There were enormous arms supplies to the Palestinian Authority that were made public that showed that Palestine supported terrorists. In fact, the Palestinian policemen took their arms and fought the Israeli soldiers (Pressman 11). Israel understood this to mean a breach of the Oslo agreement and that they were not willing to follow it. If the Palestinians authority could attack Israel, then they were not interested in the peace process. Palestinians point of view of the Oslo process Palestinians believe that the Oslo process succeeded to some extent in the sense that it changed reality and created a Palestinian Authority that could be the foundation of a state in the coming days. However, the Palestinians believe that the Israelis were not willing from the start to recognize Palestine as an independent state (Baumgart-Ochse 1116). Palestine believes that the destruction of the Oslo accords was only a matter of time since there was not any good faith on the Israeli and the United States governments. The PLO had decided to pursue Palestinian independence through consultation. The PLO and Israel signed agreements referred to as the Oslo Agreements. However, despite the signing of the agreements, Palestine claimed that Israel violated their word and core principles (Barak 729). Palestine believes that the US favored Israel and at the expense of Palestine and that the Oslo accords should not be considered a failure since it never took off. The accords did not succeed due to any contradictions but was destabilized by PM Binyamin Netanyahu and his colleagues. By subverting the accords, the PM inflicted much damage on the Palestinians, Israel, and the entire Middle East. The Palestinians explain that the disintegration of the Oslo peace process was because of the expansion of Israeli settlements against the Oslo agreement. They also claim that it was due to the disappointing extent of the territorial control of the Palestinian Authority; Palestinian public opinion polls indicated that many people had this opinion. Palestinians believed that the accords involved a commitment by the Israelis to stop the development of settlements and start bringing them down (Rynhold 12). Although there was no such clear commitment to the agreements, Palestine claimed that Israel must have understood it as fully obvious. The Palestinians claim that such conditions were a necessary precondition for them to sign the agreements (Barak 730). A “third redeployment” of Israel that was anticipated never materialized. The West Bank was sub-divided into 3 zones. The Palestinian Authority had absolute authority over Area A; Israel controlled Area C while Area B witnessed a joint control. Area B was proposed to offer civilian Palestinian rule together with that of the Israeli security. The Palestinian Authority only managed to have control over 50% of the West Bank, a far less figure than the Palestinians had anticipated. Palestinians believed that Israel did not intend to give Palestine authority over their affairs (Pressman 19). There was no realization of a “free passage” path that connects the West Bank and Gaza Strip that could run through Israeli territory. However, Israeli military roadblocks were put on the roads between the cities of Palestine. Although Israel cited security reasons, the move was understood by Palestine as an Israeli effort to create separate Palestinian regions to stifle any likelihood of a possible future Palestinian state. The Palestinians saw that action as betrayal from the Israelis and that they were not interested in peace agreements (Pressman 23). Conclusion Although the Oslo process may be said to have failed since it has never been completed, it is critical to note that the accords have transformed the framework within which the two parties pursue their national goals. The meetings held by Israel and Palestine, and the signing of the Oslo accords is a legacy of vast consequence to a point where some commentators feel that the Oslo process is not dead. Both Israel and Palestine appeared not to trust each other, and they could treat one another with suspicion. Works Cited Barak, Oren. "The failure of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, 1993–2000." Journal of Peace Research 42.6 (2005): 719-736. Baumgart-Ochse, Claudia. "Democratization in Israel, politicized religion and the failure of the Oslo peace process." Democratization 16.6 (2009): 1115-1142. Hermann, Tamar, and Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar. "Divided yet united: Israeli-Jewish attitudes toward the Oslo process." Journal of Peace Research 39.5 (2002): 597-613. Pressman, Jeremy. "The second intifada: Background and causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." Journal of Conflict Studies 23.2 (2006). Rynhold, Jonathan. The failure of the Oslo process: inherently flawed or flawed implementation. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, 2008. Smith, Charles. "The Arab-Israeli Conflict." International Relations of the Middle East (2013): 245. Read More