Rise of the Islamic State - Report Example

Rise of the IS (Islamic and how the U.S. is fighting that war Introduction The Islamic (the IS) is a terrorist group, military, and political organization that holds extremist or radical interpretation of the Islam political philosophies and impose their worldview via force on non-Muslims and Muslims. The group was expelled from Al-Qaeda for allegedly being too extreme, the group claims legitimacy as the ruler of all Sunni Muslims (Al-rikabi 2). The group was originally formed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and took part in the Iraqi War as it fought against Americans after the fall of Saddam; later it joined the Syrian Civil War by focussing on defeating the rule of Bashar al-Assad, as they aim at building their own Islamic state. The Islamic State announced Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the leader of the established Islamic caliphate, as the caliph on June 29, 2014 (Al-rikabi 4). Ideology The Islamic State’s ideology is that of the Salafist-jihadism; there is no distinction between state and religion. Any decision is guided by the hardline interpretation of the sharia or the Islamic law. Salafist ideas are based on returning to pure form or nature of Islam practiced or stipulated by Mohammed and other earlier Muslims; they disagree with any additions as innovation or the bid’ah and un-Islamic (Cordesman and Khazai 39). Goals The Islamic State’s short-term goal is the consolidation of the areas that it controls and capturing additional territories in Iraq and Syria. Their medium term goals include the consolidating and expanding its territorial control in Syria and Iraq in order to advance into the neighbouring Sunni countries (Mastors 9). Organizational Structure Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi leads the terror group and also declared himself the Caliph. His caliphate runs by the appointed ministers, cadre of advisors, and military commanders. The group has the Hisbah or the morality police that ensure the Sharia law are followed (Feldman 13). The Islamic State is the wealthiest terror organization; its income is mainly from the oil smuggling, kidnapping, supplemented by extortion, and taxes imposed areas controlled (Csis.org 1). Account of IS activities In 2014, Islamic State-related forces, support of the ousted Iraqi Leader Saddam Hussein with some Sunni Arabs, started their advance along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers of Iraq, taking over populated centers such as Mosul. Since then, the forces have massacred Iraqi and Syrian adversaries that include civilians from religious or ethnic minorities and hostages. The IS offensives in Anbar province of Iraq and also against the Kurdish enclaves is on-going. The terrorist’s tactics have raised the U.S. attention into both the Iraq’s political troubles and the Syrian civil war; and also has drawn international ire too. On September 10th of 2014, the U.S. President declared series of actions towards “degrading, and ultimate destruction” of the IS. The U.S. is seeking and leading in the expansion of multilateral coalition carrying direct military action; providing training, advice, and equipment for the partner forces in Syria and Iraq; sharing or gathering intelligence; and utilizing financial restriction or measures against the IS. These measures are aimed at shrinking the political and geographic space, financial resources, and manpower available to the IS. The U.S. refer to the strategy or initiative as “ISIL-first” and “Iraq first”. The U.S. President has ruled out utilization ground forces to Syria or Iraq, but did not rule out the provision of the forward aircraft controllers, military assets or military advisors. Experts assert, not all, that coalition partners within Syria and Iraq -selected Syrian groups and the Iraqi government forces- are too weak for the IS; hence require assistance from U.S. troops. Most of the regional coalition members are seeking an expansive U.S.-led mission that is inclusive of the effort in ousting President Asad of Syria (Csis.org4). The 113th Congress availed funds and new authorities for the efforts in combating the IS in Iraq and Syria in the consolidated appropriations acts or P.L. 113-235 and the FY2015 national defense authorization or the P.L. 113-291 in December 2014. Currently, the 114th Congress is proposing the Administration FY2016 budget request and authorization for the utilization of force against the IS (Csis.org2). The U.S. strategies in combating the IS The US President’s direction are leading mixed coalition looks for “degraded and destruction” of the IS via reduction of its political and geographic space, financial, and manpower resources. The US and its allies are carrying out various or different measures, that include the direct military actions, supporting for Syrian and Iraqi forces, sharing and intelligence gathering, and the efforts in restricting the flows of foreign fighters into Syria or Iraq, and disrupting the IS’ finances(Csis.org6). Military strikes The U.S. forces and allies used armed unmanned aerial vehicles, combat aircraft, and the sea-launched cruise and guided missiles in conducting various strikes in the Iraqi soil as from August 8th in 2014, while September 22th of 2014 in the Syrian soil. The stated objectives of the U.S. attacks and strikes have changed as circumstances and various goals have been achieved including the initial focus of stopping the IS from advancing and reducing evident threats to the religious minorities and American personnel in the northern parts of Iraq(Csis.org6); now the U.S. is supporting both offensive and defensive military procedure by the Kurdish forces and the Iraqi military and also weakening the IS ability in supporting its operations in the Iraqi soil from its elaborate bases found in Syria(Al-rikabi 5). “Training and equipping” of the Iraqi Forces The U.S. President authorized introduction of over 3,000 military personnel from U.S. to Iraqi soil for advising the Iraqi forces, or gathering necessary intelligence on the IS, and acquiring security for the U.S. personnel or facilities. In 18th December of 2014, General Terry James, the commander of the joint task forces, said they anticipated the coalition’s contributions should produce additional personnel of approximately 1,500 in the supporting of the U.S. The U.S. and allies deployments target at addressing severe weaknesses of the Iraqi’s ground forces or security. The U.S. undertook the assessments of Iraqi forces, and the U.S. advisers concluded that about half of the Iraqi Forces are capable of the U.S. advisers in assisting them regaining the captured territories via the given advisory of assistance (Csis.org 1). The U.S. officials define “capable” in this context as the integration of both Shiite and Sunni personnel (Chandra Chari 23). Under the guidance of FY2015 NDAA, U.S. Secretary of Defense collaborating with the Secretary of State are authorized into providing assistances, that incorporate the training, logistics support, equipment, supplies, and other stipends, services, facilities and infrastructural repairs and renovations, and sustaining, of security or military forces associated with or of the Government of the Iraqi, for example the tribal and Kurdish security forces(Csis.org6), or any other friendly local security forces for the following objectives: defending the Iraqi’s people, partner nations, and allies from the IS threat; and securing the Iraqi’s territories(Cordesman and Khazai 29). The U.S. expects continued support towards the Iraqi commanders at both regional division and brigade headquarters in engaging in the fighting against the IS. Support of vetted Syrians The Pentagon’s spokesman Admiral Kirby John gave a statement in January 2015 on the planned deployment of the U.S. military training staffs in the supporting the training and equipping of the vetted Syrians(Csis.org9). The Congress authorized the assistance and training in the FY2015; the initial funding for the program got approved by the congressional defense committees in 2014 December via authority originally mandated by the Congress in the FY2015 continued allocation resolutions of the September 2014. Kirby considers the U.S. officials’ engagement with different or varied Syrian groups would identify potential recruits towards the program.  Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have agreed on the hosting of related program’s activities while the U.S. officials are expected to utilize intelligences given by the partner countries in the assistance towards vetting the participants. Consultations, bilateral, are continuing among the leaders of each country (Csis.org10). Syrian opposition and the U.S. sympathizers or supporters have constantly criticized the Administration’s plans agreement on training and equipping the initial force of the over 5,000 vetted Syrians at the first year in a 3-year planned program, claiming for insufficiency in terms of size. The opposition further disagrees with the strategy with the President and they believe that the U.S.-backed troops should equip or train for the offensive programs and operations towards or fight the Syrian government (Wheatley 19). Disruption of the IS Financing The U.S. Government is carrying a policy that reduces the financial resources of the IS focusing on the disruption of the IS revenue streaming, reducing or limiting the IS access to any formal financial systems, and further imposition of sanctions towards the group’s financial facilitators and leadership. The U.S. is disrupting the IS revenues streams as prescribed under the under Treasury Act against Terrorism; the U.S. seeks to disrupt the IS revenue’s streams via targeting individuals who transport, refine, sell, or handle IS oil. The U.S. is collaborating with the regional partners in identifying any cross-border smuggling routes or individual involved in the smuggling cartels of the IS. The U.S. has requested United Nations (the U.N.) states members in the assistance toward the cut off of resources of the IS. The U.S. is restricting the access of the IS to the financial system with an aim of restricting its ability to moving, using or storing funds it gets locally. The U.S. is working with the Iraqi banks’ headquarters, authorities, and other international financial communities in preventing the IS from utilizing local banks’ branches in the areas that are under its control; but the Iraqi intelligence report of January states that the IS had started their own bank at Mosul, that accepted deposits and granted loans (Csis.org20). The U.S. is carrying financial sanctions against the IS officials or their associated external financial sympathizers or backers. As from September 24th, the U.S. Department of the Treasury identified or found 12 people for their role in procuring military equipment, soliciting funds, and recruitment of foreign fighters that are found in Syria and associated with the IS(Csis.org9). Budgeting On November 7th of 2014, the White House proposed that it would it would double the quantity or number of U.S. military trainers, advisers and the support staff in Iraq, that is from 1,620 to around 3,102, in assisting the nations security forces in tackling the Islamic State, one of the major Sunni extremist outfit. On November 10th, President Obama requested the Congress for an extra $5.6 billion in the year 2015 to cater for U.S. missions and operations in the region (Wilson 1). Restricting flows of foreign IS Fighters The U.S. officials are using the intelligence community, and State Department agencies on the continued assess, monitoring, and responding to threats by the IS fighters in Syria and Iraq. The intelligence and diplomatic efforts target at coordinating with the sources, transits, or returnee location countries in strengthening shared preventive and responses measures. The U.S. appointed Bradtke Robert December 2014 as the “senior adviser that engages partners on Syrian IS foreign fighters.” Bradtke is leading comprehensive efforts, that incorporate marshalling of representatives from the U.S. agencies in encouraging the key North African, European, and Middle Eastern member allies in prioritizing the threats, and addressing the vulnerabilities, and adapting to - and preventing- IS foreign fighters (Walker 14). Issues in relation to the new authorization for the military force use President Obama’s Administration relies on authorization in order to conduct campaigns against the IS, for instance, abandoning the 2001 AUMF without amendment causes a continued source of contention and confusion regarding the presidential authority in the usage of the military force in the IS. The limitation or restriction on the utilization of the ground forces or operations might restrict the capability or ability of the U.S. military and the President leadership in prosecuting the conflict against the IS in a way that they feel is effective; the geographic limitation hinders the President’s ability in striking the IS and its associated forces in Syria and Iraq (Csis.org12). The limitations of the 2001 AUMF authority has deleterious effects on the US’ campaign against the IS; the limitation should be modified or removed via the legislative actions; the limitations lacks flexibility. Maintaining and deepening coalition support In the past, U.S. efforts in Syria and Iraq indicate that U.S. policy makers face the challenges of maintaining purposed unity among the coalition members, ensuring sustainable coalition financial and material contributions with time, and the management of the risks or costs to the U.S. in association with conditional or limited commitments by the coalition members (Thomas 20). Conclusion One of the potential practical effects of the U.S.-lead operations, particularly striking the terrorist targets that are associated with the IS, may be that most of the Syrians turn polarized in their thoughts or views on Syria’s future or destiny and the role of external forces in developing or building it. The perceived U.S. allies or partners in Syria may be engaged further in the conflict with the anti-U.S. groups and also feel the additional pressure in collaborating with them; hence this might amplify or increase violence in specific areas and could also weaken the opposition’s ability in placing the coordinated pressure towards the Asad government. Works Cited Al-rikabi, Jaffar. Baqir Al-Sadr And The Islamic State: A Theory For Islamic Democracy. The Journal of Shia’s Islamic Studies 5.3 (2012): 249-275. Web. Chandra Chari.,. War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World. London: Routledge, 2010. Print. Cordesman, Anthony H, and Sam Khazai. Iraq in Crisis. Print. Csis.org,. Iraq, Syria, And The Islamic State: The "Boots on The Ground" Fallacy | Center for Strategic and International Studies. N.p., 2015. Web. 2 Mar. 2015. Feldman, Noah. The Fall and Rise Of The IS (The Islamic State). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012. Print. Jabareen, Yosef. The Emerging Islamic State: Terror, Territoriality, and The Agenda of Social Transformation. Geoforum 58 (2015): 51-55. Web. Kfir, Isaac. Social Identity Group and Human (In) Security: The Case of Islamic State in Iraq and The Levant (ISIL). Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2015): 1-20. Web. Mastors, Elena. Breaking Al-Qaeda. Boca Ratons: CRC Press of the Taylor and Francis, 2014. Print. THE MONTH IN BRIEF: Islamic State Forces Pushed Back In Iraq, Yemeni Oil Threatened, And Ebola Hits African Oil Trade. Oil and Energy Trends 39.12 (2014): 7-7. Web. Walker, Kira. Islamic State Plunges Research in Iraq into Darkness. Nature Middle East (2014): n. pag. Web. Wheatley, S. Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of A Radical Islamic Intellectual. Journal of Church and State 57.1 (2015): 157-158. Web. Wilson, Lee. The Budget to Fight Islamic State. Businessweek.com. N.p., 2014. Web. 1 Mar. 2015. Read More