The Outcome of the Ongoing Syrian Conflict - Coursework Example

The ongoing Syrian conflict is not one that is particularly easy to understand. Instead, it is a conflict that involves a great many foreign powers and a desire to influence upon a specific region. As a means of understanding these dynamics, the Syrian conflict is best understood as something of a type of proxy war between the following actors: the Assad regime, NATO, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the Russian Federation. Naturally, on the list that has been provided, the reader can note that some of these countries belong within NATO itself; namely the United States and Turkey. However, they had been listed separately due to the fact that their mutual interest do not oftentimes accurately denote their self as expressed with regard to foreign relations and the desire to see Syria change hands. As a function of the following analysis, the research will be concentric upon finding these different actors and the desires that may have for the nation of Syria. Ultimately, by understanding the nuances of international relations and power dynamics, the reader can come to a more definitive and informed understanding of the way in which the Syrian conflict the same place; as well as the way it is likely to continue to unfold the immediate future. Perhaps the first and most important dynamics of the Syrian conflict, has to do with the conflict between the United States and the Russian Federation. Even though it is true that the Soviet Union fell apart well over 20 years ago, the level of competition that exists between the Russian Federation and the United States has only increased over the past several decades. As the Russian Federation has been enriching itself on the pockets of the sale of oil and natural gas, as well as other natural resources, the level of engagements that question, and by extension its military, and have world has subsequently increased alongside this renewed level of economic power (Haskins 52). Accordingly, business of the impacts that to place during the Cold War, the United States continued to pursue a policy of containment. Accordingly, just as with regard to North Korea for Vietnam, this policy of containment necessarily creates a situation that guarantees a conflict of interests throughout the globe. As the Russian Federation understands Syria and other Middle Eastern countries within its sphere of influence, the United States understands the Middle East as a vital, of foreign-policy; due to the fact that will be 70% of the available fossil fuel resources, this particular region. Even though is true that Syria itself does not have a wealth of will or natural gas resources, the desire to ensure that stability and is a pro-American regime exists within one of the most powerful Middle Eastern countries remains a high priority for the United States. By means of contrast and comparison, the Russian Federation is specifically interested in the Cheney access to the Mediterranean and the power of depression least. As can be seen with the ongoing crisis Ukraine, and specifically Armenia, the Russian Federation is uniquely interested in retaining all of its limited access to the Black Sea. Additionally, Russian Federation also retains a naval presence of Tarsus. Partly because of this, the Russian Federation is highly reticent to allow Western regime to come to power in Syria; leading that this could drastically reduced below trade, cooperation, and military agreements that exist in Syria (Aaron 43). Another extremely important dynamic that is currently taking place within Syria has to do with the struggle for regional supremacy between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Naturally, Saudi Arabia is also supported and aligned with the United States; however, for purposes of clarity and discussion, this section of the analysis will only engage with the dynamics between these two regional powers. Enriched by extraordinary oil wealth, Saudi Arabia has come to play a dominant role with regard to the politics of the Middle East. Although allied with the United States and protected by it, Saudi Arabia exerts a great deal of self determinism within the region and its security services are ever mindful of any political or economic situations that might be beneficial for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Sibels 51). As such, the rise of Iran, despite the severe economic sanctions that much of the rest of the world has placed upon it, has been especially troubling for Saudi Arabia. Moreover, as Iran is dabbling with nuclear ambitions, Saudi Arabia seeks each and every opportunity to diminish the role and importance/significance that Iran plays within the Middle East. In many cases, Iran and Saudi Arabia find themselves at odds due to the fact that both are so distrustful of one another and seek to carve out larger and larger zones of power and control within the Middle East. However, the level of disagreement and distrust between these two regional powers cannot be understood to have started with Syria; instead it has been brewing for quite some time. Looking as far back as 2011, the researcher can note that Iran was tacitly supporting Gaddafi in Libya via its Syrian proxy. As a direct result of this “aggressive action” on the part of Iran via its surrogate, Saudi Arabia came to realize that the Syrian regime was no longer “friendly” and should be replaced with another (Tiller, 32) Additionally, there is the case of Turkey. With a shared border with Syria, Turkey is perhaps the only one of the interested parties thus far that has the greater stake in how this situation will end up. Additionally, the fact that Turkey is and has long been a member of NATO necessarily influences upon the way in which it engages with Syria, Iran, the Russian Federation, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. However, before one comes to the conclusion that all of the actors that have thus far been elaborated on are merely split between the United States and those who oppose it, the unique dynamics of the situation help to prove otherwise. There is no central consensus with respect to how the situation should resolve itself. Because of this, insurgent groups, backed by one or more of these represented interests, vie for power in an internecine conflict that shows no signs of abating anytime in the near future. Whereas the original goal may well have been regime change, the current situation has presented each of these regional and/or global powers with a far different reality; one in which the ongoing struggle appears to have degenerated into a stalemate from which neither side is guaranteed victory (Carpenter 1). Being a NATO ally, Turkey also exhibits strong regional power dynamics within the region and vies with the likes of Iran and Saudi Arabia to be the voice of leadership throughout the Middle East. One need look no further than Turkey’s involvement with regard to the way in which the Arab Spring took place to realize that the nation, and its governmental and foreign policy decisions all consider this important goal. For issues of saving face, all of the actors that have thus far been referenced are locked in this struggle with no clear end in sight. Furthermore, due to the fear that the nations of Iran or the Russian Federation might stand to gain more regional power or clout, the nations of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, The United States, and others are committed to ensuring that the conflict does not result in their ultimate victory (Trilling 1). Sadly, the conflict itself continues to cost the lives of thousands as the ongoing civil war between pro and anti-Assad forces manifests itself at various places throughout the war-torn nation. With no clear end in sight, all of the above nations continue to fund their proxies in the hopes that a breakthrough will occur; or at the very least that their enemies hopes of gaining influence and control within Syria will be stymied. Instead of seeing this conflict from the one-dimensional perspective that so many around the world have been led to believe, the reader can point to the fact that the Syrian civil war is perhaps the largest proxy war since the conflict in Vietnam. In seeking to provide justification for such a claim the reader can consider to the fact that major powers within and without of the region have a vested interest in how the situation in Syria ultimately plays out. Firstly, realizing that both the United States and the Russian Federation are vying for influence within the region and supporting the respective components/sides of the struggle that they believe will best suit their interests. However, this level of proxy war has thus far been clear and many analysts and scholars have picked up on the way in which the United States and the Russian Federation are engaging in this struggle. Yet, the other nations that should be included in to this central discussion on a secondary level are Iran and Saudi Arabia. Just as with the United States and Russia being global poles of power and influence, Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran are regional poles of influence and power within the Middle East. Even more disturbingly, the current situation in Syria brings one’s attention to the unnatural bedfellows that conflict invariably makes. Before the attempted ousting of Bashar al Assad, the United States and its allies had been involved in fighting a protracted “War on Terror”. Yet, at the moment it appeared expeditious to seek to topple Assad, cooperation and armaments given directly to al Qaeda front groups within Syria became something that was not only considered; but something that was actively engaged. Whereas there has been little outspoken criticism of this fact within the Western world, it is the view of this particular analyst that no matter how sinister or “evil” the regime of Assad might be, arming groups such as Al Nusra (which is directly affiliated with, ascribes to, and is supported by al Qaeda) is a morally reprehensible position that should have never been engaged. Although the policy objectives of great powers oftentimes see “grey” areas of morality created, the ramifications of such an action, or blowback as the CIA so appropriately dubs it, will doubtless result in a much great headache for the Western powers than they might initially presuppose. In essence, the situation in Syria has no “good guys”. As such, the best approach to deciding who should lead the country will be decided by Syrians and should not be a part of great power brokering. As such, a slurry of interests abound within the Syrian civil war and make it a much more complex issue than has previously been thought. On an even further level, one can see that other nations such as Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Qatar, and Turkey all seek to influence the outcome in whatever way they feel would benefit them the most. The sheer complexity of this situation helps the reader to come to the appreciation of the fact that there is likely not a determinate end in sight that can be accepted as legitimate by either side in the conflict. Rather, the means by which the conflict continues to unfold, is funded, and is provided with weapons and soldiers, likely has much more to do with the decisions that the other previously mentioned stakeholders make than the decisions that Bashar al Assad or the Free Syrian Army can make. Sadly, what the reader can take away from all of this is the fact that the Syrian conflict will no longer be determined by the will of the Syrian people but by the powerful interests that exist within the region and have their own designs and aspirations with regards to how the balance of power will look in Syria and elsewhere throughout the region. As the United States seeks to deny Iran from becoming nuclear capable and/or exerting further influence over its neighbors, Russia seeks to stop the United States from toppling any more moderate Islamic regimes within the region and thereby allowing Saudi Arabia and its more radical approach to gain more influence. Works Cited Aaron, Tom. "The bloody stalemate persists; Syrias civil war." The Economist 2013: 43. Business Insights: Essentials. Web. 2 May 2014. Carpenter, Ted Galen. "Tangled Web: The Syrian Civil War And Its Implications." Mediterranean Quarterly 1 (2013): 1. Project MUSE. Web. 2 May 2014. Haskins, Robert. "Still no hint of a compromise; The Syrian civil war." The Economist 2013: 52. Business Insights: Essentials. Web. 2 May 2014. Tiller, Max. "Beirut bombs kill 23; blasts linked to Syrian civil war." CNN Wire 2013: Business Insights: Essentials. Web. 2 May 2014. Trilling, Daniel. "The road to nowhere: more than two million people have fled the civil war in Syria. Many of them are desperate to get into Europe--but no country wants them." New Statesman (1996) 2014: 32. Business Insights: Essentials. Web. 2 May 2014. Sibels. Gregory. "Rebels v rebels; Syrias civil war." The Economist 2013: 51. Business Insights: Essentials. Web. 2 May 2014. Read More