Why is the Notion of Identity so Important for the Constructivist Approach - Term Paper Example

Why is the Notion of Identity so Important for the Constructivist Approach. Introduction Emergence of Constructivist Approach The constructivist approach appeared during the late 1980s with the closing of the Cold War. Political leaders in the late 1980s were randomly questioning the assumptions and outcomes of the Cold War time with political leaders of the stature of Mikhail Gorbachev forcing his glasnost and perestroika, openness and reframing, policies in the USSR for instance, randomly questioning their typical, preconceived identity. This period offered the background to the questions facing International Relations asked on its prevalent theories, scientific approaches and their importance in the making of global might. The bent towards constructivism, besides other important theories of IR, was smoothened by the finish of the Cold War and the incapability of IR academics to have predicted its finish (Fierke, 2010). Constructivism can be observed dynamically distinct from the conservative theories of IR like Realism and Liberalism, besides their new versions. Although there are various kinds of constructivism, there is common element between them, with mass stress on the significance of ideas and how these ideas relate to the global mechanism (Barnett, 2008). Besides, a concern was observed for the meaning of this mechanism and how it designed and impacted the identities and stakes of states. This mechanism in turn is recreated and changed by both state and non state players (Bolt, 2011). Constructivism and Constitution of Identity Identities in constructivist study play a very important role because they are central to the stakes of the state. According to constructivists “explanations based primarily on interests and the material distribution of power cannot fully account for important international phenomena and that analysis of the social construction of state identities ought to precede, and may even explain, the genesis of state interests” (Bukovansk, 1997, p. 209). Wendt discusses that what kind of anarchy (or cultures of anarchy) that will prevail depends on “how [actors] construe their identity in relation to others” (Zehfuss, 2001, p. 318). Wendt (1992) indicates that shared identity could be created internally at the systemic level and such a procedure would friendly environment. The constructivist approach considers the concept of identity quite significant, especially the state identity. Both Wendt (1999) and Katzenstein (1996a) have approached constructivism from the perspective of state identity. That’s why it has become a segment of the nearly reserved rationalist mainstream of international relations theory. This constructivist approach, normally viewed as the most serious challenge to rationalist superiority, assert that the theoretical design based on the concept of state identity can provide a possible choice to rational choice theory. Although state identity is just one of the numerous non-material elements researched by the constructivist academics, it offers very significant causal connection to back the root arguments of constructivist theoretical design. The notion of identity makes it feasible to assimilate changes to the actors’ stakes into the research design. According to the constructivist logic, the stakes of states are structured by their identities, while state identities and stakes themselves are prone to change in the process of assimilation. That’s why the constructivists argue that their approaches can offer better theoretical details of development and change in international relations than their rationalist counterparts. Constructivists also support the argument that states follow trends not just it is in their self-interest, but also by practicing them in their identities, thus widening the squeezed liberalist pattern for researching norms. It shows the significance of state identity for constructivist theory, nevertheless, a straight-forward definition of the notion is not offered by constructivists. The constructivist approach sees cultural norms of a state to be the same as the identity of the state by incorporating these norms into their identities. Without understanding the link between them, one cannot appreciate the importance of identity in constructivist approach. Wendt points out three possible levels of its incorporation. The first level of incorporation happens when a state, in neo-realist trend, is compelled to follow cultural norms. Such a norm might be repulsive, like “kill or be killed” norm of Hobbesian anarchy. The neoliberal logic that a state follows norms because it is in its own interest matches to the second level of incorporation in Wendt’s generality. Lastly, the third level of incorporation happens when, as per “constructivist hypothesis,” a state adheres to the cultural norms that it notices to be legitimate (Wendt, 1999, p. 250). To observe a norm as legal basically means totally agreeing that norm’s righteousness on itself via appropriating of a matching identity (Wendt, 1999). Whether states perceive norms as legal finally depends on their identities. A matching argument is furthered by Katzenstein (1996a, p. 27), who differentiates between “thin” control norms of liberal approaches and “thick” componential norms that define actors’ identities and design their interests. In his study of Japan’s identity, Katzenstein claims that the relation between Japan and the United States relates to “the realm of regulatory norms, of standards of appropriate behaviour within a diplomatic relationship defined in terms of long-term interests,” and therefore, “do not touch on issues of collective identity” (Katzenstein, 1996a, p. 150). Such thin control norms match with the second level of incorporation in Wendt’s argument. The third level of incorporation is typified by what Katzenstein understands to be the central factor of Japanese shared identity, namely the constitutive norm of Japan as a “non-majoritarian polity that respects intensely held views of strong minorities” (Katzenstein, 1996a, p. 19). Another norm that is basic to Japan’s identity is a norm of Japan as a trading state that is keen to gain economic prosperity (Katzenstein, 1996a). Possibly all constructivists affirm that state identity notion makes it feasible to go farther from the tight utilitarian perspective of norms as supported by rationalists. A specific action not permitted by a norm becomes conceived as irrelevant with the facade of the Self. This could involve appearance of a new state identity, but often with a little improvement of the current identity is fine. For instance, the norm that prohibits the first use of armaments of mass destruction generally does not require a new state identity, as it could be comfortably integrated via the enlargement of a state’s past identity as a “civilized” nation. Norms are therefore an essential component of state identity within constructivist paradigm. In the absence of the notion of state identity, constructivist details of norms would not be distinct from the previously presented by neoliberal scholars. Therefore Katzenstein (1996b, p. 5) makes an outward reference to identity when he defines norms as “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors within a given identity”. Because state identity is both a central part of culture and a repository of norms, it is a crucially significant notion that capacitates and keeps intact much of the constructivist argument. State identity is normally related to culture, which is associated with socially agreed viewpoints, as defined by a large segment of constructivists. So there is a difference of associating identity to culture to the limit of relating it in the context of international relations. Berger (1998) has approached the relation of identity with culture to the wider context of a state’s domestic political-military culture, relating it to defence, security, and the use of military power in international matters. Discussion on identity could help in deriving and relating it with either domestic or international culture. Some academicians view a state’s local culture as a reflection of its identity. For instance, Wendt (1992; 1994; 1999) observes culture of border-state community as a lead factor of state identity. Wendt (1999) sees international relations in terms of three ideal kinds of interstate-level social mechanisms. These are Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures of anarchy. Significant part of these cultures is that beliefs of these cultures relate to states, not people. The leading feature of each kind of culture is “role” or stand taken by the Self toward the Other in case of violence. State’s own identities and stakes are by-products of those system-generated roles. Relatively speaking, the Kantian culture of anarchy is sober to Hobbesian and Lockean cultures of anarchy wherein states communicate and perform the role of friends, “allies who do not use violence to settle their disputes and work as a team against security threats” (Wendt, 1999, p. 258). While the very notion of state identity appears to mean unproblematic and fixed border between the self and other states, Wendt’s approach hints that the borders of the self might enlarge to include other states. The example of Kantian culture befits well when states develop common identity as “friends” and begin to identify with each other’s wellbeing and safety, for example, the “European Union member” identity that describes the probability of changing identity borders in a relatively friendly environment. It highlights the importance of knowing the difference between the cultures of anarchy and the state identities to be formed. Suganami (2002) evaluates connected claims of Wendt’s logic to conclude that a culture of anarchy is just a system-level detailing of a situation when states carry a specific role as their identity. Wendt’s cultures of anarchy do not form the state identity of a specific state; they are just names for the normally combined role of the state identities of a group of states. Wendt’s approach to state identity is based on complicated assumptions, viewing it as a single actor. His definition of identity of state is easy to understand that shows a miser perspective of state’s interest and action. This perspective of identity designs state’s interests, which in turn guide state behaviour. The response for state behaviour requires to “identify” the identity accountable for the stakes that steer state actions. Nevertheless, this approach basically calls for a redundant line of argument. Wendt defines state identity only in the context of its outside aspect, requiring inferring identity by viewing state actions on global platform. Nevertheless, when state identity is finally derived from its behaviour, there is no dependable way to find out whether transformations in behaviour are caused by identity change or other elements. Thus, state identity risks becoming a tautological label for some comparatively permanent design of a specific state’s behaviour, while any change to this design is leniently mixed with identity change. An associated issue of many state identity approaches is that they do not offer a satisfactory reasoning of how actors select between competing identities. This issue is not even acknowledged by some constructivists. Wendt does acknowledge that “many situations call up several identities that may point in different directions” (1999, p. 230). Wendt himself probably locates the resulting level of indecisiveness built in constructivist analytical design. Agreeing that there is no method of foretelling before time how insider identity issues are resolved. He provides a general hypothesis that such issues are resolved according to importance or ranking of identities. Wendt assumes that all stakes arise from identities. Yet in particular situations of identity change, when old identities are stricken out and new ones are selected and welcomed, a shift in values becomes the cause for such change. Identities, therefore, reside at the same time with values or stakes: neither sets a precedent to the other. Stakes are created by identities, but then identities are selected because of certain stakes or values. Wendt (1999) explaining states’ behaviour indicates that certain states are very reclusive and communicate very little with the system, such as Albania and Burma, claiming them to be ‘autistic’. This deficiency of communication with others surely starts to define their very identity itself besides other states’ outlooks of them within the global system. Burma’s identity as an indifferent state managed by a military junta with no value for human rights governs its relations with other states. Many states have placed limitations on Burma, for example, the USA prohibited imports from Burma, besides other steps (BBC, 2009). It indicates that Burma’s identity is bound to see its position in world politics and the resultant reaction of other states towards it. It can easily be derived that an actor’s situation is not without limitation, but they can manage their choices whilst dealing with others (Fierke, 2010). Burma could have shifted its political and diplomatic stance by cooperating with others to bring about a transformation in other states’ perspectives but it does not. Additionally, Ruggie emphasises the significance of identity and identity making in relation to supranational organisations. Ruggie rewrites a quote from ex Czech President Vaclav Havel in connection with approaching NATO membership for the Czech Republic: “In short, according to Havel, the would-be NATO members are asking for affirmation that they belong to the West – an affirmation of identity from which concrete interests and preferences flow” (1998b, p. 877). This rephrasing stresses the significance of identity to the post-communist states of East-Central Europe, sandwiched between their past communist identities and their past relations with Russia and their wish to strengthen relations with the West. The constructivist approach over identity in the context of international relations helps in differentiating it from other approaches, such as culturalist and relativist outlooks that are based on the distinctiveness of various states’ political cultures and diplomatic functions. It helps in establishing a relationship between state identity and other significant notions of constructivist approaches. Identity of the state is the basic notion of constructivism. It offers a guide to the theoretical basis for the constructivist argument regarding norms. A study of the identity notion may help in clarifying irrelevancies creeping in through constructivist theorising of the identity of the state. Relations of the state identity are not clear with other significant notions of constructivism, the issue of selection among various identities, and the application of the notion of state identity. The study of identity notion can help in clearing the dust over its welcoming by hugely rationalist leads of the international relations discipline. Otherwise ignored by the lead scholars, the study of the notion of identity would help in organising fruitful discussion on the role that state identities perform in international relations. The research and appraisal of identity carry the pivotal role in the constructivist study programme. Nevertheless, systemic constructivism formed by Wendt also negates the most critical aspects of that identity –particularly the internal aspect of it- from the research. This neglect to the domestic sources of identity – internal aspect- and its dealing with the outer aspect essentially undermines the constructivist assertion. Wendt also makes implicit assumptions, which, if analyzed thoroughly, may threaten to undermine the possibility of his constructivism. In conclusion, identity is essential in attempting to comprehend international politics today. Irrespective of the assertions of realists and neorealist’s, states are not just power usurping, self-centred people; various states have distinct identities, which are impacted by their various stakes. Identity seems to perform a basic role in global relations. Both constructivism and post-structuralism stress the significance of identity in their schools of thought. Renowned academicians like Wendt use identity as a key word in their research. Identity can assist in comprehending the working of global relations, as the example of Burma indicates. References Barnett M., 2008. Social constructivism. In: Baylis J., Smith S., and Owens P., The globalization of world politics. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.162-171. BBC., 2009. Overview of Burma sanctions. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8195956.stm Berger, T. U., 1998. Cultures of antimilitarism: national security in Germany and Japan. Baltimore, Md. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Bukovansky, M., 1997. American identity and neutral rights from independence to the war of 1812. International Organization, 51 (2), pp. 209-243. Fierke K.M., 2010. Constructivism. In: Dunne T., Kurki M., and Smith S., International relations theories: Discipline and diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 177-194 Katzenstein, P. J., 1996a. Cultural norms and national security: police and military in post-war Japan. Ithaca, London, Cornell University Press. Katzenstein, P. J. ed., 1996b. The culture of national security: norms and identity in world politics. New York, Columbia University Press. Ruggie J.G.,1998b. What makes the world hang together? neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge. International Organization, 52 (4), pp. 855-885 Suganami, H., 2002. On Wendt’s philosophy: a critique. Review of International Studies, 28, 23-37. Wendt, A., 1992. Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International Organization, 46(2), 391-425. Wendt, A., 1999. Social theory of international politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Zehfuss, M., 2001. Constructivism and identity: a dangerous liaison. European Journal of International Relations, 7 (3), pp. 315-348. Read More