Policies of Anwar Sadat - Research Paper Example

Policies of Anwar Sadat The objective of this paper is to critically analyze the leadership of the third president of Egypt, Anwar El Sadat during his time in office from 15th October 1970 till his assassination on 6th October 1980. The paper will assess the significant events that took place during his time in office and how Sadat’s reaction and resolution for the said events shaped his tenure, consequently, concluding whether Anwar El Sadat’s leadership can be termed as a successful one or not. Born on 25 December, 1918 in a village located in Egypt’s Monufia Governorate to an Egyptian father who worked as a clerk in an army hospital and a Sudanese mother, Alagna notes that Anwar El Sadat was greatly intrigued by historical stories of nationalist heroes who fought against British presence in Egypt from his early years (Alagna 12). The story of Zahran, the hero of Denshway narrated to Sadat by his grandmother is said to have had a great influence on his desire to imagine a progressive and glorious Egypt free from British occupancy. Sadat’s early education was completed at the Koranic Teaching School situated in Mit Abul Kum and in 1938 he went on to graduate from the Royal Military Academy. Sadat’s posting in Sudan soon after his graduation allowed him to meet a number of like-minded officers including Gamal Abdel Nasser who would go on to become the second president of Egypt. Along with the members of the Free Officers Movement established with the junior officers he had met in Sudan, Sadat played an integral role in overthrowing the Muhammad Ali Dynasty in 1952 of what was known as the Egyptian Revolution. When Anwar El Sadat took office in 1970 after Gamal Abdel Nasser’s death, his political credentials were by all means inferior to that of Nasser. Nasser had intended on establishing a socialist Egyptian state with the underlying ideology of pan-Arabism that promoted a sense of unity and harmony between the nations of the Arab world, opposing any enemy that would harm the existence of any state in the Arab League. Sadat believed that he needed to move away from such Nasserist principles by creating a government that had its own credibility and in doing so Sadat acting by taking swift measures which surprised many of his critics. Heifetz suggests that Anwar El Sadat was a man who defied the beliefs, ideologies and general assumptions that the people of his country had developed during the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser (Heifetz 34). One of the first and foremost decisions taken by Sadat as soon as he took office was to launch an idea of an internal change in the political and bureaucratic setup of Egypt by radically parting ways from the teachings of Nasserism, much to the dismay and surprise of those who had believed that Sadat was incapable of taking such decisions for he was always assumed to be in the shadow of leaders such as Nasser and Naguib. In his policy of “Corrective Revolution” that emerged in 1971, Sadat gradually worked upon strategies to weaken the presence and domination of ASU – the Arab Socialist Union that was established on the underlying tenets of Nasserism so that his presidency no longer faced an emergent threat. Ryan asserts that at the same time Sadat was able to liberate much of the interest groups across Egypt which also included the Islamists by forming the perception that he was a president who was a “believer” (Ryan 30). An important event that occurred during the early years of his presidency was the release of several members of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to counter the growing influence of leftist elements in the Egyptian youth. Analysts suggest that the autonomy provided by Sadat to Islamists organizations, however, proved to be a terrible move for his regime, and once free from the shackles that previously held them during the presidency of Nasser, the Islamists had now set their eyes on dismantling Anwar El Sadat’s government. Uri Bar-Joseph’s study of the peace initiatives taken by Sadat to release the tension between Egypt and Israel suggest that the president had a clear idea that the hostilities between the two countries were steadily marching towards war. Even though, several plans had been introduced previously to resolve the issues between the two nations, none of them seemed to have worked at mending the relationship. In a last-ditch effort Sadat introduced a thorough plan for peace in February of 1973 that included several clauses which had been set by Israel as mandatory for any peace process to move forward. Even though, Sadat’s initiative looked promising it was not accepted by Golda Meir and the failure of this significant attempt left war as the only possible alternative to the foreign policy of peace. It was evident that Sadat was serious about forwarding any peace talks with Israel, something that his predecessor was unwilling to do. On October 6, 1973 an alliance of Arab nations, lead by Egypt and Syria with the support of the Soviet Union attacked Israel. The Egyptian and Syrian military forces attacked simultaneously as the former crossed the Suez Canal while the latter launched an offensive on the Golan front. The war began in the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the same day that the Israelis were observing Yom Kippur. The war struck as a complete surprise to both Israel and its ally America, who were considering Sadat’s repeated hints about a possible offensive as mere bravado. By the time the first day of military action by Egypt ended, the forces were able to boost of a complete control over the east bank. Israel’s counteroffensive however, came a bit too late even though; their army was able to dominate the Syrian forces the consequences of war on Israel were such that it was not able to regain confidence in its ability to handle the looming Arab threat. The passing of the Resolution 339 by the UNSC served as a term for all involved members to agree upon a ceasefire, by 25th October the ceasefire terms were placed into effect. The consequences of the Yom Kippur war had a vast and lasting impact across the region; despite of the fact that a surprise attack had not allowed Israeli forces to fully mobilize, the military was still able to yield an impressive defense, for the Arab forces however, Egypt’s success in severing the Bar Lev Line provided a tremendous boost in the confidence of the nations across the peninsula who now held the conviction that their forces were as capable in battlefield as that of Israel (Parker, 9). The loss that both parties faced in the war led many to raise questions such as could a better diplomatic peace process and the expertise of skillful policy makers and diplomats have prevented a state of war? It is understood that Sadat had unsuccessfully tried to initiate policies that were aimed towards avoiding a situation which eventually culminated on Yom Kippur and the 10th day of Ramadan in 1973, however, the failure of the peacemaking processes can be attributed towards a lack of commitment for the betterment of relations from both sides. This part of the paper will discuss two of the most significant events that occurred during Anwar El Sadat’s presidency – the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the subsequent Egypt-Israel Peace treaty signed on 26th March, 1979. In November, 1977 Prime Minister Menachem Begin invited Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem, an invitation that Sadat readily accepted to become the first leader from Egypt and the Arab world to visit Israel. In an introduction presented by Ambassador Yehuda Avner, the ambassador asserts that Sadat believed that his acceptance of the invitation would act as an automatic indication that Begin was willing to act in a most merciful manner in his peace talks and concessions to Egypt (Begin, xviii). This misunderstanding lead the talks to come to a standstill even before they had begun with full intensity but the zealous commitment of both Sadat and Begin at arriving at a peaceful consensus no matter what, caused the treaty to prevail. As soon as President Jimmy Carter took office, the U.S government realized that it was imperative that Egypt and Israel arrive at an agreement owing to the numerous hostilities that they shared with each other, in 1978 the three countries, Egypt, Israel and U.S acted as participants in comprehensive negotiations and peace dealings finally took place over a 13 day period as a result of the intense diplomatic efforts of the preceding fourteen months. Egypt’s past involvement in the crisis of the Arab world had left the nation to suffer from grave economic woes and Sadat recognized the problems of his nation that he believed were being overlooked due to Egypt’s intense participation in matters related to its Arab neighbors, therefore, for President Sadat the motivation to arrive at a diplomatic agreement was more important than ever. The Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979 presided on the articles that required the existence of tensions and hostilities that had prevailed between the Arab world and Israel since 1948 to be terminated along with the departure of the Israeli military forces from the lands that it had captured when the war broke out in 1967. Another significant clause of the agreement was the acknowledgment of Gulf of Aqaba as an international channel along with the Strait of Tiran. Karawan highlights the momentous role that Sadat played in the negotiations to emerge, observing from his meetings with Sadat, Henry Kissinger declared that in the signing of the Egyptian-Israel Peace Treaty it was the extraordinary strategic thinking of the Egyptian president that led to the peace process to come forward while for President Carter it was Sadat’s audacity of doing something he strongly believed in that guided his actions during the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (Ibrahim 250-255). Fisher argues that at the time of the treaty, both the countries wanted two different things, with Egypt wanting sovereignty and Israel wanting security; it were indeed the diplomatic skills of Sadat and Begin to look at the situation from the view point of both the parties’ interests rather than their positions that lead the treaty to prevail (Fisher et al 42). The international reception to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was conflicting, on one hand Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin were adorned with the Nobel Peace Prize for their diplomatic efforts, while on the other hand the Arab world took the treaty as a betrayal on Egypt’s part. Sadat became a hugely detested figure across the Arabian Peninsula while, Palestine failed to acknowledge the treaty and termed it as a fake display of peace. A few years before Sadat’s assassination in 1981, tensions and turmoil had already started to erupt across Egypt, the Islamists that Sadat had trustingly given a substantial degree of autonomy to towards the beginning of his presidency had begun to evoke a crisis situation across the nation, mostly protesting over economic and cultural issues such as Sadat’s “open door” or infitah policy that appeared to raise Egypt’s reliance on the West. The principal cause of organizations such as militant Gamaa Islamiya’s hostility towards Sadat however, was their disapproval of his peace initiatives with Israel (Marr, 50). The final nail in the coffin for Anwar Sadat came in September 1981 when he ordered the imprisonment of 1500 members from a stratified segment of the Egyptian society. On 6th October, 1981, eight years after the Yom Kippur war Anwar Sadat was assassinated by Khalid Islambouli, a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, while attending a parade to celebrate Egypt’s victory over Israel in the same month back in 1973. Battle described how mourning over the death of Anwar Sadat presented two very different scenes across the world, while, Cairo and the rest of Middle East presented little evidence of melancholy the global reaction to Sadat’s death was similar to that of John F. Kennedy’s demise (Battle 41). Indeed Anwar Sadat was a fine leader, statesman and political figure who challenged the presumptions about his leadership that regarded him as weak or a shadow of Nasser, the leader Egypt had just lost when Sadat took over. But, it should also be observed that in his political and specifically diplomatic approach, Sadat was at crossroads for the most part. From the period of 1970 till 1973 Anwar Sadat worked towards the establishment of a distinguishable and credible government that followed a harsh foreign policy stance in the majority of its diplomatic dealings, the patience and tolerance that Sadat’s leadership carried in the later stages of his presidency was certainly missing in the early years of his regime that included the Yom Kippur War against Israel in 1973. In dealing with the relations of the Arab world and Israel, Sadat had failed to establish a concrete economic policy proposal for his own country and his Infitah policy proved to be hugely unpopular amongst poor Egyptians who felt that they were being marginalized in the name of a freer and more liberal economic strategy and the encouragement of foreign private investment. By 1977, the year in which Sadat became the first Arab political figure to visit Israel, massive riots in Egypt had already begun to erupt that indicated dissatisfaction over the economic situation of the country. It is believed that at this point Sadat had already realized that he needed to tackle the peace proceedings with Israel as soon as possible so that Egyptian interests could also be protected. The Camp David Accord of 1978 and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979 proved to be a tremendous achievement for Sadat in terms of promoting peace on an international scale but it was not well-received by his own people. The growing influence of militant and Islamist organizations such as Gama Islamiya and the Muslim Brotherhood that were provided autonomy by Sadat himself to avoid the rise of leftist Nasserists became a threat, that ultimately proved to be fatal for Sadat. Anwar Sadat, as a strategic thinker, diplomat and champion for peace was a highly successful leader credited with working towards a major breakthrough in Arab and Israel relationships. Even though, the treaty was not accepted by the Arab World it did act as a bridge towards establishing a strategic relationship between Egypt and Israel. The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 however, has raised concerns about the status of the treaty, but it was and still stands as one of Sadat’s greatest successes during his time as the president of Egypt. WORKS CITED: Alagna, Magdalena. Anwar Sadat. The Rosen Publishing Group, 2003. Pg. 12 Heifetz, Ronald A., and Marty Linsky. "When leadership spells danger."Educational Leadership 61.7 (2004): 33-37. Ryan, Curtis R. "Political strategies and regime survival in Egypt." Journal of third world studies 18.2 (2001): 25-46. Bar-Joseph, Uri. "Last chance to avoid war: Sadats peace initiative of February 1973 and its failure." Journal of contemporary history 41.3 (2006): 545-556. Parker, Richard Bordeaux, ed. The October war: A retrospective. University Press of Florida, 2001. Begin, Menachem, Harry Zvi Hurwitz, and Yisrael Medad. Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence. Gefen Publishing House Ltd, 2011. Ibrahim A. Karawan. International Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. 26, No. 2 (May, 1994), pp. 249-266 Fisher, Roger, and William L. Ury. Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in. Penguin Books, 2011. Marr, Phebe. Egypt at the crossroads domestic stability and regional role. DIANE Publishing, 1999. Battle, Lucius D. "Anwar Sadat Remembered." SAIS Review 2.3 (1981): 41-48. Read More