The Level and the Possibility of Ethnic Conflicts Between and Within States - Essay Example

Introduction In the recent decades, ethnic conflict has supplanted ideological rivalry as the primary root of conflict between and within nation-states. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, several ethnic conflicts became hostile, and this pattern has, on the whole, persisted from then on. These ethnic-based struggles are generally called ‘civil wars’ or ‘new wars’ (Carment & James, 1997, p. 86). Ethnic conflicts are not merely limited to the territory of a particular nation, but their consequences also impinge on neighbouring nations, making themselves felt in the form of threats to international security. This essay argues that ethnic conflicts still matter as a security threat in the age of international terrorism. The analysis of the security dilemmas of ethnic conflict draws on major international relations theories. Besides causing severe miseries on people within the surrounding area of the conflict, ethnic strife usually undermines governance, economic progress, and development within the bordering territories where they take place, threatening security by intensifying armed conflict and organised criminal activities. Generally, nation-building is a challenging enterprise, wrestled within the economic, social, cultural, military, and political context (Saideman & Zahar, 2008). Once a nation is broken up ethnically besides the social, economic, and other areas of conflict, another domain is inserted to the current possibility of conflict. Confrontation strategy may range from integration to cultural subjugation, and, worst, genocide or ethnic cleansing (Williams, 2012). Conversely, the accommodation policy of the government involves adhering to the power-sharing practice among various ethnic groups, building self-governing regions and federal regimes. In relation to state policy, the manner in which ethnic conflicts are addressed generally establishes their threat to security (Williams, 2012). Normally hostility provokes violence, and accommodation can usually, but not constantly, offer bigger opportunity for long-term freedom from strife given the correct conditions. Hence, according to Brown (1993), it is not always true that the larger the diversity of ethnic groups the more serious the ethnic conflicts. The Repercussions of Ethnic Conflict for International Security Ethnic conflict denotes violent struggle between rival ethnic groups in a country. Due to the fact that there are no rigid, impartial measures for establishing what comprises an ethnic group, it is quite problematic to establish which conflicts should fall under the label ‘ethnic’. In general, these can be considered as conflicts where in issues of group recognition and identity serve a major function (Taras & Ganguly, 2009). Members of the rival parties regard themselves as members of different ethnic groups because of different languages, cultural traditions, religions, etc. They also view other groups as a risk to their identity. On the other hand, they may believe that their group has been granted inadequate recognition and value by other groups. They aim to weaken the influence of those other groups, which they try to accomplish by attempting to exterminate or banish them or by attempting to build their own sovereign state (Taras & Ganguly, 2009). Ethnic conflicts are generally secession struggles, and could be reinforced by ethnic cleansing and genocide. In the 1990s, a chain of violent struggles, like those in Rwanda and ex-Yugoslavia, pushed numerous scholars to bring up a revival of ethnic strife and to think that these would represent the major threat to international security in the post-Cold War period (Oyebade & Alao, 1998). The 1990s have seen a series of ethnic conflict rage across Africa, the previous Soviet Union, and regions of Eastern Europe. States, provinces, and at times entire regions have been overwhelmed in exploding hysteris of ethnic violence and threat. The initial hopefulness that the conclusion of the Cold War may pave the way for a new world order has been immediately frustrated (Oyebade & Alao, 1998). New fears of ethnic conflict have flowed all over the international community. Many fear that ethnic conflict is an epidemic, that conflict in a particular setting can spread out like wild fire, and that early occurrences in Africa, the previous Soviet Union, and the Balkans, if not controlled, may trigger a pandemic of unparalleled proportions. International relations (IR) scholars also worry that ethnic strife will go up by attracting outside plotters and neighbours (Shimko, 2007). Thinking about these fears, James B. Steinberg argued that “the war in the former Yugoslavia continues, and there remains a risk that it will spread, not only to other parts of Yugoslavia, but to its neighbors as well” (Lake & Rothchild, 1998, p. 3). In trying to convince the American public to approve of the deployment of U.S. soldiers to Bosnia, President Clinton supported this argument. He declared, “Without us the hard-won peace would be lost, the war would resume, the slaughter of innocents would begin again, and the conflict that already has claimed so many people could spread like poison throughout the entire region” (Lake & Rothchild, 1998, p. 3). Most daily news about ethnic conflicts across the globe substantiate such apprehensions. Ethnic conflicts usually have major repercussions for international security. In Bosnia, ethnic conflicts go beyond national borders, with the global movement of ethnic groups generally contributing to the issue. For instance, the Croatian emigrant population in the United States gave generous financial support for the separatists in Croatia, endowing them with a major advantage over moderate competitors in the first democratic elections in Croatia in 1990 (Williams, 2012, p. 274). Soon after, in 1991, a politically powerful international Croatian community in Germany pushed the nation’s foreign policy towards the Croatian movement. This event weakened international attempts to prevent full-blown conflict. Hence, Croatian emigrants in the west contributed much to the collapse of Yugoslavia and the large-scale conflicts that ensued (Collins, 2006). Another international security implication of ethnic conflict is the formation of refugees as populations reasonably escape from conflict-ridden areas. Ethnic conflicts, nevertheless, generate particularly massive populations of refugees because these ethnic conflicts are usually about which group will seize power over disputed territories, hence expulsions and mass executions are often exercised as weapons (Collins, 2006). When the affected peoples remain in their homeland, they are in principle ‘internally displaced persons’ instead of refugees, and their global influence is restricted (Williams, 2012, p. 274). Posing a humanitarian challenge, they usually obtain humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, if they do move outside their national boundaries, refugees may be considered an international security threat in a number of ways. For instance, when Serbia carried out in 1998-1999 an ethnic cleansing movement in Kosovo, the massive number of ethnic Albanian migrants who crossed international borders into Macedonia further endangered the weak ethnic unity between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians (Williams, 2012, p. 274). On the other hand, refugees may convert their refugee sites into outposts from which to assault their previous homeland. In 1994, for instance, a huge population of ethnic Hutus escaped from Rwanda to Zaire when their adversary, the Tutsi, seized control over the area. They immediately started attacking the Tutsi regime in Rwanda, exploiting international humanitarian support to strengthen their cause (Oyebade & Alao, 1998, p. 131). Eventually, these attacks goaded Rwanda and its supporters to attack Zaire, not merely bringing an end to the assaults but also overthrowing Mobutu Sese Seko, the incumbent president, and setting off what later on came to be known as ‘Africa’s first world war’ (Oyebade & Alao, 1998, p. 131). Ethnic conflicts can also become centres of international relations. While the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia escalated in the 1990s, ambassadors debated over the most appropriate measures to take to prevent war. Unfortunately, Europeans were originally divided over the Yugoslav conflict, with Britain and France initially supporting the Serbs, driving the European Union (EU) to step up its attempts to build a shared security and foreign policy (Engelbrekt, 2002). The outcome is at times successful diplomatic solution, and at times disastrously failed diplomacy. When diplomacy alone is inadequate, the international community at times decides to send humanitarian agencies, peacekeepers, or diplomats to try to handle ethnic conflict. If there is a cessation of hostilities, peacekeepers can be useful in sustaining it, particularly if they can actually break up the fighting groups (Saideman & Zahar, 2008). Bosnia, nevertheless, is a classic illustration of the uselessness of peacekeepers if they are brought in incorrectly. Since international involvement in ethnic conflicts is frequently forceful, and since peacekeepers are not consistently successful, the international community usually turn to aggressive or violent means, either indirectly or directly (Carlsnaes, Risse, & Simmons, 2002). Indirect means in ethnic conflicts are prevalent—foreign nations often supply resources to the parties they support. In numerous instances, this international support is ethnically driven as well, with nations supporting the party more strongly associated with them. At times such interventions are simply pretentious or opportunistic instead of ethnically driven. When indirect military mediation is insufficient and stakes are great, the international community at times turn to direct use of force to control ethnic conflicts (Carlsnaes et al., 2002). Ethnic conflicts are a major threat to international security partly because there is usually the possibility they will become global wars. The Security Threat: Ethnic Conflict and IR Theory The disintegration of imperial governments can be usefully considered as an issue of ‘emerging anarchy’ (Carlsnaes et al., 2002, p. 415). Realism, the oldest, most established, and most useful IR theory, openly tackles the implications of anarchy, or the nonexistence of a supreme ruler, for international security. In states like the Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, ‘sovereigns’ have vanished (Lake & Rothchild, 1998, p. 382). This anarchy produced a multitude of cultural, religious, and ethnic groups that are weakly unified. These groups should keep an eye on the major aspect that nations have traditionally dealt with, the issue of security, although most of these groups still have a fragile sense of statehood. Realism states that the circumstances of anarchy place greater emphasis on security (Carment & James, 1997). It may not be the case if states are not concerned about their continued existence as sovereign entities. So long as states are concerned about their survival, there will be rivalry for power—the means to security. The rivalry will usually persist until the rival parties have accumulate more power than required for security and, hence, as a result begin to intimidate or threaten the security of others (Lake & Rothchild, 1998, pp. 382-383). Entities that are threatened will act in response. Using IR theory is necessary for a number of bases. IR theory is focused mainly on matters of conflict and diplomacy. Although IR theories are focused on the actions and function of states in the global arena, they still begin by explaining basic ideas about human nature. Both liberalist and realist theory view human beings as rational and self-centred entities focused on their own survival (Collins, 2006). In a state of anarchy, this implies full dependence on self-reliance: gain as much power as possible so as to conquer any danger to one’s survival. Another basis for using IR theory for a greater understanding of ethnic conflict’s threat to security is empirially supported. Although it is factual that conflicts between states have remarkably declined in rate of recurrence since 1945, the widely recognised assumption that conflicts within states are currently one of the biggest threats to international security is to a certain extent a generalisation of a much more complicated issue (Williams, 2012). Ethnic conflicts may not be inter-state conflict, but they are usually not internal conflicts either for they are often not restricted to the boundaries of a particular nation. For instance, the Chechnya conflict has implicated Georgia, exploited as an outpost and pathway for Chechen dissenters, and has threatened nearby areas in Russia (Collins, 2006, pp. 150-151). The assumption of realism is that states aim to strengthen their security in a perilous period. For defensive realism, this implies that states will act in response to threats through the formation of alliances. States can enhance their security and comparative status by supporting attempts that would diminish the accumulated power of their enemies and the dangers they create (Saideman, 2001, p. 18). The common assumption that can be obtained from realist theory, therefore, is that “when threatened by another state, states will support secessionist movements in that state” (Collins, 2006, p. 151). This assumption alone suggests that ethnic conflict is a massive threat to international security. The most essential feature of the argument of Stephen Walt—a scholar of international affairs—is the recognition of threats. Walt specifies that major factors influencing “the level of threat that states may pose: aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions” (Saideman, 2001, p. 18). The more powerful a state is, the more intimidating it is. The greater the power a state has, the more likely others will back up secessionist campaigns within it. Similarly, when a state enhances its offensive capacity, it raises a larger threat to other states. Although the concept of offensive capacity is quite conventional with an emphasis on the comparative edge of the defense or offense, Walt regards offensive capacity as “the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost” (Engelbrekt, 2002, p. 89). Lately, Walt has further developed his concept of offensive capacity to comprise ideological rebellion. Hence, his theory may be expanded further to regard the capacity to back up a secessionist campaign, or the capacity to threaten a state’s territorial security, as an offensive capacity (Engelbrekt, 2002, p. 89). Therefore, a state capable of backing up secession movements will create a serious threat, forcing others to back up secessionist campaigns within that state. Geographic proximity, another feature of threat, is definite: the nearer an enemy is, the bigger the threat it creates. States will react more aggressively if the prospective enemy is in close proximity (Shimko, 2007, pp. 81-82). Apparently, geographic proximity serves a function as it enables states to offer aid like weapons to separatist groups more efficiently. States will be more likely to back up ethnic conflicts in neighbouring states than elsewhere. In the meantime, ‘perceived intentions’ are the most complex feature of threat: “States that are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them” (Shimko, 2007, p. 82). Obviously, a state with antagonistic motives is more dangerous than a state without this kind of intention. The concept of ‘perceived intentions’ generate the following assumption: “a state perceived as willing to use the ability to disrupt the territorial integrity of other states will provoke increased support by other states for secessionist movements within its own territory” (Saideman, 2001, p. 20). In other words, states back up ethnic conflicts in states that terrorise them. On the other hand, Stephen David clearly integrates domestic politics in his theoretical perspective. For him, leaders are interested in and apprehensive about both global and local threats, and usually prefer to form outside alliances with states that are likely to aid them in their local struggles (Saideman, 2001, pp. 20-21). One may expand David’s argument: leaders are mostly interested in domestic politics, leading them to take part in foreign policies that can significantly contradict their nation’s security priorities. By giving an explanation of the foreign policy orientations of states, based on elites’ interests, the foreign policy and ethnic politics theory may help in understanding why several threats are interpreted as such and why a number of states create ‘antagonistic’ or ‘unfriendly’ motives. Ethnic politics is not able to give an explanation of all the conflicting relations in the world (Saideman, 2001, pp. 20-21). Nevertheless, when taking into account relations towards ethnic conflicts and the tendency to back up the opponent of one’s enemy, the nature of threats and adversaries may be more appreciated if ethnic conflicts between and within states are considered. Conclusions Several major conclusions may be derived from the discussion. Above all, the realist IR theory and security dilemma have major capacity to give an explanation of and foresee the level and possibility of ethnic conflicts developing from the ruins of great civilisations. The IR theory also indicates that the security threat related to these ethnic conflicts are great. Therefore, if the international community wants to understand and possibly lessen the possibilities of conflict, they should evaluate the ethnic groups’ perception of their condition. By reducing the threat felt by these ethnic groups, the possibilities of conflict could be lessened. References Brown, M. (1993) Ethnic Conflict and International Security. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., & Simmons, B. (2002) Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage. Carment, D. & James, P. (1997) Wars in the Midst of Peace: The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Collins, A. (2006) Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Engelbrekt, K. (2002) Security Policy Reorientation in Peripheral Europe: A Comparative-Perspectivist Approach. London: Ashgate. Lake, D. & Rothchild. D. (1998) The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Oyebade, A. & Alao, A. (1998) Africa After the Cold War: The Changing Perspectives on Security. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. Saideman, S.M. (2001) The Ties that Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press. Saideman, S. & Zahar, M. (2008) Intra-State Conflict, Governments and Security: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Assurance. London: Routledge. Shimko, K. (2007) International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Taras, R. & Ganguly, R. (2009) Understanding Ethnic Conflict. UK: Longman. Williams, P. (2012) Security Studies: An Introduction. London: Routledge. Read More