Export Control: International Traffic in Arms Regulations - Research Paper Example

International Traffic in Arms Regulations (Export Control) Edward K Tammachat Abstract The poise between export competitiveness and national security has been the subject of export controls controversy for decades. The current U.S. export control system is too dispersed among a number of different licensing and enforcement agencies. The American administration must decrease the probability of allowing delicate items being held by wrong people while permitting legitimate trading activities is significant in overseeing the transfer of weapons and associated technologies worldwide. However, it has become increasingly difficult to achieve this balance due to the constant changes in security threats, an increasingly globalized economy, and the coordination challenges among the agencies. A unified export control system is the key to see this balance to realization (Creswell, 2009). Keywords: ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations), export control, reforms International Traffic in Arms Regulation Introduction The American government exports expensive defense services and articles, for example, training, military aircraft, firearms, technical assistance, explosives, and, repair parts that may at times include significant technologies. The administration perceives the export of these services and articles as an essential component of protecting the national security and advancing foreign policy objectives. The exports are managed by two agencies: the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Arms Export Control Act. Similarly, they are also administered by the Department of State for all items on the U.S. Munitions List (USML) and by the Department of Commerce for all “dual-use” commercial items on the Commerce Control List (CCL). The authorization to transfer defense articles and provide defense services if applied properly can assist in meeting the proper requirements of friendly countries, promote the peaceful resolution of disputes, deter aggression, and foster regional stability. The Government Accountability Office has highlighted the flaws in the adequacy of government strategies meant to provide guidance to significant technologies. These are largely pointed to inadequate complex interagency processes, synchronization within different government agencies, and inadequate information sharing that contribute to export enforcement issues (Government Accountability Office, 2007). The past studies by the Government Accountability Office have revealed two weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the export control system: the Department of State and the Commerce department have not clearly determined which of them controls the export of certain sensitive items. Unclear jurisdiction allows exporters and not the government to establish the export rules that are applicable and the form of government assessment that will occur. This increases the danger of items falling into the wrong hands and establishes an uneven platform among organizations. The government’s ability to guarantee that unlicensed exports abide by export laws and rules has been hampered by the inadequate clarity on exemption use (Government Accountability Office, 2007). Unfortunately, the Government Accountability Office’s findings also had gaps and limitations in the specifics of the recommendations and did not prompt any further actions by the State Department or the Department of Commerce to institute any changes to the current export control policies. Furthermore, instituting across the board changes and restructuring would require a large amount of funding that no one in congress was yet ready to support. The studies showed that these weaknesses contributed to the government enforcement community and aerospace and defense industrial base, particularly the commercial satellite producers, and the Printed Circuit Board (PCB) manufacturers (Government Accountability Office, 2007). This paper will look at issues in export control regulations and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, and a proposal of areas to be improved. The American administration perceives the export, re-transfers, and sale of defense services and defense articles as a core component of protecting the national security and enhancing foreign policy objectives. Permission to provide defense services and move defense articles can be helpful in dealing with the legitimate needs of responsive nations, foster regional stability, promote the peaceful resolution of disputes, and deter aggression, if applied judiciously. However, America is conscious of the probable severe effects of unlawful transfer of weapons and, therefore, firmly controls exports and re-exports of defense technologies and items to safeguard the country’s interests and the interests of the entire international community (Creswell, 2009). The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and Directorate of Defense Trade Controls have the responsibility of managing the temporary import and export of defense services and defense articles under the United States Munitions Lists in relation to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, and 22 U.S.C. 2778-2780 of the Arms Export Control Act. With the regulations, in place, the violations normally, occur in the “re-transfers” of defense articles to “End-user” of the articles. In many cases, these end-use and end-users are unauthorized agents or countries. The DoS's attempt to avert illegal technology transfers and defense exports depend on End-Use checks. End-use checks also referred to as “Blue Lantem” depends on the foreign governments, the cooperation of Border Protection and Customs, and, most significantly, America’s diplomatic posts during pre-license audits and post-shipment ascertaining of defense exports (Weinberger, 2006). Between 2005 and 2009, exports of defense materials, for example, explosives, military aircrafts, and firearms were approximately $22 billion in a year. Almost 60 percent of the defense materials were exported through organizations to external actors via DCS licenses. In addition, the remaining percentage was sold to external actors through the FMS program. The largest component of the exports was made up of aircrafts and associated parts. This was almost about 44 percent of the entire exports. The second largest composition of the export was electronics equipment, communications, satellites, and their associated components. (Weinberger, 2006). In addition, exports of defense materials were located in a number of states. They include the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Egypt, the United Kingdom, Australia, South Korea, and Israel. Nonetheless, there is no information that illustrates the export of defense services, for example, training and technical assistance given using the DCS. In addition, exports of defense services accomplished via FMS were constant, and they accounted for almost a third of the total exports. The law proscribes the unlicensed export of specified information or materials for reasons of protection of trade or national security. Nonetheless, majority of exports do not need licenses from the government. Only exports considered by the administration as licensed controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations need licenses. Moreover, export controls result from either or all of the following reasons; Government issues on suspected or declared final use or the final utilize of the export; the export has potential or actual economic protection or military application issues; and government worries about an individual, organization, or country. Export controls entail the inclusion of all foreigners in activities that comprise technology without getting a license from the relevant government bureau. Also, when a thing is regulated, a license may be needed prior to the export of a technology (Fergusson & Kerr, 2012). This requirement does not only relate to physical commodities, for example, software or prototype, but also the outcomes of research. In addition, there are a number of nations where the United States law denies license for the export and sale of these products. These countries include Serbia and Montenegro, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Armenia, Syria, Azerbaijan, North Korea, Belarus, Libya, Cuba, Iraq, and Iran. The American administration regulates exports of delicate technology, equipment, and software as a strategy to enhance foreign policy objectives and national security interests. The American administration can utilize the export control system to enhance the stability of the region, promote national security by minimizing access to the most delicate weapons and technology, conform to international standards, take into consideration human rights, and put a stop to production of technologies and weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, to promoters of international terrorism and problem end-users (Fergusson & Kerr, 2012). Every broker, exporter, and manufacturer of defense services, defense articles, or associated technical information, as explained in the United States Munitions List, is supposed to enlist with the Department of State. Registration helps the American administration to acquire relevant information on the people involved in the development and export activities. Registration is a requirement for the approval of export or issuance of a license and does not give any export privileges or rights. Every person who registers is required to pay a minimum of $2,250 every year. Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, any American citizen who wishes to export United States Munitions List commodities to a non-American, he must gain permission from the Department of State before the sale can be performed (Stinnett, 2000). This means, for example, a non-American citizen in America will maintain his status of being a foreigner due to International Traffic in Arms Regulations and an export of United States Munitions List commodities to them in America require export authorization. The American administration has significantly enhanced acts against individuals and organizations that violate International Traffic in Arms Regulations from 1999. The most prominent enforcement act was a penalty totaling $100M applied to ITT due to the unlawful relocation of night vision technology, in 2007, to the PRC. In addition, there are a number of American defense contractors who have been fined for violating International Traffic in Arms Regulations in latest times; they include Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Motorola, L-3 Communications, and Boeing. In numerous cases, fines against organizations comprise a compulsory compliances component needing the body to expend finances on measures of compliance (Stinnett, 2000). Likewise, sentences may necessitate the party to give into external check. Also, a party may be banned from exporting commodities in the future for a period, where the cases are momentous. In 2009, the president proclaimed the introduction of a complete evaluation of the export control system. The Defense Secretary recommended a strategy that would develop an export control licensing bureau for both munitions and dual-use exports. The export control licensing bureau would develop an integrated security system, set up an enforcement coordination unit, and embrace a unified control list. There have been widespread discussions on reforming or improving the export authorization process and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (Fergusson & Kerr, 2012). Nevertheless, these discussions are not new. For example, before the September eleven attacks, key law makers made statements regarding larger fences around fewer commodities. The deliberation has in recent times strengthened, but, because of the competitiveness of American satellite and defense industry globally, enhanced international defense cooperation, worries about the gradual speed of processing International Traffic in Arms Regulations export authorization, and International Traffic in Arms Regulations item restrain are presumed not to be significant to the national security anymore. A team of Defense Science Board has established that America’s policy continues to prevent the country from attaining economic and security advantages. Also, numerous views concerning the International Traffic in Arms Regulations authorizations processing can be dealt with by the executive branch of the administration (Fergusson & Kerr, 2012). Nonetheless, the export control regulations, especially, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations needs to improve in a number of areas. First, regulations must deal with a policy that counter terrorist activities and facilitate export commodities that promote homeland security main concerns. Second, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations should concentrate on a trivial sample of significant things that cause a severe intelligence or national security menace to America and its affiliates. Third, newly proposed International Traffic in Arms Regulations control files should concisely recognize items that are managed and are effortlessly modernized as technology materializes, becomes largely available, or advances. Fourth, the unilateral controls employed in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations should focus on a present foreign or legal policy objective. Fifth, regulations should also be totally synchronized with the mutual export control systems so as to be adequate. Sixth, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations should improve in the licensing processes. The licensing procedure should be timely and predictable. Seventh, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations should enhance its enforcement abilities. The enforcement capacity should be improved to deal with increase capacity and non-compliance to stop transfers that are not approved (Weinberger, 2006). Conclusion The implementation of export regulations and control laws incorporates a number of agencies with different authorities, roles, and responsibilities. The agencies concerned with the enforcement of export control undertake a wide range of activities, comprising pursuing and inflicting appropriate fines and penalties against violators, investigating probable export control breaches, and inspecting products to be exported (Weinberger, 2006). The different agencies gain their enforcement power from an intricate set of regulations and laws, which provide simultaneous influence to a number of agencies to carry out investigations. Also, these agencies come across a number of difficulties in implementing export regulations and control laws. There is also a widespread discussion between academia, the industries, and Department of State controlled by International Traffic in Arms Regulations in relation to how the regulatory restrictions are harming higher education institutions and businesses. In addition, prior reform attempts have produced different amounts of success. Familiarity implies that decisive features in producing consequential reform incorporate both adequate consultation with the private sector and congress and constant administration by senior government officials. In addition, significant reform improvements of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations will necessitate congress feel that there is an urge for reform of both the export authorization procedure and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. References Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Fergusson, I. F., & Kerr, P. K. (2012). The U.S. export control system and the president’s reform initiative. Congressional Research Service, 1-21. Government Accountability Office. (2007). High-Risk series: An update. GAO-07-310, 2-34. Stinnett, R. (2000). Day of deceit: The truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor. New York, NY: Free Press. Weinberger, S. (2006). Here we go again: Industry and government revisit U.S. export controls. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 165(3), 82-88. Read More