David Kilcullens Models of Global Instability - Essay Example

Military David Kilcullen argues that the current global environment encompasses four models of instability that describe the rise of insurgencies across the globe (Kilcullen 27). He asserts that these four models of instability occur simultaneously, and a number of insurgent groups have formed due to one or a combination of these environmental models. Kilcullen’s four models of instability include Backlash Against Globalization, Globalized Insurgency, Civil War Within Islam, and Asymmetric Warfare. This paper focuses on evaluating how Kilcullen’s four models of global instability will influence the types, characteristics, and frequency of small wars the United States may face in the future. The first part provides a brief description of Kilcullen’s models of global instability, and then the second part provides how these models influence small wars that the U.S. will face in the future. Kilcullen argues that the rise of extremist or insurgent groups, within Islamic nations, is as a result of backlash against globalization, especially the West’s corruptive and negative influences within the Muslim faith. Globalization has created an environment where people have an easy access to information, criminal activities, arms, and goods and services. According to Kilcullen, perceive Western dominance and influence resulting from globalization has a direct threat to Muslim’s cultural identity (Kilcullen 29). Globalization Insurgency Model suggests that the radical Sunni Islamic groups, Takfiri, like al Qaeda have created sympathetic insurgencies and caused social unrest across the globe as a reaction to the increased globalization. They believe that the Western cultural practices have direct threat on the Islamic faith. Therefore, in order to seek for the U.S. interventions and gain sympathy and support from the local population, they sponsor violence and terrorist attack. The main objective of Islamic insurgent groups is to develop insurgencies that defy standard COIN practices that are developed and maintained by the West and the U.S. (Kilcullen 31). However, Kilcullen speculates that the rise of Islamic insurgencies and the increasing stability within Islamic nations is as a result of civil war within the Muslim faith, but not as a result of backlash against Western influences (Kilcullen 31). He further posits that the conflict between Shi’ah and Sunni is the most probable cause of the rift between Persians and Arabs, amongst other factors such as economic competition, in the petro-chemical market (Kilcullen 39). In asymmetric warfare model, Kilcullen argues that the rise of Islamic insurgencies is as a result of ideologies, which suggests they cannot defeat Western militaries through conventional means. He states that the dominance of the U.S., in the twentieth century, has created an environment where the insurgents use irregular methodologies to confront and fight the U.S. (Kilcullen 54). The number of small wars, especially counterterrorism, stability operations, and COIN are likely to increase, in the future as the U.S. increasingly intensifies its fight against takfiri extremist and al Qaida groups across the globe. The U.S. has been in the forefront in the addressing terrorism activities and other terror attacks, not only in the U.S., but globally. For instance, in Somalia, located in the horn of Africa, there are increased terror activities and attacks, not only in Somalia but its neighboring nations such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. The Muslim insurgent group responsible for launching these terror attacks is known as Al-Shabaab militia group, which is supported by al Qaeda (Kilcullen 115). There increased attacks on the locals and neighboring nations have called for U.S. intervention. For instance, early this year, the U.S. supported an agenda to move United Nation’s troops into Somalia to help in combating this group’s terror activities. In this case, the U.S. military is perceived as the only national power, which has maintained the willingness and resources to employ, deploy, and sustain military operations in support of small wars. In this context, it is obvious that the frequency at which the U.S. and other Western military groups will be deployed to tackle small wars, in the future, will significantly increase in relation to Kilcullen’s four models of global insecurity (Kilcullen 28). Additionally, the strategies that the U.S. is adapting to address, disaster and conflict will significantly structure the future issues regarding the characteristics of small wars. For instance, the U.S. will demand assistance beyond its manpower, expertise, and capabilities of the U.S. military, in the wake of COIN, FHA operations in Japan and Haiti, and stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and operations to disrupt al Qaeda terrorist activities and attacks (Kilcullen 117). The political uprisings in Egypt, Syria, and Libya called for the U.S. intervention. Since the U.S. could not counteract these political unrest single handedly, he called upon the United Nation, European Union, and African Union to provide resources, and military troops to help the U.S. military in ending these small wars. This is an indication that the U.S. is beginning to rely on nonmilitary resources and means to address small wars. Additionally, the U.S. is likely to rely on the civilian contractors and sectors such as PVOs and NGOs to address the long-term focus and complexities for small war operations (Kilcullen 264). The characteristics of future small wars will also be influenced by reliance on regional partners. The reliance on partner nations will be triggered by the common political, cultural, economic, and security ties that the U.S. shares with its regional partners. For example, the recent U.S. participation in small wars, across the globe, illustrates the strategic need to include multinational and regional partners, alongside other civil sectors such as nongovernmental organizations and agencies to assist the U.S in addressing areas of instability, conflict and disasters (Kilcullen 267). It is apparent that civil-military operation centers and provincial reconstruction teams will become more robust and diverse, in capabilities and compositions as the U.S. will be addressing future small wars. The increase in political uprisings and social unrest demonstrate the significance of coordinating the deployment of the U.S. military troops and resources with regional partners in addressing future small wars. Similarly, the need for other nations to reduce the footprints of the U.S. military troops across the globe, in addressing disasters and conflicts have forced other nations to demand active participation in addressing counterterrorism operations, stability operation, or the overall security cooperation operations over COIN (Kilcullen 187). This will indeed change the U.S. methodology of supporting small wars, in the future. Likewise, it is also necessary to demonstrate that Kilcullen’s models of global insecurity may not change the characteristics and frequency of U.S. involvement in the future small wars. The U.S. government may decide to reduce its commitment, in addressing stability operations and COIN requirements, due to the increasing involvement of insurgent groups, in terrorism attacks and activities. In spite of Kilcullen’s suggestion that there will be increased number of regional instabilities, across the globe, the U.S. might lack the required manpower and resources to extend it military operations when addressing future small wars (Kilcullen 189). Additionally, the demands of the Department of Defense are likely to increase due to the need for modern military equipment that is made with current technological ideas. This will increasingly reduce the Congress inclination to address future small wars, unless it directly affects the U.S. vital interests and national security. On the other hand, the U.S. may shift much of her attention to address its vital national interests and national security priorities (Kilcullen 252). This implies that the rate at which the U.S. will participate in small wars will depend on internal strategic security considerations, but not the increasing number of Islam insurgencies across the globe. In the U.S., the National Security Strategy (NSS) provides comprehensive guidelines for applying all the instruments of national power when addressing any disaster or crisis. For example, the NSS established that al Qaeda is the leading terrorist threat to the U.S. national security (Kilcullen 116). Therefore, with the fall of key al Qaeda officials like Osama Bin Laden and the warning given to the Muslim nations, it is most likely that the U.S. involvement, in future small wars, will significantly depend on the NSS’s objectives, but not Kilcullen’s models of global insecurity. Works Cited Kilcullen D. The Accidental Guerrilla:Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. London: Oxford University Press, 2009. Print Read More