Analysing the Concept of National Interest Defined in Terms of Power - Research Paper Example

Analysing the Concept of National Interest Defined in Terms of Power Introduction In global politics, the concept of ‘rationality’ is greatly viewedin instrumental terms. In international political affairs national leaders should embark on a subjective process of decision-making with incomplete and indefinite information. Instrumental rationality does not necessarily involve foresight, but it does expect that the policies or strategies adopted by states embody the rational decisions of national leaders, and that, in reaching those decisions the leaders are capable of assessing and addressing foreseen results (Smith 1999). To these beliefs, proponents of classical realism would insert another: that the leaders reach these decisions derived from an estimate of national interests with respect to their relative power. This assumption is described by Hans Morgenthau: “We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out” (Smith 1999, 63). This essay attempts to explain this statement by Morgenthau and provide a critical assessment of the accuracy of this assumption. The National Interest Defined in Terms of Power Hans Morgenthau argues that the foundation of actions or decisions of states are strongly based on human biological tendencies: this unavoidably produces a capability for self-seeking, self-centred actions, either by individuals or in political affairs through shared self-interest. One of the main biological tendencies of human beings is believed to be the need to rule or control others, or to possess power (Burchill et al. 2009). The roots of social problems and interstate conflict in most cases can therefore be attributed to the encoded human nature, which is characterised by a “limitless and ever unstilled desire which comes to rest only with the exhaustion of its possible objects” (Glenn et al. 2004, 30). Hence, Morgenthau believes that all studies of society and all suggested solutions to the issues of a certain period should not put emphasis on educational and institutional change, which presumes a certain extent of natural human selflessness. Rather, it should “start with the assumption that power politics, rooted in the lust for power which is common to all men, is for this reason inseparable from social life itself” (Glenn et al. 2004, 30). It is this very perception of human nature that created the currently popular belief that “statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that out” (Williams et al. 1993, 194). Regardless of the definitive goal, the primary goal of foreign policy should be to sustain, prove, or expand the state’s power or influence, for power is the path to all other goals in global politics. Morgenthau’s argument has instructional, prescriptive, and explanatory propositions. Advocates of realism believe that this is how national leaders do think and behave, and, in a context where influence, control, or power is everything, it is how national leaders should think and behave (Williams et al. 1993). Indeed, it is the instructional and prescriptive components that are emphasised by classical realists. According to Dunne and colleagues (2010), realists have long observed that there are departures from and distortions of these instructions in the foreign policies and national strategies of several states, which they describe as unwise, at most. The rational choice model of examining individuals in the process of foreign policymaking in fact does not focus on particular individuals whatsoever. This model develops directly from the main assumption of realists that views a state as an integrated agent. In global politics, as described by this perspective, states are simply distinguished through the relative power they possess, and not through their domestic attributes. Hence, economics, history, form of government, and the characteristics of the people vested with political power are not important to the analyst. The choices made by statesmen are identified as the choices of the state (Nicolson & Fierke 2005). This juxtaposition of the state and statesmen exists due to an important idea that realists hold about statesmen (Neack 2003, 46): all statesmen behave in ways in agreement with the country’s long-standing national interest. Because this national interest stays unchanged, changes or adjustments in leadership are inconsequential. Decision making is described as the “act of choosing among available alternatives about which uncertainty exists” (Neack 2003, 46). This description is not in any way restricted in its application to rational choice advocates and realists until it is translated into the crucial idea of this school, which is, that states are integrated agents driven by subjects of national interest identified as gaining and protecting power. The original analytical account of the realist decision-making framework was given by Burton Sapin, H.W. Bruck, and Richard Snyder in 1954. Within their paradigm, they specify these points (Neack 2003, 46-27): Because states are integrated agents, the choices and behaviour of statesmen can be regarded as similar to the choices and behaviour of the state. Because every state is held to be motivated by national interests, all states arrive at choices similarly. State decision-making could be described as a course of action where in national leaders study external and internal factors, identify the issue under consideration, take into account other strategies and afterward choose the strategy which excellently benefits the national interests. The decision-making theory has frequently been portrayed as a ‘black box.’ One cannot and does not have to see inside the box because all black boxes--which symbolise statesmen, governments, and nations— function similarly (Guilhot 2011, 60). Facts about existing problems, workable solutions, probable responses, and calculations of outcomes for the various solutions are placed inside the box. A decision afterwards emerges from the box. Apparently, national leaders or decision makers are living in an imperfect world, and thus do not have at their disposal every important fact or information upon which to base the most appropriate choice. With regard to the state’s political relations or activities, this may not be a great hindrance to accurate decision making because decision makers have an option to reassess their decisions based on a continuous stream of responses. Even in urgent situations, decision makers make decisions that are anchored in the predicted and actual feedback to those decisions (Guilhot 2011). According to Halliday (2004), due to the inadequacy of relevant information and the uncertainty of situations, statesmen make the most favourable decision or even choose the first alternative that meets the minimum prerequisites of a rational decision. Meanwhile, Morgenthau views the national interest as a reality to be learned instead of an issue of conditional and created preferences. Impartial and objective interests set down the essence and quality of reliable foreign policy. According to Morgenthau, there is a “logically required connection between interest and foreign policy” (Donnelly 2000, 45). He further stated that states “cannot help pursuing policies designed to serve their national interests” (Donnelly 2000, 45). The concepts of ‘ideological preferences’ or ‘concern for motives’ involves studying the attributes of groups or individuals, or even studying a country’s political mechanisms—issues that have no value in the rational choice, realist perspective (Reus-Smit & Snidal 2008, 248). Morgenthau does believe that, in uncommon situations, sentiments of mass democratic politics or mental instability in an individual may compel decision makers to make choices that are incompatible with national interests. Thus the question is, why do rational choice proponents believe that individual differences are of no consequence when examining the process of decision making in the foreign policy arena? A rational choice supporter, who disdains the use of the term ‘individual’ instead of ‘regime’ specifically because ‘regime’ diverts one’s attention from behaviours or individuality, gives this clarification (Neack 2003, 45): Any individual who attains a position of major foreign policy responsibility will have been socialised through education and processes of political selection to pursue some set of common goals. Individuals differ in their perception of the national interest but role expectations reinforce a sense of common interests. For this rational choice supporter, social relations and political traditions are important, but not in a manner that necessitates the investigation of such. Rather, social relations and traditions generate uniformities among the people who are vested with political power, eradicating individual differences and the desire to examine such differences. In addition, the existing belief of McGinnis is that “changes in foreign policy goals attributed to changes in individual leaders or ruling coalitions can be interpreted as random (but not necessarily insignificant) fluctuations around a common ‘regime interest,’ which is based on domestic support structures and geopolitical concerns which act as the primary sources of continuity in foreign policy interests” (Neack 2008, 33). In this description, one can understand the core decision-making paradigm at the centre of every realist and rational choice discourse. It is absolutely not questionable to argue that states normally work towards their held interests. Unsystematic and deliberately self-destructive attitude is discarded, but this description enables such particularly ‘idealistic’ habits as relating an individual’s interests to the ‘human interest’, religion, moral standing, or justice, and behaving out of legal responsibility, camaraderie, allegiance, or empathy (Donnelly 2000, 45). The decisive flaw of Morgenthau’s assumption resides in the argument that states supposed to, even should, “define their interests in terms of power” (Donnelly 2000, 45). Nevertheless, Morgenthau’s analysis of American foreign policy suggests that at least a single superpower for almost a century did not quite define more than a few of its interests. In truth, almost all states seem to work towards the betterment and interests of their people, or certain group or class of people, mostly regardless of matters of power. Hence, oligarchies are usually disparaged for giving up national interest all for the benefit of a powerful elite. Democratic governments are usually criticised, by proponents of realism particularly, for giving more priority to temporary economic or political benefits, moral objectives, fleeting trends than critical national interest (Olson & Groom 1992). States do not pursue only power. Morgenthau’s assumption, even in cases where states actually seek power, is totally unclear (Donnelly 2000, 46): A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power... A nation whose foreign policy tends toward keeping power and not toward changing the distribution of power in its favour pursues a policy of the status quo. A nation whose foreign policy... seeks a favourable change in power status pursues a policy of imperialism. A nation whose foreign policy seeks to demonstrate the power it has, either for the purpose of maintaining or increasing it, pursues a policy of prestige. Morgenthau fails to provide any theoretical description of the specific moment and reason a state will prefer a particular option over another. For instance, he claims that imperialism strategies develop largely from defeat in warfare, triumph in combat, and prospects created by the weak points of others. Basically speaking, prospects, triumph, and failure normally activate imperialism. This assumption is unclear. Moreover, not all successful nations want to depose the prevailing situation prior to the war. The assumption of Morgenthau fails to specify whether a state will pursue advantage or security, favour defence or offence, avoid or allow the dangers of expansion (Donnelly 2000). This ambiguity is theoretically severe because such goals independently may suggest completely different strategies and mutually includes a wide array of potential actions. The three strategies outlined by Morgenthau, instead of giving an explanation of the behaviour of states, simply offer a way to classify a broad range of differing, even conflicting, actions. The central idea of Morgenthau’s model is that states inherently desire power maximisation. Because every state defines its interests with regard to the imprecise enlargement of this power, each is capably ruler or subordinate to any other. Furthermore, the reality that, within this form of contest, states should eventually turn to self-reliance for their survival implies that the establishment of a strong military is the key priority of all states. The Flaws of Morgenthau’s Theory The primary marker that guides political realists through the maze of international politics is the notion of interest conceived with regard to power. This theory presents the connection between rationality attempting to interpret global politics and the facts/information to be interpreted. It establishes the political domain as an independent arena of action and knowledge aside from other domains, like sociology or economics (Buzan & Little 2000). The statement that “we assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out” (Smith 1999, 63) enables one to re-evaluate and foresee the actions a national leader has chosen or will choose on the political landscape. Considering the idea of interest conceived as power, one reflects as the leader does, and as an objective observer one appreciates the leader’s decisions and behaviour. However, to analyse foreign policy wholly in the interests of national leaders or statesmen is misleading and useless. It is useless because interests are a misleading aspect in the field of psychology, deceptive as they are, often indiscernible, by the feelings and motives of both observer and actor. However, even if people had a way of knowing the actual interests of national leaders, that information would contribute little to the analysis of foreign policies, and could even confuse them. It is factual that knowing the interests of statesmen may provide people lots of hints as to the path of their foreign policymaking (Burchill et al. 2009). Unfortunately, it is not able to provide the most important hint by which to foresee their political decisions. History proves no automatic and direct association between the nature of foreign policy and the nature of interests. This is factual in politics and moral domains. It is not possible to assume from the righteous motives of a national leader that his/her political decisions will be either politically effective or ethically commendable. Considering his/her intentions, it may be assumed that s/he will not deliberately adopt strategies that are unethical, but it is impossible to assume about the likelihood of their effectiveness. If one wants to gain knowledge of the political and moral attributes of the statesman’s decisions, one should know the leader’s individual qualities, not his/her intentions. Honourable intentions provide guarantee against intentionally poor policies; they do not assure the political effectiveness and ethical uprightness of the policies they promote. However, if one aims to acquire understanding of foreign policy, one should not largely focus on a statesman’s interests, but his/her rational capacity to understand the basics of foreign policy, and his/her political capacity to put into action what s/he has created into triumphant political campaign (Halliday 2004). Political theory should try to understand the political features of decision, resolve, and rationality. Furthermore, a realist perspective of international politics will discourage the widespread misleading notion of associating statesmen’s foreign policies with his political or dogmatic ideologies. National leaders, particularly within current circumstances, might create a practice of developing their foreign policies with regard to their political and dogmatic ideologies so as to acquire public approval. But they will differentiate between their legal obligation, which is to decide in relation to the national interest, and their individual motive, which is to witness their personal political ideologies and ethical principles internalised all over the world (Dunne et al. 2010). Realism in international politics does not necessitate, nor does it disregard, apathy to moral values and political ideologies, but it necessitates in fact a definite differentiation between the workable and the favourable, or, more specifically, what is favourable universally and what is workable within the actual conditions. It is unquestionable that not every foreign policy has consistently pursued a disinterested, impartial, and rational path. The conditional components of personal interest, bias, and behaviour, and of all weak points of the mind and spirit, are destined to draw away foreign policies from their rational path. Particularly in instances where foreign policy is carried out within the circumstances of democracy, the necessity to mobilise mass sentiments to the benefit of foreign policy cannot be unsuccessful in damaging the rationality of foreign policy. However, a foreign policy model which focuses on rationality should for now separate from such irrational components and try to create an image of foreign policy which offers the rational core to be situated in history, devoid of the conditional departures from rationality which are situated in history as well. Departures from rationality which are not the outcome of the statesman’s personal caprice could seem conditional only from the point of view of reason, but could themselves be components in a logical structure of irrationality. Political realism, as well, views a foreign policy based on reason to be excellent foreign policy, because it is a rational foreign policy that reduces and increases advantages and, thus, conforms both to the political condition of success and the moral principle of discretion or good sense (Guilhot 2011). Informed of the unavoidable discrepancy between rational foreign policy and the actual one, political realism holds not merely that theory should place emphasis on the rational components of political realism, but that foreign policy should be rational as well in consideration of its practical and moral principles. Conclusions Therefore, it is unquestionable that Morgenthau’s theory discussed in this essay has some strengths and weaknesses, but more on the latter. The statement that ‘we assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out” misinterprets the objective of political realism, which is to offer not an haphazard or random explanation of political reality, but an explanation of international politics based on the rational decision-making model, or, in general, rational theory. A long way from being overthrown by the reality that, for example, a faultless approach to balance of power will hardly be encountered in the actual world, it presumes that reality, being inadequate in such regard, should be interpreted and assessed as a rough calculation of a perfect structure of balance of power in global politics. References Burchill, S., et al. (2009) Theories of International Relations. London: Palgrave. Buzan, B. & Little, R. (2000) International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Donnelly, J. 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