Analysis Politics of Japan - Research Paper Example

Introduction Being one of the greatest and most steady political parties to ever exist in the world of democratic government, the Liberal Democratic Party reigned almost unceasingly for approximately 54 years since its formation in 1995 up until it was dethroned by the Democratic Party of Japan or DPJ during the 2009 election, states Christensen (2012). In August of 2009, the longest running democratic party of Japan - the Liberal Democratic Party - has finally been deposed by the Democratic Party of Japan. It brought in an overwhelming substance on the part of the Japanese people, the political scientists and analysts, and historians as well as its foreign alliances for the reason that the political party which ruled for the nearly half-a-century was defeated for a whimsical short period of time. "The summer 2009 electoral victory of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) over the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) holds historical significance, not only for political scientists but also for the people of Japan, and possibly for the country’s Asian neighbours and the United States as well." (Pekkanen and Krauss, 2010, p. 05) While it is no longer ruling now, the success history of the LDP has been very convincing. It is considered to be one of the most successful political parties ever formed in the entire political history of the world. Pekkanen and Krauss (2010) states that since 1995, there was a non-stop dominion by the LDP over Japan until a short stoppage for ten months from 1993 - 1994. In the House of Representatives - albeit being minor nevertheless the more dominant house - the party hoarded an astonishing reputation when it did not commit any lost for more than 50 years up until August of 2009. Seen this way, the downfall of LDP presents a thought-provoking question as to why it was defeated within a fleeting period of time. It had become a norm for the Japanese people to live under the governance of the LDP. As we can recall, the only disruption to their reign was when a minute cluster decided to separate from the LDP in order to take hold of supremacy and influence as part of a different union that did not do more than just to ratify laws and proposals prior to its disintegration. Japans democracy works in accordance with the electoral consequences that took place in the past. Approximately 60% of all LDP officeholders were produced and many other currently serving and past officials were unseated. On the other hand, the Democratic Party of Japan has taken an enthralling unprecedented record win of 308 seats over 480. Further, the result of the election has become more appealing when in 2005 LDP contrived its grandest victory. Again, how did LDP lose from its supremacy? What were the key elements of their downfall and why it happened in just a very short period of time? This particular research will probe the political dominion of the Liberal Party of Japan or LDP to establish the platform and the changes that can possibly take place now that there is a new political party dominating in Japan. At the same time, this research shall deliver fresh perspectives as to why LDP was overthrown. The Reign of the Liberal Democratic Party from 1955 to 2009 LDP supervised over the scarcity that blighted the country just soon after the war and extended up to the economic marvel during the 1960s up to the 1980s followed by the massive contamination and pollution crunches which considered Japan as the "most polluted nation" (Pekkanen and Krauss, 2010, p. 06) that triggered its environmental advocacy to improve the ecological condition of the country via passing environmental laws in the commercial realm. Of all the rare democratic nations governed by parties for more than 25 years, the Liberal Democratic Party remained. But how did LDP afford to sustain its authority for a very long time? In addition, why and how did it lose its seemingly indomitable power? And what is more bizarre is that why did it take place just a couple of years after it succeeded the then recent election? What does their lost mean to the Japanese people and to the rest of the country? While the LDP was dominant almost all throughout their supremacy, during the period between 1955 and 1993 - although they were the dominant party by this time - simultaneously, it was both dispersed and disjointed and had a feeble prime - ministerial headship, and was then provoked by the prime challenging party which was the JSP or the Japan Socialist Party which was initially an equally potent competitor but eventually waned in the 1980s. Aldrich and Kage (2011). Upon this period, the country had a lone non-negotiable electoral system. Basically, it followed the electoral system in the United States wherein each voter can cast a single vote for a single runner; nevertheless, for each locality, they elected numerous delegates. It preformed the same as the Congressional System for elections of the United States; however, in its place of once victor in each region or district, the three to five candidates were also offered official seats in the government contingent to the number of seats available for the runners. Although LDP was not overwhelmingly famous with the preponderance of the extremely politically disintegrated Japanese, there were manifold factors that aided LDP to keep and prolong its stint in power. Scheiner (n.d.). As a matter of fact, the partys share of vote weakened monophonically from its stardom until 1980; nevertheless the disintegrating of the opposition permitted LDP to preserve a margin. Also, the gaming platform of the electoral system was not precisely identical: misallocated regions/districts consented rural electorates - being largely regarded as strong adherents of LDP - to provide LDP more spaces than it else might have obtained. Some other elements participated in part as well. Japans economic monopolization and componential state emboldened customary associations, that the LDP made the most of in order to call up for support. Opposing LDP delegates and representatives in each locality established an investor-consumer connection with local assemblage statesmen and was the way to transport pork-barrel subsidies to the local constituency, particularly to conventional mainstays in rural regions. The LDP, too, developed alliances with potent back-upping groups that produced votes for LDP: the postmasters which are persuasive and powerful in rural areas, the farmers and landowners, and workers in the blue collar jobs. The leading national administration imposed industrial rules and regulations which enabled speedy growth in Japans economy following the 1960s and made prosperity, occupations, and extra disbursements that could be dispersed via these linkages. With having small cases of delinquency and unemployment, together with the ever-incrementing communal and singular rewards sent down the political pavement, the LDP suggests a great stake for most of the Japanese people to hand their government over to. The Positive and the Negative Aspects of the LDP’s Organization The LDPs establishment progressed in a way that permitted the party to make the most of these political circumstances, and for so long, the party had blossomed. However, by the early 21st century, the drawback of its establishment had become obvious: these organizations had mutated into paralytics, placing the deterrents on its efforts to again run and contend in the next election - when the persona, likeness and the policy count, and the voters progressively are disconnected from their political allegiances. The LDPs organization is a rather unique style of political organization due to the following: first, it adapts candidate-concentrated individual sustenance associations instead of divisions; second, official and exclusive parties of deputies and congresspersons and lastly, a prime law-making body - the PARC or the Policy Affairs Research Council - that was situated at the external position of the legislature. There were many LDP legislators consider these arrangements as the root of the disaster that happened during the 2009 election. Albeit the Japanese Government should have worked just like a consolidated electoral system, with it having a potent prime minister, upper and under cabinet administration and policy making, and votes that are rallied by party semblance and policy positions. Majority of the votes that gathered were rallied by the candidates via associations and organizations in regional districts which delivered entertaining events and individual favors to citizens. Punters inclined to reinforce candidates in response to the favors and benefits that they have received or for the individual appeal of the candidates or for their capacity to generate and transport pork barrel to the regional and local areas. The LDP disintegrated was separated into five major and numerous minor groups; nevertheless, its being had done nothing tremendous with policy dissimilarities and modifications. Members of the Diet placed their allegiance in supporting their lead in their pursuit of winning the prime ministerial position. These associates have drafted and preserved the allegiance of single representatives by aiding them in getting selections for their candidatures; acquire finances in order to sustain and continue their electoral campaigns, and to guarantee key nominations to party, legislatorial and governmental seats. The legislatorial and governmental seats were all ascertained by precedence in the group and not by oldness. Numerous of the crucial positions made available were on the PARC, the party agency via which all parliamentary bills had to go through prior to being directed to the Diet. Lengthy provisions on the specified and specialized policy departments and commissions of that particular body delivered proficiency and acquaintances that allowed the legislatures in order to become persuasive and influential dealers and gatekeepers for laws in that particular location which will give them more votes during the election and will help them generate more funds from security factions. When the gathering of votes, the dispersal of agencies and the policy making became devolved, and the cabinet was selected by divisive proportionality, the comparatively feeble lead becomes that prime minister. The government was characterized by shared rather than separate headship. Several political scientists ascribe these individualities of the LDP merely to the inducements of the lone non-negotiable vote electoral scheme and competitions within the party itself. Albeit the election scheme did deliver some enticements for this rare association, in-house party contention and fight, the orders of decisions made by governmental businesspersons, and methodical administrative processes may have been as significant. Why did the Liberal Democratic Party lose? What happened to the LDP in 2009? Did something go wrong with their electoral tactics? Has there been any internal hypocrisy that took place? According to Pekkanin and Krauss (2010), there were four short-term and four long-term reasons that can be identified and can be taken into consideration. In the short term, LDP needed to compete with an annuity, allowance records disaster, inadequate politicking and leadership from the prime minister, dexterously organized opposition at the regional level, and a decline in the commercial sequence. The long term causes possibly are more significant to political intellectuals; hence, we dedicate more time to these types of causes in this research. In this classification, we comprise the forfeiture of the LDPs trustworthy rural base, an electoral scheme that exaggerated the consequences of vote fluctuations, unstable voters, and most importantly, when LDP failed to settle in after lengthy victories of the 55 scheme. In 2007, when it was revealed that the government had lost a projected 50 million annuity records, the people turned enraged. The LDP failed to win in the House of Councilors election in 2007 in no minor portion due to the fiasco, and lasting annoyance undeniably embittered the House of Representatives canvass for the party in 2009. Both the then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso did not do enough to convince the people to vote for LDP. Further, their deteriorating unpopularity had added to the candidates burden when they had not gained enough sympathy from the people. “In 2009, too, the DPJ skilfully coordinated its campaigns with the opposition parties, including the Social Democratic Party of Japan (the erstwhile Japan Socialist Party), the People’s New Party, YourParty, and even the Japanese Communist Party." (Pekkanin and Strauss, 2010, p. 09). This precluded the opposition from shattering its polls among opposing candidates; instead, merging them after the toughest candidates in an attempt to oust the LDP. Going to long-term grounds, a consequence that shows up is the LDPs downfall in the rural areas. It was very unusual for any Japanese citizen who has long been not following the flow of Japans political conditions that LDP could fail to win in rural areas. Altogether, LDPs strong, stable and preponderant members had been produced attributable to its solid win in the countryside, although, remaining not too competitive in the urban areas. Ironically and surprisingly, during the 2009 elections, DPJ defeated LDP in terms of votes in almost all rural regions and districts of Japan. DPJ won 35 seats against LDPs 33. The defeat can be ascribed to numerous reasons. Prime Minister Koizumi who served Japan between 2001 and 2006 made a tremendous effort to demolish the olden LDP tactics in postmasters, construction workers, and the farmers. When the postal centers were converted from public to private offices, postmasters subsequently displayed their disapproval of LDP. Moreover, the budget and spending reductions had disbanded LDPs partners in construction. The DPJ convinced the farm voters to turn their favor to the DPJ by assuring them of bigger aids and supports as compared to the LDP. The expanding economic margin in Japan debilitated the rural districts which, as a result, persuaded them to place their votes to the DPJ. Local governments had been one of the key elements of LDPs dominion in Japan but because of the fusions of several local districts, reducing more than three thousand local governments to just more than half in 2006; it lessened their chances of getting more support from its local community allies. The shrivelling number of local districts reduces the number of local politicians who became adverse to LDP. This marked a change in Japan’s political taste, “… the politics of Japan is changing because the people of Japan are changing … the man in the noodle bar thinks he has subordinated his own interests to those of company and government for long enough.” (Allum, 2009) Japans progressively disconcerted constituency was another part of the story. In the United States of America, voters are often immersed to a debate or conversation regarding "swing" voters - electorates who turn their support to the adverse parties in future elections. However, in Japan, it is called "floating voters" that means a voter who has no strong linkage to a political party. For the past twenty years, voters had become less agreeable to directing their votes via social linkages and koenkai. They were basing their choice for political party from what they heard from the media. In turn, the results of the elections had become very random and arbitrary; it was very hard for the political analysts and scientists to cogitate on what could be the peoples new preference: “…examining the role of policy preferences (support for reform) and utilizing interaction terms, our analysis takes into account the fact that politicians at different stages in their careers and facing different sorts of electorates respond to electoral factors in every different ways."(Reed and Scheiner, 2003). Further, the peoples vote had become contingent to the party label, the image of the leaders associated with the party, and focus on the policy making and not concentrating on how these parties can make themselves more known to the people. The new political tide in Japan had brought in so much pain to the LDP as they were having a hard time figuring out how they can win more votes from these floating voters who had become more capricious and unpredictable; hence, their collapse from being the strongest political party ever to exist in Japan. LDPs strategy was focused on the structure of its cabinet in order to appear more interesting to voters however, to their disaster, they failed to recognize the need for change in their campaigning strategies and to alter the structure of their party association in order to win the sympathy of the floating voters which are heavily reliant on media. In fact, referring to (LDP, n.d.) they still continued to use groupings, factions, PARC together with koenkai to serve as their forerunning offence for elections. Albeit the new electoral scheme had lessened the number of LDP candidates in every district to one, the work of the factions sustained. But having a lone representative in every locality, it had undercut the influence and power of the factions. The only control left for them was their ability to appoint for positions. Nevertheless, because of these delimitations, factions weakened and took lesser control and fidelity from its members. Further, the budget cuts and controlled spending utterly obliterated their grant purpose brought about by the newly imposed finance law. This had also signalled a rise on the upheaval of the political power of the prime minister. As a matter of fact, Koizumi clinched factional appointments of cabinet members eventually giving the prime minister more power to control over the political realms of Japan. This has resulted into some changes in the government as “…relative support influences both cabinet shuffles and prime ministerial replacements. When the cabinet ratings fall behind the LDP, staff changes become significantly more likely.” (Burden, 2008) The electoral reform has brought immense changes in the inter-party competition in Japan. Single-member district and its sole candidate per locality provided potent advantages for smaller parties to consolidate into obtaining pluralities in local districts, as well as on electoral competition as based on the policy diversions. Pekkanen and Strauss (2010). The LDP was entangled in differences that took place from its tentative adjustment to the new electoral climate. For two decades, the populace desired for an alteration on the bureaucracy and party aspects of the government that managed the country underneath a 55 system. They desired for squarer and fairer politics and a party that could conspicuously express laws to lead the country. Koizumi, in his noble power as the prime minister, had met all these pleas and gathered together the new supplies and resources that the beurucratic, electoral reformation and the media age had delivered. However, this has triggered intraparty skirmish when the deep-rooted forces of defiance to alter yet had sufficient strength within the factions and other support divisions. What is the significance of the 2009 election? “The most important change that the DPJ is quite likely to carry out is to challenge the pre-eminence of the elite bureaucracy.” (Pekkanen and Strauss, 2010). The core of its movement was to emphasize setting law-making power and accountability fairly in the cares of the political people. Once it results into a spontaneous flow, it is just fair to presume more explicit reduction of bureaucratic impact on laws and policies, an inclination that has been pressing on with respect to time. It is always possible that the officeholders, administrators and officials take advantage of the media: they watch the television and read the newspapers, and it is a valid assumption that they are fully aware of what the DPJ has been alleging. It will remain obvious, apparent as to whether they will take the same route or they will take another way to destroy the policies set by the DPJ. Perchance, it would remain apparent as to whether the advantages that may come from a procedure ruled by politicians will overshadow the deflation and the suspension or relegation of the "elite national bureaucracy" (Pekkanen and Strauss, 2010), mostly as the deficiency in resources of Japanese politicians that are offered in another place. Secondly, while LDP had a wide-ranging PARC law-making machine wherein its leads have been the answer in acquiring agreement according to Pekkanen and Strauss (2010), it was a great feasibility that the DPJ will become a "top-down policy making party" (Pekkanen and Strauss, 2010). Conversely, DPJs methods that will benefit the leaders an advantage for a policy agreement within the innermost circle of the party was hazy at the same time, its policies were initially unreliable. DPJ made a plea to all its members to manifest their agreement by signing the manifesto. However, submitting to a hazy testimonial of incompatible principles is then withered by the tests of passing funds in the present economic conditions. Next, there are several members of the DPJ party are becoming more non-interventionists when it comes to the economic policy and as a matter of fact, they may look a lot like Koizumi more in this particular aspect thats when the LPD did past and prior to his service. Nevertheless, DPJ is not comprised of commercial rudiments; instead, it varies itself in a sense that it prefers to kindle the demands of the patrons. Manifold of its laws and policies just like the subventions for families who have children and dependents, reducing the tax for gasoline, and releasing fee roads, steer in this direction. Pekkanen and Strauss (2010). Lastly, albeit nationalistic and extremely conformist members of the DPJ are very prevalent, it aimed to trim down emphasis on the neo-nationalistic themes resonating within the entire country. It can be anticipated that Japan would have improved relationships with its Asian neighbours. Is there a possibility for LDP to win back its dominion? This carries us to the utmost important result of the election in 2009 - the interchanging of power and influence over Japans electoral system. The transferal and modification in power delivered a permanent change in the political system of Japan; the competition is recent. On August 31, the electorates have also awakened themselves by their own volition and might to destroy or to build governments. It cannot be expected that the DPJ will dominate for such a very long time just like LDP. The Japanese citizens - being more contingent to the media - will absolutely sling out the DPJ if it will not work as it promised. The most important thing is that the strong means that the DPJ have used in order to win the election, the destroyed local and districts base, emergence of floating voters, and the ever-growing influence of media prevented the most mistaken followers from fantasizing of a likewise 50 years dominion. Placek (2012). But thinking about LDP, will they still return in power? Will they gain their dominion back? Or will it finally be thrown into the grave? Well, these are all feasible? “The LDP has held power in Japan since 1955—except for a brief period in the 1990s when a coalition of opposition parties formed a majority in government.” (Lim, 2007). We can concede that the electoral conquest may bring a stimulus that has never been done before for the restructuring of the LDP’s inner organization. It is possible to witness LDP renovated, revived and surging high in the following election. It may spend much more time in looking for cues on how they can snatch the new taste of the electorate with the new political climate they have in Japan, LDP’s ensuing restoration of power very much possible. Reference: Aldrich, D & Kage, K 2011, "Japanese liberal democratic party support and the gender gap: a new approach", viewed 13 April 2012, http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~daldrich/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/Aldrich-Kage- BJOPS-2011.pdf Allum, J 2009, "Japan votes to swim with the current of history", Revista de Prensa, 01 September, viewed 13 April 2012, http://www.almendron.com/tribuna/26560/japan-votes-to-swim-with-the-current- of-history/ Burden, B 2008, "Economic Accountability and Strategic Calibration: The Case of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party", University of Wisconsin, Madison. Christensen, R 2012, "Liberal-democratic party of Japan", Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, viewed 12 April 2012, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/339041/Liberal- Democratic-Party- of-Japan-LDP Liberal Democratic Party of Japan n.d., A History of the liberal democratic party (n.d.), Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, viewed 12 April 2012, http://www.jimin.jp/english/about_ldp/history/104304.html Lim, V 2007, "Predicting DPJs defeat", UCLA Paul I. and Hisako Terasaki Center for Japanese Studies, viewed 12 April 2012, http://www.international.ucla.edu/japan/news/article.asp?parentid=72344 Pekkanen, R & Krauss, E 2010, "The rise and fall of Japan’s liberal democratic party" The Journal of Asia Studies, vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 5-15, viewed 13 April 2012, http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/039/11625.pdf Placek, K 2012, "Japan’s liberal democratic party: life in opposition" East Asia Forum, viewed 13 April 2012, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/02/11/japan-s-liberal- democratic-party-life-in-opposition/ Reed, S & Scheiner, E 2003, "Electoral incentives and policy preferences: mixed motives behind party defections in Japan", viewed 12 April 2012, http://www.jstor.org/ discover/10.2307/4092307?uid=3738824&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21100716072581 Scheiner, E n.d. "Democracy without competition in Japan: opposition failure in a one-party dominant state" viewed 13 April 2012, http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/scheiner/New_Folder/Democracy%20without%20 Competition/Book%20Page.htm Read More