Is NATO Effective Response to Terror of Institution Past Its Prime - Case Study Example

Running head: MODERN EUROPE RESEARCH PAPER Modern Europe Research Paper (school) Modern Europe Research Paper Introduction There are various points in our history, recent or otherwise which have and will impact on our current status as nation states. These events and circumstances imply the importance of implementing prudent and effective political processes. Different events in the 20th century have affected the current European history. Among these incidents are the conflicts involving national independence and interdependence, autocracy and democracy, and mutual defense and individual action. This paper now seeks to explain some of the major social and economic trends in 20th century European history, and establish the impact of these events over time. It shall particularly consider the question: NATO: Effective response to terror of institution past its prime? It shall consider the historical context of each question, assess the significance of this issue over time, and discuss how this question may be determined in the future. Discussion The issue of whether or not the NATO is still a relevant organization can be resolved by assessing the organization’s ability to protect and ensure security and peace when it is most needed. With the global reach of activities which disturb the peace and security, the efficacy of the NATO seems to depend on the degree to which a more extensive application of its overall goals can be established and supported (Michta, 2007). Even as the NATO is considered an organization of equal states (with equal authority) who apply a consensus in their decision-making processes, the organization seems to function based on the extent of United States participation in these decisions. The security policy objectives of the US are important policies for the NATO (Michta, 2007). Its future efficacy largely depends on whether the European members will consider sharing common priorities with the Americans and whether these members will accept the related risks to such sharing. In the contemporary scene, it is important to consider the extent to which NATO supports such goals and the extent to which it has failed. NATO’s current dilemma exemplifies the looming issues in the current operations, mostly in the continuing armed issues with the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (Michta, 2007). The questions on NATO’s efficacy come from its failure to implement similar expansion activities it implemented during the 1990s in terms of military capability. Such a failure also comes from the missed opportunities after the September 11 attacks and the intercontinental political gaps over Iraq. Despite the shared contempt for any and all terrorist attacks, the US and the European states have still not agreed on how to respond to terrorist and other forms of attacks (Daalder and O’Haanlon, 2001). Attempts to resolve these differences in perceptions have not been successful. As a result, countries like France, Germany, and other European states still have differing opinions with the US in terms of methods which address the terrorist issue and other security problems. The NATO is currently unstable because the end of the Cold War threat in the 1990s caused a gridlock on what the organization’s main mission should then be (The Economist, 2011). NATO established that it needed to consider partnerships, expansions, and enhancement of capabilities; however, the organization cannot seem to act as a united organization in terms of what its main security mission today is. The visions for NATO seem to be competing with each other, and these competing visions are not likely to be settled or resolved via the Continental security approach being advocated by France, Belgium and Germany (Michta, 2007). While the European members have supported NATO’s operations, the scope and the quality of the missions seems to be vague. Moreover, the EU’s goals to establish the European Security and Defense Policy have also impacted on the NATO’s ability to coordinate with the EU (Michta, 2007). In order to be effective as an international security cooperation, there is a need for the organization to consider security challenges and be prepared to use more effective and assertive tools to deal with such challenges (Grant, 2001). Even as the political aspect of the NATO’s expansion attempts has been very much successful, its failure to establish the necessary military power has emphasized the ongoing tension within the organization. NATO has failed to establish an effective transatlantic security goal -- one which is shared and unites its members. Various NATO summits have established appropriately about the united purpose of the organization, and yet, based on the military aspects of the organization, such a united purpose is still very much in doubt. Even with the successful establishment of the Exercise Steadfast Jaguar in Cape Verde, the NATO response force must still deal with the serious issues of failed goals, inadequate funding, and missions agreed upon by its members (Michta, 2007). NATO is being torn apart in various directions. On one hand it seeks continued support for the enlargement of the organization in order to establish a bigger role in terms of missions and expeditions; and on the other hand, it seems to insist as well on maintaining its regional and restricted defensive function (Michta, 2007). The first goal as supported by the US is also shared to some extent by the UK, Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, as well as some new members (Michta, 2007). However, the second role is highly supported by France and Belgium as they visualize NATO as a regional security organization which seeks regional and peripheral protection. NATO’s goals before the 2006 Riga summit were varied and numerous, as it included strategic talks, current missions, full operational capability of its Reserve force, and establishing new partnerships. In the long-term, NATO seeks to establish improved enlargement by 2008, and new strategies by 2010 (Michta, 2007). However, such enlargement and related goals have been strained. Details of the Riga summit seem to indicate that enlargement is not the first priority of the alliance. In effect, the organization seems to have come to an impasse with its current members, as well as its future goals. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, various actions of the US, as well as the capability of the NATO at that time seems to indicate variances and a conflict of goals. The US chose not to consider NATO as a means of implementing its military operation: Operation Enduring Freedom. These actions seem to show outright that the structures which NATO had at that time did not fit the mission that the US was carrying out (Ferguson, 2001). However, beyond organizational limitations, the issue was based on the scarcity of European military resources. Rumsfeld believed that the Afghanistan mission was one which very much needed cooperation and coalition, and these same beliefs were echoed in the Iraq operations. When the Bush administration launched its War on Terror, it highlighted the importance of full military control over the operations, prompting the need for its allies to assist in US plans, but not giving them any say-so in the planning of the operations (DeYoung, 2001). In effect, the US chose not to ask support from the NATO in Afghanistan and in the process made the NATO role in a major terrorist attack largely inutile. Operation Enduring Freedom was launched in October of 2007. Current analysis indicate that this period marked a time where the NATO’s role as a transatlantic security alliance was reduced due to the US’s decision to launch its military operations alone. With such operations, the repeated calls in Europe on NATO’s need to share in the missions became nothing more than verbal positions (DeYoung, 2001). In order to implement any actions in pursuit of its objectives, it is important for the NATO member to have a consensus on the mission and related responsibilities. Such consensus is very much lacking. In a way, Europe seems to be heavily concerned about retaliation from Islamic extremists when they would support the launching of military operations against these terrorists. The European nations seem to consider the issue differently, and they do not agree as to the causes of such issues and on how to manage such issues (Grant, 2001). They even refuse to see such issues as anything related to a “war.” It is also important to note that some European countries do not even consider terrorism as an intense threat to their security. In the years preceding the 9/11 attacks the alliance has been actively seeking for a new mission it could unite its members under. After the September 11 attacks, that mission was seen in Operation Enduring Freedom (Erlanger, 2001). It was a mission which would have tested whether a transatlantic assent on the mission would manifest or if the organization would still be inutile. The fact that the Operation Enduring Freedom was not made a NATO mission implied a significant shift in the alliance. Notably, the Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO’s deployment of iSAF defined the contributions of the NATO on the operation (Michta, 2007). It also defined the sustained commitment to the political aspect of the organization as an important tool for the US’s impact in Europe. The more significant context of NATO’s future efficacy has also to be analyzed in terms of the disagreement over the actions of the US and allies over Iraq. The US decision to intervene in Iraq also manifested the limitations of the organization in terms of transatlantic diplomatic decisions (Michta, 2007). NATO’s crisis became more evident as the events leading up to the Iraqi attack unfolded. A disagreement over the invocation of Article 4 as a way of preventing retaliation against Turkey by Iraq was one of the issues discussed within the alliance. The decision of France, Germany, and Belgium in blocking the decision in NATO tied the hands of the alliance (Michta, 2007). The February 2003 confrontation within the organization highlights its worst moment in history as France, Germany, and Belgium refused to support the plan of giving Turkey access to military resources and military troops for its protection. This refusal shocked the alliance, including the international community (Michta, 2007). It was a decision which revived the fear than allies requesting alliance when its security would be threatened would not receive support under Article 4 and 5, unless all members assent and for as long as the threats are real. This 2003 crisis in NATO over Turkey made the situation especially difficult for the alliance and its member nations because it was a transatlantic conflict between allied nations who objected to the war and the US’s decision to go to war (Dempsey, 2001). The three countries insisted that they agreed with the US’s actions of retaliation and with the threat which was posed on Turkey, however, they refused to dismiss the possibility that other more diplomatic actions could be taken on the issue. As a result, NATO’s power to decide was stalled because of a basic policy disagreement on a request made by an individual member or ally. If the organization were to ultimately prove unable to give defensive support to a member requesting assistance, there seems to be no validity of the security guarantee under the Washington Treaty (Michta, 2007). Furthermore, the resources which Turkey needed were of a defensive quality, disavowing any possibility for such resources being used as retaliatory measures against Iraq. In effect, the crisis was mired in too much politics. Having been barred from the initial actions of Operation Enduring Freedom, the alliance was proving to be even incapable of establishing contingency plans to support its members. Such issue was never faced by the NATO before. It was an issue and incident which impacted on its credibility, further implying future inefficacies on discussions or questions which relate to military modernization and protection (Ferguson, 2001). Various questions seem to have sprouted from the 2003 NATO crisis. One issue is on whether or not smaller states who have not focused their development on military capabilities would find their requests for assistance blocked by other member states. These smaller states have a genuine concern on finding themselves on their own when there are immediate security issues (Michta, 2007). This is an offshoot of the current inefficacy of the NATO in failing to support its threatened members. The issue of assistance to Turkey was a crucial determinant in the schism within the alliance which would even become clearly apparent in the Bush administration’s description of “old” Europe versus “new” Europe (Michta, 2007). The issue was handled procedurally in a move which changed the decision from the North Atlantic Council to the Defense Planning Committee where France does not take part. However, the incident already caused much damage within the organization and this persisted in compromising allied consensus and NATO’s long-term efficacy. Germany’s stance in the Iraq incident was crucial in this case, especially with France’s position on the issue, a country which has had a long history of conflict with the US (Morelli, 2009). Germany’s position was an important development. Quite similar to its refusal to participate in the 1991 Gulf War, it now argued that the Iraqi issue may be resolved in a different way. For all intents and purposes, Germany opposed the US within the NATO, but it also shared such position with France, Russia, and China. Although the US managed to secure the agreement of allies to carry out transformation, disagreement over the Iraq issue continued to disrupt allied interactions. The division headed by Poland was sent to Iraq, however the fighting persists in falling mostly on the US military and to some reasonable extent, on the UK, with the coalition forces providing limited troops and military support to the war (Morelli, 2009). The 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul exemplified to the US that Europe would not assist the US in the Iraqi war. Discussions during this summit on whether the alliance should train security forces in Iraq signified significant strains in the transatlantic relations. In the years when the War against Terror was being fought in Iraq, NATO’s assistance was very much limited. The organization was involved in the training and in technical assistance, but not in the actual combat. Financial assistance in the name of the NATO was also limited (Dempsey, 2001). As a result, the NATO and the US have been very much distant from each other as far as the Iraqi war was concerned. In the current context, NATO is no longer an effective alliance because it is not supported by a shared understanding of threats and of how to respond to such threats; moreover, it does not have a common purpose to carry out beyond political declarations (Gordon, 2002). Such conflicts and disagreements may have also been apparent in other organizations. And during the Cold War, NATO had a strong purpose and function as it defended Europe against communist aggression. The external threat on the different member countries themselves strengthened the NATO alliance (Lindley-French, 2005). They shared the views on communism and the threat that communism presented in their statehood status. In the current context however, Europe does not share the views of the US on the magnitude of the terrorist threats. While the US sees itself in a war against terrorism, either the Europeans disagree with the US position or they believe there are other strategies for dealing with Iraq. It is important not to discount the relevance that the NATO has had through the years, especially during the Cold War period. It was instrumental in preventing the outbreak of outright violence during the Cold War and it was even instrumental in ending the Balkan wars (Michta, 2007). Post communist territories were even assisted in their thirst for democracy and independence. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the organization tried to remain relevant by reinventing itself politically and militarily. In the political sense, it was indeed able to achieve enlargement goals, while also promoting democracy and diplomatic civil and military interactions. In terms of military goals however, the alliance has failed to establish significant commitment to resources. Conclusion The current issue is on whether the NATO is already past its prime based on its efficacy on handling terrorist threats. In reviewing this issue, the 9/11 attacks seem to be the best determinant for assessing NATO’s efficacy. In the post-Cold War period, NATO has been seeking to justify its existence as a transatlantic alliance, and to unite its members under a common purpose. After the 9/11 attacks, the NATO potentially found a conflict which could renew its shared purpose and mission; however, this did not happen, even with its strong expression of support for the US on its war against terror and on its retaliatory actions against Afghanistan. The preventive actions against Iraq exacerbated the gap between the US and France and Germany; moreover, there was a rift between the so-called old and new Europe with the European nations being divided in terms of support for the US actions against Iraq. The fact that the NATO has not taken a more active stance against terrorism is further proving to be its downfall as an alliance. The current conflicts afflicting many countries of the world involve terrorist threats. And yet, the alliance and European countries still fail to perceive these terrorist threats as actual threats to international security. Without such acknowledgements of terrorist threats, the NATO will be outdated and outmoded as an alliance. In order to regain its former glory as an alliance, it needs to be united in its purpose and to back up its political statements with actual actions. Works Cited Daalder, I. & O’Haanlon, M. (2000). Winning ugly: NATO’s war to save Kosovo. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, p. 220–23. Dempsey, J. (2001). White House Avoids Seeking NATO-Wide Aid. Financial Times. DeYoung, K. (2001). Allies are Cautious on ‘Bush’ Doctrine. Washington Post. 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