To What Extent Does Post-Soviet Russia Face an Islamic Threat - Term Paper Example

To what extent does Post-Soviet Russia face an “Islamic threat” The fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of the s in CentralAsia resulted in an active cultural reawakening throughout the region (Bowers, Musayev, & Samson 2006, p.375). Caucasian region with a strong Islamic position was not an exception in this Post-Soviet campaign. Prior to begin analyze the reasons and consequences of the Islamic radicalization in the North Caucasus, it is important to discuss briefly the history of the Chechen state after the fall of the Soviet Union. Historic review In 1991, after the collapse of USSR, there was a first attempt to create a wholly independent Chechen state on the territorial and administrative basis of the former Soviet Chechen-Ingush Republic (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.121). This attempt was spearheaded by the former Soviet air force general Dzhokar Dudayev, who later became a chairman of Executive committee in the Chechen National Congress and the commander of the Chechen National Guard (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.122). Yeltsin declared the Revolutionary movement under the direction of Dudayev as illegal and imposed martial law in Chechnya. The period from 1992 to 1994 in Chechnya was characterized by the efforts to construct an independent statehood with national symbols and other state institutions (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.123). Despite all Dudayev’s efforts to create independent state, the country was overwhelmed by crime and criminals (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.123). After several attempts of negotiation with the Chechnya, Russian President made a decision to “use the full brunt of the military with a purpose to renegade republic of Chechnya’ back into the legal, political and economic space of Russia” (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.125). In December 1994 began the first Chechen War, which lasted till August 1996 (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.125). The main reason that contributed to the Russian loss in this war was factor the Chechen people uniting with an overriding goal to defeat Russian forces and thus to keep its political autonomy (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.126). Even though the Chechen Republic won the first war, the state was extremely weak and the society was sharply fractured together over the next few years (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.126). In 1997, the then president of Chechnya, Maskhakow entered into negotiations with Yeltsin with a purpose to receive aid for Chechen reconstruction (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.126). Even though this agreement was signed in May the same year, the Yeltsin administration continued to deny independence of the Chechen Republic (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.127). During the period of 1997 to 1999 political relations between Chechnya and Moscow grew more problematic and hostile. Maskhadow’s regime in Chechnya was very ineffective from both economic and social perspectives; Russia failed to provide significant economic aid to this state (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.128). During his reign in 1997, Jandarbyev (Malashenko and Trenin 2002) declared Chechnya as an “Islamic Republic” and announced the gradual introduction of sharia law to the state (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.128). Meanwhile, Chechen relationship with Russia became more exacerbated mainly because of Chechen’s attempts to rebel forces stationed near the border of Dagestan (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.126). After the Putin’s (the then Russian Prime Minister) appointment “to stop gangs of international terrorists”, southern Russia, Dagestan and Moscow sustained losses of more than three hundred people in result of devastating bombings (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.130). On 30 September 1999, in response to the Chechen terrorism, Putin announced that combat operations have began once again in Chechnya (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.130). Thus, on 1 October 1999 commenced the second Chechen war, which continued till June 2000 (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.130). After the Russian troops won a victory over Chechens, Putin’s administration began the process of legal, economic and political integrating Chechnya into Russian Republic (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Subrnik 2004, p.132). Vladimir Putin, who was going to become the Russian President, was seriously concerned about the strategic dangers of Islamist extremism and expansionism from emanating Chechnya (Dannreuther and March 2010, 97). Islamic factor in Chechnya Separatist and nationalist movement based in the republic of Chechnya has turned into a network of extremist Islamic jihadists, which has taken root in many of the other Muslim republics of the region (Sagramoso 2007, p.703). Islamic factor played a double-faced role in the Chechen conflict: Maskhadov seen the republic as secular state, while the group of separatists headed by Jandarbyev, planned the foundation of Chechen Republic on the Islamic basis only (Malashenko, Trenin and Lieven 2004). The events in Chechnya during 1994-1996 and its further “sovereignty” have lead to a powerful impetus for the development of the Islamic extremism in the Northern Caucasus. In autumn, 1996 there was made an attempt to use Islam as a tool for state building (Malashenko, Trenin, and Lieven 2004). When in 1997 the Parliament of Chechnya adopted a change in the Constitution, claiming Islam as a state religion, Wahabi used this religion as political, instrument (Malashenko, Trenin and Lieven 2004). Malashenko, Trenin, and Lieven (2004, p. 71) explained that Islamic factor in politics was conditioned by the sense of Islam, by its total religion. Chechnya was considered to be an “exporter” of Islamic radicalism in Muslim regions of Russia, because exactly there has been materialized “Islamic threat” for the post-soviet space (Malashenko, Trenin and Lieven 2004). Malashenko, Trenin, and Lieven (2004) defined Islamic factor as a constant constituent part of the Chechen conflict. The greatest threat of was referred to radicalism and extremism of fundamentalism, called also as “militant Islam”. Under this approach terrorism, violence and other brutal activities are perceived as an acceptable measure in case there is a political interest/need (Malashenko, Trenin and Lieven 2004). It was concluded that radicalization was partly caused by the dynamic internationalization of the Chechen resistance movement (Souleimanov and Ditrych 2008, p.1204). Chechen’s Islamic radicalism was reflected by a set of serious terroristic acts, which continued even after the formal end of war between Russian and Chechen Republic. In February 2004, two Moscow subway bombings killed 46 and wounded nearly 100 of Russian citizens (Hahn 2008, p.6). Later in summer, Moscow was hit again with several bombings in and around subway system, in result of which 49 people were killed and 300 wounded (Hahn 2008, p.6). One of the most tragic and brutal terroristic act is referred to the hijacking of school in Beslan, North Ossetia in September 2004, in result of which a high number of individuals including children, were killed (Sagramoso 2007, p.700). All these indiscriminate actions significantly fuelled the cycle of violence and brought forth yet more severe repression from the Russian side (Sagramoso 2007, p.700). The Putin’s response to terrorism The North Caucasus crucially threatened country’s integration and lead to the weakening of state structures. In 2000, after Vladimir Putin has taken a post of the President of Russian Federation, there have been made significant efforts with a purpose to reverse decentralizing trends in the country (Sagramoso 2007 p.686). The North Caucasus defined and formed the presidency of Putin, because it was the place of grounding his (Putin’s) prestige; Vladimir Putin reaped the rewards of a military campaign, his popularity almost never waned (Dannreuther and March 2008, 99). When he came to power, Putin said that his mission, his historic mission was to resolve the situation in the North Caucasus (Dannreuther and March 2008, 99). To follow own mission, Putin managed to construct a vital source of legitimacy for more authoritarian political structures in the intervening period (Dannreuther and March 2008, 99). Putin focused not only on restoration of control over Chechen Republic, but also on bringing federal laws with the republican constitutions (Sagramoso 2007 p.686). To reassert the centre’s control over the whole Russia, the Russian President decided to streamline legislation, to modify the way of election to the Federation Council and to grant the president’s right for dismissal of regional leaders (Sagramoso 2007 p.686). Thus, in 2004 there was eliminated the election of governors (Sagramoso 2007). Despite all these efforts, the North Caucasus was still forced to rely on local elites and in many ways these policies have exacerbated the violence in this region (Sagramoso 2007 p.686). Dannreuther and March (2008p.98) stated that it was Putin who had introduced structured and legitimated political changes during his presidency and thus contributed to the Russia’s success in Chechnya. This success mainly related to the processes of successful eliminating well-known Chechen leaders, such as Shamil Basaev; and the process of consolidation Kadyrov’s power (Dannreuther and March 2008, 97). After the bomb attacks in 1999 which caused death of more than 300 Russian citizens, Vladimir Putin decided to respond with decisive action (Dannreuther and March 2008, 100). Putin’s intervention in Chechnya was defined as a counter-terrorist operation, establishing new rules of engagement (Dannreuther and March 2008, 100). While Eltsin hide from any unpleasant repercussions emanating from the North Caucasus and devolved responsibility for the Chechen campaign, Putin made a decision to assume full responsibility for it (Dannreuther and March 2008, 101). Putin’s campaign was very effective and professional comparing with the evolution of the first Chechen War (Dannreuther and March 2008, 97). He approved to conduct the war in such a way as to guarantee a resolute victory; he gave to understand that there will be no more negotiations with the “Chechen terrorists”, establishing uncompromising new rules for dealing with major terrorist incidents (Dannreuther and March 2008, 100). After brutal terroristic acts in the Moscow Dubovka theatre and Beslan, Putin was willing to use deadly force with a purpose to end the sieges (Dannreuther and March 2008). After these catastrophic terrors, the Kremlin re-thought its counterterrorism strategy which began to rely almost exclusively on the use of force (Dannreuther and March 2008). However, in pursuit of resolution to the situation in Chechnya, Putin realized that the only practical alternative of fighting against the terrorism was to pursue a political path, seeking to localize or de-internationalize the conflict by establishing a genuinely pro-Russian support base with Chechnya (Dannreuther 2010, p.116). In the aftermath of Beslan, electoral system was centralized and gubernatorial elections were abolished in the name of antiterrorism (Dannreuther and March 2008, 102). To make force application more effective, there was created a new federal-level commission, which was enabled to coordinate the power of Federal Security Service, military intelligence and foreign intelligence services (Hahn 2008, p.9). In general, Putin’s policy of “Chechenization” is considered to be a significant measure for improving Russia’s fortunes in the Caucasus (Dannreuther and March 2008, 102). Devolution of power to Ramzan Kadyrov was the main “achievement” of this policy (Dannreuther and March 2008, 102). Russian counter-Jihadi successes 2006 was suggested to be the most successful year in the counterinsurgency campaign of Russia (Hahn 2008, p.13). This year was prominent by few main military achievements: the death of ChRI Emir President Sadulayev and several other jihadists (Hahn 2008, p.13). According to the data provided by the Russian security, most of jihadists (400-700) were isolated in Chechnya’s mountains to the South (Hahn 2008, p.14). Thus, Putin’s counter-Jihadi, anti-terrorism campaign was declared to be a strategically successful measure against Islamic radicalism, fundamentalism and extremism (Hahn 2008, p.15). Putin’s efforts aimed to regain respect for Russian in the Middle East In the early 2000’s after the second Chechen war, image of Russia in the Muslim world was on the decline (Dannreuther 2010). Russia’s operations during the war were named to be inhumane actions against the Muslim Chechens and perceived by the countries of Middle East as the brutal and aggressive acts against fellow Muslims (Dannreuther 2010). With an overriding goal to regain respect for Russian in the Middle East, Putin’s administration focused on a diplomatic activity of the president (Dannreuther 2010). Russia decided to join the OIC as an observer state; the government has been careful to ensure that the official ideology emphasized both multi-confessional and multi-ethnic nature of the Russian Federation (Dannreuther 2010). Limitations of the Putin’s counter-terrorist campaign Dannreuter (2010, p.116) concluded that Putin’s strategy based on coercion and military force has certainly not resolved the problem of Islamic radicalization on the North Caucasus. The Islamist insurgency movement has changed into a more diffuse and networked set of groups rather than has absolutely disappeared. According to Dannreuter (2010, p.116) these groups pose a significant threat to other republics in the North Caucasian region, most notably Dagestan and Ingushetia. Even though the Russian Federation was “relieved” from the majority of jihads, the ideology of Islamic radicalism still remained in the Caucasian region, especially among young individuals (Sagromoso 2007, p.695). There are many young individuals who are guided by the Wahhabi ideologies and willing to change society, introduce wider equality and social justice. Having a distorted understanding of Islamic religion and being encouraged to join radical groups in order to avenge the suffering and losses of their relatives, young Chechen generation may be a potential threat of the Russian stabilized state (Sagromoso 2007, p.696). References: Bahcheli T., Bartmann B., Srebnik H. 2004. “De facto states: the quest for sovereignty”, Routledge, London, pp.121-137. Bowers S., Musayev B., and Samson S. 2006. “The Islamic threat to Eastern Central Asia”, The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, vol.31, no.4, pp.375. Dannreuther R., and March L. 2008. “Chechnya: Has Moscow won?”, Survival, 50:4, 97-112 Dannreuter R. 2010. “Islamic radicalization in Russia: an assessment”, Journal Compilation, Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, International Affairs 86:1, pp.109-126. Hahn G. 2008. “The Jihadi Insurgency and the Russian Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus”, Post-Soviet Affairs, Bellwether Publishing, 24:1, pp.1-39. Malashenko A., Trenin A. and Lieven A., 2004. “Russia’s restless frontier, the Chechnya factor in Post-Soviet Russia”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 1-71 Sagramoso D. 2007. “Violence and conflict in the Russian North Caucasus”, Journal Compilation, Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 83:4, pp.681-705. Souleimanov E. and Ditrich O. 2008. “The Internationalization of the Russian-Chechen Conflict: myths and reality”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.60: 7, September 2008, 1199-1222 Read More