The US Fate in World Politics: The Impending Decline of US Hegemony - Essay Example

 The US Fate in World Politics: The Impending Decline of US Hegemony? Table of Contents I Introduction II Hegemony and the Hegemonic Stability Theory III Hegemonic Cycles and Lessons from History’s Three Hegemons IV US Hegemony, the Collapse of the Cold War and 9/11 V Challenge to US Hegemony: The Rise of China V Globalization And the Fate of US: The Impending Decline of US Hegemony? VI Conclusion The Impending Decline of US Hegemony? I Introduction Contemporary history has always been associated with US ascendancy in the world order. Even before the collapse of the Cold War, with two contending superpowers fighting over to keep the balance of world power, the US has always been perceived to be at the top, the true world hegemon – the force that keeps the world in order and peace. Recent events, however, have enfolded that puts this perception under doubt. First, the events that followed in the wake of the 9/11 debacle where the US exercised without subtlety its military might, and almost unilaterally, to pursue its global war on terror and second, the seemingly meteoric economic and military rise of China from the ashes of poverty. Bogged down with its unflinching resolve to go after its enemies, real or not, the US had let slip by opportunities to arrest China’s ascent in the global order as the latter had used every opportunities and tools open to it by globalization, an economic order pursued and cemented by no less than the US. Today, the indicia of an impending China hegemony are very much all over, from its success in cornering the world’s import markets to establishing new unlikely alliances in EU, Latin America and Africa. Some think, however, that all is not lost for the US. The long years of cultivating a democratic and liberal western order that is legitimate, established and trusted by the world community may served well for US as this world order will most likely absorb China rather than be swallowed by it. II Hegemony and the Hegemonic Stability Theory Antonio Gramsci, known as the “theorician of hegemony,” was credited with the development of the theory of cultural hegemony, a term often seen to be a combination of the notion of the power to gather consensus among a group of alliances and the use of consensus to sway its alliance to overpower a rival group (Mouffe 1979 237). From Gramsci’s theory grew another called the hegemonic stability theory, a theory of international peace and free trade totally dependent upon a powerful, predominating state that enforces international rules to sustain and maintain order and peace in the manner. That powerful, predominating state is called a hegemon (Kegley 2008 289). Hegemony implies stability of the international economic situation because it eases away the fear of nationalistic commercial tendencies (Kegley 2008 289). It is buttressed by the liberalistic concepts of free trade and globalization, which makes a hegemon necessary to ensure that no state closes its trade to other states or imposes itself commercially, in any way. The premise is that a globally liberalized scheme of things would spell global chaos and anarchy without a dominant power that would keep the states toe the line (Kegley 2008 289; Layne 2006 136-137). The ability of the hegemon to rally other states to police global mercantilism is another reason, why hegemony is not only tolerated but also perpetuated. Ultimately, a hegemon does not only manipulate the global economic order to benefit itself but also for the benefit of other participating states. Without a force steering global economic order that ensures the smooth flow of free trade and globalisation, an open world economy will be difficult to sustain as most states will most probably adopt selfish, protectionist policies (Jackson & Sørensen 2007 196). There is, therefore, a distinction between an empire and imperialism on the one hand, and a hegemon and hegemony on the other. While the former evokes sheer military and political power, the old face of world dominance founded on coercion, the latter suggests global political ascendancy that although banked on military and economic might presages a more contemporary, consensual, peaceful and civilized supremacy. Hegemony “does not just happen; it is made.” The existence of economic and military might is insufficient without a vision and a will to pursue ends that will catapult one to the top. (Agnew 125). III Hegemonic Cycles and History’s Three Hegemons The book The American Century: Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of American Power observes that a global world system had emerged since the 16th century, with different cycles of historical modification since then constantly manifesting themselves. The longest cycle, the book claims, are the hegemonic cycles, which outline the rise, accomplishment and fall of specific states and their accompanying societies. Three such cycles have purportedly manifested themselves since the 16th century: the Dutch in the late 16th century to the 18th century; the British from the 18th century to around the 1900s, and; the US in the late 19th century and its expected onset of demise in the late 20th century (Slater & Taylor 1999 4). The common element of all the four hegemons was their strength in the agro-industrial production, which enabled them to excel as traders in the world market with their respective major cities established as the world’s financial center. Aside from these, something set them apart from others, an X-factor that was not possessed by other great and powerful states. This is the quality of leadership. Hegemons drew the admiration of the world because they initiated the introduction of something new to the times, became advanced states for it, and caught the fancy and attention of the world as a result. The Dutch, for example, introduced mercantilism to the world, the British brought industrialization to the attention of the world, and the Americans initiated the age of consumption (Slater & Taylor 1999 5). The exercise of hegemonic ascendancy has not always been peaceful and conducive to world order, however. This is because, while hegemony itself may bring about order, a challenge to the state in the hope of wresting the title may bring violence and extensive conflict. At the end of the 19th century, for example, Germany, perceiving Britain’s power to be waning attempted to wrest the title from it. This move resulted in one of the bloodiest war the world has ever known. In the aftermath of the World War II, it was the turn of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) to take center stage and upstage each other out. (Chari 2008 1-2). IV US Hegemony, the Collapse of the Cold War and 9/11 The US dominance in the global sphere became apparent when the British became bankrupt as a result of having fought two wars. The US, which was possessed with military, political and economic power unmatched by any other state in the world at that time, filled the gap to become the world’s foremost superpower. It had after all, at that time, almost all of the world’s capital reserves, most of the world’s food supply and more than half of the world’s manufacturing capacity. It was a role that even in 1942 had been recognized by the government as inevitable for the sake of national interest (Stokes 2005 221). Hegemony, however, as earlier said does not just happen but is willed. US hegemony was underpinned by a vision that was engendered by the New Deal experience and was willed and initiated by the Roosevelt Administration and all the business leaders and politicians of that time (Agnew 126). To ensure its continued viability, the strategy was to establish a pattern of relationships, in which the US through ‘Empire by invitation’ would extend its hand to major European capitalist powers, integrate them into its fold and form a grand alliance for their common security and advancement. True to the inherent nature of a successful hegemon, the US depended not only upon its military and economic strength but also upon the consent of its allies (Stokes 2005 222). With the collapse of the Cold War in the late 1980s, however, and the threat of the USSR gone from the picture, America’s transnational role as a protector of world order is being overshadowed by its national logic of self-interest (Stokes 2005 231). This was aggravated by the Bush administration’s adoption of the New American Century project, which blueprinted the government’s plan for “unprecedented global integration created by endless capital accumulation” at the end of the century. The sustenance of the American predominance, according to this project, is to control the global oil spigot through the installation of a friendly regime in Iraq, Iran and Central Asia. This was a strategy, however, that according to Thomas Friedman, is not conducive to the effort of sustaining US hegemony simply because it would be immoral (Arrighi 2005 I 31) In the wake of the 9/11 cataclysm and the manner of response that the US foisted upon its enemies and the world, the common perception is that it has transitioned itself from a unipolar hegemon to an imperialist empire overnight. This perception is largely engendered by its bypassing sanctions of international multilateral organizations and unilaterally carrying out acts to go after its enemies in the name of pre-emptive strike against the so-called ‘axis of evil’ (Stokes 2005 218-219). The Bush administration’s radical shift to unilateralism, has totally rejected the coalition-building strategy subsequently acknowledged by senior administration officials as a means to capitalize on the crisis to shift American role in a new world order as it did during the Truman administration in World War II (Callinicos 2003 64-66). V Challenge to US Hegemony: The Rise of China The emergence of China as a potential superpower has complicated things for US hegemony. Since it has launched reforms in the 1970s, China’s economy has grown four times and is expected to double ten years from now. Among the many of its accomplishments are: it has amassed huge foreign reserves estimated to have reached $1 trillion in 2006; it has gained status as one of the world’s major manufacturing hub, using one-third of the world’s supply of iron, steel and coal; it has rapidly expanding military power owing to increased spending for it; it has successfully gained diplomatic grounds by reaching out to countries outside Asia and into Africa, Latin America, and Middle East. Unexpectedly, China has accomplished what Russia was not able to accomplish at the height of the Cold War: rival US not only militarily but also economically (Ikenberry 2008 2). China’s economic juggernaut is palpable in its trading activities not only with countries in its region but also beyond it. It accounted for one-third of the increase in the world’s imports, which played a pivotal role to Japan’s economic recovery after it has absorbed many of the latter’s imports. Its recent status of trade with India culminated into a complete turnaround in their relationships after trade between them made a colossal leap from $300 million in mid-1990s to $13.6 billion in 2004 and a major oil agreement signed between them. As China’s economy grows by leaps and bounds, so does its need for fuel, forcing it to explore the African continent and thereby finding and establishing new economic partners and alliances in that continent (Arrighi 2005 78). China has not only increased trade with other countries and established new ones with countries previously out of its trading sphere; it has also found new political alliances. Its trade with African countries, for example, may have rose to $18.5 billion in 2003 but more significantly, it has successfully established a deeper relation with them than mere mercantilism. It has doled out development assistance to a number of these countries sans the conditions that comes with Western aide. In Latin America, China likewise carefully nurtured the possibility of political alliances by offering Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba some $30 billion worth of new investments and long-term guarantees of raw materials. Meanwhile, trade between the EU and China rose by 44% in 2004, with both rumored to be poised to form a China-Europe axis (Arrighi 2005 79). V Globalization and The Fate of the US: The Impending Decline of US Hegemony? Globalization came about as a means of coping with a series of economic crises brought about by labor unrest that started in the 1960s and the inability of the US to control world prices only through monetary means and domestic economic policies. The path towards globalization slowly took shape with the elimination by President Nixon of the Bretton Woods, accelerated during the Reagan administration and clinched by the Clinton reign (Balakrishnan & Aronowitz 22). A political analyst called globalization as a mere “fancy word for imperialism, imposing your values and institutions on others” (cited Mabee 1360). The Bush administration seemed to have confirmed this perspective with its use of American military dominance to pursue its ‘global war on terror’ after the 9/11 catastrophe. Moreover, political historians see an overlap between imperialism and globalisation: an international system that is open; a Westphalian type of international system that distorts the distinction between the national and the international, and; the existence of a hierarchy within the international order (Mabbe 2004 1366-1367). All of these characteristics can be linked to US’ part in globalization, which points to its imperialistic albeit democratic role. But while globalization has consolidated and extended US homogeny, it has also become the means by which this homogeny is being seriously threatened. Many states have, in the past, attempted to wrest US homogeny but to no avail. Inadvertently, globalization has allowed a state to surreptitiously threaten US’ status in the present world order. That China has become a force to reckon with because of its meteoric economic rise after it has capitalized to the hilt globalizations tools and free trade in undeniable. This is best illustrated by the recent inability of the US to compel China to reevaluate its overly devalued currency vis-à-vis the US dollar. Not surprisingly, the US was forced to accept China’s refusal as its global war on terror and other reasons have forced it to be dependent on this Asian country. First, the US relies on China to deal with recalcitrant North Korea while it is busy with Iraq and second, the US needs help from China in financing its war on terror by selling its Treasury Bonds to its central bank (Arrighi I 2005 76-77). The shift in the rising importance of China and the waning influence of the US can also be gleaned from their relationships with third parties. In the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in 2003, many countries were beginning to perceive China’s rising importance in the region eclipsing that of the US. This stemmed from the fact that China’s trading activities with Japan and South Korea, considered close trading partners of the US in the region, were fast catching that of the latter. Even some influential Asians who used to disparage China were forced to swallow their words and sing an entirely different tune (Arrighi I 2005 77). The question is: will China’s newfound economic, military and political prominence and affluence seriously pose a challenge to US hegemony? Has the US reached the end of its hegemony cycle with China poised to take over similar to what happened with Britain over the Dutch in the 18th century and the US over Britain in mid-20th century? If a transition occurs, will it be violent? Historically, power transition involving the decline of one state and the rise of another almost always spelled disorder and conflict as exemplified in the case of Germany and Great Britain in the late 19th century. China’s rise in the 20th century can pose a parallel threat to the world order although some political analysts opposed this view considering that there were also historical moments when power transition did not end up in wars such as in the case of Great Britain and the US in the early part of the 20th century or in Japan’s emergence from the ashes of the WWII into a great economic power but posed no challenge whatsoever to the existing international order (Ikenberry 2008 2). The possibility of China overtaking the US, author Ikenberry opines, might not be gut-wrenching as what happened in other hegemonic cycles and might be even different. This is because if China does so, it would not be facing the US alone but an established, age old western system that is different from its own. If at all, it will be China that will be most likely absorbed by this existing order rather than be the one to dynamically alter it as what happened to the past hegemons (2008 1). What the US can do, Ikenberry further advises, is for the US to strengthen the western-based international liberal political system that it has shaped making it difficult for China to topple it and imposed itself completely upon it, carefully and extensively building the motto “the road to the east runs through the west.” The US by its lonesome cannot depose China, which is presently on an economic and military momentum. However, a China facing the entire western system with the US at its helm is a different matter. This is because the present western order was been shaped to be more liberal rather than imperial, underpinned by the principles of democracy and capitalism. This US-shape system has been deeply rooted because it has acquired trust and legitimacy and it will be difficult to contravene with an opposing or alien system (2008 2). This observation has been validated by history in the cases of West Germany with the European Steel and Coal Community and the Atlantic Security Pact, Japan with the alliance partnership and economic ties, the Marshall Plan and during the Cold War when the democratic nature of established of international rules and regulations prevailed over the resolution of different crises in history (Ikenberry 2008 3). What makes the US-shaped western order difficult to topple by a potential China ascendancy and homogeny? Ikenberry gives at least three reasons: it is underpinned by non-discriminating rules and market openness that benefitted not only the US but other countries as well and even new emerging economies; it is underpinned by cooperation and alliances where no one state openly and overtly dominates, and; it is dense, encompassing and constantly evolving and therefore non-exclusive to the culture and system of any particular state and alienates almost no one (Ikenberry 2008 4). In short, the western order has gained trust and legitimacy because of its democratic and liberal underpinnings which even allows the rise, as for instance China, of new emerging powers. The idea that the US hegemony is declining is not unique to the present era. Even in the 1970s, this perception has been floated around due to the notion that hegemony is closely linked with the idea of imperialism – that is overwhelming military and political supremacy exercised over other states, a throwback to the Roman era. Since in the early 20th century, the words ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ became taboo and were in fact, lost even to the left, and the US itself had not been keen on being branded as such. This created the impression that American world supremacy was eroding. The collapse of the Cold War and the Gulf War, however, had slowly changed all that. The only remaining superpower after the disintegration of the former USSR, the Gulf War illustrated that the US was still in control by being in command of the precious world resource that made it attain superpower status in the 1940s. Moreover, the US had openly used its power to the extent of dictating others in the pursuit of globalization or what it calls an “open and integrated international order based on democratic capitalism” (cited Panitch & Gindin 4). VI Conclusion The fact that China is on the rise, both economically and militarily, and that the world may soon see it actually overtaking the US is not anymore an impossible scenario. The indicia of a China supremacy is all over: its dominance in the imports market; its huge amount of reserves; its cornering the manufacture industry; its new formed alliances with strategic regions like the EU, Africa, Latin America and Asia, and; most importantly, the US dependence on it for financial matters, a dependence that has caused the ballooning of its debts. Whether China, however, can establish world dominance to the extent of wresting US hegemony is another matter. Without a doubt, the US will be scaled off of its former glory, as China overtaking it economically and perhaps, military, is inevitable. Hegemony, however, requires and presupposes more than economic and military might. It presages trust and admiration on the part of the world. Admiration is easy to establish but trust is more difficult and this is true for China whose political system is quite different from the majority of countries composing the predominant world order. The Soviet Union, which had been enjoying superpower status longer than China was not able to break into that wall and established trust with the rest of the world. China may have a harder time. What is more significant however, is that China will be breaking into a world order entirely different from hegemon wannabes which came before it, a world order that has been carefully cultivated and nourished by the state it is threatening to overtake and wrest the hegemon crown from. This world order aptly called western order, is a established, deep and legitimate order that had been nourished by the democratic and liberal ideals and therefore harder to alter and break into. As Ikenberry said, US alone facing China will be to its disadvantage, but China facing the whole of the western is another matter. US decline is inevitable but China hegemony is not. The US may lose its former glory in the wake of China economic and military supremacy but it cannot be easily deprived of its role under the western order. What it must do, according to Ikenberry, is strengthen that order and the rules that make it up, the same international rules and policies that had, in the past, confined the actions of rising and erring states, and kept them at bay. Western Germany, Japan and recently, the Soviet Union had no option but be bound by the principles of democracy and liberalism as embodied in the various treaties and international agreements. Similarly, China will have a difficult time asserting itself above these rules and the entire western order and be forced to be absorbed by it rather than absorb it. Works Cited Agnew, John A. Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power. Temple University Press, 2005. Arrighi, Giovanni. Hegemony Unraveling-I. 2005. http://www.wildcat-www.de/dossiers/forcesoflabor/arrighi-hegemony-unravelling-1.pdf Arrighi, Giovanni. 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