Electoral Reform: Motivations and Implications in the European Context - Essay Example

Electoral Reform: Motivations and Implications – the European Context Introduction Societies are governed and governments are chosen; the old way of which is through elections – a system that had begun in ancient Athens, Greece, and in the Roman republic as well that for thousands years has evolved into different systems (Freeman 2001, p. 623) in response to changing contexts and situations. In elections, governments are generally chosen and installed in power by the vote of the people. At this particular occasion, (perhaps, in some countries this is the only occasion that) politicians become too interested to their constituents, because it is when the citizenry legitimately exercise its political power as it decides who from among the candidates should govern them for a specific range of time that usually lasts for four or six years. Thus, whoever wins in an election is supposed to be the choice of the people. In this sense, election is but a political process by which the people legitimise the authority and power of its elected government, expecting in return that it will truly represent the interests of the people. As such, fair and honest election is regarded to be the fundamental pillar of democracy, as it empowers the citizenry and as it promotes equality and freedom among the people (Klug, Starmer, & Weir 1996, p. 266). Clearly this emphasises the fact that by elections governments are installed to power by the people to serve the people. With this, elections are perceived the fairest way of installing governments to power and in making governments accountable to the governed. However, there is more to election than its claimed equality, fairness and people empowerment, because just like any other democratic exercises, rules can be manipulated. In fact, electoral fraud and violence characterise elections in newly democratised where democracy is still fragile. However, manipulations of the election process to favour those in power can also be done legally through reforms in the electoral rules, be it partial change or an overhauling. The importance of elections to safeguard democracy and the vulnerability of electoral systems and electoral reforms to manipulations make the study of electoral systems and electoral reforms very important because of the profound impacts they may have on election results (Renwick 2010, p. 1) and consequentially on the governance of the nation, on the electoral system itself, and even on a wider political system (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis 2005, p. 2-3). As Perelli (2005, p. I) rightly forewarns, referring to electoral systems: “They can contribute to the development of stable democracy or they can be a major stumbling block to it.” Electoral Systems: Outlining the Course to Power Electoral system or simply, voting system, is the scheme by which people’s votes are transformed to seats of power in the government (Elklit 2002, p. 16). In this context, an electoral system primarily functions in two ways: first, it installs the representative government, giving it legitimacy – by this, electoral system then becomes the most basic requirement of representative democracy (Lijphart 1994, p. 1); and second, it essentially begets power – with this, it is now regarded as among the most powerful political institutions, as it defines and configures how the aspired seat of power be won by a candidate, thereby helping to ascertain who gets elected, how do political parties play, how are political campaigns waged, and ultimately, who will govern the nation (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis 2005, p. 5). In short, electoral systems “define how the political system will function. Metaphorically, electoral systems are the cogs that keep the wheels of democracy properly functioning” (Farrell 2001, p. 2).   Electoral system has three components: (1) the ‘district magnitude’ (DM) which determines the number of representative/legislators that districts elect – for example, the UK uses single member plurality system, each constituency is to elect only one legislator, thus a DM=1; Spain uses the list system of proportional representation, each constituency can elect an average of seven legislators, thus a DM=7; (2) the ‘ballot structure’ that defines the manner by which voters cast their votes, which can be classified as categorical ballots (UK) – “used in single-member districts where voters can vote for only one candidate, as well as in multimember districts where voters can vote for only a closed list of candidates or en bloc” (Darity 2008, p. 2), ordinal ballots (Ireland or Malta) – wherein, voters can vote for all the candidates by ranking them according to their preference, or whether the voters vote for the individual candidate (individual voting) or for the party (block voting); (3) and the ‘electoral formula’ that supervises the translation of votes into seats, which in principle has an indefinite supply of options that can be broadly categorised into three main groups such as majority/plurality, proportional and mixed systems Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis (2005, p. 3). The relationships of these three components determine the performance of the electoral systems, with the district magnitude found not only having a greater impact on but also being positively correlated with the overall proportionality on the election outcomes, which means that votes are translated into seats more proportionally as district magnitude becomes larger (Farrell 2001, p. 6). The breadth and depth of the impact of electoral systems on the outcome of elections and on wider political systems: ‘the proportionality of vote seats-results, degree of fractionalisation, or cabinet stability’ (Grofman and Lijphart 2002, p. 1) is further emphasised by Grofman and Lijphart (2002, p. 1-3) summarised as follows: (1) The effect of electoral systems on the whole electoral process and its outcome can be significant, direct and irreversible and can directly extend even to wider political issues. For example the fight for women suffrage in Britain had tested its judicial system and had also changed the role of women in society. After demonstrating the valuable role of suffragettes in WWI, the House of Commons by an overwhelming majority vote surprisingly passed the 1918 Representation of the People Act, which gave propertied women over the age of 30 the right to vote. Still not all women could vote but it was a major start. By 1928 all women achieved the equal right to vote. (Trueman 2000) Another example, after the election of the first ever Indian MP in Britain’s too exclusive House of Commons in 1892, India since then has become the single largest ethnic community in Britain, the second largest investor in Britain, and next to Chinese the highest number of ethnic student in British universities (TV-Novosti 2010). (2) Even if electoral rules in different electoral systems look as if the same, they may diverge considerably when it comes to their specific outcomes, such as the average number of elected representatives for each constituency, or the conduct of election campaigns, or the inclusion and exclusion of candidates (Grofman and Lijphart 2002, p. 2). (3) Electoral systems do not operate in a vacuum or independent of other political institutions and culture. They operate in a given specific context of time, situation, and culture that demands specific response (Grofman and Lijphart 2002, p. 2). For example, Britain which is a constitutional monarchy elects its Prime Minister very distinctly from other parliamentary systems. Although, Britain operates a first-past-the –post voting system for general elections wherein every person can cast one vote for their chosen MP, voters do not directly elect their prime minister. The majority party in the House of Commons forms the government wherein the leader of the party automatically becomes the Prime Minister. But the life of the parliament rests upon the Crown. (Agence France Press 2010) (4) Any modifications in the electoral system may have their full effect only after a course of time, “since it may take time for key actors to realize the nature of the behaviours that constitute optimising strategies in the new system” (Grofman and Lijphart 2002, p. 2). As Boix (1999, p. 609) argued, electoral rules are “formal institutions that encourage the strategic behaviour of both elites and voters and hence force their coordination around a set of viable candidates.” (5) A key intermediating factor that can significantly manipulates the degree to which electoral institutions or electoral reforms may have an effect on the election results, particularly with regards to the proportionality in the translation of votes into seats, is the ‘geographic distribution of partisan support’ (Grofman and Lijphart 2002, p. 3). For example in his study, Colomer (2006, p. 5) has found that, at the state level, a more proportional ethic minority representation is more possible in a multi-member district lower chambers than in a single-member district of both lower and upper chamber in the same states. There are two incompatible ideas of representation as suggested by McLean (2001, pp. 143-144). For one is the ‘principal-agent’ conception, which politically imply that elected officials who did not perform accordingly will no longer get the same endorsements they had from the people in the next elections because essentially the interest of the principal (the people) was abandoned by the agent (the elected official). However, once a candidate is elected by the majority of the electorate, he/she regardless of performance may remain in office until the next elections. Such concept of representation is more associated with the majoritarian conception of representation, which serves more conveniently with elections to single executive posts like for instance the election of the Mayor of London. And the other is the ‘microcosmic’ conception, which compares representation to a map – “the legislature should be an exact portrait, in miniature of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason, and act like them” (Mirabeu 1984, cited in McLean 2001, p. 145). Such concept of representation is more associated with the proportional systems. However, McLean (2001, p. 145) also pointed out the three difficulties that come with the microcosmic representation. First, since each macrocosm in itself has many microcosms – ethnicity, gender, region, political opinion – with each of these microcosms having its own ‘microcosmographia’, in effect, representation is also challenged. Second, under this conception, the legislature must provide not only a government but must also mirror opinion. So the more diverse the constituents the more diverse should the government and opinions in the legislatures should be. Here lies the difficulty because under such condition, “the negotiations to form a government may be long, protracted and distant from the electorate. And governments may fall for reasons unrelated to the electoral support of their component parties” (McLean 2001, p. 146). Third, as the Jenkins Committee discloses, proportionality of seats does not mean proportionality of power, because every government requires a centre party, and it is expected that the centre party would be more powerful than those are not (McLean 2001, p. 146). Although in principle, there is a plethora of electoral systems, only few among these is in actual use all throughout the world. Below are the tables that sum up the types of electoral systems and the number of countries using each systems. The above data show that indeed the modern world has widely accepted the polling precinct or the voting booth as the most legitimate instrument of political change. And observably, electoral institutions, specifically in established democracies, are found, resistant to change (Lijphart 1984, p. 426). For this, the most resilient to change is Great Britain’s. However after the cold war electoral reforms suddenly sped up, especially among new democracies, which susceptibility to change is understandable because its democratic institutions are still fragile, but this has been evident too in a number of established democracies – For example, Italy in the early 1990s altered its List PR, both to a Mixed Member Proportional system, while appeals to stretch MMP further than Wales, Scotland and London reaching out to the British House of Commons continue (Reynolds 2006, p. 10). What breaks the resilience of electoral institutions to change, specifically in Europe, would be best understood in exploring the motivations and implications of electoral reforms. Electoral Reform: Changing the Rules of the Game As defined, electoral reform is changing the structure of the prevailing electoral system itself, thereby significantly altering the configuration and dynamics of the political game (Doron & Harris 2000, p. 15, 17). Why are electoral laws changed, being changed, to be changed? Do electoral reforms support Sartori’s (cited in Lijphart 1994, p. 139) characterization of electoral systems as “the most specific manipulative instrument of politics?” Studies (Bowler, Donovan, & Karp 2006, p. 434) on electoral reform show two diametrically oppose stances: those in power who benefit more from the present electoral system naturally oppose any electoral reform (Doron & Harris 2000, p. 3), while those excluded or being marginalised naturally push through electoral reforms. Given this conflicting interests, the following points are worth noting. For one, foreseeing the possible coordinating end results of electoral rules/laws, any government in power, which today is characterised by ruling parties, would most likely than not “to shape these electoral laws to its advantage” (Boix 1999, p. 609). In fact, a study (Colomer 2006) on the relationship of political parties and electoral systems showed an upside-down relationship – that, which determines the electoral process is not the electoral rules/laws but the political parties. Meaning, “it is the parties that choose electoral systems and manipulate the rules of elections” (Colomer 2006, p. 1). By mid-19th century, parties in Britain and few in Western Europe initiated printing their own ballots which listed only their candidates to promote block voting that is advantageous to party votes (p. 7, 10). Suffice it to say that electoral rules are in fact partisan in the sense that it serves the interest of one party against another. Secondly, electoral reform remains remote as long as the political situation does not change substantially and the electoral rules/laws satisfactorily serve the ruling party. But, once change in the electoral arena occurs, the government in power would most likely consider electoral reform, calculating the situation that would be most advantageous to it. (Boix 1999, p. 609). Thus, the greater the change in the environment threatens the government in power and the electoral institution, the higher is the chance for electoral reform. On the other hand, the UK had undergone several reform processes, yet they were all practically vetoed. The failure was due to the first and second condition of Shugart’s ‘systemic failure’ model in plurality elections – “when lopsided majorities or reverse winners reflect a strong partisan bias” (cited in Blau, 2008 p. 69). According to Blau’s (2008, p. 67, 69) examination of the several attempts for electoral reforms in the UK (1916-17, 1931, 1998), indeed “the wrong party initiated reform according to the seats-votes equation.” As Benoit (2004, pp.373-4) rightly argued: Electoral institutions could be changed if a political or coalition espouses an alternative electoral system that will benefit the party more than in the old system and has the power to legitimately bring into force the proposed alternative electoral system. Thirdly, radical reforms once implemented could result to something unintended and unexpected. For example the Westminster Model of plurality electoral system at general election usually turns a plurality of votes for the leading party into a majority of seats. By doing so, it follows its electing of legislature with that of a single executive, since with majority seats it can choose a government with sure legislative support. In effect, the plurality rule ended up fulfilling the majoritarian task – to elect a single executive. (McLean 2007, p. 144) Several reasons were forwarded as to why electoral reforms happen. For example in his study on a number of Westminster-type democracies Reynolds (2006, p. 10) suggests five themes motivating electoral reforms such as: (1) the broadening of geographical representation and improving the accountability of individual representatives in the case of List PR systems – widely used in continental Europe (Reilly & Reynolds 1999, p. 22); (2) the discomfort that results from FPTP or Block Vote systems (3) the need to lessen the disintegration of parties under unstable political systems, as in the cases of Italy and Russia; (4) the promotion of inter-ethnic adaptation in a deeply divided societies, as in the case of Bosnia and (5) the belief for empowering minority communities through a representation. On the other hand, Fraenkel and Grofman (cited in Reynolds 2006, p. 10) partly attributed the dramatic electoral reforms by which ethnic heterogeneity of different settings are handled, for example in the case of the new East-European member states that are too ethnically diverse. Moreover, in his particular study of the many failed attempts of electoral reform in the United Kingdom, Blau (2008, p. 62) considered four reasons that may motivate the Labour or Conservative party to instigate an electoral reform in the UK: (1) a well-known and influential party figures may think that it is high time for reform; (2) to temporarily obtain the support of minor-party in a hung parliament; (3) to make use of popular reform in order to improve the party’s vote share; and (4) to benefit the party either in votes, seats, policy, position etc. Table 3 below summarises the different motivations for and against electoral reform. Observably discussions regarding electoral reform mainly centre on its possible consequences either on the status quo or on the proponents of the reform. Yet at the core of these arguments are the beliefs of the criteria that would bring about the ideal electoral system and that which criteria takes centre stage to best define democracy. In other words, each of the electoral systems claims something most important to representative democracy, that under such system, life for the citizenry would be much better, because programs and services could be easily enacted, etc. However, the mere fact that systems continually evolve resulting to new systems only proves that there is no single perfect electoral system for all situations. For example, proponents of majoritarian system uphold that above anything else, ensuring government effectiveness is of utmost importance. A good example of this is the classic ‘Westminster model. Its system of FPTP ensures a single-party, not coalition government. The Cabinet government can pass any legislation they find necessary because the legislature is essentially, the government (Norris 1997, p. 302). However, a stable and efficient government is not solely determined by the electoral system, but a convergence of varied factors (Reynolds, Reilly, & Ellis 2008, p. 11). Besides, efficiency is not simply making things done without objections. On the contrary, an effective government should not avoid objections because they sharpen thoughts; in this sense they are progressive. On the other hand, there seems to be a universal clamour for electoral proportionality as the determinant criteria of electoral systems. For this matter, proponents of proportional representation (PR) sees proportionality as tantamount of electoral justice as it seeks for the inclusion of the minority (Lijphart 1994, p. 140) – ethnic minority group, gender, race, etc., thus truly equalising opportunities, which is the true spirit of democracy. Actually, the shift of many countries to PR (Finland, the Netherlands in 1917, Germany, Norway, Austria, Italy, Ireland) simultaneously occurred with the recognition of universal manhood suffrage (Blais, Dobrzynska, & Indridason 2005, pp. 183-4). Although it may be true that majoritarian systems can also make special provisions to accommodate minority representation, however, this will not equal the proportionality that PR promotes, because minority representation in the majoritarian systems excludes other minority groups, unlike in the PR which permits all (Lijphart 1994, p. 140). If established PR systems are seldom contested, plurality systems are oftentimes challenged on the ground that “it tends to produce highly disproportional result” (Lijphart 1984, p. 429). In fact, the reappearance of public debates on electoral reforms is apparent in countries which existing electoral systems are non-PR. Thus, today, the common electoral system in democratic countries throughout the world is the PR, while few retain plurality and majority systems, like Britain and France (p. 428) in the case of Europe. Notably, the remaining countries utilizing the plurality and majority systems are the rich countries of the world. Would this be the result of what majoritarian systems assert as effective governance – making things done the quickest way without opposition? And since under these electoral systems the elites are those in power, would it follow then, that effective governance belongs to this class? And most importantly, which is oftentimes the point of debate in electoral reforms, will this mean then that effective governance is of utmost importance than representation? But, given the election result under plurality and majority systems which concentrate power to a single-party – doesn’t this violate the democratic principle of equality? Basically, therefore, election is about power by representation, because essentially in any of electoral systems only one thing is being solved and that is to whom should the power be given? Thus, it could be argued that under a single-party, which is the end-result of plurality and majority systems, power is concentrated to only one group, which partisan bias would naturally be stronger. Thus benefit of the system would only be concentrated to a few, forfeiting the very aim of democracy. Yet, as power is what holds this electoral systems to hold, Doron & Harris (2000, p. 3) pointed out that “an inclusive system, such as one that allows many people and groups to be represented and to compete for the resources, will be hard to reform”. Would this mean that PR systems are more stable than plurality and majority systems? Immediately, this would be negated by the six developed countries which remain using plurality and majority systems. Conclusion Electoral reform is essentially a power struggle. It is a painful political process as hurting interests is inevitable. As revealed in the above discussion all electoral reforms are motivated by the dissatisfaction of a larger group. Therefore, changing the rule is hurting only a small participant as against to a greater number that pursues change, but the possibility for electoral reform is also greatly influenced by the very electoral system being changed. A classic example of this is Britain’s formidable Westminster model that, despite many attempts to introduce reform it, the system simply veto it. This means that all electoral reforms are progressive not only because this seeks to serve the interest of a greater interest, but also because change would contribute to the further development of this democratic institution, which is essentially a pillar of democracy. Label it a tyranny of the majority, but this is what democracy is all about. Furthermore, electoral reforms involve many issues to contend with, thus it should be dealt with intently because to change the rules would logically change the result of the elections, which may lead to undesired consequences. Ultimately, electoral reform, whatever is the real intention of its proponent is not only a response to a new situation, but is creating a new situation, subjecting democracy to its fulfillment and limit. 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