Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations And Foreign Policy - Research Paper Example

Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations And Foreign Policy Under the late King Hussein, Jordan’s foreign policy aimed to minimize Jordan’s inherent vulnerability to external events that threatened to disrupt its already weak military, economic, and demographic stability (Mufti 3). In most cases, this resulted in Jordan seeking aid or support from outside powers, creating a long-time pattern of dependence on others for survival and security (Chapin Metz 1). Since the death of Jordan’s longtime ruler in 1999, his son and successor, Abdullah, has followed in his father’s footsteps of being a moderate and cautious ruler. King Abdullah rules under the slogan of “Jordan First,” which has dictated his domestic and foreign policy over the past decade. In general, “Jordan First,” involves nationalistic policies that prioritize the economic and geopolitical security of Abdullah’s regime (Ryan 4). True to his father’s ways, however, Abdullah has not broken away from the pattern of constrained decision making the results on Jordan’s indebtedness to outsiders and its dependence on foreign aid to attain legitimacy and survival (Ibid.). This paper will examine how Jordan’s recent foreign policy, over the past twenty years, has shaped the shifting relations with its Arab neighbors and world powers. The paper will outline the progression of Jordanian foreign policy along a series of key events, highlighting the subsequent changing of foreign relations and revealing the consistent aim of its policy to strengthen and stabilize regional and global ties in pursuit of regime security. The paper will review Jordan’s foreign policy surrounding the 1991 Gulf War, 1994 Jordanian-Israel Peace Agreement, and the period marked by the Second Intifada, Post 9-11, and 2003 US War on Iraq. It will provide the context for each of these events, foreign policy choices, resulting relations with involved countries, and show Jordan’s consistent trend of striving to maintain its own survival and stability, with the help of others. 1991 Gulf War The circumstances leading up to Jordan’s foreign policy decisions in the 1991 Gulf War involved a combination of a severe economic recession, pressure from a dissenting population that demanded support for Saddam Hussein, and economic importance of Iraq to the Jordanian economy. These three factors threatened the survival and stability of King Abdullah’s regime and resulted in him taking a middle road approach in his foreign policy choices surrounding the issues. While he called for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, he refused to send Jordanian troops, and he denounced the international coalition’s military response, favoring a non-violent, Arab response (Ryan 5). He also took a “wink and nod” approach to the UN sanctions, publically opposing the sanctions and continuing to send goods and receive oil from Iraq (Kelly 16). Jordan’s support for Iraq alienated most of the international coalition and resulted in strained relations and lost revenue that Jordan continued to feel for over a decade. Jordan’s economic crisis in 1989 began with the steep decline of oil prices in the early 1980s, which resulted in remittances to labor exporting countries, such as Jordan, to fall sharply (Brynen 85). Workers sent home from Jordan’s oil producing neighbors faced unemployment and remittances fell from $2.3 billion to $1.5 billion in six years (Ibid.). At the same time, external grants and foreign aid to Jordan dropped substantially, leaving Jordan with a state budget deficit and forcing it to reneg on its international loans and enter into an austere IMF debt restructuring program (Ibid.). Due to these effects and the devaluation of the dinar in October 1988, Jordan was on the verge of economic collapse at the beginning of the Gulf War in 1991. The economic stresses facing Jordan leading up to the Gulf War were exasperated by the unrest of the newly unemployed and refugee population who demanded support for Saddam Hussein. The popular support for Saddam drew from Jordan’s self-declared 40-60% Palestinian population who favored Iraq’s stance against Israel’s Western supporters (Mufti 3, Hinchcliffe 344). This support for Saddam also emerged from deep-seeded resentment towards Kuwaitis by immigrant workers who never were allowed to emerge from a second-class status (Hinchcliffe 344). A third factor, which influenced King Abdullah’s decision to oppose UN sanctions and the international coalition’s military response was the economic dependency of Jordan on Iraq. Due to an agreement reached during Iraq’s eight-year war with Iran (1980-88), Jordan provided its only port, Al Aqabah, to Iraq. Jordan benefitted from this arrangement in the form of transportation companies, local employment, and being able to send consumer goods for sale in Iraq. Iraq also provided Jordan with significant oil discounts as well as military equipment captured from Iran (Chapin Metz). This economic relationship was so important to Jordan that, even after finally condoning Iraq’s behavior in 1995 and expelling diplomats in 1997, a “functional and pragmatic economic cooperation” was maintained between the two countries, despite UN-imposed sanctions (Ryan 12). The result of Jordan’s anti-international-coalition and anti-UN-sanction stance in the Gulf War resulted in lost revenue and lost security assurances. When King Abdullah denounced the US-led assault of Iraq as being against all Arabs and Muslims, the US responded by suspending all of its $80 million in foreign aid (Mufti 12). Relationships with the UK and other Gulf States in the coalition also suffered. Saudi Arabia, who had offered $200 million in emergency aid to Jordan after the devaluation of the diner immediately cut all aid and trade with Jordan (Brynen 92). Other Gulf States responded by withdrawing aid, restricting markets to Jordan, and deporting Jordanian citizens (Hinchcliffe 345). These results were detrimental to the already fragile economic environment of the country. The combination of the internal dissidence, economic recession, and economic importance of Iraq threatened to disrupt the survival stability of King Abdullah’s regime and led him to make foreign policy decisions that alienated key providers of economic and geopolitical security for the country. After the war, Jordan worked quickly to restore relationships, starting with the US, Israel, and the UK by signing the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1994. 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty In the wake of the strained relations caused by Jordan’s foreign policy responses to the 1991 Gulf War and the gravity of Jordan’s economic crisis, it was urgent that amends be made in order to recuperate from the damage done. While public opinion in Jordan prevented King Abdullah from joining international coalition forces in the Gulf War, with Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) forces on board and the economic and security incentives provided by the “peace dividend,” the signing of the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty brought immediate benefits to Jordan (Cunningham 196). Although some relationships, such as with Syria, became strained as a result of the peace deal, Jordan’s foreign policy at this time served to stabilize and fortify the economic and security status of the country and regime. Prior to 1993 it would have been difficult for Jordan to consider a peace deal with Israel. The Palestinian Intifada of 1987-88 against Israel’s occupation of the West Bank threatened to spill over to the over 1 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan’s east bank, making this population’s voice un-ignorable during Gulf War foreign policy decisions (Mufti 9). Also, during this time, aside from the need to placate Palestinians living within its borders, Jordan received funds from other Arab countries for maintaining its position as a ‘front-line’ country against the Israeli occupation (Hinchcliffe 344, Cunninham 196). However, at the end of the Gulf War, public negotiations at the regional peace conference in Madrid and secret negotiations in Oslo led to PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, to sign the Declaration of Principles, thereby agreeing to make peace with Israel (Ibid). The threat of a Palestinian uprising within Jordan was dissolved and Jordan looked to the economic and security incentives of signing the Peace Treaty. The economic and security incentives resulting from a restored relationship with the US and Israel upon signing the Peace Treaty came in the form of immediate financial and military assistance. The Peace Treaty resulted in recognition of borders and security assurance from Israel, the largest power in the region (Mufti 5). The US also provided financial and military assistance in the form of aid and equipment donations (Hinchcliffe 346). The Treaty resulted in debt forgiveness from industrialized countries and foreign investment attraction that could undo some of the damage done under UN Sanctions and cut trade with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Ibid.). It also resulted in increased tourism and an important water sharing agreement with Israel (Mufti 5). All of these measures contributed to ensuring Jordan’s stability and survival and the maintenance of control and power centralization of Abdullah’s regime. However, despite the precedent set by the PLO in favor of the treaty, the Jordanian public, as well as other Arab States were not in favor of Abdullah’s decision. While Abdullah justified his foreign policy on the economic and military gains, public discontent in the peace/normalization process with Israel continued to decline as economic conditions worsened and the promised government liberalization within Jordan was stopped. Civil liberties were limited or reversed and domestic tensions were high (Cunningham 197). Regionally, Jordan’s policies were frowned upon as Arabs states saw Abdullah unable to refuse pressure from the US and Israel. This alienation from the Arab League and rising domestic instability were risks that Abdullah was willing to take in exchange for the benefits that came from the West (Ibid.) Jordan’s relationship with Syria was especially strained as a result of the signed Peace Treaty. While the peace deal served to neutralize Syria and help Jordan keep up with this continually rising regional power (Cunningham 197, Hinchcliffe 346), Syria viewed Jordan’s involvement in the peace deal as selling out to Israel (Ryan 7). A historically volatile relationship, the Jordan-Syria relation suffered once again until a 1999 Joint Jordan-Syrian Higher Committee broke five years of diplomatic silence between the two countries. They were later to form new cooperative trade arrangements, as well as a water sharing agreement that was vital for Jordan’s survival (Ibid.). However, the relationship did not reach a strong point until they came together in support for the second Intifada that began in 2000 and shared joint opposition efforts to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq (Ibid.). 2000 Intifada, Post 9-11, and the 2003 US War on Iraq Despite Jordan’s close ties to the US and Israel after the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty, growing dissatisfaction within Jordan’s opposition forces and the region as the second Intifada began in 2000 and the US made threats against Iraq forced Jordan to review its policy and take a stance against the US’s and Israel’s actions (Ryan 10). This Post 9-11 period is marked by a trend in Jordan’s foreign policy to stabilize and strengthen relationships with its neighbors, Arab States, and global powers. Best stated by Ryan (4), “the kingdom [was] intent on preserving its economic links to global powers, and also on restoring and deepening its economic connections to regional states such as the "oil kingdoms"-- the Arab monarchies of the Gulf.” This required a good deal of concessions-making and a strong repression of civil liberties at home. Relations with Iraq had grown tense after Jordan publically broke with Iraq in 1995 and expelled two Iraqi diplomats in 1997, but ties were mended when Jordan became the first country to send medical supplies and high level diplomats, and later, commercial airliners to Iraq; a motion that was soon followed by other countries (Ryan 13). After this gesture, warm relations persisted between Jordan and Iraq until the start of the war, and the two countries continued to provide vital economic services for each other: Iraq benefited from access and use of Jordan’s port Al Aqaba, and Jordan received 100% of its oil from Iraq- it received half of the oil for free and the other half at an unheard of 50% discount (Ryan 4). As a result of the 2003 US-led War on Iraq the Jordanian-Iraqi relationship has deteriorated over recent years. In March 2004, Jordan removed its diplomatic personnel from Bagdad because of security threats at the Jordanian embassy (Country Watch). In response, Iraq withdrew its own diplomat from Amman and reported that relations between the two countries were in “crisis mode” (Ibid.). In the Post 9-11 environment Jordan’s relationship with the US grew stronger as it became a staunch ally in the US War on Terror. Jordan supported an anti-Taliban mission to Afghanistan and sent peacekeeping troops to Afghanistan after the mission was completed (Ryan 14). The direct benefits from this assistance came in the form of a US-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement, the first with any Arab nation, and increased US foreign aid (Ibid.). The increased foreign aid was worth $250 million in USAID funds and $100 million in military assistance in 2002 (Kilani 26). Also in 2002, the US imported 200,000 metric tons of wheat to Jordan (Ibid.). In 2003, Jordan received a combined $500 million from USAID and military assistance (Ibid.). This aid represented a significant safety net for Jordan’s economy and regime stability. In the context of defending Iraq in the face of the 2003 US declared war, Jordan wanted to avoid the political and economic alienation that it suffered as a result of its policy decisions in the 1991 Gulf War, but without losing its important oil connection. Jordan felt certain that no other alternatives existed for oil provision at an equally beneficial arrangement as it had with Iraq, but it could not risk losing the US aid mentioned above. Jordan also feared a surge in Iraqi refugees across its border, adding to the already unmanageable population of Palestinian refugees and the increasingly numerous Iraqi dissidents (Ryan 15). The result was a foreign policy that made concessions without giving in entirely. Jordan stood in strong opposition to the US invasion of Iraq and refused to participate in coalition activities on Iraqi soil (Ibid.). Jordan did, however, permit limited, non-combat deployment of US troops from within its borders, a concession that kept helped Abdullah fill his foreign policy aim of maintaining economic and geopolitical security by maintaining good relations on all sides (Ibid.). As a result of its defensive foreign policies in the Iraq war context, Jordan was able to improve relations and make allies with many of its Arab neighbors including Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia. These states also stood against the US invasion of Iraq and did not send troops to the coalition army. Abdullah was the only head of an Arab state to announce its opposition to the US invasion of Iraq at the 2003 World Economic Forum in Davos. Also at the Davos forum, Abdullah echoed the thoughts of his Arab allies by expressing his greater concern about the growing instability surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (Ryan 15) In August 2004, King Abdullah and Syrian President Bashar called for the removal of occupation troops from Iraq, an important sign of the improved relations between the two countries (Country Watch). With similar caution as used in foreign policy choices about the US invasion of Iraq, Jordan proceeded with prudence in its policy decisions on the Israeli-Palestinian situation. Much to the enragement of Jordanian civil society, Abdullah stuck to the Peace Treaty even as the Palestinian death toll continued to rise. Abdullah’s main concerns were the possible overflow of West Bank Palestinians into East Bank territory (Ryan 15) and the threat to the 50,000 estimated illegal Jordanians working in Israel in 2002 (Kilani 26). His foreign policy punishment to Israel was to delay the sending of a Jordanian ambassador to Jerusalem and to encourage US former President George W. Bush to hurry the process for forming a Palestinian state (Country Watch). Jordan continues to support the peace process and has maintained strong ties with Israel, resulting in a 2002 project to pipe water from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea and a 2004 project to construct a science center on the Israel-Jordan border (Ibid.). The reaction of the Jordanian public to Abdullah’s continued support for Israel has grown stronger in its opposition over the years and has been met with repressive measures from King Abdullah (Ryan 5). King Abdullah publically justifies his pro-Israel and US actions based on the economic and security benefits that Jordan receives for its continued support and participation (Ibid.). The issue of Jordanian civil society opposition is discussed further below. Conclusion Under the ruling of King Hussein until 1999, and under the “Jordan First” slogan of his son, King Abdullah, Jordan’s foreign policy has focused on stabilizing and strengthening the governing regime. In general, the approach has been one of caution and prudence, as a result of Jordan’s lack of economic resources and its dependence on others for the provision of financial and military support (Chapin Metz 1). In this decade, King Abdullah has moved on from repairing and strengthening relationships with states to working with multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, Inter Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization in order to gain more aid and support from these institutions through economic liberalization (Ryan 18). He is encouraging investment in technology and private capital sectors by creating free trade zones and developing relationships with non-traditional allies (Ibid.). These new forms of dependence are variations on the decades-old approach of the Jordanian kings to look for stability and survival from outsiders. As this paper has shown, Jordan’s reliance on outsiders for support has resulted in a commitment to maintain foreign relationships while neglecting or repressing the interests and rights of its own citizens (Byrnen 78). As mentioned above, while the PLO was placated and on board with peace negotiations in 1993, allowing Jordan to move forward with the Peace Treaty, the general population of Jordan was not. Public discontent continued growing over the years after the signing of the peace deal led to nation-wide boycotts of US and UK companies that deal with Israel, which continue to this day (Kilani 25). In the post 9-11 world, with cooperation from the US, Israel, and other world powers, Jordan has been able to move ahead confidently in its support of Israel, and has been able to quench the voice of Jordanian civil society by repressing domestic freedoms (Ibid). Such repression comes in the form of forbidding protests and demonstrations, arresting journalists, and, in 2002, closing down the Al-Jazeera television office in Amman for broadcasting a criticism of the late King Hussein’s close relationship to Israel and the US (Ryan 5). Another startling show of opposition was the assassination of US diplomat, Lawrence Foley, in Amman in 2002 (Country Watch). The Jordanian government blamed the assassination on eight, al-Qaida related, Islamic militants, who received the death sentence in 2004 (Ibid.). The Jordanian public “drew comparisons to Israeli repression in the Intifada,” (Ryan 17). Most analysts ask for how long and at what price can the Jordanian government continue to carry out foreign policy decisions that counter the will of the people. They will ask how long and to what extent the Jordanian government can repress the people’s opposition movements, as they continue with unpopular foreign policy. If the increasing violence towards foreigners on Jordanian soil and Jordanians on foreign soil is any indication, the situation will not disappear while the government turns a blind eye or provides yet another regime-based justification for its actions. At some point, as it did in the Gulf War, the Jordanian leadership will have to put the opinion of its people ahead of the interests of outsiders. If lessons from the past have not been learned, the cycle of dependence and indebtedness will restart and continue once again. Works Cited Brynen, Rex. “ Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan.” Canadian Journal of Political Science . 25.1 (1992):69-97. Chapin Metz, Helen ed. Jordan: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1989. Country Watch. “Jordan: Foreign Relations.” Accessed on 14 April 2009 from http://search.countrywatch.com.library.ccccd.edu/cw_searchdocument.aspx?DocNumParam=50 Cunningham, Karla J. “The Causes and Effects of Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Analysis of Jordanian Peace with Israel.” World Affairs. 160.4(1998):192-201. Hinchcliffe, Peder. “Jordan's relations with her neighbours: Victim of war or casualty of peace?”Asian Affairs. 28.3(1997): p343-349. Kelly, Michael. “Desert Rat.” New Republic. 204.7(1991):14-18. Kilani, Sa’eda. “Boycott Fever in Jordan.” Middle East Report, 226.Spring(2003): 24-27. Mufti, Malik. “A King's Art: Dynastic Ambition and State Interest in Hussein's Jordan.”Diplomacy & Statecraft. 13.3(2002):1-23. Ryan, Curtis R. “’Jordan first’: Jordan's inter-Arab relations and foreign policy under King Abdullah II. Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ). Summer, 2004:1-19. Read More