The Westminster Model of Democracy and the Consensus Model of Democracy - Term Paper Example

Lijphart’s consensus model and Westminster model Introduction The current dis on the Westminster Model of democracy and the Consensus Model of Democracy as they are being practiced in the modern world has engaged the attention of many critics and analysts. Lijphart’s book (1984) on Patterns of Democracy is a landmark perspective-based critique of the two democratic models and is invariably a more authoritative contribution to the ongoing debate on “which one is better”. His theoretical underpinnings ranging from Westminster Model’s basics – bicameral asymmetric legislature, one dimensional party system, executive power concentrated in barely majoritarian cabinets, pluralist electoral elections and processes, unwritten constitutional structures, representative barely majoritarian democracies, parliamentary sovereignty based on separation of powers, cabinet supremacy, power hierarchies within a centralized government run by a Unitarian party-centric polity – to Consensus Model – evenly-keeled bicameral legislature, well defined power separation doctrine, a power sharing executive, coalition politics, minority representation, issue-based non-party politics and majoritarian rule. The former elements are typical of the system found in the United Kingdom while the latter typically represents elements found in the US system. The apparent implausibility of majoritarian models of political governance as been thrust to the forefront of debate by Lijphart while much of their credibility deficit is primarily attributed to the colossal waste of mental energy spent on reconciliation efforts by pro-majoritarian scholars. While he does not question the legitimacy of majoritarian models, he definitely argues that political pluralism is not necessarily a circumscribed domain within the fundamental theoretical limits that have been imposed on the freedom of expansive political thinking. Liberal ideological constructs could have been more accommodating to welcome the kind of divergent models that are basically founded on the same majoritarian principles of democracy. Analysis Political pluralism and majoritarian parliamentary representation are not identical though, for the former strictly refers to party politics at the grassroots while the latter seeks to identify majoritarian models that are increasingly becoming divergent in their operational environments. While the spectrum of connotations and denotations in majoritarian models of parliamentary democracy is so extensively marked, there is an element of constriction applied on the freedom to diverge. This is altogether an unconscious element though. Political pluralism based on heterogeneous societies is appropriate for consensus democracy while majoritarian democracy is more likely to produce concrete results in homogeneous societies. It’s the former – consensus democracy – that Lijphart basically attempts to explain and expand. Lijphart’s efforts to advocate consociational or consensus democracy began way back in 1977 with his earlier book “Democracy in Plural Societies”. According to him consensus democracy is better suited to heterogeneous societies so that there is a certainty that minority rights would not be subject to a roughshod riding process by a roller-coaster majority in the legislature. His earlier efforts were centered on advocating consociationalism which is not necessarily the same as consensus democracy model that he now advocates. Yet Lijphart felt that in some states traditional majoritarian democracy might fail and therefore he felt that consociational democracy would be a better alternative because those societies are ethnically diverse, religiously divided and linguistically separated. According to him there is no better alternative for these societies despite a plethora of theoretical postulates and peripheral variants. Consensus Model - USA With his current book on consensus model and Westminster/majoritarian model, he has invariably got into the hotbed of ideological undercurrents. As Andeweg (2000) points out “consociational democracy has always been controversial”. Further according to Andeweg consensus democracy is a broader concept and therefore it embodies some of the consociational elements. In this context, Lijphart’s advocacy of consensus democracy is quite understandable. Its structural elements have been of great appeal to generations of political scientists despite the apparent risks involved in adopting it in largely backward societies. Madisonian conceptualization of consensus democracy as found in the USA is a much more advanced model that needs adaptation in one way or the other before adoption in many societies. America is the best functioning example of consensus democracy in the world today and its bicameral legislature, i.e. the Congress, with the Senate and the House of Representatives at the federal level has all the attributes of a consensus democracy. The state level democratic process with a governor as the head of the local legislature illustrates the dynamic political processes that underlie the very strength of a consensus democracy at the grassroots. The US system has indisputably prevailed against the often quoted failure-prone conflict-ridden non-consensual bicameralism that’s seen in some parts of the world today (Hazan and Maor, Editors, 2000). The separation of powers doctrine works much better in the US because the three branches – the executive, the judiciary and the legislature – are distinctly identifiable with separate functional attributes of each. This distinction, as Lijphart points out, is basically determined by the practical outcomes of an otherwise complex process of divergent viewpoints. These three branches of the state function within their defined limits though it must be noted here that as in any other model appointments of judges by the Executive President might act as a negative influence (Caramani, Editor, 2008). But nevertheless in the US it has been a constant practice of each successive President to pick non-controversial judges for the highest court in the country. Minor disagreements are often settled through consultation and consensus with the other party is always the corner stone of the American system. Power sharing executive is a reinforcement mechanism under consensus model. It actually enables the bicameral legislature to function within a mutually beneficial symbiotic environment. In the US the Executive President is elected for a four-year term in office by nation-wide elections though the Electoral College might go one way or the other by casting its lot with a single candidate. The President is both the executive head of the state and the parliament. His/her selection of the Cabinet of Ministers, i.e. secretaries, is effectively a process of consensual agreement because every such selection is subject to the vetting and approval of the Senate which is a broader representative body of states’ interests. Of course the Senate might prove to be a one-sided affair as is currently the case with many Senators from the same party representing it at a time. However, according to Lijphart, the checks-and-balances mechanism works here with additional vigor as against the Westminster majoritarian model because consensus principle is determined by the pulls and pushes of state level compulsions thus evenly balancing the scale of preferences. The veto power, exercised by the US President in effectively curtailing the powers of the Senate and the House of Representatives, has been one of the topics that have engaged the attention of many critics and analysts over the years. The overarching power dynamism entrenched in this presidential practice is both debatable and apparently dubious. However, in reality as Lijphart suggests there is very little or no substance in the argument that “power corrupts but absolute power corrupts absolutely” that has been often cited under these circumstances. In the first place the veto power of the American President is an adjunct of the office of the President that has been necessitated by the unpredictable behavior of a single party dominated House at times (Whitman, 2005). Minority interests have a greater chance of being protected under these circumstances by an Executive President with the veto power than one without it. A series of minor but sustained arguments against the US system’s shortcomings ranging from the legislative filibustering to pork barrel sharing efforts and from log-rolling to raising the ante, has been put forward by many critics. Filibustering is a very peculiar practice in the US whereby legislators might resort to delaying tactics so that a certain piece of legislation, however important it might be, is unlikely to be passed within that session. But minority representation and issue-based politics carry much more weight than the above. Westminster or Majoritarian Model – UK On the other hand Westminster or majoritarian model of democracy as found in countries like Britain is essentially a multiparty democracy with two political parties at the helm of affairs. For example in England the Conservative Party and the Labour Party often exchange terms in office while a third party, the Liberals , are less and less represented in successive parliaments. Then there is an array of independents who profess an equally wide array of political views from left to right. The bicameral legislature consists of the House of Commons, the directly elected representatives through the first-past-the-post election system and the House of Lords who serve their terms on a rotational basis by virtue of their links to important lineages or being descendants of former kings and queens. While the judiciary’s highest court gets its members from the House of Lords, including the Minister of Justice, the House of Commons is the sole legislative assembly that serves a five year term with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition as the most important figures (Webb, 2000). The government consists of the cabinet of ministers appointed by the Queen, as a royal prerogative, but effectively recommended by the Prime Minister who is just “the first among equals” and non-cabinet government members of parliament. The concept of parliamentary sovereignty acquires much greater significance here than elsewhere. The Queen is a constitutional monarch and as such plays only a customary role in the affairs of the state. All executive powers of the state dwell with the Cabinet headed by the PM and therefore it enjoys powers without parallel. With an unwritten constitution, again a peculiarity, Britain is not like any other majoritarian model. Its current political and constitutional status confirms centuries of transformation and evolution (Gamble, 2006). As Lijphart describes British model of democracy has come to be associated with one dimensional party system in which one party with a bare majority (and sometimes even minority governments) rules the country for five years simply because it has a majority of seats in the parliament. Thus according to Lijphart power hierarchies tend to be created at every level of the government and anti-systemic forces raise their heads from time to time. Ministers are there as long as they enjoy the privilege of being favoured by the PM. Since the PM is the head of the victorious political party at elections, a system of favours cannot be avoided. Power structures within the party are formed as a result of a continuous struggle for supremacy by power brokers. Such structures distort both the party-centric outcomes and electoral process with little or no benefit to the citizen. Pluralist electoral processes tend to be vitiated by extreme dependency on donations made by individuals to party funds. A variety of favours is seen to be made by the victorious party to such henchmen and party supporters in recognition of such support. Social milieu that is essentially heterogeneous in Britain, is influenced by these outcomes though such factors are taken for granted as common. Comparison Consensus model of democracy has been praised by Lijphart as the better model because of its versatility and flexibility to deal with any extreme outcome such as the continuous vigilance over minority rights thus ensuring their perpetuation and implementation. While rights would entail some obligations on the part of those groups of minorities, there can be very little room for them to deviate from their obligations since rights would start eroding when obligations are not discharged. On the other hand, according to Lijphart’s analysis, in a majoritarian democracy such as in England, there would be less room for the protection of minority rights because a heterogeneous society with many ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities would tend to identify itself with the majority’s definition of “what’s right and what’s wrong”. In a consensus democracy as in the US, there is also the room for greater representation of minorities because popular consensus at the electoral level is essential for the party to have a fair chance of its candidate being elected, irrespective of other variables such as the direction of the popular wave, party policies and programmes and so on. On the other hand in a majoritarian democracy fair representation of minorities is less likely to be ensured by the very nature of the electoral process. With the first-past-the-post-system of election candidates would eagerly seek to identify themselves with the majority disregarding equanimity principles. The explanation is very simple. Each candidate has a fairer chance of being returned at the election if he or she chooses to favour the majority which has a tendency to make no common cause with the minorities. Finally, consensus democracy operates with a greater degree of executive power sharing agreement which is not found in majoritarian democracies. Power sharing executive is limited by a number of unwritten social compacts including the one on collaborative politics on common issues such as economic policies. In a majoritarian democracy this is lacking to the extent that the victorious party has been elected by the electorate to run its own programme of governance. Conclusion In a broader context consensus democracy according to Lijphart has more merits than demerits in a heterogeneous social milieu while majoritarian democracy has some valuable applications in homogeneous society. Yet consensus democracy effectively ensures rights of minorities in divided social contexts. In other words consensus democracy works better in whatever the social context irrespective of its composition. Lijphart refutes the argument put forward by the supporters of majoritarian democracies that today’s minority has a fair chance of becoming the majority tomorrow; therefore exclusion is not a problem. Lijphart argues that today’s majority would consistently work at preventing crossovers to the minority side by majority numbers so that the majority would continue to remain the majority in times to come. This is almost possible given the numerous divisions on the lines of religious, ethnic, linguistic and other differences. Finally consensus model of democracy holds more promises by way of ensuring regularities in electoral process while majoritarian model might tend to develop irregularities at every level of the process. For instance in England political parties engage in election campaigns on the basis of block-vote collections irrespective of future benefits while in the US such block-vote collections as from the Spanish minority could mean ensuring the passage of legislation that would not antagonize minorities. REFERENCES 1. Andeweg, R. B. 2000, Consociational Democracy, Leiden University, Leiden. 2. Caramani, D. (Ed.), 2008, Comparative Politics, Oxford University Press, New York. 3. Gamble, A. 2006, Theories of British Politics, Political Studies, Vol. 38, Issue 3, pp.404 – 420 4. Hazan, R.Y. and Maor, M. (Eds.). 2000, Parties, Elections, and Cleavages: Israel in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective, Routledge, New York. 5. Lijphart, A. 1999, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and In Thirty-Six Countries, Yale University Press, Connecticut. 6. Whitman, J. 2005, Veto Power, Pocket books, London. 7. Webb, P.D. 2000, The Modern British Party System, Sage Publications, California. Read More