The United Nations and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Limiting Production and Trade - Coursework Example

The United Nations & Weapons of Mass Destruction: Limiting Production & Trade The end of the Cold War in 1991 brought with it a renewed enthusiasm for multilateral diplomacy and reinvigorated the hopes of meaningful international cooperation in combating threats to international peace and security. The United Nations (UN), long crippled by the superpower divide of the Cold War, finally began to find its feet in international politics, a fact reflected by the number of peacekeeping operations it involved itself in. Of the 63 UN peacekeeping operations till date, more than two thirds were initiated since 1991 (UN Peacekeeping 2008). Concomitant to this energetic post-Cold War activism, another important dimension emerged in the UN’s operations: preventive diplomacy. The establishment of the nuclear non-proliferation regime remains one of the greatest successes of multilateral diplomacy; the conscious development and expansion of this regime has sought to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states and non-state actors. Arms control – with the ultimate objective of disarmament – is one of the cornerstones of the UN’s modus operandi, and the framework includes not only nuclear but chemical and biological weapons as well, which are collectively understood as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This essay shall attempt to trace the legal and political environment in which the UN operates and endeavors to reduce the trade and production of WMD. By focusing on the UN’s functional structures, we shall try to understand the salience of its role in preventing the spread of WMD, and also assess whether these policies have any bearing upon the transfer of WMD to non-state actors. Undoubtedly, the UN aspires to perform a noble task, but it is our objective to evaluate how this normative standard compares to the empirical realities of our world. Legal Framework & Political Environment Treaties and conventions have been mainstays of the UN’s continuous effort to improve the conditions of international peace and security. Essentially, “[a]n international treaty contains legally binding commitments and provides a basis for relevant national legislation. Once registered with the United Nations under Article 102 of the UN Charter, it may be submitted to the International Court of Justice in cases of disputes about the interpretation of its provisions or a breach of an international obligation.” (Goldblat 2008: 43) The most important of the UN’s treaties have been the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1975 and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993, along with the abortive Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1994. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 set the tone for what was to become the most complex and elaborate multilateral venture to curb the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the ‘P-5’ i.e. the permanent members of the UN Security Council (SC). Without going into the long tussle between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) that served as its backdrop, we should take care to note that with a 187 signatories, the NPT has been one of the most successful international treaties of all time. However, the missing signatories – India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan – all either possess nuclear weapons or shall soon acquire them (Haass 2005: 81). This results in a climate of uncertainty for international peace and security, and in addition challenges the authority of the non-proliferation regime’s legitimacy (Behrens 2006: 12-16). In any case, it is prudent at this time to consider the structure of the NPT and how it has been operationalized as the fulcrum of the non-proliferation regime. When the NPT was opened for signature in 1968, it was conceived in terms of three ‘pillars’: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The nuclear weapons states (NWS) – namely, the US, USSR, Great Britain, China, and France – agreed not to export nuclear weapons or weapons technology to non-NWS, or assist the development of any nuclear weapons program in the latter. The non-NWS, in turn, consented not to receive any (nuclear) explosive device or technology from the P-5 or any other source, and not to manufacture or acquire the same. In return, the NWS would transfer technology, resources and know-how to compliant non-NWS in order to develop their civilian nuclear power projects (Simpson 1985: 1). One must also remember that the UN had already played an important part in limiting the testing and emplacement of nuclear weapons. Nuclear explosions were banned in the Antarctic in 1959 following the Antarctic Treaty and the Limited (or Partial) Test Ban Treaty in 1963 outlawed nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, or in outer space. In 1967, two more important treaties were concluded and brought into force: the Outer Space Treaty and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty. The first prohibited the emplacement of any nuclear device in the Earth’s orbit, on the moon, or any other celestial body. The second forbid the installation of nuclear weapons or devices beyond 12 miles from the coastline. All of these treaties were precursors to the NPT, which in turn was the first to limit the production and trade of nuclear weapons. The successes of the NPT have been offset by what some have called the “three-state problem” of India, Israel, and Pakistan, who still refuse to sign the landmark treaty, and “their standing outside the system of non-proliferation obligations and rules undermines global security” (Perkovich 2004: 21). In addition, the non-proliferation regime is undermined by the threat of catastrophic terrorism, nuclear trade and black market procurement of nuclear materials, clandestine weapons programs and transfer of civilian technology to military programs, and the existing stockpiles of weapons in the established NWS (Johnson 2004: 10). But, India remains a responsible nuclear power, evident from the recent exceptions granted for its nuclear trade by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), and Israel – though its nuclear stance is ‘opaque’ – can be restrained because of its position as a key ally in the US foreign policy rubric. Pakistan remains the central worry because it is increasingly becoming the hub of terrorist organization and activity, with the fears nuclear proliferation to non-state actors. However, it might be instructive to remember that Pakistan’s refusal to sign the NPT was more a reaction to India’s position and the recent democratic turn in Pakistani politics may yet hold the silver lining in the cloud that has descended upon the country over the last decade. The CTBT, proposed in 1994, held the promise of complete nuclear disarmament, but its unique entry-into-force requirements have meant that it is yet to get off the ground. The Treaty holds that a list of 44 States held (however implausibly) to be NWS or nuclear-capable have to sign and ratify the draft before it takes the shape of law. This list includes India, which has categorically stated its refusal to be a party to this agreement on two grounds: firstly, India was vehemently opposed to the provision for entry-into-force of the Treaty and held it to be contrary to customary international law; secondly, the Treaty did not submit a timeline for the nuclear disarmament of the 5 NWS, and though each of them have stopped testing, a resumption of the same can never be ruled out until its entry-into-force. Moreover, India’s self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing – which lasted till 2007 – was perceived at the time to be more robust than the test ban (Ghose 2006: 25-27). The problem is further heightened by the refusal of the USA to ratify the CTBT and Pakistan’s failure to sign it on the same grounds as the NPT. The CTBT’s ultimate downfall was caused partly by the US Senate’s resolute resistance to its implications and partly by the now well-known fact that the idea of the relationship between the test ban and nuclear disarmament has become, at best, tenuous. The BTWC, at the time of its entry-into-force in 1975, was the only such mechanism addressing biological weapons, though at this time, there are a fairly large number of such instruments (Millett 2006: 47). The principal shortcoming of this Convention was that biological agents have various civilian uses, and thus all restrictions on them are conditional to their specific use. Medical research and vaccine production are vital areas where the ‘banned’ toxins are readily required, and diversion of these for use in weapons cannot be ruled out, especially in military regimes and planned economies. However, the BTWC has increased its areas of focus from agents harmful only to humans, to those which affect plants, crops, and animals, resulting in indirect attacks on humans. The Sixth Review Conference for the BTWC in 2006 called for universal adherence to the Treaty’s obligations, improving national implementation of the BTWC, enhancing confidence building measures to prevent raising suspicion, and encouraged the UNSC to swiftly investigate any alleged contravention of the Treaty obligations (Feakes & Pearson 2006: 37-45). Further, certain arms of the UN – like the World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Organization for Animal Health – have been linked to the BTWC to operationalize a Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, to efficiently counter spates of biological war. The CWC remains yet another massive multilateral treaty which has met with incredible success, with 182 signatories, though not all have ratified. Notable absentees in the treaty are North Korea, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Syria and Libya. There were two fundamental challenges for the Convention at the time of its first Review Conference: firstly, the production of dual-use and precursor chemicals which have legitimate non-military uses but may be diverted towards weapons use; secondly, a peculiar historical problem concerning the vast numbers of Japanese chemical weapons (shells, mostly) dumped in China at the end of the Second World War. A view towards chemical weapons disarmament, greater international cooperation, a strict verification and export control regime and the transparency and accountability of State Parties were essential to tackle these problems (Kelle 2002: 4-9). Though existing stockpiles also remain a cause for concern for the CWC, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – which overlooks the Convention’s functions – operates as an efficient body, making the CWC one of the UN’s successes in limiting the trade and production of WMD. Some lesser known treaties also contributed to the non-proliferation regime advanced by the UN. For example, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 limited “US and Soviet test explosions to 150 kilotons with reciprocal verification…and two years later a complementary measure dealt with the use of peaceful explosions…[known as] the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty” (Whittaker 1997: 61-62). Export Controls on WMD-related Trade and Missile Control A whole range of global export control measures operate simultaneously with treaties on WMD disarmament, with the leading role played by the UN’s coordinating efforts. The NPT Exporter’s Committee (Zangger Committee) was established in 1970 to monitor the nuclear materials being exported between the members of the NPT. It has close to forty members and provides a “trigger list” of nuclear sensitive items and materials. The NSG consists of the same States above, bar China, and their foray extends to a wider category of nuclear-sensitive material, including dual-use systems. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was founded to keep a check on the export of nuclear-capable cruise and ballistic missiles (whether systems or parts thereof). Its provisions were further revised to include missiles capable of delivering chemical or biological weapons. India, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and Libya are not a part of this régime, and China and Israel, though non-members are committed to follow the plans of the MTCR. However, China has been repeatedly accused of helping the development of missile technologies in North Korea, Pakistan, Iran and Libya, while trying to acquire more advanced technologies from Russia and Ukraine. Post-1999, Russia has been able to tighten its export control régime. It is important to remember that the MTCR is not a binding treaty and has only met with limited success, and its substitution by a binding agreement could see greater results. The Nuclear Material Convention (NMC) was set up in 1979 for the protection, recovery and security of nuclear material, in accordance with the NPT. Membership of the NMC is primarily from within the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU). Also, the UN has imposed 27 arms embargoes in the post-Cold War period, and the empirical evidence suggests that “the UNSC appears willing to maintain arms embargoes until the target exhibits [behavioral] improvements, whether the embargoes are the open-ended, time-limited or regularly reviewed types” (Fruchart, Holtom, Wezeman, Strandow & Wallensteen 2007: 49). For arms embargoes to be successful, the political will exemplified by regional and global powers must back any UNSC resolution. However, that seems highly unlikely in a world of intense contestation. For example, China has been reluctant to exercise any influence over Khartoum in the matter of the Darfur conflict due to its dependence on Sudanese oil and natural gases. Further, when the UN proposed an overhaul of the existing arms trade regulations in 2006, it was the US which offered the most vehement opposition; one should also note that the US remains the biggest exporter of arms in the world. Another important part of the UN’s commitment to limiting the production and trade of WMD comes in the form of missile control. The problem became especially acute in the post-Cold War era, with the proliferation of short-range missile arsenals across many of the developing nations and non-state actors, as demonstrated by their use by the Hezbollah on Israel in 2006 (Scheffran 2007: 11). The most advanced missile control regime at the moment is the Hague Code of Conduct, which binds its members to curb the production of WMD, but its membership is only voluntary, and many of the world’s powerful countries have not joined in. The prospects of missile defence systems – perhaps even lodged in space, to the detriment of the Outer Space Treaty – and transfer of missiles to terrorist organizations which could then use them as delivery systems for WMD complicates matters further (Carle 2007: 9). However, some analysts suggest that there might be lessons for the UN from regional arrangements like pre-notification of flight testing of missiles in South Asia, the efforts of the Arms Control and Regional Security group in the Middle East and the Six-Party Talks in North-East Asia, especially in formulating step-by-step arrangements and developing missile-based confidence building measures (Sidhu 2007: 27-29). Also, verification and monitoring could proceed through remote sensing, on-site inspections, declarations by countries and remote monitoring (Vannoni & Biringer 2007: 33-35). Still, the success of the bilateral Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 between the US and the USSR has been hard to replicate on the global stage. WMD Proliferation and Non-State Actors The vivid images of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US serve as a chilling reminder of the nature and scope of catastrophic terrorism which the world faces today. If such non-state actors (NSAs) or terrorist networks like the al Qaeda were to acquire WMD, it shall indeed prove to be a calamity for the international community. Though there is no known incident of any terrorist group obtaining WMD, the threat itself is too grave to be discounted. In 2005, the UN General Assembly (GA) adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Once ratified, the Convention shall make it illegal for individuals or groups to possess or demand any sort of radioactive material or device with the aim of causing death, injury or damage to one’s person or property. But, “The final line of defence against international terrorism is preventive national measures in countries that are the targets of attack. This includes robust counter-terrorism intelligence and surveillance efforts by the law enforcement, national security and border control, and financial regulatory and surveillance agencies. There is not much scope for UN involvement here…” (Thakur 2006: 188, emphasis in original) To this line of analysis, some suggest that there could be ways in which the UN could prove useful. Firstly, it could actively seek the suspension of highly enriched uranium (HEU) production across the world; secondly, it could influence an indefinite moratorium on the construction of (nationally owned) uranium enriching facilities; and thirdly, seek a worldwide moratorium on the construction of plutonium reprocessing facilities (Levi & O’Hanlon 2005: 59). However, there remain structural and institutional constraints on the UN, along with many particular state interests which limits its role; trying to manipulate domestic policy instantaneously reeks of a challenge to sovereignty, while the influence of the great powers, especially the US, can often hold the world body hostage (Luck 2004: 95-104). In fact, there remains sound historical evidence to believe that the UN’s role is indeed limited: “Prior to the end of the Cold War, it was generally the case that NSAs could indulge in some basic ideological posturing to secure supplies of weapons from one or other of the major powers. This extended beyond the two superpowers to other major powers such as China and France, for example. The covert shipment of weapons to non-state actors was often used as a foreign policy tool.” (Smith 2008: 46) However, if the Cold War rivalry which had dogged the UN for close to five decades has now withered, so should such foreign policy imperatives of the previous era. For those NSAs for whom the deployment and use of WMD seems attractive, only some vigorous monitoring, information sharing and controls on the trafficking of WMD could thwart their intentions (Kibaroglu 2008: 39-42). Conclusion Evidently, the challenges facing the UN in its effort to maintain international peace and security are many. As we have seen, the lack of political will on the part of Member States or even unconventional positions taken on popular issues could go a long way in producing a debilitating effect on the UN’s performance of essential functions. Within that framework, this essay finds that the UN achieves its objectives to a fairly high degree. Although the threat of WMD proliferation still looms large, no significant headache for the UN has yet emerged. Instead, we find that institutionally, the body has gone a long way in adopting and implementing strategies to limit the production of WMD and weapons-related materials and has also sought to rein in the trade of the same. Though some ventures remain unsuccessful – like the CTBT and the proposed Fissile Material Production Cut-off Treaty of 1995 – the existing non-proliferation framework has seen several successes, especially in the gradual elimination of chemical and biological weapons stockpiles. Nuclear weapons remain inextricably intertwined with the geopolitical realities of the world, and there salience shall continue to endure not because of the UN’s failure to engage appropriately with the issue, but rather in spite of its repeated efforts to move towards a more peaceful world. List of References Behrens, C. E. (2006) CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service/Library of Congress. Carle, C. (2007) ‘Missiles Matter.’ Disarmament Forum, 1, 3-10. Feakes, D. & Pearson, G. S. (2006) ‘Achieving the Outcomes of the Sixth Review Conference.’ Disarmament Forum, 3, 37-45. Fruchart, D., Holtom, P., Wezeman, S. T., Strandow, D., & Wallensteen, P. (2007) United Nations Arms Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour. Stockholm: SIPRI. Ghose, A. (2006) ‘Maintaining the Moratorium – A de facto CTBT.’ Disarmament Forum, 2, 23-27. Goldblat, J. (2008) ‘Open Forum: Treaty or Code of Conduct?’ Disarmament Forum, 2, 43. Haass, R. N. (2005) The Opportunity: America’s Moment to Alter History’s Course. New York: PublicAffairs. Johnson, R. (2004) ‘Is the NPT up to the Challenge of Proliferation?’ Disarmament Forum, 4, 10-19. Kelle, A. (2002) ‘The First CWC Review Conference: Taking Stock and Paving the Way Ahead.’ Disarmament Forum, 4, 3-9. Kibaroglu, M. (2008) ‘Dealing with the Threat Posed by Non-State Armed Groups Aspiring to Weapons of Mass Destruction.’ Disarmament Forum, 1, 37-44. Levi, M. A. & O’Hanlon, M. E. (2005) The Future of Arms Control. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Luck, E. C. (2004) ‘Another Reluctant Belligerent: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism.’ In The United Nations and Global Security. Ed. by Price, R. M. & Zacher, M. W. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 95-108. Millett, P. D. (2006) ‘The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in Context: From Monolith to Keystone.’ Disarmament Forum, 3, 47-63. Perkovich, G. (2004) ‘Strengthening Non-Proliferation Rules and Norms – The Three-State Problem.’ Disarmament Forum, 4, 21-32. Scheffran, J. (2007) ‘Missiles in Conflict: The Issue of Missiles in all Its Complexity.’ Disarmament Forum, 1, 11-22. Sidhu, W. P. S. (2007) ‘Lessons from Regional Approaches to Managing Missiles.’ Disarmament Forum, 1, 23-29. Simpson, J. (1985). ‘The Non-Proliferation Treaty at Its Half-Life.’ In The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ed. by Bellany, I. London: Frank Cass: 1-12. Smith, C. (2008) ‘Weapons Transfers to Non-State Armed Groups.’ Disarmament Forum, 1, 45-51. Thakur, R. (2006) The United Nations, Peace and Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vannoni, M. & Biringer, K. (2007) ‘Missile Control Agreements: A General Approach to Monitoring and Verification.’ Disarmament Forum, 1, 31-42. Whittaker, D. J. (1997) The United Nations in the Contemporary World. London: Routledge. Read More