United States Strategy in Iraq - Term Paper Example

An Analysis of the US Strategy in Iraq The US strategy in Iraq has been the of much debate. From its own citizens to the international community, there have been questions concerning the validity of the actions performed by the US in the name of its own security. With so many questions, it is the duty of the government to answer any and all of these concerns, which in the opinion of many has not been satisfactorily done. Any action that is the result of a pre-emptive attack necessarily should. The reason given for the attack was our own protection. When weapons were not discovered, the administration stated that the invasion of Iraq was protecting the US from terrorism: “And I saw a threat in Saddam Hussein…he was sponsoring terrorism” (Bush, G. 2006). Obviously there is much to discuss. This paper will discuss the US strategy in Iraq and the debate surrounding it, and it will give an evaluation of US actions and strategies. By discussing these issues in more depth than the average citizen generally knows about Iraq, hopefully this report will attempt to be informative in regards to the real situation in Iraq. It should also be noted that merely questioning the motives of an administration does not in any way make a person any less patriotic, though this strategy was used by members of the news media when people attempted to initially speak out against the war before the invasion actually took place: “In [Democratic leaders] warped way of thinking, America is the problem, not the solution. They dont believe there is any real danger in the world except that which America brings upon itself…Kerry would let Paris decide when America needs defending. I want Bush to decide” (Saletan 2005). US Strategy in Iraq First and foremost, the current administration has stressed one single factor in the invasion of Iraq, and that is the protection of the United States.. As mentioned, the weapons of mass destruction that were initially the main reason behind the invasion were not there: “I understand that the intelligence didnt turn out the way a lot of the world thought it would be. And that was disappointing.” As this was the case, the reason for the invasion was given as a pre-emptive strike to protect the US from terrorism. It was felt that deposing the regime of Saddam Hussein would not only negate a supposed link to terrorism, but this would also serve as a way to test one of political science‘s prized ideas: “The defining act of Bush’s presidency was grounded in a theory that the political scientist Jack Levy once declared was ‘as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.’ Namely, that democracies do not fight each other”(Owen 2006). By democratizing Iraq, the US would be planting the seed of democracy in the Middle East and not only would Iraq not be a threat to the US as a fellow democracy, but it would encourage democracy throughout the Middle East, bringing peace to an unstable region. To succinctly state the administration’s main goal in the protection of the US through the invasion of Iraq, our military forces must “defeat al-Qaeda and its supporters and ensure that no terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq” (whitehouse.gov) There are many steps that must be taken in order to accomplish this goal that the administration has set forth. The Iraqis must have the ability to run their own security efficiently and effectively. Also, the decision-making power must be handed over to the Iraqi government in order for peace to fully flourish. To accomplish this, we must “continue to strengthen the Iraqi Security Forces and accelerate the transition of securing responsibilities to the Iraqi government” (whitehouse.gov). The more power the insurgency views the US as having, as opposed to their own government and their own people, the more resentment and fuel the insurgency will have to continue fighting. As we can see, it is imperative in the long run for the Iraqis to take over their own security. There are many aspects to the conflict in Iraq that must be considered. For instance, there has yet to be a restoration of basic utilities to prewar levels: Most reconstruction efforts in Iraq have focused on rebuilding major infrastructure from the top-down. According to the Wall Street Journal report, US funded reconstruction projects in Iraq have largely failed to restore the country’s electricity output, water supply, or sewage capabilities to prewar levels (Turner 9). Obviously reconstruction efforts are an important aspect of the building of Iraq as a democracy. Without the proper means by which the country will be able to support itself, for instance once the US army has withdrawn, there is no way for democracy to properly flourish. Without a proper economy, there Iraq will not be able to maintain the type of security force necessary to defend itself from insurgents. There is no way that Iraq can build a stable economy without first its utilities being at a completely functional level. To review and state these steps succinctly, Iraq’s infrastructure must first be rebuilt, only then will a stable economy arise that will be able to fund a government can protect its people from violent insurgents, at which point the US will be able to successfully withdraw the majority of its troops from the country. This is the plan as outlined by our current administration to ensure the safety of Iraq, the Middle East, the United States, and the world in general. The administration also states that the rebuilding of Iraq is necessary to the future stability and the chance for democracy to flourish in the Middle East. If the job were to not be done to a satisfactory level, then there is a good chance that the countries of the Middle East would not trust the Untied States: “Middle East reformers would never again fully trust American assurances of support for democracy and pluralism in the region” (Bush, G 2006). As the Bush administration frames it, this is an opportunity that will come once; there will not be another chance to plant the seed of democracy in the Middle East if the current efforts are not successful if Iraq turns into a permanent quagmire and descends into a state of chaos and civil war. Though it was not apparently planned for initially, the conflict will take time to resolve, but the rewards for patience and a thorough job will be worth the time, money, effort, and sacrifices being asked of the US forces. The Debate Surrounding Iraq As the main reason behind the pre-emptive strike in Iraq is the safety of the United States, the main debate around the conflict in Iraq centers on how necessary the invasion was to ensure our safety, and if the invasion has really made our country any safer than if Iraq hadn’t been invaded. Since no weapons of mass destruction were found, the administration has focused on Iraq as the center of the war on terror. In speeches, President Bush has the tendency to discuss the conflict in Iraq and the conflict in Afghanistan interchangeably: “But this war came to us, not as a result of actions we took, it came to us as a result of actions an enemy took on September 11, 2001” (Bush, George, 2006). The President’s use of the term “this war” is frustratingly vague considering that there are two very different wars in two very different countries. The tendency of the majority of US citizens is to still mistakenly believe that Iraq had connections to the 9/11 attacks: “Nearly seven in 10 Americans believe it is likely that ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the Sept. 11 attacks, says a poll out almost two years after the terrorists strike against this country” (Associated Press 2003). Obviously this is a very disconcerting statistic, especially to those people who take the time to research current events beyond what the US news media supplies people with. If one were to do so, it would be found that there is: "‘no credible evidence‘ that Saddam Husseins government in Iraq collaborated with the al Qaeda terrorist network on any attacks on the United States, according to a new staff report released this morning by the commission investigating the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks” (Gunaratna 2003). Also troubling is the tendency to allow US citizens to mistakenly believe that the group that calls itself “al-Qaeda” in Iraq has no ties to the group that attacked the US on its own soil: ““The people we’re calling ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’ are not the same people who flew planes into buildings on September 11, 2001” (Turner 2007). Considering the general population’s belief of Saddam Hussein’s involvement in 9/11 and a non-related group calling itself al-Qaeda inside the borders of Iraq, it is very easy for people skimming headlines to believe that the war on terror really is centered in Iraq. Another tactic used by the administration is to mention the very strenuous ties that had at one point existed between Iraq and bin Laden’s group: “Iraqi intelligence agents have met with Al Qaeda leaders and operatives, but there is no conclusive evidence of Iraqi assistance to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda operatives have traveled in and out of Baghdad, but there is no evidence of state sponsorship” (). As stated here, there is no evidence of state sponsorship, and to mention this brief meeting without thoroughly informing the public about the lack of evidence in regards to the Hussein/al-Qaeda links is irresponsible at best and manipulative at worst. With all of this to be considered, it is easy to see why there is so much controversy surrounding the US invasion of Iraq and the dissent amongst the international community in regards to the invasion. While it is difficult to try to discern whether their were certain less than altruistic motives behind the invasion, it can be stated that the administration went ahead in their plan despite apparent evidence that their plan would probably achieve the opposite of what their stated goal was: Thursday morning CBS Newss Early Show criticized President Bushs latest justification for the Iraq War as being the first line of defense against al Qaeda, by citing an upcoming Senate Intelligence Committee report which states that the administration was warned before the invasion that a US presence in Iraq would actually increase terrorist influence (Edwards, 2007) In the face of all of the evidence stating contrary results, the administration continues with the same sort of rhetoric, seemingly willfully ignoring the statistics and finding where it disagrees with their strategy. The same lines are repeated over and over again: “Success in Iraq remains critical to our national security and to success in the war on terror” (Bush, 2006). As we search further and further into the debate behind the Iraq war, we discover more and more questions that have gone unanswered. These are not the type of questions that should left unanswered, yet there is little to no outcry in the popular media. This is not to say that there couldn’t possibly be appropriate answers to these questions, merely that the administration has willfully chosen to not answer these questions. It would seem as though as long as the majority of the population does not feel the need to demand these questions, they simply will not be answered. Obviously there are many issues that have contributed to the intense debate surrounding the Iraq invasion and subsequent occupation. Evaluation of Actions and Strategies Beyond discussing the administration’s actions, the effectiveness of these actions needs to be taken into account. As it was mentioned that this action was based upon the idea that democracies do not fight each other, it needs to be examined whether or not the forced democratization of Iraq was an appropriate action. First off, while the democratic peace theory discusses the fact that democracies do not fight each other, what it does not do is to provide one country with the motivation to invade another, considering that “the democratic peace theory does not dictate that the US can or should remake Iraq into a democracy” (Owen 2005). Stating that one country will not attack another if they are both democracies cannot be in any way a justification for the invasion of another country. This is simply completely unreasonable. Beyond this, there are several other factors that need to be discussed. For instance, there are exceptions to this theory: “Democracies may be stable and peace loving; democratizing states rarely are” (Owen 2005). First off, any state that has a new form of government forced upon it in at least in part necessarily resist this change. Of course, while countries have been invaded before that have been taken over and then a new form of government has been set up, this is not quite the same as what has happened in Iraq. In these previous cases, such as the invasion of the USSR into Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union was attempting to maintain its level of influence over what was considered its satellite states. Or as Germany’s invasion of Poland set off WWII, there was a maintained German presence planned for the occupation. In other words, these countries were invaded by the invading countries out of the invading countries own self-interest. In these instances the countries weren’t invaded and told that what was being done was a completely altruistic act on their behalf and told that their government was being reshaped into the image of the invading countries own government because, simply put, they didn’t know any better and it was for their own good. There were many aspects of the invasion of Iraq that were not thoroughly researched, or the research that was available was not taken into consideration. For instance, it was not considered as to whether Islamic countries are open to democracy or not: “As the historian Elie Kedourie put it, democracy is alien to the mind-set of Islam” (Owen 2005). It’s not an appropriate assumption to make that one culture will fully accept the values and views of another culture, which was the assumption that was made when the administration thought that the Iraqi people would welcome the US forces with open arms and simply adopt the US viewpoint. This assumption left the US forces unprepared for the difficulties that would be faced by the occupying and rebuilding forces. Over and over throughout the literature we find an admittance that the US had no idea of the difficulties that would be faced: “An extended occupation had not been part of the Pentagon’s plan to administer postwar Iraq” (whitehouse,gov). This underestimation has been quite detrimental to the US plan and to the Iraqi people. Frankly speaking, it was completely irresponsible in regards to the citizens of Iraq to not be prepared to restore the country to near its prewar condition in a reasonable timeframe: “Most reconstruction efforts in Iraq have focused on rebuilding major infrastructure from the top-down. According to the Wall Street Journal report, US funded reconstruction projects in Iraq have largely failed to restore the country’s electricity output, water supply, or sewage capabilities to prewar levels” (Turner 2006). Beyond resentment that the citizens of an occupied would feel towards the occupiers, obviously there will be even less support for the occupiers if they can’t, to phrase it colloquially, can’t fix what they broke. As restoring the infrastructure is the very bottom base of the pyramid in regards to steps that must be taken in order to fully democratize Iraq and place the government in a position where they will be able to fully govern and control any future insurgencies, the lack of restoration to Iraq’s infrastructure is a huge mistake that has to be rectified. The restoration of infrastructure is not the only area in which the US strategy is falling short of what it needs to accomplish. For instance, the full succession of power to the Iraqi appointed government has taken longer than initially proposed. As such, this is another source of resentment. Without a ruling body of their own citizens being in a position of power, the Iraqi citizens will continue to feel like a conquered people: The IGC [Iraqi Governing Council] was never able to agree on a formula for political transition, partly because of its own deep internal divisions along philosophical, ethnic, and sectarian lines; and partly because its members resented not having any real power” (Turner 11). With this lack of cooperation and obvious lack of power, there would have been no way for the Iraqi government to take over in a decent time-frame, extending the amount of time that the US forces have to remain in Iraq and in a position of power. Of course, while there were comments made about John Kerry desiring Paris to determine when it was necessary to protect ourselves, the US still had a strong expectation of the international community to aid in the efforts. These expectations were not met: “The expected level of Iraqi and international community financial support for Iraq’s development needs have not been met” (Turner 14). Again to phrase the issue colloquially, the US wanted the international community to help clean up the mess that was made. Without support from the majority of the main European powers, obviously this sort of support wasn’t going to be given once the US went ahead and invaded Iraq anyways. The extent to which the US was unprepared and has insufficiently been able to implement the plans which would return stability to Iraq is completely unacceptable. Without the situation in Iraq being properly handled, the Middle East could become even more unstable than it already is. As mentioned, though democratic states do not fight each other, states that are mock-democracies are even more likely to start wars, as well as states that are going through the shaky process of democratization: The Middle East could also become a much more dangerous place if Washington and the rest of the world settle for a merely semi-democratic regime in Iraq. Such an Iraq…would be uncommonly likely to start wars…such an Iraq may also be just what we are likely to end up with (Owen 2005) Obviously, since we have already started this process, Iraq must be fully rebuilt and have enough power to be able to sustain itself. Letting Iraq descend into chaos and creating more instability throughout the Middle East is completely unacceptable. With careful planning by the future administration, this will not take place. Conclusion With the current administration leaving office at the end of the year, there will be the chance to resolve this situation. With the repeated lack of satisfactory results from implemented US plans, the quote from presidential candidate John McCain concerning another one hundred years in Iraq might come to be true if the current plans are not changed and fixed. The US can’t afford to let that happen, and the Iraqi people will not want this to happen either. For our own country, for Iraq, the Middle East, and the international community in general, the situation in Iraq must be handled in a timely manner. Works Cited Associated Press (2003) “70% believe Saddam, 9/11 link.” Available from http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-09-06-poll-iraq_x.htm Bush, George “US strategy in Iraq.“ available from www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html Edwards, D., Kane, M. (2007) “Bush created ‘safe haven’ for terrorism with invasion of Iraq.” Available from http://www.infowars.com/articles/iraq/terrorism_bush_created_safe_haven_for_terror_with_iraq.htm Friedman, Brandon (2007) “Al-Qaeda…in Iraq?” available from http://www.vetvoice.com/showDiary.do?diaryId=318 Gunaratna, Rohan (2003) “Iraq and al-Qaeda: No evidence of link.” available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/2003/0219alliance.htm Saletan, William (2005) Opposing Bush becomes unpatriotic.“ Available at Owen, John, (2005) “Iraq and the Democratic Peace.” available from http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20051101fareviewessay84611/john-m-owen-iv/iraq-and-the-democratic-peace.html United States Government Accountability Office (2006) “Rebuilding Iraq.” available from www.gao.gov/new.items/d06788.pdf Turner, Clarence, (2006) “US reconstruction strategy in Iraq.” Available from Thomas, Dylan, (2008) “Winning or Losing.” Available from http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11701218 Read More