U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism - Case Study Example

U.S. & EU EFFORTS TO FIGHT TERRORISM Terrorist attacks in New York, London and Madrid have propelled Al Qaeda into international fame and forced the U.S and EU into counterterrorism cooperation. Since 9/11 U.S and EU security officials have formulated a counterterrorism understanding framework, entered into strategic agreements to boost mutual performance and held periodic meetings to upgrade/act on latest terrorist information. While minor differences have surfaced due to differing individual methods, their overall cooperation has been strong and significant. They have foiled several terrorist plots in the U.S and Western Europe. Their ongoing cooperation is vital as Al Qaeda has regrouped to pre 9/11 strength and poses a potent threat. In its latest development, it threatened terrorist action against those nations presently involved militarily in Iraq. The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations and the FBI unanimously define terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Payne, 2007). Although terrorism existed on a smaller scale before, the events of September 11, 2001 involving simultaneous, massive and spectacular attacks against the U.S. resulted in highlighting terrorism on the international stage {especially in Western countries} like never before. 9/11 revealed to the world the existence of the “mother of all terrorist groups” Al Qaeda. I. Introduction Starting with 9/11, the world witnessed 3 deadly terrorist attacks against the U.S. and EU nations. The first, 9/11, was the single most destructive act of terrorism ever committed in the United States (Lance 94) in which 19 terrorists on an Al Qaeda suicide mission hijacked 4 U.S airliners (Alexander 10), that were used as unique projectiles of destruction to cause the death of 2972 people (September11victims.com, 2004) besides leaving many more maimed for life. Witnesses later said the 19 fanatics repeatedly chanted lines about Islamic visions of holy death such as ‘flying to the eternal paradise’ and ‘Allah’s perpetual white light’ (Lance 94). Although the U.S had experienced terrorist attacks against its interests earlier {such as the 1983 truck bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon that killed 41 persons (Cronin et al. 41), and the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 when bombs detonated in the parking garage of the Center killed 6 persons and maimed 1,042 more (Alexander 20)}, 9/11 was its worst terror experience. The second deadly terrorist attack involved the detonation of 10 nearly simultaneous bombs on commuter trains arriving at Madrid’s Atocha railways station on March 11, 2004 that killed 191 and wounded hundreds more (Hoffman 11). It was viewed as the first sensational post-9/11 proof of a terrorist threat to EU nations (Jacobson 18). The third deadly terrorist attack was the vicious series of bombs detonated on London’s tube trains and buses on July 7, 2005 that killed 52 people and maimed 700 more (Hoffman 11). Before this, the only high profile terror case involved the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988 after a bomb smuggled on board in luggage from Malta went off (Lance 94). Many people {especially the French who nicknamed London as ‘Londonistan’ on account of the U.K.’s tolerance of Islamic militants} thought that the U.K. long looked upon as a sanctuary for terror suspects, had been inviting such an attack (Jacobson 35). The massive scale of these attacks made Al Qaeda and its associated groups the principal international terrorist threat (Cronin et al. 98). II. U.S-EU Counterterrorism Framework The 3 deadly terrorist attacks jolted the U.S. and EU into undertaking counter-terrorism measures in close cooperation with each other, to {in the words of the 9/11 Commission’s directive}, “form a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamic terrorism, exchange terrorist information with trusted allies, and strengthen border security by fostering global cooperation” (Archick, 2006). The U.S was better placed in this connection because the FBI had already created a specialist Joint Terrorism Task Force {JTTF} in 1980 and it simply pressed the accelerator in its employment (Jacobson 47). While identifying the enemy as the radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them (Pena 8), the U.S and EU acknowledged certain basic facts about terrorism and terrorists: first, that terrorism does not result from the psychological pathology or untypical behavior of individuals (Cronin et al. 23), for example, similar to other 9/11 bombers, Nidal Ayyad did not conform to any known profile of a terrorist planning to perpetrate mass murder (Lance 94); second, that causes of terrorism are complicated, with no single variable that leads to perpetration of terrorist activities (Cronin et al. 20); third, that terrorists are computer savvy {for example, an Al Qaeda computer found by American forces in Afghanistan had architectural models of a dam in the United States, and software with which to simulate devastating failures (Hoffman 153)}; fourth, that many significant limits to garnering information about terrorists are inherent to the subject and the modus operandi of terrorists (Cronin et al. 117); fifth, that the subject of geography or space is vital to the definition of terrorist organizations and to the methods used to fight them (Cronin et al. 171); sixth, that Al Qaeda and its associate groups depend heavily on the Muslim world to garner sympathy and support and for recruits to be trained into terrorists (Pena 6); seventh, that the terrorists’ war is part of a total war that views the entire society as the enemy (Alexander 12), for example, while a shocked witness called the sight of United Airlines Flight 175 smashing into the South Tower of the World Trade Center ‘a sickening sight,’ to master terrorist Ramzi Ahmed Yousef it was the ‘culmination of a dream’ (Lance 10); and eighth, that a significant characteristic of terrorism has been the link between comprehensive political or ideological notions and rising levels of terrorist activities globally (Cronin et al. 36). III. U.S-EU Counterterrorism Meetings and Agreements Since 9/11, U.S. and EU security officials hold regular meetings to discuss existing and fresh strategies against terrorism. The U.S. Secretary of State, Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security hold high profile annual meetings with their opposite numbers in the EU, while senior members of a joint U.S.-EU group hold half-yearly meetings. Liaison officers have been posted on both sides – two officers from Europol are stationed in Washington, while one FBI officer is posted in The Hague. A U.S. Secret Service representative is also stationed in the same Dutch city to interact with Europol on counterfeiting matters. The close cooperation has enabled officials on both sides to update their terrorist information (Archick, 2006), make such information accessible to U.S and E.U security officials (Jacobson 46) and create an ongoing formal discussion on terrorist financing and border/transport security matters such as sharing passenger information, statistical study of biological data, cargo safety and sky marshals (Archick, 2006). Another achievement has been the signing of U.S-EU Counterterrorism agreements. Two Police and Judicial cooperation agreements were signed in 2001 and 2002, authorizing U.S. law enforcement agencies and Europol to make common use of ‘strategic’ data {such as threat leads, crime prototypes and risk evaluation}, and ‘personal’ data {like specific names, locations and list of past crimes}. Both sides also concluded two agreements in 2003 on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance {MLA} to enhance the process of extradition and prosecution. Due to the EU opposition to the death penalty in the U.S., it was agreed that anyone extradited from the EU to the U.S. would not be given the death sentence there. Two Border Control and Transport Security agreements were concluded in 2004 that, among other things, allowed U.S. Container Security Initiative {CSI} officers to be posted in EU ports to assist initial scanning of cargo containers destined for the U.S. to prevent smuggling of dangerous substances including weapons of mass destruction (Archick, 2006); this step is seen as greatly aiding overall CSI strategy that has to contend with more than 15,000 containers arriving by ship and 30,000 containers arriving by truck on daily basis into the U.S (Pena 159). IV. Other Areas of U.S-EU Counterterrorism Cooperation The U.S. and EU extended their cooperation in many other areas of counterterrorism. Their pooled information led to designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations {FTOs} (Cronin et al. 105) and freezing their financial assets (Cronin et al. 138). They agreed to exchange data on lost or pilfered passports, statistical identifiers of biological data, and aviation safety technology {like airplane counter tactics against shoulder-fired ground-to-air missiles [MANPADs] (Archick, 2006)}. Discussions are underway to check the feasibility of a German proposal to match increasingly modern terrorist communication techniques by covertly installing ‘remote forensic software’ into the computers of those suspected of links to terrorism (Economist.com, 2007); the U.S in particular would have no problems implementing such a strategy given that an important aspect of their overall plan of action, authorized by changes made in the Patriot Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act {IRTPA} (Jacobson 53), has been to persecute suspected terrorists for non-terrorism related offenses (Jacobson 32) – a strategy that is increasingly been followed by Germany as well (Jacobson 38). V. Areas of Conflict in U.S-EU Counterterrorism Cooperation Although thankfully not major in nature, some areas of dissent and difference have arisen in the U.S-EU counterterrorism cooperation. First of all, in keeping with its strategy of gradually increasing the number of Federal Air Marshals by using law enforcement officers loaned from several federal agencies (Alexander 34), the U.S. insists on having armed air marshals on flights to Europe; EU countries – with the exception of the U.K and France – are opposed to it (Archick, 2006). Secondly, the U.S. looks upon Europol as not adequately capable of proper law enforcement (Archick, 2006) widely believing the increasing terrorism threat from terror groups based in Europe is partly the result of unsatisfactory EU counterterrorism measures (Jacobson 14), and that the complex nature of EU laws and regulations prevents close cooperation even among EU member states (Alexander 96); the Netherlands is considered the most vulnerable in this connection, a fact that Dutch security officials agree about (Jacobson 15). Thirdly, both sides protest that the process of sharing data leaves much to be desired. Terrorist lists of both sides do not always complement each other, for instance, in spite of pressure from the U.S., some EU countries prefer not to add charities linked to Hezbollah or Hama’s {such as Hama’s-related charity Al-Asqa (Alexander 211)} to the EU common terrorist list (Archick, 2006). Fourthly, the EU does not approve of new U.S. pressure to receive PNR lists ‘before’ rather than ‘after’ airplanes have left EU soil bound for the U.S (Archick, 2006). Lastly, the EU is pressurized by its nationals’ skeptical view of U.S. policies considered increasing distance from the ‘hearts and minds’ of Muslims, such as continued U.S. involvement in Iraq, past atrocities against prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison and continued internment of persons believed guilty of terrorist crimes at Guantanamo Bay prison (Archick, 2006). VI. Terrorist Plots Foiled in U.S and EU In spite of these minor differences, the U.S. and EU continue their counterterrorism cooperation. During several recent years, terrorist suspects have been apprehended in the U.S as well as Western nations of the E.U such as Italy, Britain, Germany, Spain, Holland and Belgium (Jacobson 6) all of which possess large expatriate Muslim populations (Hoffman 289). U.S-E.U counterterrorism cooperation has resulted in the very commendable foiling of several terrorist attacks. First, the Millennium Bomb Plot in 2000 spearheaded by Algerian Ahmed Ressam to set off bombs in Los Angeles airport on the eve of the Millennium was foiled by U.S security authorities (Washingtonpost.com, 2005). Second, the Shoe Bombing Plot in 2001 involving Richard C. Reid’s plan to set off a bomb concealed in his shoe during an American Airlines flight was thwarted by U.S security authorities acting on a specific intelligence tip. Reid was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment (Jacobson 78). Third, the West Coast Airliner Plot in 2002 that involved the use of hijacked commercial planes to crash into targeted cities along the U.S. West Coast was foiled by U.S security authorities (Whitehouse.gov, 2005). Fourth, the Jose Padilla Plot in 2002 that involved detonating bombs in selected apartment buildings all over the U.S was foiled by the FBI (Whitehouse.gov, 2005). One of those convicted was U.S citizen Jose Padilla, who was arrested by the FBI at Chicago’s O’Hare airport in May that year (Jacobson 108). Fifth, the East Coast Airliner Plot in 2003 that envisaged the use of hijacked planes to crash into selected cities along the U.S East Coast was disrupted as a result of the combined efforts of security authorities of the U.S and a friendly nation (Whitehouse.gov, 2005). Sixth, the Heathrow Airport Plot in 2003 that planned the use of hijacked planes to crash into Heathrow International Airport was averted by the combined efforts of U.S and EU security authorities (Whitehouse.gov, 2005). Seventh, the U.K Urban Targets Plot in 2004 that involved detonating bombs in selected urban areas around Britain was foiled by the combined efforts of U.S and EU security authorities (Whitehouse.gov, 2005). Eighth, the U.K Plane Bombing Plot in August 2006 that was “intended to be mass murder on an unimaginable scale” by simultaneous detonation of explosives aboard 10 airplanes flying from the U.K to the U.S. was thwarted by the combined efforts of the U.S., EU and Pakistani security authorities acting on specific information provided by a British spy who had infiltrated the terrorist group. The plot involved the use of bombs put together by adding peroxide based gels to soft drinks that could be set off by an MP3 player or cell phone (Cnn.com, 2006). Ninth, the Germany Bombing Plot in September 2007 to bomb Frankfurt airport and U.S. bases in the country by using total bomb power that would have caused more devastation than the Madrid and London bombings was averted by shared intelligence between the U.S and EU that led to the apprehending of 3 terrorists in a small central German village (Economist.com, 2007). This marked yet another foiled attempt by terrorists to strike in Germany. German authorities claimed to have foiled 5 attacks since 9/11 (Jacobson 9), including a 2006 plot where two suitcase bombs were placed on two trains {they did not explode due to some technical deficiency} (Economist.com, 2007). Tenth, the Copenhagen Conspiracy hatched by 8 young Muslims in September 2007 to perpetrate acts of terrorism in the Danish city was foiled by the combined cooperation U.S and EU security officials (Economist.com, 2007). VII. Conclusion The continued cooperation between the U.S. and EU is vital in the face of increasing threats from Islamic terrorist organizations (Jacobson 45) led by Al Qaeda. While other parts of the world have suffered as well {after 9/11, terrorists struck in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines (Pena 116), there are increased perceptions that the greatest threat is fanatical terrorists employing nuclear {Osama bin Laden hinted at this long back in a May 1998 statement entitled ‘The Nuclear Bomb of Islam’ (Alexander 15)}, biological or chemical weapons {supplied by rogue states (Pena 9)} in spectacular WMD attacks against the U.S and/or EU nations (Cronin et al. 77). Al Qaeda has, according to latest U.S. military intelligence reports analyzed during a White House meeting on July 12, 2007, regrouped to its pre-September 11, 2001 strength {Karl, 2007}. The continued potent threat posed by Al Qaeda and its group under the formidable leadership of Osama bin Laden {who, in the wake of 9/11 said in a statement aired by Al Jazeera on December 27, 2001: “God willing, the end of America is imminent” (Hoffman 129), and who is s still very much alive since he took over control of Al Qaeda Services Office in 1989 (Lance 40)}, is evident from Al Qaeda’s threatening announcement in September this year that it intends to enhance attacks especially against those countries that are supporting security forces in Iraq (Hegseth, 2007). Meanwhile, the U.S and EU counterterrorism officials continue {in the words of President George Bush in the wake of 9/11} “[the war on terrorism that] will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (Pena 8). References used: Alexander, Y. (2006). Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations. USA: Potomac Books Anon. (2006). Agent Infiltrated Terror Cell, U.S. Says. Retrieved December 18, 2007, from Cnn.com Web Site: http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/08/10/us.security/index.html Anon. (2005). Fact Sheet: Plots, Casings, & Infiltrations Referenced in President Bush’s remarks on the War on Terror. Retrieved December 18, 2007, from Whitehouse.gov Web Site: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-7.html Anon. (2007). Foiled, This Time. Retrieved December 18, 2007, from Economist.com Web Site: http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9769480 Anon. (2005). Man Convicted in Millennium Bomb Plot is sentenced. Retrieved December 18, 2007, from Washingtonpost.com Web Site: Anon. (2004). September 11, 2001 Victims. Retrieved December 18, 2007, from September11victims.com Web Site: http://www.september11victims.com/september11victims/victims_list.htm Archick, K. (2006). U.S.-EU Cooperation against Terrorism. Retrieved December 18, 2007, from Fas.org Web Site: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf Cronin, A.K. and Ludes, J.M. (2004). Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. USA: Georgetown University Press. Hegseth, P. (2007). Al Qaeda Crippled by U.S. Strategy. Retrieved December 18, 2007, from Cbsnews.com Web Site: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/01/opinion/main3315151.shtml Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. USA: Columbia University Press. Jacobson, M. (2006). U.S. and European Counterterrorism Efforts Post September 11. USA: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Karl, J. (2007). Al Qaeda’s Strength ‘Undiminished’ in Iraq. Retrieved December 18, 2007, from Abcnews.com Web Site: http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=3366118&page=1 Lance, Peter. (2004). 1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI – the Untold Story. USA: Harper Paperbacks. Payne, C. (2007). Understanding Terrorism – Definition of Terrorism. Retrieved December 18, 2007, from Globalterrorism101.com Web Site: http://www.globalterrorism101.com/UTDefinition.html Pena, C. (2006). Willing the Un-War: A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism. USA: Potomac Books. Read More