Election on Bahrain - Book Report/Review Example

Elections in Bahrain Bahrain – Geographical and political characteristics Bahrain is a country with a strategic importance for all other countries inthe Gulf area. In order to understand the significant role of this country to the development of the whole area we should proceed to a detailed presentation of its position in the greater area of Gulf. In this context, it has been stated that ‘Bahrain is an archipelago lying between the east coast of Saudi Arabia and the Qatar Peninsula; Made up of some thirty-six islands—the biggest of which is Bahrain Island, where the capital of Manama is located—Bahrains total area is 706 square kilometers (273 square miles); Bahrain has a population of 724,000, and 85 percent of the residents live in cities; foreigners make up one-third of the population and more than half of the labour force’ (Bahrain, 2007). In other words, foreigners have a very important role to the development of the country as they constitute a significant part of the workforce. On the other hand and regarding specifically the country’s political system it has to be noticed that Bahrain has passed a series of turbulences until the formulation of its Constitution on 2002. More specifically, the political system held in the country is that of the Constitutional hereditary monarchy. It should also be noticed that the independence on the country started on 1971 (until then Bahrain was a protectorate of Britain). Another important detail that should be mentioned is that the country’s Constitution was first approved on May 26 of 1973 however after being suspended on August 26 of 1975, the country was left without a formal text that would regulate the relationships between the citizens and the state. Finally, the new Constitution was issued on February 14 of 2002. The reference to the above details is necessary in order to understand the general political context in which elections in Bahrain had been held as well as the reasons for the particular behaviour of the candidates. As for the country’s political structure this can be described as follows: In the hierarchy of the political system is the King while the Prime Minister is the head of the government. There is also ‘a Council of Ministers (cabinet) which is appointed by the King and headed by the Prime Minister’ (U.S. Department of State, 2007). The structure of the ‘legislative’ power should be also mentioned: ‘the bicameral parliament (al-Majlis al-Watani) consists of a 40-member elected House of Deputies and a 40-member Shura Council appointed by the King; members of both chambers serve four-year terms’ (U.S. Department of State, 2007). The above details are necessary in order to understand the distribution of political power in Bahrain to the extension that this power could explain the behaviour of participants in the latest elections of November 2006 during which a strong conflict took place between the representatives of Shia and the Sunni parties. A report published by the World Factbook: Bahrain in 2005 noticed that ‘Bahrains small size and central location among Persian Gulf countries require it to play a delicate balancing act in foreign affairs among its larger neighbours; facing declining oil reserves, Bahrain has turned to petroleum processing and refining and has transformed itself into an international banking centre; the new emir, installed in 1999, has pushed economic and political reforms and has worked to improve relations with the Shia community’. The strategic position of Bahrain in the greater area of Gulf can possibly explain the strong oppositions caused between the participants in the recent elections of November 2006. However, it seems that there are also other factors, like the religion, that can lead to conflicts that can be more severe than the ones caused because of financial or political reasons. In Bahrain, the period of political reform started mainly in 1999, when Sheikh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa ‘assuming the title of emir in 1999, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa launched a wave of democratic, security and governance reforms, promising his subjects that his top priority was "achieving national unity and internal security, through the solidarity of all Bahrain citizens, without discrimination, whatever their origin or creed’ (Moran, 2007). The development of the country’s political structure that followed the suggestions of emir proved that Bahrain has entered a period of significant political restructuring. This could mean that the country would be more powerful towards the other countries of the area, a fact that can help Bahrain to face the severe financial and political turbulences that characterize the greater area of Gulf. The reforms suggested by emir have been presented as ‘a series of royal makramas [concessions], included measures to allow the formation of political associations; the granting of political rights to women; a general amnesty for political prisoners and exiles; the abrogation of state security laws; and the institution of a 40-member National Assembly elected on the basis of a general franchise’ (Moran, 2007). It should be noticed that the stability in Bahrain’s political structure has been a challenging task for the country’s governor. With a series of political competitors, emir managed to keep the unity in the internal of the country facing effectively all the problems appeared in the political and the financial sectors. In this context, it has to be noticed that ‘Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa succeeded the throne in March 1999, after the death of his father Shaikh Isa bin Hamad Al Khalifa, Bahrain’s ruler since 1961; he championed a program of democratic reform shortly after his succession while in November 2000 he established a committee to create a blueprint to transform Bahrain from a hereditary emirate to a constitutional monarchy within 2 years; The resulting "National Action Charter" was presented to the Bahraini public in a referendum in February 2001’ (U.S. Department of State, 2007). The effort of emir for the development of the country’s financial structure has been combined with the abolition of the State Security law and the State Security Court as well as the pardon of all ‘political prisoners and detainees including those who had been imprisoned, exiled or detained on security charges’ (U.S. Department of State, 2007). In November 2006 Bahrain held elections for its ‘five municipal councils and the 40 seats in the lower house of Parliament’ (U.S. Department of State, 2007). The Orders for these elections – as the ones for the elections of 2002 – had been issued by the King of Bahrain in accordance with the article 42 of the country’s Constitution. More specifically, article 42 of Bahrain’s Constitution specifies the following: ‘a. The King shall issue the Orders for elections to the Chamber of Deputies in accordance with the provisions of the law. b. The King shall invite the National Assembly to convene by Royal Order, and shall open its proceedings and bring them to a close in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. c. The King is entitled to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies by a Decree that states the reasons for the dissolution. The Chamber cannot be dissolved for the same reasons once again’. The above provisions refer to the procedure that has to be followed in Bahrain in case of elections in accordance with the Constitution of 2002. These provisions have been also followed in elections of 2006 although the strong conflicts between the participants created severe turbulences to the whole procedure. The most important issue regarding the elections of 2006 in Bahrain is the fact that the population had the chance to decide on the political structure of the country, a right that had been eliminated in the past and appeared for first time in the elections of 2002. Generally, it could be stated that Bahrain is at ‘an important juncture in its process of political reform, and thus has the potential to act as a model of reform in the Gulf, and set into process reforming tendencies throughout the region; moreover, the elections will allow all the people of Bahrain to perceive their identity not only as Muslims, but also as members of Bahrain by highlighting how Bahrain should be reformed, and also the direction which it needs to take in the future’ (Zweiri et al., 2006, 4). The above comments highlight the importance of elections in Bahrain however they should be criticized as not applicable in the country at least under current social and political conditions. Elections of 2006 in Bahrain have been an ideally mean for the evaluation of the various issues related with human right. In this context, it has been found that ‘Bahrain’s human rights practices improved significantly following reforms decreed by the king, Shaikh Hamad bin `Isa Al Khalifa, in 2001-02, but the government did not institutionalize in law protection of basic rights such as freedom of assembly, association, and expression; Some new laws ratified in 2006—on counterterrorism and public gatherings, for instance—contain provisions that undermine those rights’ (World Report, 2007). The recognition and the respect of the above rights are related with the government’s competency to realize its plans and to protect the rights of the citizens. However, in the case of recent elections of 2006 in Bahrain human rights were not respected at least regarding the women candidates who faced an extremely hostile behaviour by their contestants. Elections of 25 November 2006 – Participants Before referring to the participants of the 2006 elections in Bahrain, we should primarily refer to the structure of the local government in order to understand the role and the targets of each of the candidates. In this context, in accordance with a local report, the government of Bahrain consists of:   ‘5 governorates: Capital Governorate, Muharraq Governorate, Northern Governorate, Central Governorate, Southern Governorate   12 municipalities (manatiq): Al Hidd, Al Manamah, Al Mintaqah al Gharbiyah, Al Mintaqah al Wusta, Al Mintaqah ash Shamaliyah, Al Muharraq, Ar Rifa wa al Mintaqah al Janubiyah, Jidd Hafs, Madinat Hamad, Madinat Isa, Juzur Hawar, Sitrah.   The reforms of 2002 created the five governorates. Each governorate has an elected ten-member council. A ministry for municipal affairs has oversight and control, rendering the governorates largely powerless’ (Bahrain, 2005) Regarding specifically the candidates, it has been found by Moran (2007) that ‘Shia opposition groups participated in a national poll for the first time since 1973; Pro-government Sunni parties maintained their control of the parliament in the election, returning 22 lawmakers to the 40-seat parliament’. Under these terms, in elections of November 2006 in Bahrain, the following political groups were represented: the Shia opposition was represented by the National Democratic Action Association and the National Accord Association. As for the rest of the candidates, it has been noticed by a report published by the Bahraini parliamentary election (2006) that ‘the former alliance consists of Bahrains main Shia Islamist party, Al Wefaq, the radical Shia Islamist, Al Amal, Leftist Wa’ad and the former Baathists; to meet the challenge posed by Al Wefaq, the two main Sunni Islamist parties, the salafist Asalah and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Al-Menbar Islamic Society, agreed to form a coalition to maximize their votes’. Moreover, it has been noticed that the total number of candidates ‘who ran for parliamentary elections reached 207 candidates who nominated themselves in 39 electoral constituencies while 13 candidates announced their withdrawal from the electoral battle; the candidates competed for 40 House of Representatives seats while 171 candidates competed in the municipal elections for 40 seats in five municipal councils in Bahrain’s five governorates’ (Arab Elections Watch, 2006). In other words, the competition for the both the House of Representatives seats and the seats in the municipal councils has been intensive. Generally, it is suggested that ‘for the Shiite opposition, a choice must be made between accepting the Kings controlled and gradualist reforms on the one hand, or a confrontational approach furthering the cause of reform based on democratisation; the latter choice is likely to trigger a 1975-style suspension of reforms and dissolution of political life in the Kingdom if the ruling elites feel a threat to their planned and controlled reform process’ (Zweiri et al., 2006, 4). On the other hand, it has been noticed that ‘since the start of his reign, King Hamad has promoted reforms characterised as liberalising, as opposed to democratising, by which he may maintain control of the pace and direction of these reforms, thus avoiding the elites loss of political and economic privileges; Bahrains Shiite population, on the other hand, clearly seeks a more fundamental political re-orientation that, if allowed, would undermine the current centralised power base of King Hamad by assuming political and legislative power as the majority indigenous group’ (Zweiri et al., 2006, 4). Another characteristic of the above elections is the high number of candidates that announced their withdrawal from the procedure as well as the extremely low number of women which won just one seat. This could be considered as a failure of the efforts made in the country for the enhancement of women’s position. If considering the importance of the specific elections (the elections involved almost all country’s political levels, i.e. the lower house of parliament, the Chamber of Deputies and the municipal councils) it can be understood that the efforts of women for the promotion of their participation in the social and political procedures of the country will not be an easy task. The above elections gave to the Shia and Sunni candidates a clear victory towards their competitors. It has to be noticed that liberal and ex-communist candidates finally lost their seats. On the other hand, Wa’ad (National Democratic Action) was represented in the second round by four candidates. Elections of 25 November 2006 – Results The results of the above elections were as follows (Bahraini Parliamentary elections, 2006): ‘Al Wefaq (Shia Islamist) 17 seats: Sheikh Ali Salman (leader), Khalil Al Marzooq, Shaikh Jassim Al Momin, Abduljalil Khalil, Mohammed Al Mezal, Sayed Jameel Khadim, Shaikh Hamza Al Dairy, Jalal Fairooz, Jawad Fairooz, Sayed Abdulla Al Aali, Dr Abdali Hassan, Sayed Haidar Al Sitri, Sayed Maki Al Wedaie, Abdulhussain Al Metqawie, Mohammed Jameel Al Jamri, Dr Jassim Hussain and Jawad Fairooz Al-Menbar Islamic Society (Sunni Islamist) 7 seats: Dr Ali Ahmed Abdulla, Dr Samy Qambar, Nasser Al Fadhala, Ibrahim Al Hadi, Dr Salah Abdulrahman, Dr Shaikh Abdullatif Al Shaikh and Mohammed Khalid Al Asala Islamic Society (Salafist) 5 Seats: Sheikh Adel Al Maawada, Ibrahim Busandal, Ghanim Al Buainain, Abdulhaleem Murad and Hamad Al Mohannadi. Pro-government independents 9 seats Adel Al Asoomi, Isa Abu Al Fatah, Khalifa Al Dhahrani, Samy Al Buhairy, Jassim Al Saeedi, Abdulla Al Dossari, Khamis Al Rumaihi, Latifa Al Gaoud and Hassan Salem Al Dossari. Dr Abdulaziz Abul, liberal independent’ The elections held in Bahrain in November 2006 gave more power to the Shia-based political group (named as Islamist-leaning-al Wefaq-National Islamic Society) which won 17 out of 40 seats. On the other hand, the Sunni parties still remain the majority. At a next level, it has been found that ‘the elected chamber of parliament shares its limited legislative powers with an upper house that is directly appointed by the king, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa; the new parliament therefore poses no threat to the governments dominance of policymaking’ (The Economist, 2007). The results of November 2006 elections in Bahrain were in fact a verification of the policies followed by the government although the participation of public can be regarded as a great achievement and another step towards the country’s independence from political trends of the past. There are also opposite arguments like the one of Fattah (2006) who supported that ‘in Bahrain, where sectarian tensions feature prominently between the majority Shiite population and the Sunni- dominated government, a flurry of official manoeuvres apparently intended to reduce the Shiite vote has preceded municipal and parliamentary elections of 2006; in the tiny nation of 700,000, often held up as a model of reform and democratization, opposition figures say that elections are a symbol of backtracking, not of growing democracy’. The 2006 elections in Bahrain has been characterized by a series of political analysts as a victory of the Shia Al Wefaq National Islamic Society. It has also been noticed that ‘the National Democratic Action Society made up of leftists and nationalists, known as Waad, failed to win a single seat; similarly, women candidates also failed to win any seats they contested for the second time in a row but the female candidate Latifa al Gaoud, was elected unopposed’ (Dossari, 2006). In other words, the influence of traditional ethics and considerations has been proved to be stronger in the Bahraini society from the willingness for change. In the results of the elections of November 2006, this assumption has been verified. Moreover, the high level of participation indicates that the results represent the majority of the population. In this context, it has been stated by Dossari (2006) that ‘the supreme elections commission declared that the participation rate in the 2006 election stood at 72 percent, indicating a high turnover that included political societies that boycotted the 2002 election’. Of course, the percentage of participants cannot lead to the assumption that the relevant procedure didn’t face any problem. In fact, strong oppositions and conflicts before and during the elections showed that the country needs more effort to be stabilized as a democratic society. Elections of 25 November 2006 – Details with political interest In the elections of November 2006 in Bahrain women were the main losers. More specifically, only one woman out of the 16 candidates managed to won a seat. Moreover, none of the women lost ‘was qualified for the rerun’ (Arab Elections Watch, 2006). Regarding the behaviour of Shia political group, it has been stated that the candidates of this group felt like ‘they could put additional pressure on the government by coming in and being critical within the institution [National Assembly]; but they also left open the option that they would walk out and paralyze it; that would be a disaster’ (Moran, 2007). The noticeable event of the above elections is the fact that ‘one female candidate, Latifa al-Qouhoud, became Bahrains first woman parliamentarian after running unopposed in her constituency however the failure of liberal parties to make any impact emphasizes the primacy of underlying sectarian tensions in the minds of voters’ (Moran, 2007). The fact that the government has structured the political system in order for the Shia party to be the minority in the parliament (even after having being voted as the most favourable political movement) has also being criticized (Moran, 2007). However, the participation of the government in such an initiative cannot be proved and even if there was a restructuring in the country’s political system this should be considered as appropriate because it ensures the existence of many ‘political powers’ within the country’s assembly eliminated the phenomena of power’s concentration in one political group (which would not be in accordance with the democratic reform been attempted in the particular country). At the same time ‘Bahraini authorities, citing Law 32/2006, have banned meetings on the grounds that the organizers failed to get authorization and on several occasions forcibly prevented or dispersed meetings; On September 15 of 2006 police prevented the Movement of Liberties and Democracy (Haq) from holding a public seminar on the group’s petition calling for a new constitution, on the basis that the group had not sought permission from the Ministry of the Interior’ (World Report, 2007). It should be noticed here that in accordance with a recent report ‘the al-Wefaq party boycotted the 2002 election over its opposition to the division of power in the National Assembly, whereby the king appoints the upper house but recently the party indicated it can achieve its goal of constitutional reform better through the formal political system; however, al-Wefaqs decision to take part in the election has caused a split within the group, leading to the formation of the al-Haq movement; the splinter group has indicated it believes participation in the election amounts to the acceptance of the 2002 constitution; negatively, al-Haq has advocated civil disobedience and violent protests’ (Middle East Finance and Economy, 2006) Another issue that needs to be discussed regarding the elections in Bahrain in 2006 is the hostile (even threatening) behaviour against women candidates. More specifically it has been found that ‘several female candidates faced an orchestrated campaign of political abuse against them through text messages telling them to withdraw from the contest and one woman had her election marquee burnt to the ground while womens organisations have been strongly criticized for not doing enough to support female candidates; liberal columnist Sawsan Al Shaer commented: We have seen business leaders, liberal thinkers and even foreign religious scholars move from one tent to the other to interact with constituents or deliver lectures’ but we have not seen any womens organisation do or say anything throughout this month’ (Bahraini parliamentary election, 2006). The above behaviour towards women candidates in Bahrain’s elections prove that there are many aspects of political and social structures that should be reconsidered in that particular country. On the other hand, ‘women candidates have complained that they are at a disadvantage because none of the popular Islamist parties have backed their candidacies, they cannot campaign in mosques, and social perceptions; without the backing of a political party they are at a financial disadvantage too if they run as independents’ (Bahrain elections 2006: Women candidates, 2006). The above policy applied regarding the funding of women candidates in elections of 2006 in Bahrain was differentiated from the one followed regarding the male candidates who were supported straight by the government. More specifically, it has been found that ‘Bahrains parties receive financial assistance from central government but women had no such support and instead they have had to rely on support from the womens rights body, the Supreme Council for Women, which has also provided training to candidates’ (Bahrain elections 2006: Women candidates, 2006). This was a support that was proved afterwards to be insufficient. Despite the above figures in women participation in politics in Bahrain, it has been proved that ‘world average of women in all chambers of Parliament reached an all time high, with almost 17 percent; this is a gain of 50 percent over 1995 figures when women held 11.3 percent of all parliamentary seats; three Gulf Cooperation Council States recorded significant political changes; in the United Arab Emirates, both women and men stood for election and voted for the first time in that country’s history. Nine women entered Parliament gaining 22.5 percent of the seats; women stood for election for the first time in Kuwait as well, but none won; in Bahrain, a woman was elected to the Lower House of Parliament for the first time in that nation’s history’ (Women in Parliament, 2006). The above comparative analysis for the participation of women in Parliament around the world it can help to understand the significance of the effort of women in Bahrain if compared with all the other countries of the Gulf region. In any case, the exclusion of women from the political governance of Bahrain will be proved a severe mistake in the future. Women have the ability to approach social issues with greater understanding being more flexible in the confrontation of difficult situations, an attribute that cannot be recognized as existed in men. Moreover, the members of a country’s government are been elected by the public and the strict application of this rule is the only way to ensure the establishment of democratic procedures within a particular country. In the case of Bahrain, the elections of 2006 led at a positive result for the country’s existed governors. More specifically, the ‘executive power in the kingdom remains largely in the hands of a ruling troika within the royal family: Sheikh Hamad, Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, and the kings uncle, Prime Minister ύKhalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa.; the trios relationship to their primary political support base, the wider royal family, is managed by the Family Council’ (Moran, 2007). As for structure of the new parliament this can be described as follows: ‘17 Wefaq (Shi’a), 8 Minbar (Muslim Brotherhood) and 5 Asala (Salafis); that’s 75% of the make-up of parliament, in which only one is liberal, and the rest have distinct Islamist leaning’ (Mahmood’s Den, 2006). The results of elections in 2006 in Bahrain ‘underlined a deepening social and religious conservatism in Bahrain, which has been among the most liberal of Arab states in the region and is host to the U.S. Navys Fifth Fleet; The religious sweep in Bahrain mirrored results of elections in Iraq, Egypt and Palestinian territories, where Muslim hard-liners have made inroads and for this reason the vote was watched closely by neighbouring Arab countries planning similar steps toward democracy or dealing with their own Shiite populations clamouring for power’ (Krane, 2006). Moreover, it has been noticed that ‘following the 2001-02 reforms Bahrainis have enjoyed a greater measure of freedom of expression, although the Press Law (47/2002) contains measures that unduly restrict press freedoms, such as prohibitions on insulting the king and on reports that “threaten national unity”; the authorities invoked the law in 2006 to ban coverage of controversial matters; the country now has two independent daily newspapers, but other dailies as well as Bahrain’s radio and TV stations are state-run’ (World Report, 2007). It should be noticed that either before and during the elections of 2006 in Bahrain ‘allegations of attempts to manipulate election results have surfaced, as a controversial report was leaked accusing key figures in the regime of actively using gerrymandering to disrupt the demographic composition; opposition parties, including Al Wefaq and Amal Islami, organised a number of rallies and petitions condemning what they labelled political naturalisation, a tool used by the government to inflate the number of eligible voters from 36000 to 52000’ (Zweiri et al., 2006, 4). The efforts of Bahrain’s king for reform cannot be characterized as successful. More specifically, it has been found that ‘despite the reforms, Sunni-Shiite tensions remain and have been partly aggravated by the Shiite perception that a once-repressed Shiite majority is now, through elections, the predominant power in Iraq. Some Shiite anti-government protests persist, asserting that the government is backsliding on reform and that it will adjust the parliamentary election districts to ensure that Shiites do not win a majority in parliament. However, there is not nearly the level of violence seen in the 1990s’ (Katzman, 2006, 2). The above assumptions are verified in practice by the events took place during November of 2006 in Bahrain. The extremely strong conflicts between the candidates proved that the transition of the country to a more democratic style of governance will be difficult. The elections of November 2006 in Bahrain have also highlighted the social and financial problems of the country. More specifically, it has been proved that ‘social tensions are being fuelled by high unemployment levels, which according to official data stand at 14%; negatively, recent government data shows a fall in the percentage of Bahraini nationals working in the private sector, despite the governments Bahrainisation program; according to the data, locals accounted for 24% of all private-sector jobs in 2005, down from nearly 27% in 2004 and 29% in 2003; although in absolute terms the number of Bahrainis employed in the private sector increased in 2005, foreign nationals took up 89% of the new jobs created’ (Middle East Finance and Economy, 2006). On the other hand, the results of elections of November 2006 in Bahrain may be proved to be significant for the political reform of the country. In the past ‘Bahrain’s Shiites, who make up about 60 percent of the population, have been sidelined alleging that the government has backed Sunni Islamists and encouraged increasingly sectarian politics; many Shiites had realized that their being out of the political process only allowed the government to promulgate laws that hurt the Shiites’ interests, including regulations limiting public gatherings and protests, as well as new terrorism laws that threatened to hamper the work of the opposition; government officials hope the entry of the Shiites will serve to ease tensions; but opposition members say they intend to use their seats in Parliament as bully pulpits to goad the government into changing’ (The New York Times, 2006). In accordance with the above report, cooperation in the political field of Bahrain is not much likely to take place. However, even through the oppositions, the relevant political powers may found the way to resolve the country’s lasting problems regarding the fair participation of the citizen in his/ her country’s political reforms. 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(2006) Drive for democracy stalls in Arab world, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/09/news/democracy.php Katzman, K. (2006) Bahrain: Reform, Security and U.S. Policy. CRS Report for Congress, available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/2006/upl-meta-crs-9318/95-1013_2006Aug04.pdf?PHPSESSID=59b5e5b0a6799b120b78a9bcea5e2ca5 Krane, J. (2006) Islamists Dominate Bahrain Elections, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/26/AR2006112600280.html Mahmood’s Den (2006) available at http://mahmood.tv/2006/12/03/its-over-an-islamist-parliament-is-complete/ Middle East Finance and Economy (2006) Bahrain – Political Developments to dominate, available at http://www.ameinfo.com/93007.html Moran, D. 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Centre for Iranian Studies, available at http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/iranian.studies/Policy%20Brief%202.pdf Read More