Are Sanctions a Humane Solution to End a War - Research Paper Example

Are Economic Sanctions a Humane Alternative to War, or are they Simply another Tool of Coercion? Sanctions have been in use since time immemorial for shaping interstate relations between nations and to coerce weaker nations into submission. However, since the end of the Cold War, the use of sanctions as a tool for statecraft has seen a dramatic increase as developed nations have tried to avoid costly military confrontations. The most prolific and efficient use of sanctions was witnessed during the Gulf Crisis, when attempts were made to weaken the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein prior to a military confrontation. The sanctions on Iraq and the impact of such sanctions were widely covered by the international media and as a result of this coverage, debates have been taking place about the utility and effective use of economic sanctions. When diplomacy has failed and states have entrenched positions about the stand that they have taken, then sanctions can be considered as being a logical outcome of any strong differences, short of an all out war. However, sanctions have been observed as being rather ineffective in changing the policies of those who have been sanctioned and those who suffer most are the innocent civilians, as the ruling elites strengthen their control on precious resources. Calls have been made to develop “smart sanctions” which will have a smaller impact on civilians, but the debate about the use of sanctions in the conduct of international statecraft continues. It is possible for states to use sanctions as a tool for coercion against weaker nations, although in an era of globalisation and global institutions, it is less likely that any unilateral sanctions will not be taken into consideration by other nations of the globe. This brief essay presents a discussion about whether sanctions are a humane alternative to war or simply another tool for coercion in statecraft. Contents Introduction 4 Are Sanctions a Humane Alternative to War or a Tool for Coercion? 6 Conclusion 11 Bibliography / References 14 List of Tables and Figures Figure 1: Map of the Autonomous Regions of Russia Showing Chechnya on the Left 10 Introduction When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the United Nations, which was led by the United States of America, imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq, including a ban on all financial transactions with the country, a ban on the purchase of Iraqi oil, suspension of all flights to Iraq, the freezing of Iraqi assets overseas and an arms embargo (Bengtsson, 2002, Pp. 1 -6). These sanctions were designed to punish and contain the Saddam Hussein led government of Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait and its threatening stance against other countries in the region. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, had a demonstrated stance of military aggression against other countries for trivial reasons which had resulted in the loss of numerous human lives and the country had not desisted from the use of weapons of mass destruction. However, Iraq was not the only country against which sanctions had been used and Cuba, Haiti, South Africa, Libya as well as the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and other conflicts had required the use of sanctions to pressure governments and political groupings towards changing or moderating their behaviour (Reisman, 1996, Pp. 1 – 5) and (Morgan, 2004, Pp. 1 – 8). Sanctions or “blockades” have been used on numerous occasions since the dawn of human civilisation to wage war and to try and impose the will of one group on another. Economic sanctions have not just been used for coercion in intra - state disputes, but they have also been used against ethnic groups within a state, such as the Kurds in Iraq. Sanctions have become an increasingly important tool in the art of statecraft since the end of the Cold War. Since 1990, economic sanctions have been used by the United States, Russia, Greece, the United Nations, the European Union, China, Germany, Belgium, France, the Organisation of African Unity or the OAU, Saudi Arabia, England, Netherlands, Spain, Japan and the Economic Community of West African States or ECOWAS etc (Lektzian, 2001, Pp. 3 – 10). Great powers including United States, Germany and Japan have preferred the use of sanctions over military action and economic coercion is often used prior to military action. Conflicts between anti – soviet alliance partners have increased in the recent past and the increased market integration of smaller economies in an era of globalization often leaves them vulnerable to coercion. However, in international statecraft, a distinction has to be made between the inhabitants of a nation state and the rulers of such states, who may have imposed themselves on an unwilling people through the organized use of force. In hard times that have been brought about as a result of the imposition of economic sanctions, it is entirely possible that the ruling elite may resort to an even more brutal use of force in order to remain in power and to retain what is left of the available economic resources for themselves, leaving the masses to suffer great hardships. The negative impact of any sanctions on those who are opposed to undesirable regimes may be even greater then any impact on the ruling elite. It has been observed that any intended economic damage does not necessarily translate into desirable policy change and any economic hardship can in fact encourage the ruling elite and its supports while the influence of opposition groups is diminished (Kaempfer, 1992, Pp. 1 – 5) and (Garfield, 1999, Pp. 1 – 9). Sanctions which have been imposed with the backing of the United Nations require prior agreement in the Security Council about the behaviour of the sanctioned country being a threat to international peace and stability. Sanctions must also have popular international political support amongst nations that are economically important to a nation that is being sanctioned in order to be capable of being implemented. Thus, the imposition and the policing of sanctions also carries a cost for all those who have imposed sanctions against others and long drawn out economic wars are possible in which innocent humanity, rather then those who may be described as being military combatants suffer endlessly. Sanctions can be considered to have met with success if (Lissel, 2006, Pp. 19): A target state concedes to the demands that have been made on it by those who are imposing sanctions. Sanctions or the threat of sanctions have been instrumental in changing the behaviour of a target. No other credible explanation exists for a target’s change of behaviour. However, in the case of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the most recent and the most publicized case involving application of sanctions by the international community which was also widely covered by the media, it was observed that despite massive international support for sanctions and the most effective international enforcement possible, sanctions failed to change the behaviour of the Iraqi regime and only a massive military operation led by a global super power was able to topple the Iraqi dictator. Although the suffering of the people of Iraq was evident to all, members of the Saddam Hussein regime continued to lead a relatively unaffected life. A popular debate is, therefore, being conducted today about how effective sanctions are as a humane alternative to war and if sanctions have become a tool for coercion in the exercise of foreign policy. This brief essay attempts to examine the evidence in order to come up with some meaningful conclusions about the use of sanctions. Are Sanctions a Humane Alternative to War or a Tool for Coercion? In an era of globalisation, openness and instant communications when an interlinked world has developed something that resembles a global consensus about what may be considered to be moral in interstate relations, along with the institutions to support coordinated international action, it is far less likely that nation states can be openly coerced by other states without the matter receiving international attention. If one nation state chooses to impose sanctions or war upon another and such an action is viewed to be unfair, then it is likely that still other interested parties may develop an interest in the conflict. After all, this is what the United Nations Security Council is all about. However, it has to be understood that engagements between nations are massive engagements and although third parties may take a moral view and extend their support, the costs associated with any covert, overt or military interventions can be very substantial. A nation may put at risk its own economic interests and the lives of its own citizens by trying to intervene in the affairs of others and this is likely to deter others from wanting to become a part of a conflict. Hence, despite the political stance which nations may take, international interventions in conflicts or attempts to coerce only take place when the situation has deteriorated very substantially and a party has been able to succeed in appealing to the conscience a majority of nations which may also have their own interests threatened as a result of a conflict between nations. However, it is possible for the world community to impose sanctions of its own, or to respond with military might in response to the coercive or threatening behaviour of a nation against others, yet it is still possible for nations that are acting in a coercive and threatening manner to get away with a lot before any third party may want to become involved. After all, when Iraq had attacked Iran and weapons of mass destruction, in the form of nerve gas were being used, no one in the international community extended any substantial support to try and set right what involved a massive slaughter of humanity. However, when Kuwait and its oil fields were at risk and this risk threatened global oil supplies along with a permanent destabilisation of the Middle East, the global community acted very quickly to try and contain Iraq. Hence, despite mechanisms that have been put in place by the international community, it is still possible for nations to try and harass or coerce weaker nations in their region of influence and get away with a lot. Global morality has to consider the size of a belligerent nation and what will be required to set right its threatening and coercive stance. Sanctions and blockades have been a part of legitimate military strategy for a long time and it is far more preferable to weaken an opponent prior to taking military action in order to win the final war, rather then taking heavy casualties in trying to engage in military conflict from the very beginning (Mohammed, 1994, Pp. 1 – 8). Although democracy and an effective media has made it possible for ordinary citizens in a nation to voice their opinions about what they consider to be moral in regard to the suffering that has to be endured by innocent civilians who are being subjected to sanctions, either fairly or unfairly, and thus shaped global morality, the question remains as to what can be done to contain a nation that may be considered to be an immoral foe without taking heavy losses. Hence, economic sanctions are definitely a more humane alternative to direct military action and such sanctions can provide time for a consensus to develop both within and outside of nations, serve as a warning or indication of a status quo being unacceptable or provide time for diplomacy to work even if diplomacy had failed prior to the imposition of sanctions (Odell, 1997, Pp. 1 – 10). It appears that it is preferable for public health to suffer in a nation that is being subjected to sanctions rather then for very many deaths to occur, or for a massive damage to national infrastructure to occur in a conflict which involves broader interests and global morality as well as the international rule of law that can all suffer as a result of nothing being done (Barry, 2000, Pp. 1 – 4). After all, the concept of global morality and international rule of law was developed with great difficulty after millions of years of human evolution and if humanity did not try to uphold international legal and moral standards, then the international rule of law and morality will have become a farce. Sanctions are in fact so essential a tool in the art of statecraft that now the so called “smart sanctions”, which will try to inflict minimal damage to the innocent civilians of the country that is being subjected to sanctions, are being discussed in published literature (Minear, 1998, Pp. 1 – 10), (Bengtsson, 2002, Pp. 17 – 45) and (Lektzian, 2001, Pp. 1 – 8). Hence, the question about morality of sanctions reduces to the one about whether it is possible for nations to impose unfair and coercive sanctions against others, especially the weaker nations, in an era of a broad consensus about international moral standards that are being supported by international institutions, such as the United Nations and can the United Nations or other powers act to nullify the actions of strong nations that are bent upon coercing weaker nations in their region of influence (Lissel, 2006, Pp. 17 – 49). After all, what can be considered to be global morality and to what extent are other nations likely to pay attention to moral standards in order to safeguard any diversions from such moral standards when they have to incur massive economic costs as well as costs in terms of the lives of their citizens when they are being called upon to protect morality and international law (Hovi, 2004, Pp. 1 – 9). It appears that the world has indeed developed some moral standards after centuries of human evolution involving a lot of bloodshed, sacrifice and suffering (Mueller, 2006, Pp. 1 – 46). Without such moral standards, it would not have been possible for the United Nations to have imposed economic sanctions against South Africa in response to its policies of apartheid (Reisman, 1999, “The Application of Economic Sanctions by the United Nations”). After all, no one was being unduly inconvenienced by the suffering of the blacks at the hands of the whites in South Africa and it was probably difficult for nations that were predominantly white to have imposed economic sanctions against their own kith and kin in order to straighten out the system of apartheid (Arnold, 1972, Chapters 1 – 3). It is indeed true that the white settlers in South Africa had done a lot to develop the region and to bring civilization to the land, which the black South Africans could not match. Also, if the United States of America imposed sanctions against Cuba, then these sanctions were imposed in response to an increasing and unnecessary military threat against the United States of America by the Cubans which could have inflicted civilian casualties if it had gone unchecked (Morgan, 2004, Pp. 1 – 12). Sanctions against Libya were imposed when this country involved itself in barbaric acts against innocent civilians in response to grievances that it had held against the more developed Western nations and their exploitation of the oil wealth of the Arabs as well as their involvement in the settlement of the Jews on Arab lands (McFall, 2005, Pp. 1 – 10). Lesser developed nations which had been soundly beaten because of their own backwardness, lack of ability and an ability to coherently focus on their needs could not blame others for their own shortcomings. Muslims at large and Islam has appalled the world with its attempts to impose its misguided and demonic philosophies on others by using force and Muslims themselves have shown a remarkable lack of understanding or coherence in their thoughts about their own doctrines (Ripsman, 2002, Pp. 1 – 5). The Serbs quite appropriately concluded that the Muslims only understand the language of a thorough beating if they are to leave others alone. This was possibly the reason for the Bosnia – Herzegovina crisis. The resolution of the Kashmir issue in the United Nations may have some moral merits, but its resolution using force or sanctions could not have worked against India and hence this was an unsolvable puzzle which continued to ask for even more human blood if it were to remain in the international limelight. The United Nations Charter makes it impossible for any sanctions to be legally imposed on other nations without the prior approval of the Security Council (Reisman, 1999, Pp. 1 – 15). Even if hegemonic nations were to impose unilateral sanctions against smaller nations, then it is possible for other nations to continue to have economic relations with the nation that has been subjected to unilateral sanctions, provided that such arrangements suited these other nations or appealed to their sense of morality (Brabant, 1999, Pp. 1 – 38). Unfortunately, in a world that is concerned with self interest, it is unlikely that nations will want to have economic links with other nations unless there is something to be gained from such links or unless there are ties of culture or religion between peoples (Goenner, 2005, Pp. 1 – 15). Thus, Chechnya could not enjoy an independent existence from Russia, because after the imposition of sanctions by Russia and because of its location, it could not trade with any other nation states (Makhmoud, 2004, “The Conflict in Chechnya”). To what extent was the United Nations supposed to have acted to bust sanctions imposed by a superpower and to try and provide essential commodities to the people of Chechnya when no one was particularly interested in the predicament of the ethnic Chechens? Figure 1: Map of the Autonomous Regions of Russia Showing Chechnya on the Left (The University of Texas, 2006, “Map of the Russian Autonomous Regions”) Although moral principles are important, it is difficult to get practical support for such principles if nations are not interested or do not feel inclined to assist (Drury, 2004, Pp. 1 – 15). Hence, unfortunately, it is still possible for nations to use sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, in order to coerce other nation states, but it is also possible for a nation that is unfairly suffering from the brunt of such sanctions to appeal to the United Nations for assistance if its lifeblood is being threatened. It is still far more possible for nations to thrive by resorting to diplomacy, economic ingenuity and hard work, rather then by imposing sanctions on others and by trying to get involved in useless fights. Saddam Hussein had been described as a leader who had failed to properly gauge the will of the global community and the interests of nations (International Responsibilities Task Force, 2005, “Alternative News”). His miscalculation and excesses have brought him to the gallows and ruined his country. Thus, it is entirely possible that any hegemonic nation which tries to indulge in unfair coercion of other nations can receive similar treatment from the broader world community, even though such treatment was not to be expected. High moral standards in inter – state relations and governmental affairs have assumed a greater importance in the new era and it is most appropriate for governments to deal with everyone with such high moral standards. Humanity is still to face greater challenges in the future involving access to essential commodities and diminished natural resources. High moral standards are likely to be important if humanity is to rise above its new challenges. After all, the fact that humanity has some agreement on morality is the result of the fact that all nations of the world have been given the concept of right and wrong by the predominant religious doctrines that are to be found in these nations. Conclusion From the previous discussion it can be concluded that sanctions are definitely a humane alternative to war and it is possible to reduce human causalities as well as the destruction of war by imposing sanctions. It is possible for a strong protest to be registered by imposing sanctions and both parties to a dispute have time to think about their positions as well as allowing for diplomacy to work (Strandow, 2006, Pp. 35 – 37) and (Robinson, 2006, Pp. 1 – 10). However, the mere fact that sanctions have been imposed on a nation is a sign that diplomacy has failed and that a hardening of the position of parties to a dispute has taken place, with further progress only being possible if mediation efforts are made. Nevertheless, sanctions are better then attempting to wage all out war on a strong enemy as this is definitely an alternative which is far more costly and destructive then sanctions. Sanctions, threats of sanctions and coercive economic policies have been widely used in history and are still capable of being used by hegemonic nations. However, comprehensive global sanctions are only possible after the approval of the Security Council and any attempts to impose unilateral sanctions are likely to be examined by other nations who may also decide to retaliate in response to such sanctions. Thus, interstate relations ought to be governed in a moral and ethical manner in the present era, even if the art of statecraft knew little morality and was far more concerned with the balancing of powers, interests and natural limitations in order to determine the response of a state. It can only be hoped that the broad moral consensus that nations have been able to hammer out in an age of globalisation after much bloodshed and suffering can continue to guide interstate relations in the future when humanity is likely to suffer from very many crisis as a result of dwindling natural resources and access to these resources for all. Nations will have to continue to make sacrifices involving economic resources as well as the lives of their citizens in order to do so, because laws and moral principles that are not backed up by force are meaningless. Bibliography / References 1. Ahmed, N. M. 2003, Behind the war on terror: Western secret strategy and the struggle for Iraq Forest Row, E. 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