The Preeminent Consociational Democracy in Europe - Research Paper Example

The Preeminent Consociational Democracy in Europe Introduction Arend Lijphart is the leading supporter of the consociational/ consensus model. He highlighted ‘consociational’ democracy as an appropriate model for states characterised by deep religious, linguistic, or ethnic divisions (Crepaz, Koelble & Wilsford 2000). Nevertheless, in his recent work, Patterns of Democracy, Lijphart (1999) supports ‘consensus’ democracy, or an adjusted variation of consociational democracy, as the perfect type of governance for any state, not only extremely divided states. In contrast to the widely held wisdom that effective, influential, majoritarian leadership results in superior policy outcomes, Westminster democracies fail to surpass consensus democracies (Lijphart 2007). On a number of pointers, such as inflation, consensus democracies essentially outperform Westminster democracies; in general, they perform slightly better, which somewhat implies that consensus democracies execute no worse (Lijphart 1999). Moreover, consensus democracies have a more moderate, benevolent attributes: better environmental protection, more welfare support, more foreign assistance mission, lower imprisonment rates, and less exercise of capital punishment (Lijphart 1999). Consensus democracy has certain benefits for extremely divided states. Majoritarian democracy may be denounced for ruling out nearly half the population from the decision-making or law-making process, as it can exclude 49.9% of the population from the governmental process (Crepaz et al. 2000). In the existing literature, it is claimed that this disapproval is invalid on two situations (Lijphart 2007). First, if the current minority has an actual opportunity of becoming the future majority, then exclusion perhaps is not a critical dilemma, because each half of the nation alternates being in charge, which will have a tendency to regulate exploitation of the marginalised by the mainstream (Mair 2005). Second, if a country is adequately unvaried, then non-inclusion might not be a critical dilemma since the barred interests of the minority do not diverge much from those of the majority (Ersson & Lane 2003). Lijphart (2007) challenges these two premises by emphasising that in several countries, particularly in societies with deep-seated ideological, religious, linguistic, or ethnic divisions, neither situation is valid. These deep-seated cleavages can thwart crossover voting, stopping the current minority from having an actual opportunity of being a future majority (Lijphart 2007). Furthermore, there is unlikely to be a great deal of overlap between the interests of the majority and the minority in a deeply divided society. Hence, the permanent omission of the minority might result in violence or instability (Cunningham 2001). The institutional solution of Lijphart (1999) to this problem is consensus democracy, enabling democracy to operate by integrating minority rights and permitting minority groups to take part in the governmental process. Though there may be less revenue in the administration, legislatures will represent a wider array of interests (Lijphart (1999). Democracies come in various forms and sizes. As argued by Lijphart (1999), “There are many ways in which, in principle, a democracy can be organised and run; in practice, too, modern democracies exhibit a variety of formal governmental institutions, like legislatures and courts, as well as political party and interest group systems” (p. 1). He carries on uncovering particular designs in the institutional framework of democracies and categorises them in view of the level to which their rules and practices are either majoritarian or consensual. Whilst the majoritarian framework is founded on the notion of basic majority principle, the consensus approach aims to make best use of that majority. Consensus democracy scores higher with regard to women’s representation, electoral participation, democratic value, political equality, and contentment with democracy (Hendriks 2010). The objective of this essay is to evaluate which among the European countries comes closest to the Lijphart’s ideal democracy. Four consensus democracies in Europe, namely, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands, will be compared to one another in order to determine which among these countries is the preeminent consensus democracy. Austria The party system and pillar parties of Austria, throughout ‘classic’ consociationalism, showed all the attributes predicted by Lijphart’s framework, hence the strongest among the aforementioned countries. The pillar party leaders contending in the consociational game wielded a major function in infiltrating their own subculture, in organising its members and in aiming to guarantee its hierarchical control and political solidarity (Luther & Mueller 1992). They were also the major players in Austria’s underlying elite accommodation. The arena of that elite association ranged from a fundamental control of regional and federal administration, to duopolistic monopoly over the neo-corporatist structure, as well as over huge sectors of the public-sector and civil service ventures (Steininger, Bischof & Gehler 2008). Generally, the above analysis indicates that when expanded to involve the important function of parties, the paradigm of Lijphart still offers valuable ideas into the formation and upholding of democracies typified by divided political cultures and underlying elite role. It is apparent that the political architects of Austria intentionally reinforced the pillars sustaining the framework of consociational democracy by the strengthening poles of organisational pillarisation, or integration (Luther & Mueller 1992). This increased the amount of subcultural integration. In the meantime, elite accommodation was enlarged to build not just a single curve across the pillars, but a comprehensive ‘hemisphere’, through which party relations included wide domains of the social, economic, and political system (Steininger et al. 2008). The outcome has been an outstandingly strong structure. The curve (or hemisphere) may perhaps be surpassing the objective for which it was initially built. Nevertheless, it has thus far survived the ‘shudders’ originating from socioeconomic change processes, which have lessened division (Steininger et al. 2008). Certainly, there has been a number of de-pillarisation, as secondary and party union membership has diminished. However, the enveloping and intricate network of organisational strengthening poles which the subcultures have built since 1945 remain a strong influence on the nature and framework of political movement in Austria (Lakoff & Collier 2008). Therefore, while everything that rises may perhaps in the end have to collapse, the timing and context of the deconstruction of the consociational structure of Austria and the manner in which the components might later be reorganised will have much to do with the action and techniques of the pillar party leaders (Lakoff & Collier 2008), who have thus far wielded a very important function in Austrian consociationalism. Switzerland Of the four countries in Western Europe abovementioned as models of consensus democracy, Switzerland is perhaps the one that qualifies with the initial paradigm the least. Nevertheless, it is perhaps the country where components of consensus governmental process have continued longest (Kriesi & Trechsel 2008). Switzerland, on the one hand, does not have the cultural division necessitated by consociational model, unlike that of Austria. Consequently, political parties were prohibited from occupying the primary intra-subcultural function required by the model, and no pillarisation might flourish along cultural divisions (Kriesi & Trechsel 2008). The federal system can barely play as an efficient counterpart of pillarisation. Primarily, even though power over territorial subcultures was perhaps a reality in the latter part of the nineteenth century, this power has hardly been present in the post-war era (Fossedal & Berkeley 2005). Furthermore, by dividing the political system and more crucially the party system, the federal system has itself aided the weakening of national parties and their reliance upon territorial sectors (Church 2004). The other institutional eccentricity of Switzerland, that is, direct democracy, has also significantly undermined the power which parties could have been supposed to wield over their subjects (Fossedal & Berkeley 2005). Switzerland’s mechanism of direct democracy has permitted interest groups and the electorate to acquire further access to the various phases of the legislative process (Fossedal & Berkeley 2005). Whilst parties consider close-knit relationships with the interest groups, the latter have acquired the advantage, mainly as an outcome of the extensive indirect and direct consequences of referendums (Kriesi & Trechsel 2008). In other words, both direct democracy and federalism have discouraged political parties from manipulating their subjects. On the other hand, the Swiss party system indicates that political parties seem to play a role that quite resembles to that one may work out from the consociational framework (Kriesi & Trechsel 2008). Proportionality, adjustment and concentration remain the major terms to portray the form and structure of decision-making among the top political leaders of the Swiss political system (Hega 1999). Therefore, it seems that the function which political parties fulfil among themselves is mainly detached from any power that the political leaders might wield over their subordinates. Accommodative policy-making within the framework of a huge government federation and major consultation processes appears to be existent not due to the power that the elite benefits from its subordinates, but in contrast, it is present because direct democracy and federalism guarantee that the elite does not have this control (Fossedal & Berkeley 2005). Consequently, one could make the assumption that ‘consociational’ processes will continue only if these two institutional foundations of Swiss democracy persist. Even at this time, when institutional changes are being critically deliberated and a constitutional reform is in progress, few are eager to modify essentially the decision-making process and institutional system (Kriesi & Trechsel 2008). Certainly, a number of scholars suggest transforming the Swiss political system into a more efficient democratic regime (Fossedal & Berkeley 2005). Others propose significant reforms at the level of direct democracy’s institutions. Nevertheless, these are secluded perspectives and the modifications anticipated by the Swiss authorities are significantly more unassuming (Fossedal & Berkeley 2005). History demonstrates that Swiss political parties were incorporated into the government sphere when they conceded their radical demands (Hega 1999). In a condition of deepening polarisation within administration, one may speculate whether the magic of consociational democracy will disintegrate because of the radical reform of one of the component parties of the consociational alliance (Church 2004). How the party and political system will act in response to these challenges in the future will be an ultimate ordeal for the politics of accommodation of Switzerland. Belgium In terms of its principles and composition ruling its operation, the federal system of Belgium is quite evidently consociational (Wingfield & Gritzner 2008).The federal frameworks, to that extent, can possibly be regarded to have substituted the classic consociational structure of Belgium. On the contrary, it should be noted that the major features of classic Belgian consociationalism have remained (Arter 2006). However, Belgian consociationalism is weaker than that of Austria because the former’s traditional pillars are not so much religious or ideological subcultures, but webs of organisations providing services (Arter 2006). There are also additional explanations as to why Belgian consociationalism is weaker than that of Austria. Primarily, there is the problem which the pillar parties of Belgium face in trying to be receptive to the electorate (Fitzmaurice 1996). There is a prevalent anticipation that, regardless of electoral changes, coalition administrations of Belgium will always be built by the ‘spontaneous’ fusion of the two biggest pillar parties, which embody each language faction (Heffen, Kickert & Thomassen 2000). The repercussion of this is that such unions have a significantly high probability of being built, even in circumstances where those two biggest pillar parties are generally losing votes (Lane 2007). It is probable that, in the next few years, the two large-scale political groups will no longer be well-built enough to build a majority regime together. The only means to build a victorious government at the federal stage would in that case be though a major alliance of six parties, which will independently not be capable of taking into account electoral reform (Pirenne 2008). This absence of receptiveness on the part of the party system of Belgium is apparently a direct consequence of the two-party system (Pirenne 2008), but does not aid at all in encouraging public’s confidence in the parties. The Netherlands The Dutch parties are evidently weaker than those of Austria, particularly in the period of pillarisation, both in relation to inter-subcultural relationship and intra-subcultural connection (Rochon 1999). With regard to organisational integration of the subculture, numbers of party membership were quite negligible, and not expanded by those secondary organisations (Andeweg & Irwin 2002). With regard to political mobilisation, Dutch parties depended mainly on religion and representation of interest as rewards, and never made use of personal sponsorship, not even when the other sponsorships began to lose their appeal (Andeweg & Irwin 2002). Due to the comparative weakness in relation to their subcultural components, the parties were disabled from the beginning in any attempt to control inter-subcultural relations (Daalder & Irwin 1989). Dutch parties never applied the consociational premise of divided autonomy to cultivate functional or regional domination (Jones 1995). They controlled the governmental, parliamentary, and electoral domains, and they may at present be reinforcing their hold on the bureaucratic and government domains to a certain extent, but they never permeate the neo-corporatist domain or the larger civil society in any substantial level (Andeweg & Irvin 2002). In other words, the parties by no means were the subcultural centres, but only functioned as their subculture’s delegations to the state. Conclusions Austria is clearly the best consociational/consensus democracy, with regard to Lijphart’s ideal democracy, among the four countries analysed. Austria’s party system and pillar parties are strong throughout the period of classic consociationalism and pillarisation. Austria’s democracy is stronger than that of Switzerland because the latter has a deep-seated division among the ruling parties on the concern that has become certainly a core, if not the core, concern in Switzerland’s politics, specifically European integration. 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