Foreign Relationships that the UK Can Have with Somalia to Lessen High Sea Piracy - Case Study Example

Global conflicts and contexts Executive summary (To combat piracy off the Somalia coast by UK government) Federal republic of Somalia or simply Somalia is situated in the horn of Africa and shares its borders with Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. It has a long and chequered  history of trade, commerce and colonial activities and has played an important role in the history of the Cold War. However, at present times Somalia is in turmoil with its never-ending internal and external conflicts, 14 failed transitional governments and is often dubbed as a “failed state.” Such disturbing conditions have led to failed economic conditions and in recent times, that has been an increase in instances of maritime piracy off the high seas near the coast of Somalia. This paper discusses the foreign relationships that UK can possibly have with Somalia to lessen this problem of high sea piracy. Introduction A very disturbing picture is painted by Lennox (2008: 1) about the Somalia piracy where he says, “There were 115 reported pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia in 2008. Of those attacks, 46 resulted in the seizure of a commercial vessel by Somali pirates. The average ransom for the release of hijacked vessels increased from $1 million US dollars in July of 2008, to $1.5 million by December. At the time of writing 12 vessels are being held along with approximately 400 crewmembers in pirate towns along Somalia’s unlawful coasts”. Therefore, we can see that this problem has taken a magnitude of epic proportions and is threatening to completely block off the trade route via the Gulf of Aden. This the place which sees almost 20000 ships passing each year, has also the maximum number of attacks recorded, forcing the vessels to take a longer but safer alternative route. As Biegon (2009) tells us, “The increased threat of maritime piracy has heightened the shipping industrys financial concerns in the context of the global economic recession. Over 6.8 billion tons of goods are moved by sea annually in a global trade cycle worth $7.4 trillion, with up to 90% of international trade traveling by ship at some point. The wave of pirate attacks off the eastern coast of Africa has already had a major impact on global shipping patterns. Following the hijacking of the Sirius Star, for example, AP Moller-Maersk, Europes largest shipping company, diverted its fleet of 50 oil tankers away from the Suez Canal towards the longer and more expensive route around the Cape of Good Hope.” This article looks at the piracy that is spelling doom for the trading vessels and Somalia alike, and tries to define the term maritime piracy and reexamine from a historical perspective the causes of these piracies and the steps UK can take to solve it. Body Definition of maritime piracy: Gosse tells us that (in Zapotoczny, 2009: 1) “Piracy, like murder, is one of the earliest of recorded human activities.” Maritime piracy, an age-old practice, is a crime in the high seas with access to safe sanctuaries to hide form pursuers, where a group of criminals steal the cargo on a trading vessel, or the ship, as a whole. The reason for this theft may be to steal only the valuable material aboard the vessel or it may be to hold the ship for a hefty ransom. Sometimes the entire crew aboard the ship is killed to prevent resistance. Somali pirates are a little different. For them the crew on the ship is the most valuable material on it. They make use of the fact that, unlike Somalia, value of human lives is held at a greater premium in other countries across the world. Their modus operandi as May (2009) describes, “Modern pirates are well armed and well organised. Many, particularly Somali gangs, are using larger "mother ships" to reach deeper ocean waters before creeping up on ships with smaller boats and boarding them using grappling hooks and ladders”. There are two different definitions of maritime piracy as given by IMO or International Maritime Organization, and by IMB or International Maritime Bureau. “The first, used by the IMO, derives from the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It says that: “Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).” The IMB offers another definition of piracy: An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act” (in Dillon, 2005: 156). Factors contributing to the many instances of piracy off the coast of Somalia: Somalia had been never been a colonial state officially, though it had been partitioned from time to time by the colonial powers. It was also involved in wars with Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978 and was backed by USSR, and later after the cold war, by US. It failed in the wars against Ethiopia and soon lost its strategic importance to both USSR and US. It was a downhill story for Somalia after this. In 1991, the government led by Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown and the warlords from different warring factions took over the state. As Ward (2009:7) describes the situation after Barre “The country, stocked with military weapons, was overrun by warlords whose clans turned on each other…..The country was in chaos, with rival sociological groups, armed to the teeth, tearing the country apart.” After Barre was overthrown, US sent in militia to protect vessels carrying aid for humanitarian purposes to Somalia under UN support. It also tried to reign in the warlords but failed miserably in its endeavor which resulted in the deaths of 18 US soldiers. After US left Somalia groups from the Middle East came in to establish their control. Along with this came the Wahhabi sect, a rigid and stringent Islamic group. In 2005, a fanatical Islamic group known as the Shabab took reigns of Somalia and a Council of Islamic Courts took charge of Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia. This Islamic Court Council was however, to the surprise of the entire world, overthrown by the US backed Ethiopian forces in 2006 when the so-called Islamic fighters fled the capital in a chaos. Another transitional government was established, that was internationally recognized and backed by UN, the 14th since 1991. At this time, it was thought this was the biggest opportunity to bring back peace and order in the country and the transitional government managed to shift the capital from Baidoa, to the present day capital Mogadishu. At this time, the African Union was supposed to send in around 7,600 neutral peace keeping forces to Somali to help the transitional government function and also to keep the Islamic fundamentalists at bay. However, in reality, only around 1400 troops were send in by Uganda, way short from the total figures envisioned and required, to keep peace. Therefore, without much support this government was already tottering at the brink of collapse when the President of this interim government, Yusuf, resigned in late 2008. 2009 saw the election of Sheikh Sharif as the head of yet another new government and 2009 also saw the Shabab regaining control of the south central part of Somalia, leading to displacement of thousands of innocent civilians. As Zapotoczny (2009:2) interprets the situation “In April 2009, reasons for optimism were all but entirely gone when fighting on the streets of Mogadishu reached what the International Committee of the Red Cross called the worst levels in 15 years. In addition to the staggering death toll, the bloody battles have displaced an estimated 400,000 residents of Mogadishu.” After Iraq and Afghanistan, the state of Somalia has become the third ‘failed state’ where the US led war on terror is taking place. All these internal strivings and political instability along with natural disasters like a severe drought from 2002 to 2006 and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 has led to economic disasters which in turn led to the rise in Somalia piracy, that threatens to further destabilize the already war torn country, further ravaged by the Islamic fundamentalists. This piracy was first seen in 90’s after the fall of Barre and initially it was the local anglers trying to protect their waters from foreign fishing and dumping vessels. Soon these armed young men from Somalia learned that aiming defenseless commercial ships were far more lucrative than fishing, and this is how piracy started off the coast of Somalia. As Gilpin (2009: 3) puts it, “The upsurge in attacks by Somali pirates between 2005 and mid-2009 reflects decades of political unrest, maritime lawlessness and severe economic decline. Piracy has dire implications for economic development and political stability in Somalia, with economic prospects constrained, business confidence compromised and human security worsening.” Somalia pirates are formed by groups of young poverty-stricken men living near the coastal regions. As each ship is hijacked and ransom paid, it lures more young men to join the gang to get a share from the huge booty acquired from various countries, by holding their ships. As Zapotoczny( 2009: 1) aptly frames it “With the chaotic state of Somalia and the lack of a central government, combined with Somalias location at the Horn of Africa, conditions were ripe for the growth of piracy”. Now the situation is that almost all members of the coastal villages of Somalia take part in this organized crime. Somalia pirates are hailed as heroes in their own country because at the present scenario they are the only ones who earn profitably form their so-called “businesses.” . The most significant current efforts to address the issue and their effectiveness: As Murphy (2009: 2) tells us “To date, the international response to Somali piracy has been slow and ineffective because the problem has been misunderstood. Somali piracy is linked intimately to Somali politics. The criminals who organize piracy are connected to Somalia’s fractured political authorities….Only by dealing with political groups ashore will the incentive for piracy and its motivation be tempered and possibly eliminated”. At present efforts are directed at replacing the Ethiopian soldiers with African peacekeeping forces, which is not proving to be worthwhile. There has been heavy fighting in most of the Somalia cities. The current Somalia government is trying to establish a mandate and form a constitution to be able to have elections and elected representatives by 2011. This government however has been deemed to be too weak by most countries to able to bring about any strong changes. The problem of Somali piracy is also rooted in the country’s instability and as in the United Nations Security Council meeting (2009) was pointed out “piracy was a symptom of wider problems ashore in Somalia, the only sustainable solution would be effective governance, the establishment of the rule of law and security institutions, and the creation of alternative livelihoods in Somalia for stable and inclusive economic growth”. Worldwide support and monetary assistance for the interim government is absolutely necessary, for Somalia to come out of the present mess. Recommendations: Future policies or action by Britain to follow to stabilize Somalia 1. Working with the Somali government: This is important to create a stable and efficient state. As Vice Adm. William Gortney, commander of the U.S. Naval forces Central Command and the Combined Maritime Forces says “piracy stems from lawlessness, and economic instability” (in Ward 2009: 11), it should be the primary aim for the British government to help the present transition government to establish a strong and long lasting rule. It will have to be clearly understood that piracy stems from the social lawlessness, decades of political instability and the desperate economic conditions in Somalia. "Socioeconomic status in Somalia is very bad right now, as we know, and this is one of the reasons pirates have turned to hijacking," said Cyrus Mody of the International Maritime Bureau, based in London (in Zapotoczny, 2009: 3). Therefore, the first priority of the UK government is to work hand in hand with the present transitional Somalia government and see to it that the projected Constitution of 2011 is formed. It should focus on helping the government to hold fair and free elections and have elected representatives aboard the government functionary body. Once the government is formed, it will require support from various armed forces to stem the abounding lawlessness and anarchy and also to keep away the members of the Islamic Court of Council. For this, the UK government must work to provide training to the Somalia police and military forces. British peacekeeping forces must also be present until the time the Somalia government is able to stand on its feet and becomes capable of functioning on its own. 2. Greater naval intervention to protect ships: While trying to stabilise the Somali government England should also look to form a core naval force to patrol the high seas and protect the passing ships. Working with the government and also fighting the pirates would give pressure from both sides more effectively. However as Mark Stanhope, UK navy chief, says (in defenceWeb, 2010) "We have made a considerable difference in terms of the amount of successful pirating attempts that is by virtue of the number of navies that are there …While navies will do their very best in what is a huge area to address the problems of piracy, we will never solve the problem that is causing it”. In the last part, Mr. Stanhope refers to the abounding lawlessness in Somalia. Therefore, we can see very clearly that having navies around in the Indian for protecting the cargo ships is essential but not enough to restrain the pirates. However, having navies around to hold the Somali pirates at bay as much as possible, is unavoidable and England has already deployed navy ships as part of the anti piracy group formed by the UN in 2009. The total count of such ships under UN is now 7. 3. Greater levels of foreign aid to Somalia to encourage local businesses and restart the local economy: The British government should to try to invest in small businesses owned by the local people. This would help the local people to come out of their destitute condition and gain economic freedom. Once the economic condition of the country is better, it will become difficult for the Islamic militants to indoctrinate youngsters and carry on with their nefarious activities. Proper training of Somalia’s police and militia forces and education for the general masses are also other fields where the UK government should focus on, to get Somalia back on its feet. References Biegon, R. (January 29th 2009). Somali Piracy and the International Response. Regions/ Africa. Available at http://www.fpif.org/articles/somali_piracy_and_the_international_response [13th January 2010] Dillon, D. (2005). Maritime Piracy: Defining the Problem. SAIS Review. http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Maritime%20Piracy.pdf. [11th January 2010] Gilpin, R. (22nd June 2009). United States Institute of Peace Working Paper- Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy. Available at  http://www.usip.org/files/resources/1_0.pdf. [10th January 2010] Lennox, P. (December 2008). Contemporary Piracy off the Horn of Africa. Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. Available at http://qaranimo.com/2009/feb/Contemporary_Piracy_off_the_Horn_of_Africa.pdf [11th January 2010] May, L. (18th November 2008). History of Piracy on the High Seas. The Independent World. Available on http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/history-of-piracy-on-the-high-seas-1023701.html [13th January 2010] Murphy, M. (16th April 2009). Somali Piracy: Not Just a Naval Problem. Centre for strategic and Budgetary Assessment. Backgrounder. Available at [13th January 2010] http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/B.20090417.Somali_Piracy/B.20090417.Somali_Piracy.pdf. Reuters. (11th January 2010). Navies won’t eradicate piracy: UK Navy Chief. defenceWeb. Available at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6066:navies-wont-eradicate-piracy-uk-navy-chief&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106 [13th January 2010] United Nations Security Council SC/9793. (18th November 2009). Piracy off Somali coast not only criminal, but very successful, security council hears, cautioned there could be no peace at sea without stability on land. Security Council 6221st Meeting (AM). Available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9793.doc.htm [11th January 2010] Ward, T. (2009). Piracy in Somalia: Interbehavioral Assessment and Intervention. Advance Online Publication. Available at  http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/bsi/article/view/2497/2398. [10th January 2010] Zapotoczny, W. (2009). Explanation of the Reasons For the Rise of Somali Piracy. The Rise of Somali Piracy. Available at  http://www.wzaponline.com/Piracy.pdf. 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