The Postwar Consensus in British Politics - Essay Example

The debate nay the controversy which surrounds the ‘neutral’ colour and texture of British Politics after the Second World War till 1979 has been from two academic traditions. ‘Consensus’ era has been viewed and reviewed/analyzed both by Historian as well as the Political Scientist respectively. ‘The historian tends to view the tree, while the political scientist prefers to see the whole wood’ (Seldon.1994). In this paper an attempt will be made to create a blend of these two academic approaches. The purpose is to construct a holistic picture. In this paper the historical view will look at the content of ‘consensus’ and how it emerged and was translated into actual policies. In short what actually was the postwar consensus? There onwards the academic debate which surrounds and is continuing as we write; so to speak; will be examined. The core questions like; was it a consensus or was it political rivalries misnamed as consensus? Was it an elite consensus or a broad consensus of electorate to the political center? Reference will also be made to the consensus or otherwise of the interest groups (trade unions etc.). An attempt will be made to situate this discussion within the overall structural matrix of British Political System. The purpose is to show that the structure and the dynamics within, actually construct constraints and boundaries which form the context of UK Politics and any radicalism/drastic change is perceived as out of context. This argument will be supported by a brief comparative political analysis with mainland European model. It will also be supported by referring to the underlying core value structure of UK, which forms the basis of any socio-political construct. The consensus has probably always existed in British Politics, in its different variants, within the confines of practically two-party parliamentary system. This will be demonstrated in the later part of this paper, as for now, as a point of departure of this paper, it is suffice to address the ‘postwar consensus’ and it’s ‘moderately satirical’ Economist typification as Butskellism. It is perhaps an erroneous assertion to call consensus; postwar. It did not spring up suddenly between two political antagonists just after the Second World War. The War time Conservative government was a consensus government. The achievements of the Coalition Government of 1940-45 are termed as the harbinger of postwar-consensus (Addison.1975). Our assertion however is that consensus is the quintessential British Political behaviouralism, as explained earlier this will be dealt with in the later part of this paper. As for now, it can be argued that; perhaps the true meaning of the term ‘postwar consensus’, is the shift of UK Public policy matrix from Laissez-Fare to Keynesian Interventionism and its continuity through three decades irrespective of the government in power. The Keynesian revolution (the publishing of General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.1936) was not a mere academic event. It radically influenced the design and conduct of public policy in the western world. The post depression years reinforced a bipartisan rethinking for a change. The ‘Hungary Thirties’, the crowds of unemployed, who could have been easily lured to communist utopia or Fascist propaganda were a cause of concern in Britain across the political divide. The ‘war time display of patriotism by the working class and the sacrifice rendered necessitated an institutional response from the state to focus on welfare and employment, “ a war launched largely for power political reasons must retrospectively receive idealistic and material justification”( Harrison.1999). The state was perceived as an agency and provider of economic growth, employment and well being. This perception of state’s role was bipartisan at the political level as well as at the level of electorate and the general public. A proactive and interventionist state appealed to the conservatives due to their inherent desire for control and desire to payback in the form of service delivery and economic development; which in turn necessitated more control. The Laissez fare had created unrest of working classes; which was treading on dangerous ground for them. They had seen the effects in Europe. Capitalism was seen to be flexible enough to “deliver abundance without class confrontation” (Macmillan.1938). On the other hand Keynesian interventionism was ideological home ground for Labour. The pursuit of consensus ‘chimed in’ with ‘trade union pragmatism’ and ideological realization of respecting working class through full employment (Harrison.1999). The problem for Labour was to contain the drift towards Communism and the extreme left within its ranks. Thus the postwar public policy became the expression of the institutional coalescence of interests. Post War Consensus was thus ‘a system of beliefs, moral values and social aspirations held in common by the majority of powerful agents and institutions ...[which] specified the general direction of government’s policy’(Warde.1982,pp4-5). Consensus was ‘…the high degree bipartisan agreement over large areas of policy making and a two party consensual framework’ (Ball.1981,pp145-6). It was also a ‘ broad agreement about major socio-economic issues …producing merely conflict over detail…rather than over basic political, economic or social principles’(Punnett.1987, pp25). It has been termed as ‘a framework of assumptions and beliefs within which policy was conducted’( Wright.1989, pp209). Tivey, refers to this time, ‘when disagreement did not challenge major areas of policy …a set of attitude shared between the most of the influential politicians’ (Tivey.1988, pp118). Did disagreement amounting to turning the applecart ever emerge in the Modern British Parliamentary History? This now emerges the core question of our argument, however before attempting to answer it, let us first examine the meaning of the term and how it actually translated in to policy strands. We will now, itemize the ‘policy planks’ of the Post War Consensus till the advent of ‘winter of discontent’ and emergence of Thatcherian revisionism. The salient contents were: 1. Economic Policy: Both the parties prioritized maintenance of high and stable levels of employment as the foremost economic policy objective, ‘in marked contrast to the position before 1939’ (Seldon.1994). 2. Interest Groups: Tripartite consultation between Major interest groups; trade unions and business groups, fed in to policy streams of both Conservatives and Labour. (ibid). 3. Public Ownership: The Keynesian ideology was espoused by both parties. By 1951 all major sectors were nationalized with the exception of steel. (ibid). 4. Labour Relations: ‘ Both parties subscribed to voluntarism in to the late 1960s, when both turned to legislation’.(ibid). 5. Immigration: ‘Labour opposed the 1962 Act, but when in office in 1964 legislated similarly’ (ibid). The policy matrix outlined above which represents the postwar consensus has also been termed as an oversimplification, a glossing over of reality and blissful and deliberate ignorance of the existence of stark political divisions. The argument is that although the policy framework remained unchanged but the prevalence of the term masked the inherent deeper differences at academic as well as policy levels. The academic literature and analysis about consensus is thus ridden with an inherent bias and flawed set of assumptions. The argument has come forth from postmodernists challenging the basic assumption of existence of consensus at all. It is asserted that, it is unclear as to ‘what depth of agreement constituted consensuses whether it was only an agreement to follow a certain set of policy options or was it a convergence of ‘foundational values and core assumptions’ (Marlow.1997). It is inherently simplistic to view, ‘the paradox of an apparent policy consensus between two ideologically opposed political parties’ as a generic confluence. Consensus has been termed as lack of ‘disagreement over certain issues’, rather then an, ‘ unintended result of autonomous strategic (pragmatic or instrumental) decision making by the Labour and Conservatives’(ibid).This viewpoint criticizes consensus as a ‘metaphor’ , which blinds us to reality. It is asserted that the emergence of consensus as an episode in academic literature is a result of ‘intertextuality’, that is the term used for articulating the influence exerted by various texts on a subject, creating a reinforcing effect on each other and obfuscating the directions of inquiry and intersubjective learning. (Culler.1981, Worton & Still.1990). It is asserted that the diverse motivating forces and the strategic terrains of decision making which create an incline towards the center; is ignored (Marlow.1996). The argument however stops short of actually explaining the why of consensus. To organize the critique and discussion on postmodernist concept of articulation of language and its effects is perhaps beyond the scope of this paper, it is however suffice to take in to account the fact that by divulging deeper in to the diversity of consensus will not provide the answer to our core question (discussed earlier), and rephrased as to what makes British Political system conducive to consensus. It is pertinent to address the core argument of this paper which holds the stand point that consensus in all its variants is a permanent feature of the British political system. For this purpose we will attempt to highlight institutional strata within the British system, which favour and aid continuity and offering resistance to structural change, acting as the confines to the system. The British civil service is one such institution, with its neutral and traditional value structure. Its permanency in the governance and policy making matrix compels it to seek and work for continuity. Civil Service; due to its nature, training, service ethos and ‘old boys’ networking, tends to block any radical change either from the left or from the right. ‘In 1976 Lord Armstrong (head of home civil service from 1968 to 1974) thought most civil servants were Butskillites’, (Hennessy.1980, quoted in Harrioson.1999). The British electorate also favours moderation, which expressed itself in the consensus years as support for continuity of welfare state. Seldon has also pointed out the ‘constraints of, time, electoral majority, money, absence of external shocks and interest group endorsement, as factors permeating consensus through all these decades (Seldon.1994). It is argued that consensus is a structural and historical presence in UK body-politick. The period under discussion was a subtle variant of a permanent feature. The English Channel created environs of isolation. It was shielded from clasmatic political changes in the continent.(Harrison.1999). The ages of revolution (1757, 1848) passed her by. The median religious standpoint of Church of England between Catholicism and Puritanism reinforced a middle ground. The Anglican Bishops ‘instinctively operated within House of Lords to promote consensus between legislature, political parties and public at large’(Jones.1972, pp.150-1, Brown.1994). The political conflict in Britain is confined within the system and muted as compared to Europe. Moreover the fundamental value structure is designed towards accommodation and consensus, fair-play and playing by the rules.“ British people love to play at fighting even in the times of peace , but beneath the appearance of ferocity there is the basis of agreement more durable than the life itself. The parallel between team games of which we are so fond and conduct of our political life is as profound as similar”(Durbin.1942, pp.38). It is thus the structural and historical stratification of British system which promotes consensus. This structure is reinforced and cemented by the core and fundamental belief/ value system, which has grown over eons. The postwar consensus and Butskellism was not an anomaly but rather, continuity and an adherence to the rules of the system. By our line of argument it can be asserted that, consensus is relative, it only implies that the degree of agreement is more important than areas of dispute (Addison 1994,pp 287, 2nd ed.). The structure is self preserving and any restructuring is held suspect. End Note: In many ways Thatcher’s revisionism did not imply a break-down of consensus, it can be viewed as a policy shift, which New Labour has not drastically changed e.g. Labour’s distancing itself from Trade Unions, once its bastion of strength. References and Bibliography: 1. Seldon, A.(1994) Consensus: A Debate Too Long?; Parliamentary Affairs. 47: 501-514. 2. Addison, P. (1975), The Road to 1945, Jonathan Cape. 3. Addison P. (1994) The Road to 1945 (second edition), Jonathan Cape. 4. Harrison, B. (1999), The Rise , Fall and Rise of Political Consensus in Britain Since 1940; The Historical Association, Blackwell Publishers, OX4 1JF, UK. 5. Macmillan, H. (1938), The Middle Way , quoted in op.cit. 6. Warde, A. (1982), Consensus and Beyond; Manchester, Manchester University Press. 7. Ball, A.R.(1981), British Political Parties; London Macmillan. 8. Punnett, R.M. (1987), British Government and Politics (fifth edition), Aldershot; Gover. 9. Wright, A. (1989), ‘Endpiece’, in L, Tivey and A. Wright, Party Ideologies in Britain; London, Routledge. 10. Tivey, L. (1988), Interpretation of British Politics; Harvester, Wheatsheaf. 11. Marlow, J.(1997), Blind Alleys; Metaphor, Intertextuality, and the Post-War Consensus; Journal of Politics (1997) 17(2) pp.127-133.Political Studies Association, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK. 12. Marlow, J.(1996), Questioning the Post War Consensus Thesis; Alsershot: Dartmouth Publishing. 13. Culler, J. (1983), The Pursuit of Signs, London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 14. Worton, M. and Still, J. (eds), (1990), Intertextuality: Theory and Practices, Manchester, Manchester University Press. 15. Jones, A.(1972), The Politics of Reform: 1884, Cambridge. 16. Brown, F.(1994), Influencing the House of Lords: The Role of Lords Spiritual 1979-1987, Political Studies xlii (1994), 117-18. 17. Durbin, E. F.M. (1942), What Have We to Defend? A Brief Critical Examination of the British Social Tradition; Cambridge. Read More