The Concept of Behaviouralism in Political Science - Essay Example

One of the most misunderstood concepts in the field of political science, behaviouralism, until recently continues to confuse of politics and the social sciences. One of the most prominent figures of this discipline, Robert Dahl, admitted that our idea of the concept is both confounding and contradictory even though he referred to it as a 'successful protest' against impressionistic works.1 Until recently, the field of political science is haunted by the indelible marks that behaviouralism has left in the area of politics and political philosophy. Although many scholars no longer use the term, reference to this approach can still spark discussion and debate. Hence, in order to fully understand behaviouralism and the ideas attached to it, it is necessary to evaluate its definitions, trace its history, and assess if the proliferation of the approach in the early 20th century afforded benefits on the field of political science. All throughout its short history, behaviouralism and the definitions appended to it had always caused disagreements and confusion. Waldo for instance, stated that the even the concept itself emerged as confounding and vague.2 Easton admitted that those who endeavoured to define the idea only strove to bestow it his own personal definition3 and concluded that it was useless to classify behaviouralism using a definite categorization system4. A similar warning has been put forth by David Truman who argued that those who generalise the definition of behaviouralism commit blunders, as the concept was a rebellion against orthodox methodologies utilised in the study of politics.5 This is the difficulty in interpreting the meaning of behaviouralism, since authorities, to whom we can always base our interpretations, on this concept abound.6 The confusion brought about by the definition or the lack of it, led many to contend that behaviouralism did not seem to exist, at all. To understand why the concept spawned into disparate interpretations, it is necessary to take a quick glimpse at its history. The concept of behaviouralism started, according to Dahl, in the 1920's after the WWI. The flourishing of the movement in the United States was founded on the American pragmatic disposition, belief in science and 'factmindedness'.7 The term itself became more associated with various scholars, majority of them Americans, who showed disappointment on the achievements of orthodox political science, which based its study on history, philosophy and the 'descriptive-institutional approach'.8 These 'rebels' in the field asserted that other approach could either subsist or could be advanced in order to assist political science in providing it empirical methodology and systematic theories which would employ close, direct and 'rigorously controlled observations of political events'.9 At this time, the concept of political behaviour became more familiar after Charles E. Merriam initiated the call for research in this field. The call also included those involved in the study of political behaviour referred to as 'behaviouralists' although there were those who were more comfortable being labelled with the expression 'behaviourist'.10 However, David Easton insisted that it was significant to discriminate the 'behaviouralists' from the 'behaviourists'.11 The development of the concept spread more rapidly near the end of the 1940's and the start of the 50's, its period of rapid emergence and propagation. American political scientists of the era began to draw their theories and thoughts on these experiences. 12 Writings and literature on the subject continued to appear in the first half of the 20th century.13 In his book, Dwight Waldo first used the word 'behaviouralism' in the introductory text but there existed a few who used it much earlier. Scholars and political scientists began to use the expression more widely after 1956.14 However, the concept became more popular as more works appeared in that era in which the term 'behaviouralism' was mentioned in various publications. Critics against behaviouralism also flourished during this period - an evidence of the dominance of the discipline. The neutrality in the approach's definition was utilized to introduce the term to laymen and students of the period. Others employed the term in a somewhat critical manner. Thus, some adversaries of empiricism would put denotations to it to refer to endeavours, which utilized the methodologies of natural sciences on human behaviour while others referred to it as an extreme delineation of quantification. Easton even admitted that few of them concurred as to what constituted behaviouralism.15 Experts contend that from its onset, behaviouralism denoted a political notion - not a scientific one, but critics persisted on using the term in a more pejorative fashion. In addition, as it is not viewed as a research tradition but a movement in politics, its connotations and denotations endow concepts the behaviouralists were advancing. An introduction to the subject always carried emphasis on the methodology and the objectives of the discipline. The emergence of behaviouralism in the fist half of the 20th century was stimulated by the events the science of politics normally undertook as a consequence of theories, conceptual organization and research done under this field of study. It prospered according to Dahl because of the influence of organisations distinctively American in nature.16 These included institutions such as the Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford. In addition, the aforementioned foundations' substantial donations and financial support to scholarly endeavours had significantly shaped the courses of actions of the academic community. Dahl further opines that the academic communities and the foundations held reciprocal relationships. For one, the foundations heavily depended on the research outcome of the scholars and in turn, the academicians relied on the financial support of the foundations. Research done by the behaviouralists required huge amount of funds especially when research touched on the subject of presidential elections.17 The support of these institutions was instrumental in the cementing of the discipline, which became influential in the next few decades. Other key elements that gave rise to the proliferation of the concept of behaviouralism was the foundation of the different research centres which included the Chicago School of Political Science, chaired by Charles E. Merriam, said to be the founder of the behaviouralist movement, just to mention a few examples. These institutions were responsible for the recruitment of many renowned behaviouralists who strived to legitimize the empirical approach to the study of social sciences especially the science of politics.18. The American scientific culture and academic freedom, likewise contributed to the cementing of the principles of the discipline in the academic and practical settings. This contention is reminiscent of Bernard Crick's assertions that the American scientific culture is closely linked to the usual concept of science, the American's view of citizenship, democratic norms and the belief that growth is unavoidable.19 On the other hand, the culture of academic freedom in the United States greatly contributed to the shaping of the movement. 20 Scientists in the 1950's claimed that behaviouralism served as a convenient escape from the constraints of public scrutiny as behaviouralists were liberal in their politics and critiquing them would be futile. As the debate on values became significant, political scientists had to defend themselves from the attacks of both the Rightists and the Leftists -consequently moulding the course of the discipline. Hence, as one of the most dominant disciplines in the 20th century, it is important to assess if the impact of behaviouralism and its methodologies have been beneficial as a whole. Proponents of the movement such as Waldo for example, argued that the most important aspect of post-World War II political science has been the rise of 'behaviouralism.' 21Waldo added that behaviouralism and its dominance on the organized political science in its period of popularity brought transformations to various matters to which political scientists attend, and the manner in which they are addressed. According to Waldo, these are evident and readily available on vast literature on politics and political philosophy, spawned from the behaviouralists' movement, which he deemed "substantive, polemical, interpretative".22 Nevertheless, this new movement in the field of politics had endured criticisms during its peak.23 On the other hand, critics of the empirical theorists contend that studies done in this field have never obtained entirely objective and scientific outcome.24 Skinner stated that empirical theories put forward by behaviouralist such as Dahl had 'normative implications'25 as the theories and the theorists alike had never been objective and neutral in their treatment of the subject. This was a consequence of their conservative justification of and strict adherence to the existing political structure.26 In addition, critics argued that these empiricists were often suspected of having founded their ideology on conservatism and pseudo-science,27 since the theories and conceptions of empirical behavioural movement involve unsuspecting approval of its principles. In addition, its proponents had the proclivities to be 'apologists' for the existing political structure.28 The empiricists have also been attacked and labelled as heirs to the 'normative' political customs of the American political ideology and were charged as 'cautious Whig pluralist'29 whose real status was that of particularly orthodox political academics.30 Other critics asserted that the proponents of behaviouralism have incurred erroneous ideological shifts in the foundation of their supposedly 'neutral evaluation' However, Skinner argued that these arguments were futile in their refutation as they utilised faulty 'paradigm' in their assessments of the contentions put forward by the so-called empiricists.31 Thus, Skinner believes that the critics failed to put forth their arguments effectively as these did not directly address the issues contested.32 Furthermore, Skinner observes that critics assumed that majority of the empirical theorists were only concerned on sustaining secure and efficient democracy33 and strove to establish generalisations about the conditions of stable and effective democratic rule.34 This criticism however, failed to critically evaluate the principles, which Dahl tackled in his book as the critics merely assailed Dahl's assumptions on effective democracy, which the critics labelled as 'vague'.35 For instance, Leo Strauss's attack against the goal of the empiricists indirectly admonished those who were involved in 'scientific' undertakings through his lecture on political philosophy, the purpose of which is not to acquire truth but to search for the truth. Strauss states that philosophers know nothing and thus, this acceptance that they are ignorant can motivate him to further his knowledge. A philosopher, according to Strauss, ceases to be one when he ignores questions with regards his quest for truth, even those questions he fails to answer. Hence, Strauss claims, philosophers should involve in the discussions or disputations regarding possible answers to questions that beset their fields although they may not be able to reach conclusions or decisions. 36 Strauss believes that politics is naturally subject to sanctions or criticisms as it could be an alternative or a matter to be rejected.37 The aim of political thoughts is not neutrality but to explore human beings' judgment, decision and loyalty in their political life. Although Strauss did not refer to any subfield or subdiscipline of political science, he harshly criticised those who were involved in the so-called 'empirical approach' and described the study of politics 'in a state of decay' or could have already vanished completely as it was replete with disagreements with regards its methodologies and purpose. Thus, the forms of methodology being advanced in the field of political science, which in the past were indistinguishable with political philosophy, became a subject of suspicion. 38 Bernard Crick likewise critically stated that political science in America, which aimed at universally acceptable theories, fell as victims of pseudo-scientism. However, this belied its genuine function as a uniquely American ideology. For Crick, behaviouralism resembled totalitarianism, which it initially intended to dispute.39 Hence, Crick, describing this aim as a mere 'compulsion,' dared those empiricists who purported to shape a new approach in political science employing the methodologies of the natural sciences.40 Still, we cannot discount the significant impact of the discipline in political science, as its imprints in the field of politics in the United States are as considerable as in other areas of the world. The implications of behaviouralism are significant as they brought about new understanding and conceptual transformations in different areas of humanities. In the 1940's after the war, the popularity of social sciences had diminished significantly but the behaviouralist movement sparked the passion for empirical treatment of political subjects, which consequently gave rise to the emergence of research schools. The decades after the 40's were the most fruitful for the discipline as behaviouralism flourished, and its advocates, furthermore, rallied in support of modern and empirical methodologies. Dahl concluded that the approach has generated constructive and reliable results valuable for a deeper understanding of politics especially in the general area of political participation.41 This approach to political science had made itself felt as it brought about a profound understanding of a political man's psychological characteristics, his behaviour, views and inclinations. Dahl added that research in this area was of numerous range although the works did not always manifest the label 'political science. Various professionals involved in behaviouralism carried titles such as 'sociologists, psychologists, or political scientists. This has been interpreted by some as a 'disintegration' of the unique principles of political science but others argued that this phenomenon transcended professional borders since the field of politics was not viewed as detached from the social sciences and they too, utilized 'scientific methods' in their fields of study.42 Recently, some political scholars contend that behaviouralism failed because it made assertions it did not effectively met. However, its proponents countered that the real issue is whether behaviouralism actually endured during the post-behavioural period or not and which of its doctrines disappeared. This is said to be evident in the current American political life in which public opinion, one of the subfields of the discipline, continued to survive as behaviouralists focused on the study of public opinion while taking into consideration an individual's attitude and behaviour. The study of the individual was a significant methodological fundamental in behaviouralism, as the discipline presumes that the opinion or actions of the group do not depart from the beliefs and behavior of an individual. This view cemented the original objectives of the behaviouralists as they first aimed to verify the corollaries of the individual's political attitude in relation to his political institutions.43 Although a plethora of critics believe that political science during the period mid-20th century, generated trivial and minor universal scientific theories worthy for the resolution of disputed concept as it failed to generate concurrence, the passionate exchange of opinion and discussions within the field, especially during the golden years of behaviouralism - between the orthodox political theoreticians and the empiricists - on topics ranging from political culture to public opinion, paved the way for the rise of the critical evaluation of other fields and subfields of social sciences and this did not exclude political science. This was the time when American politics began questioning the existing democracy and liberalism, which impassioned and renewed the public's interest in justice and equality. For many, behaviouralism was a form of 'revolution' against descriptive, philosophical or descriptive methodologies and aimed at replacing these with precise, theory-based and pragmatic approach, so as to produce essential premises that were empirically testable. Proponents of this discipline did not treat their subject lightly and instead considered points of view, ideals and public opinion and emotion seriously. The results of the enquiry engendered by behaviouralism are until now considered as fundamental to our profound awareness of comparative politics. Thus, it could be said the that emergence and the gradual disappearance of behaviouralism benefited the study of political science as it not only made the field diverse in its treatment of the political life. Behaviouralism and the values it dearly held were instrumental to the rise of new concepts that challenged the norms of traditional politics during its golden era. Although the movement was evanescent, it also strove to uphold the principles promoted by political philosophy. Strauss himself claimed that 'political philosophy is a quest for universal understanding because it is a holistic knowledge. Based on these facts, the behaviouralists have merely done the same: search for the truth and universal understanding through the utilisation of scientific knowledge. In fact the truth that the behaviouralists sought for had more universal implications as only principles, ideas and conceptions, which manifest 'scientific' essentials, can be applied holistically. Nevertheless, behaviouralists had also discovered that truth is elusive most of the time - but however intangible truth could be, behaviouralism strove to glean even a small fragment of it during its peak These fragments of truth, until today, exist and refuse to fade away. BIBLIOGRAPHY Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics, Its Origins and Conditions, California University Press, Berkeley, CA., 1959 p. 156 Christian Bay, Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature, The American Political Science Review, 1965 David Easton, Introduction: The Current Meaning of "Behavioralism" in Political Science, in James S. Charlesworth (ed.), The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science. The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, 1962 David Easton, The Political System. An Inquiry into the State of Political Science. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1953 David Truman, The Implications of Political Behavior Research, 1951 Dwight Waldo, Political Science in the United States of America. UNESCO, Paris, 1956 Dwight Waldo, Political Science, Tradition, Discipline, Profession, Science, Enterprise, in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, vol. 1. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1975 Gabriel A. Almond, Political Theory and Political Science, The American Political Science, 1966 Heinz Eulau, Political Behavior, in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 12, The Free Press, New York, 1968 p. Leo Strauss, "What is Political Philosophy", The Journal of Politics 19(3), 1957 Michael A. Baer, Malcolm E. Jewell and Lee Sigelman, Political Science in America. Oral Histories of a Discipline. The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1991 Quentin Skinner, "The Empirical Theorists of Democracy and their Critics: A Plague on Both their Houses", Political Theory 1 (3), 1973 Raymond Seidelman (with the assistance of Edward J. Harpham), Disenchanted Realists. Political Science and the American Crisis, 1884-1984. State University of New York Press, Albany, 1985 p. Robert A. Dahl, The Behavioral Approach in Political Science, Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest, The American Political Science Review (1961) p. Read More