Was the Soviet Union In Decline when Gorbachev Came to Power - Essay Example

Was the Soviet Union 'In Decline when Gorbachev came to power of the Subject Name of the Concerned Professor March 12, 2009 Was the Soviet Union 'In Decline' when Gorbachev came to Power The decline of the Soviet Union in the early 90s has definitely ushered in a dilemma into the realm of historical understanding. Should the decline of Soviet Union ought to be interpreted as a direct outcome of the military dominance ushered in by the Regan administration or were the reasons for Soviet demise embedded deep into the political, economic and cultural framework of this ex-superpower Understanding the decline of Soviet Union poses some utterly tough challenges to the contemporary historians. It will be really myopic to understand the Soviet decline in a narrow perspective of the Cold War era, when in fact their existed a plethora of other credible reasons like a trend towards the democratization of the global politics and an exponential growth of the capitalistic economies at that time (Dukes, 1993). By the late 80s, if the cold war was becoming a major limitation for the Soviet Union, the US administration was also getting cognizant of the constraints being posed by that icy conflict. Thus a thorough understanding of the decline of the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era raises many hitherto unexpected issues (Dukes, 1993). Therefore the onus for the decline of the Soviet Union both before and after Gorbachev needs to be interpreted in the context of the socio-economic, political and cultural changes that defined the Soviet Union in 1991. Communism was as much an economic and social doctrine as a political strategy. It is really surprising to note that the Bolsheviks primarily came to power by riding on a band wagon of simple economic promises that is the extension of food, clothing and shelter to the suffering masses (Sviderskii, 1930). Hence the demise of the Soviet Union was as much a failure of the Communist economic model, as a victory of the Western democratic and capitalist ideals. The Gorbachev era was the culmination of a long history of disastrous economic policies pursued by the successive soviet regimes over the decades. So the decline of the Soviet Union when Gorbachev came to power needs to be understood in the subaltern context of the failure of the Soviet state to provide the basic means of sustenance to the masses. Food definitely constitutes an important aspect of this state failure on the part of the communist regime. In the late 20s, the Soviet regime went ahead with a positive note in the sense that it supported the idea of allowing for private agriculture and the free market economy pertaining to food grains, while retaining the Communist Party's hold over the basic market frameworks (Sviderskii, 1930). However, the agents of doom were let lose when Stalin decided in favour of the state control over agriculture and the production and the management of food stocks (Gaider, 2007). Stalin chose to do so despite the cautions extended by many of his trusted comrades like Bukharin and Rykov (Gaider, 2007). The pursuance of this food policy between 1920 and 1950 resulted in a sharp decline in the Soviet agricultural production, despite the fact that it had access to some of the largest farming tracts in the world (Desai, 1986). In fact Nikita Khrushchev wrote a letter delivered to many of his friends, mentioning that, "In the last fifteen years we have not increased the collection of grain. Meanwhile we are experiencing a radical increase of urban population. How can we resolve this problem (Gaider, 2007)" At some time in the 50s, the Soviet planners alarmed by this scarcity, put their heads together to grapple with this pressing issue and several options were suggested by them. The decision was made in the favour of the pursuance of a two pronged policy that involved the exploitation of the fallow land in the southern Russia and resorting to the Soviet planning system that was highly centralized in its perspective (Desai, 1986). This strategy delivered temporary results in the sense that Soviet Union somehow managed to stretch its food production till the 6os. However, the continuously increasing population and the shortage of the arable land were soon to eclipse over this production boom. In fact in the early 60s, the then Communist regime dispatched a communiqu to its Eastern European appendages, expressing the Soviet Unions inability to extend food assistance to them (Desai, 1986). The things deteriorated to the extent that the Soviet Union had to procure 12 million tons of food grains from the world markets and that too at the cost of depleting one third of its gold reserves (Desai, 1986). Hence, the Soviet Russia that till now happened to be the largest producer of food grains after the First World War ended up being the biggest importer of food grains. This in fact was paving the way for the demise of the Union. The burgeoning urban population that happened to be the primary instrument of dissent in the coming future was constantly being enervated and provoked by the debilitating food scarcity (Dunlop, 1994). Besides, the allied powers could read the writing on the wall and carried on with their endeavours, firm in their belief that the end of the Soviet Union was not too far (Dunlop, 1994). Gorbachev acknowledged this Soviet despondency in one of the meetings of the Communist part where he said that, "We are buying (the grain) because we cannot survive without it (Gaider, 2007)". Above this, the industrialization ushered in by the Communists was churning out goods for which their existed no buyers in the world market. Hence when Gorbachev came to power, Soviet Union was facing not only an acute shortage of food, but was also primarily exporting raw materials instead of the finished products (Sakwa, 1991). Even before Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union had realized that their existed very negligible market for the industrial machinery and the hardware produced by it (Sakwa, 1991). Thus the entire Soviet economy was predominantly dependent on the earnings yielded by the sale of its raw materials like the oil and gas. In fact the new oil fields discovered at Siberia temporarily managed to rescue the ailing Soviet economy, facing acute food shortages (Gaider, 2007). Right in the early 70s, the Soviet regime started over exploiting its oil reserves at Siberia despite the contrary suggestions extended by the nation's petroleum experts. However, the sense of desperation and despondency ushered in by the acute food shortages and the burdensome obligation of supporting and sustaining the penny less and corrupt Soviet block forced the Soviet's to carry on with their suicidal policies. However, in the coming years, the Soviet's discovered that it was no more feasible to further exploit its Siberian oil reserves, considering the fact that any such initiative required massive investments and it was simply not possible for then regime to muster such funds. The other problem with Moscow's increased dependence on oil was that oil was a highly unreliable commodity for an economy to be based on it, as it was susceptible to volatile price fluctuations in the international markets. Still, despite retaining a commensurate military might, the Soviet Union started losing its hold on the dissident elements within its territories and in the Eastern Europe, that were bent on channelizing the deep rooted economic frustration of the masses against the Soviet's. In the mean time, the Soviet Union committed the blunder of waging a war in Afghanistan in the 70s, on which it had to spend at least $ 20 billion annually (Hauner, 1991). The financially bleeding Soviet Union tried its best to survive. Several ideas were delved upon by the regime. One of the plausible options was of dissolving the unwieldy Eastern Block and to spend the savings on resuscitating the Soviet economy. However, this would have meant a tremendous loss of face (Hauner, 1991). Thus the Soviet show boy, the Eastern Bloc ended up being a mill stone around the Soviet neck, for which it had to pay through its nose. Another possible option was to cut down on the food imports, but this would have further fomented the public disgust and alienation and would have strengthened the dissident voices. Maintaining its military capability had become a costly obligation for the Soviet's and some of the elements within the regime suggested the reduction of expenditure on arms and armaments. However, the defence industry provided employment to a large section of the Soviet population and any cost cuts or closures would have rendered a large section of the Soviet population literally jobless. The crux of this argument is that by the time Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet regime had totally depleted all the indigenous sources of finance and the only way out was to look outside for sustenance and survival (Sakwa, 1991). These developments had already bolstered the hopes of the Western powers, who quadrupled their efforts to crush the Soviet regime. It did not require much, but to give the moral and media support to the disgruntled elements in the Russia and the Eastern Block. In the late 80s, the Soviet Union was desperately clamouring for funds from the international consortiums (Sakwa, 1991). Negotiating with the Western powers was becoming more of an unavoidable necessity rather then being a tactical prerogative. By the time Gorbachev came to power, the reality had dawned on the Soviet's that it was imperative to extend strategic and political concessions to the West in exchange for a solid financial support. The Soviet regime was caught in a dilemma. If it resorted to the use of force to suppress its disgruntled elements, this would have meant the loss of much needed funds promised by the West. In fact, there existed a situation of chaos and the top leadership was totally helpless and clueless as to how to put a stop to the impending Soviet Dissolution. The pre Gorbachev Russia presented an ideal situation for a political and ideological crash. The massive food shortages and inflation rampant throughout the country were simply disillusioning the workers, peasants and the influential urban population. The regime did not know how to regain the confidence and trust of the masses. The oil reserves were depleting and called for massive investments for which their existed no funds. The war in Afghanistan was bent upon bleeding the Soviet empire to death. The Eastern bloc was opening up to the ideas from the West, courtesy its geographical and ideological vicinity. The option of the use of force against the uprising masses was being constrained by the increasing dependence on the West. The counter elements were getting bolder, sensing the weakness of the Soviet regime before its internal problems and the outside influences and pressures. The populations residing in the varied constituents of the Soviet Union were fast leaning towards the sentiments of staunch nationalism and openly called for freedom. Even the nationalist elements within Russia were gaining ground. The onus of maintaining its illustrious military might was becoming an unwieldy burden for Russia. Definitely the stage was set for the crash of the Soviet Union; much before Gorbachev came to power and all that was left for him to do was to preside over the crumbling of the Soviet state. All the issues and events discussed further in this paper are a mere elaboration of the off shots let lose by an obstinate ideological, political, tactical and economical management of a great nation, carried on recklessly for decades. The decline of the Soviet Union was planned by nobody, but the limitations and the lacunas inherent in the ideology and managerial philosophy of the Soviet administrators and politicians. The crash of this system of political authority was destined to doom from its very start as it was totally noncommittal to the aspirations of the free market economy, human rights, political pluralism and world peace. Gorbachev tried his best to rework the framework of the Soviet Union in consonance with the Western ideals, which already enjoyed a massive mass support. The March referendum once and for all cleared the direction which the political and demographic future of the Soviet Union was going to take. While a considerable number of constituent republics abstained from this referendum, a thumping majority of the Russians voted in the favour of a more open, tolerant and democratic Russia (Seigelbaum, 2009). Off course, this was bound to happen, but not under the tutelage of the emaciated Communist Party. The August coup symbolized a last bid on the part of the conservative elements within the Communist party, to turn back the clock. However, the predominant public resistance left the plotters virtually paralyzed and the very attempt to revive communism in Russia ended up becoming the ultimate instrument of dissolution of the Communist party (Seigelbaum, 2009). The disillusionment of the masses with the communist regime could be gauged by the fact that the army personnel and the special KGB units deployed by the state, blatantly refused to fire on the defenceless masses. Also this coup saw the rising of a new and powerful player in the Russian politics that is Boris Elstin, who was to dominate the Russian political arena for quiet a few years. In 1991, the three Baltic republics that are Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia declared their severance from the Soviet Union and established themselves as independent and sovereign states. This step was not only a rupturing of the nationalist sentiments boiling within the masses since the Russian takeover of these republics, but also was an outcome of the Russian imposed economic and cultural policies, which the people were no more willing to bear with (Stephen, 2004). The secession of these republics was also an indication of their increasing affiliation with the Western ideals of democracy and the free market economy. Gorbachev regime, by now extremely cornered and limited in its scope could only resort to the innocuous tactics of imposing sanctions and unleashing sporadic incidents of state violence. The signing of the Minsk Agreement in December 1991 proved to be the last nail in the coffin of the Soviet Union and declared USSR to be a non entity and a nonexistent element in the realm of international affairs. This agreement also laid the foundations of the Commonwealth of Independent States whose policies were more in consonance with the democratic and capitalist ideals. Finally, on 25 December, 1991, which is on the Christmas Eve, Gorbachev resigned as the president of the Soviet Union. Thus there is no denying the fact that the Soviet Union was in decline when Gorbachev came to power. Had it been left to him, he would have certainly preferred a slow and gradual reframing and realignment of the Soviet Union, which could have slowly converged towards a more democratic setup. However, this was not to be. Still Gorbachev can not be denied the credit of being just the right person in the right place at the right time. Though he may have seemed powerless and helpless in the heat of the moment, the essence of his personality was certainly suitable to allow the events to unfold themselves at that particular phase of the world history. In fact the decline and the dissolution of the Soviet Union was too large an event to be wholly grasped and dictated by one single person, even if he happened to be Gorbachev. Total Words: 2,530 Works Cited Desai, P. (1986). Marxism, Central Planning and the Soviet Union. Cambridge: The MIT Press Dukes, Paul. (1993). From Soviet to Russian History. History Today , Vol. 43: 35-44. Dunlop, J.B. (1994). The rise of Russia and the fall of the Russian Empire. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gaider, Yegor. (2007). The Soviet Collapse: Grain and Oil. American Enterprise Institute of Public Policy Research. Retrieved March 12, 2009, from http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070419_Gaidar.pdf Hauner, Milan. (1991). The Soviet War in Afghanistan. New York: University Press of America. Sakwa, Richard. (1991). Gorbachev and his Reforms. New York: Prentice Hall. Seigelbaum, Lewis. (2009). 1991: March Referendum. Retrieved March 12, 2009, from Seventeen Movements in Soviet History database. Seigelbaum, Lewis. (2009). 1991: The August Coup. Retrieved March 12, 2009, from Seventeen Movements in Soviet History database. Stephen, E.H. (2004). Reform and Revolution in the Late Soviet Context. Slavic Review. 63(3): 527-534. Sviderskii, A. (1930). The food policy of the Soviet government. Moscow: All Russia Central Council of Trade Unions. Read More