Gorbachevs New Foreign Policy - Term Paper Example

Gobachev’s ‘New Foreign Policy’ Mikhail Gorbachevs ‘New Thinking’ was not just a catchphrase for a new foreign policy built upon traditional Russian ideologies. The revolutionary concept began during the decline of the Soviet Union in the 1980’s. It was based on the idea that there can be a relationship between national and internal security and that military power is not the only method to provide a secure national defense. The transformation in foreign policy thinking profoundly impacted policy making and was based on the realization that the real security threat to Russia came from the deteriorating economy due to excessive military spending. Rather than applying the overt exhibition of military power, Gorbachev chose to apply political influence. The ‘New Thinking’ aided the Soviet Union in garnering wide approval of many nations. Its peace-making policy that released Soviet control over Eastern Europe ultimately led to the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War. Its success would entail radical changes not only in the way the economy functions, but in social and cultural policy, in Soviet political life, and ultimately, in the way in which the Soviet Union deals with the larger international community. By-products of the ‘New Thinking,’ perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) initiated far-reaching governmental policy changes that affected virtually every aspect of Soviet life. These new concepts were a distant departure from previous Soviet practices. Gorbachev’s foreign policy approach was a direct result of domestic concerns. Gorbachev viewed economic and political restructuring as not simply the basis of domestic revitalization, it was essential to sustain the Soviet Union’s position as an international power. Gorbachev described the connection between his domestic and foreign policy programs. “The success of efforts at internal reform will determine whether or not the Soviet Union will enter the twenty-first century in a manner worthy of a great power.” (Juviler, 1988 p.1) New Soviet government leaders, led by Gorbachev, introduced radical changes to the Soviet system. He initiated perestroika, a series of economic reforms meant to eliminate ineffective administrative structures without fundamentally altering the state-run economy. Politically, Gorbachev introduced glasnost so as to decrease the control of the state and Communist Party interests, the obstacles to economic reform. Political reform was successful but also initiated opposition that ultimately led to Gorbachev’s political demise. New foreign policy thinking was created and implemented to support the pressing needs for economic reform and internal political reforms. These reforms reunited Germany and earned Gorbachev a good deal of popularity throughout the world, more so than in Russia. It also earned him the Nobel Peace prize and an honored position in history. Characteristic of Soviet ideologies from the past, the primary attention of its new leadership was on the domestic issues – first, on economic and social circumstances, then on political and cultural affairs – all ahead of foreign interactions. “By comparison with the ambitious plans for domestic restructuring and the discussion of other changes, from multiple candidate elections to a comprehensive price reform, the sphere of Soviet foreign policy appeared, at first sight, to have been relatively neglected and seemed to have been altered more in form and appearance than in substance.” (Juviler, 1988 p.97) The Russian Republic had possessed the authority to administrate foreign policy since the 1936 Soviet constitution was amended in 1944 but little was developed on this front until the 1980’s. New thinking emerged from the failings of the Soviet government leading up to this period. In 1956, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev revealed Joseph Stalin’s crimes against his own people which began to inspire the younger leaders within the Communist Party to consider alternative thoughts regarding socialism. Khrushchev moved toward a conception of common interests in an effort to avoid global nuclear war following the Cuban missile crisis. He was subsequently removed from office in 1964 because this open foreign policy concept was perceived as showing weakness by those of conservative leanings who were in the majority. The younger members of the Soviet leadership, however, embraced this new, more open design of foreign policy. The transformation from old regime ideologies to the new continued into the next decade. “In the 1970s, younger Soviet scholars advancing through the ranks began to link up with transnational networks of scientists in the United States and Europe who supported arms control and confrontation reduction.” (Wallander, 2002 p. 118) The continuation of foreign policy ideals of this younger group and its exposure to new concepts of arms control and security cooperation from outside the Soviet Union was a necessary circumstance for new thinking. The establishment of the Soviet leadership did slowly begin to understand the limitations of current political philosophies and began to change the system themselves by constructing alternative concepts. The younger group no longer had the obstacle of those who insisted to clinging to the old regime. “The new thinkers had their ideas, but they also had the powerful backing of political leaders.” (Wallander, 2002 p. 118) New thinking was based on propositions that inverted Leninist theories of foreign policy. First, new thinking rejected the view that capitalist and socialist states were mutually exclusive and that the existence of one meant a primary threat to the security and interests of the other. New thinkers maintained that common human interests, particularly in the avoidance of nuclear war were more urgent than state interests and challenged the idea that military equivalence was necessary for security. “Gorbachev disavowed the Brezhnev Doctrine, which justified Soviet imposition of socialism in Eastern Europe, in favor of ‘freedom of choice’ in his December 1988 speech to the United Nations.” (Wallander, 2002 p. 119) New thinkers, who feared the terrible consequences of nuclear war, worked to reverse the presumption that the purpose of military power was to defeat Soviet opponents. They argued that the purpose of military policy is to prevent war, not to pursue it. Gorbachev agreed to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987 which eliminated a mass of nuclear weaponry and in 1988, cut Soviet forces in Eastern Europe by a half-million. The Soviet Union withdrew its army from Afghanistan in 1989 and did not interfere as reformist governments in Hungary and Poland allowed East Germans to pass through their countries while escaping to the West. The Berlin Wall fell during Gorbachev’s presidency and “in 1990, the Soviet Union and the West negotiated not only German reunification, but also the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and a new Charter of Europe, declaring an end to division of the continent.” (Wallander, 2002 p. 120) The Cold War was rendered effectively non-existent by 1990 because of Gorbachev’s policies based on the concepts of new thinking. Soviet relations with Europe improved dramatically during the Gorbachev era, mainly because of the INF Treaty and the collapse of communist domination in Eastern Europe during 1989-90. In 1990, Gorbachev and West German chancellor Helmut Kohl worked out an agreement by which the Soviet Union consented to a unified Germany within NATO. By the June 1990 Washington summit, “the United States-Soviet relationship had improved to such an extent that Gorbachev characterized it as almost a ‘partnership’ between the two countries.” (Curtis, 1996) Gorbachevs new thinking initiatives were seen by the entire world as revolutionary in terms of freedom and democracy in all of Eastern Europe as evidenced by the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to him in 1990. The economic policies during his tenure, however steadily brought the country to a catastrophic situation. The coup of 1991 that removed him from office, for three days, had little to do with the economy though. Members of the older, more conservative wing of the government were against the signing of a new union treaty that would unify the republics into a democratic nation. This ‘old thinking’ would not be sustained even after Gorbachev’s resignation in 1991. The Soviet Union dissolved at this time but ‘new thinking’ persisted. President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev plainly indicated that Russia had common interests and could benefit from political ties to the West. Kozyrev even appealed for integration and collaboration with Europe and the U.S. and characterised Russia’s interests with the ‘civilized’ world; quite a distant perspective from recent Soviet foreign political rhetoric. Yeltsin’s government emphasized cooperation with the West for reasons that were not based on security as much as it was the integration of Russia into the world’s economy. These associations would also bring direct financial support. (Gretsky, 1997) New thinking was never formed into policy. The concept is simple and nothing more than just that, a concept. The political leaders who introduced new thinking were philosophical intellectuals, not necessarily knowledgeable in foreign policy. An influential faction of the Russian leadership has a strong interest to limit the military power of the United States thus building up theirs. The Russian military is not the power of politics within the leadership that it once was which caused conflicts within the structuring of foreign policies. “In contrast to nationalists and communists, the new thinkers did not assume that Russian national interests must conflict with those of Western countries. They were concerned that, unless Russia clearly defined its interests, the country would not be able to engage cooperatively on security, a policy priority they continued to advocate.” (Wallander, 2002 p. 122). Russia had shed Soviet foreign policy ideologies but its economy continued its crash. Many hard-line leaders argued abandoning old regime policies and adopting new Western ideals had brought economic misery to the country. “The backlash was felt as early as December 1993 when nationalists and Communists won a substantial plurality in Russia’s legislative elections. Aleksei Pushkov, an influential journalist close to the new thinkers, declared, ‘The honeymoon is over.’” (Wallander, 2002 p. 122). The ideas of the new thinkers were widely discredited in the mid-1990’s but interdependence and non-military security still remained a prominent theme for Russian political leaders. The new thinkers of the 1980’s and 90’s have little use in today’s Russian political machine although their concepts live on in a limited capacity. Still, this is a far-reaching progression from the old Soviet isolationist attitudes. A few of the new thinkers were top members of the political leadership. Today, they are not as influential in the same way, as they were in Gorbachev’s era. Their opinions regarding political, economic, and social interests continue to compete for influence in Russia’s turbulent political reality. Gorbachevs foreign policy won him much praise and admiration. For his efforts to reduce superpower tensions around the world, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. Soon thereafter, he was demonized and denounced by the vast majority of the Russian populous for failed economic measures. The answer to why new thinking entered the Russian ideological mainstream at all lies in the fact that radical political circumstance often inspires radical political changes. The change the Soviet Union went through in the short period from 1985 to 1991 was certainly radical by any description. Rarely has the leadership of any civilization under the duress of the failures of its system attempted such a far-reaching concept as new thinking. The concept of new thinking started a process of thought that promises to be forever sustained in Russia, at least in some form, for the foreseeable future. Bibliography Curtis, G. (Ed.). July 1996. Russia: A Country Study [online]. Washington D.C.: Library of Congress. < http://www.country-data.com/frd/cs/rutoc.html#ru0050> (Accessed April 23, 2009) Gretsky, S. 1997. Russia’s Policy Toward Central Asia. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [online]. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center. (Accessed April 23, 2009) Juviler, P. & Kimura, H. 1988. Gorbachev’s Reforms: U.S. and Japanese Assessments. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Wallander, C. Winter 2002. Lost and Found: Gorbechev’s New Thinking. The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 25, I. 1, pp. 117-129. Read More