Russian and Iraqi Relations - Essay Example

RUNNING HEAD: RUSSIAN/IRAQI RELATIONS Russian and Iraqi Relations School The Russian/Iraqi Relations With the fall of the USSR the entire region found itself in a state of metamorphosis and realignment. Russian interests in the Middle East were not slackened by the dissolution of the USSR. As new nations emerged and new alliances were formed Russia sought to develop and maintain strong ties within the Middle East. Iran appeared to be ripe for development of such a relationship. After years of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran was deeply in need of arms. Gorbachev during his last year in office was able to finalize several major munitions deals with Iran. Both countries benefited. Russia needed cold hard cash and Iran needed replacement arms. Munition sales were estimated at $1 billion in sales and 1992 registering even greater amounts. Russia was experiencing extreme pressure from the US to stop the sales and Russia did, to an extent, delay delivery of munitions. However, Russia stated that they viewed Iran as a friendly neighbour and needed to look after their own interests. Russia publicly agreed that they did not want to sanction any arms build up in the Middle East but the country was sure such was not the case in Iran. Tensions in Moscow began to rise as Iran began to interject itself into Azerbaijan shortly followed by visits to nine other states in the region. Regardless of this Russia signed a major deal to assist in the development of the Iran nuclear program. Relations continued to deteriorate and Russia, at this point, determined that it would honour its open arms contracts with Iran but would not enter into new contracts. However, contention remained between the US and Russia over the Russian involvement in the Iranian Nuclear Program. Moscow continually asserted that they were not supplying missile technology; however, despite Russia's unwillingness to assist with their missile project in July of 1998 Iran successfully test fired their first missile with the assistance of Pakistan, North Korea and China. Tensions of the nuclear program continued to grow and the strain began to be felt more and more on US/Russian relations. Another area of concern in the Mid East for the US was the possible resumption of relations between Iraq and Russia. The sanctions placed against Iraq were closely followed by the economic loss felt by Russia while bowing to western pressure. Russia held over $10 billion dollars of Iraqi debt which Iraq was at current unable to repay. Still Russia was eager to build solid relations in the Mid East region. As the author states Russia's motivation to build relations in the Arab world were to: "ensure Russia's national security; Prevent the spread of political and military fires in the Middle East to the increasingly unstable regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia; and make use of the potential in the Arab states t help solve Russia's economic problems." Russia did make headway in 1993 when it signed an agreement with Kuwait offering military cooperation which later led to $750 million in arms sales followed by UAE sales reported to be near $3 billion. However, arms sales were disappointing to the Russians in the Gulf area and they desperately needed hard cash. In April of 1993 the Russian parliament speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov sent an emissary to Iraq in an attempt to renew the relations the two countries has shared prior to the invasion of Kuwait. In secret meetings Iraq sought Russia's help in getting UN sanctions against the country removed. In exchange for the request to gradually lift the sanctions Iraq was to publicly assert the sovereignty of Kuwait. In the midst of these negotiations Iraq, much to the embarrassment of the Russians, sent its troops to the Kuwait border. However, maintaining their presence the Russian's continued to champion Iraq's cause by offering to oversee compliance by Iraq during the six month lifting of sanctions and again asserted that Iraq was prepared to acknowledge the sovereignty of Kuwait. The west, however, unconditionally rejected the terms and Russia once again was sent scrambling in an attempt to keep their relations with Iraq alive. The lifting of UN sanctions seemed doomed for failure when Iraq once again aggravated the west by sending troops into Kurdish northern Iraq. With Russian diplomats in Baghdad trying to arrange for the withdrawal of troops the United States launched an air attack on the Iraq. This was perhaps the low point of US/Russian relations with Russia hotly decrying the US Response. Washington retorted that it was surprised Russia had not yet learned that Iraq did not respond to diplomacy but only to threat. Iraq continued its pressure on Russia for assistance in lifting of sanctions. Russia continued in this capacity drawn in by the promise of being a "major foreign beneficiary" when sanctions lifted. Hussein again brought sanctions to the forefront when in 1997 he expelled the American members of the UN Weapons of Mass Destruction Inspection team. In response the US stepped up its presence in the Gulf and it appeared that a showdown between Iraq and the US was not in the too distant future. With midnight finagling Russia managed to avert disaster and Iraq agreed to readmit the UN inspectors and the announcement was made in Geneva. A main area of consternation continued, Iraq still refused access to what it termed 'presidential' sites and tensions again rose as Britain and the US launched strikes in Iraq. Iraqi calls for removal of the sanctions continued and finally the United Nations Security Council considered lifting bans of items such as civilian clothing while maintaining bans on military and dual use items. Ironically, the only member of the council who threatened to veto this measure was Russia. The renewed relations between Russia and Iraq, however, were not to be. As Iraq continued with its flagrant disregard for worldwide compliance tensions between the west and Iraq continued to grow, leading, of course to the US invasion. Russia still hoped to salvage some of its economic losses sustained during the years of UN sanctions. In 2004 however a wave of kidnappings in Iraq led Russia to order all its citizens out of the country. Although Russia made strong sustained attempts to champion the Iraqi cause it was not done out of a sense of duty or allegiance to Iraq. The truth was that Russia had been seriously hurt when sanction had begun to be imposed against Iraq. They had been major trade partners and quite frankly had suffered severe financial losses they were attempting to recoup, at least in part. The Russian position on Iraq was simply thatthey needed cold hard cash with which to infuse the Russian coffers and Iraq offered the promise of such. Nothing morenothing less. According to Belkin the Russian response to veto the UN resolution to declare war on Iraq was unexpected. Russia had used its relationship with Iraq to put pressure on the country to agree to weapons inspections at the risk of forced compliance for not agreeing to the inspections. The United States had felt confident that although not happy with the US proposed entrance into Iraq, Russia would in the end acquiesce and support UN Security Council Resolution 1441. Although Russia was not eager for the US to enter into war with Iraq, in response to the mounting tensions and its shared view of the 'war on terror' with the US, Russia began to take a much tougher stance with Iraq making it quite clear that their newly developing diplomatic relationship with the US was more important to them than their relationship with Iraq. The crisis mounted as it became aware that Russia would veto any UN sanctioned attack on Iraq by the US. Although the US and Russia had spent the several years since the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Towers building a mutually beneficial relation with a common goal of fighting terror, many within Russia felt that the US interest in Iraq was not terrorism related. Rather, many believed that the purported weapons of mass destruction held by Iraq was merely a ploy used by the US to gain legitimacy for their entry into the country to seize control of the petroleum markets of the country which would further its political and economic power base in the Middle East and strengthen its hold globally. Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, was the first political figure to openly speak out against the US aggression in Iraq. Many felt that he was the foil for Putin in announcing Russia's displeasure both domestically and to the international audience. Then on February 21, 2003 President Putin broke his public silence. Although he did not openly and overtly speaking out directly against the US war in Iraq he stated that "'strong, well-armed national armies are sometimes used not to fight this evil [international terrorism] but to expand the areas of strategic influence of individual states." There was much debate as to why Putin, after nurturing this new US/Russian alliance, suddenly broke from his previous pubic silence to speak out. Belkin reported that policy analysts identified several causes for the break. First was the domestic outcry in Russia. US sentiment in Russia had been falling dramatically prior to the invasion of Iraq. The invasion which the Russian people decried as illegitimate as it lacked UN backing further spawned this US antagonism. As early as 2001 the Russian people began to show growing displeasure with the US backed war on terror. As Belkin reported from a 2001 500 person survey conducted within Moscow: a total of 42.4 per cent approved of the US military efforts in Afghanistan, while 49.4 per cent disapproved of them; at least 32 per cent feared that the conflict would grow further and spill into other countries, including Russia. An overwhelming 60 per cent of the respondents believed that the US military action posed a threat to Russia, while 36.3 per cent of those polled opposed that opinion. More than half, 57 per cent, said that Russia must fully cooperate with the US, except in committing forces to action. At least 24.7 per cent advocated the position of a standby observer, while 11.3 per cent wanted Russia to denounce the US and demand a termination of the action The second reason for the Putin publicly spoken displeasure with the US invasion of Iraq was according to Belkin "the Islamic factor." 18% of the Russian population is Muslim. The Russian government feared that the war in Iraq followed by a long period of occupation could fuel internal strife and upheaval within the Russian Muslim community. The next reason was Putin's general belief in the UN and its protocol of international law. Simply put Putin did not believe the US should have entered Iraq because it was not UN sanctioned. The least publicized reason for Putin's public disagreement rested in the French and German position on the war. Putin believed that both countries would make a greater public outcry to the US invasion when in fact both countries it appeared were using the situation more to strengthen their on domestic positioning. Lastly, Putin's public outcry was reported to be with his holdover mindset of a security service officer still harbouring distrust for the US in some respects. Obviously during this timeframe he was receiving briefings from his former intelligence counterparts who kept him apprised of international press reports of the US's 'true' motivations. All the above contributed to Putin's refusal to directly answer press questions as to whether Russia would directly supply any military personnel at the Iraqi front. After all the controversy of the Iraqi situation many felt that the US/Russian relations would begin a greater downward spiral. However, on June 1, 2003 the two countries signed a joint statement. As Belkin stated this concerned "The New Strategic Relationship', reaffirming the two nations' partnership and commitment to meet together the challenges of the twenty-first century." In conclusion, Iraqi/Russian relations have had major upheavals within the last several decades. While trying to conform to the west and define their new place in the global world, Russia still remains somewhat tied to its old alliances and concepts. In the case of Iraq, Russia was somewhat mixed in their expectations. In many ways they expected Iraq to respond in a reasonable manner to many of the demands placed on it by the West and was continually embarrassed by the lack of attempt to meet compromise with compromise. The major tie to Iraq to which Russia clung was that of economics. They had been hurt badly the sanctions placed on Iraq as one of their leading trade partners. In addition to the curtailing of this cash inflow, Iraq had a sizeable debt to Russia it was unable to repay. Their attempt to negotiate the lifting of sanctions was purely economic in nature. It was not Iraq, per se. It could have been any country. Walking that fine balance between earning their place with the western powers while clinging to their old ties could have had serious detrimental effects on the country. This had to be well in the forefront of their minds and one wonders how much more the Russian's would have tolerated from the Iraqis. Read More