US foreign policy and Iraq - Essay Example

US FOREIGN POLICY IN IRAQ US Foreign Policy in Iraq Political Goals of Iraqi Government The essential political goals set by the Iraqi administration are concerning governance and reconciliation to the changed circumstances. Some of these goals are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. (Retrieved: UN Security Council 5463rd meeting on Iraq) The first and foremost aspect is to establish good and credible governance/administration. Major effort needs to be dovetailed to build national reconciliation through dialogues and consensus between all sectarian factions. The government should gradually take full possession of all national affairs including security. Another important task at hand would be to mend the socially and politically divided factions through dialogue and confidence building measures. This would require strengthening of all the democratic institutions of the country and uphold the rule of law. To gain confidence, it is imperative to improve infrastructure and living conditions of all Iraqis and put the country on a path of peace and security. Most importantly, there is requirement to firmly deal with the challenges of insurgency, crime, sectarian violence and foreign terror outfits inciting a civil war in the region. Also on the anvil is a critical review of anti-terror and de-Ba'athifiation legislation. Finally, to establish credibility and faith among all the sections of population, there was immediate need to set up a credible Human Rights Commission. Difficulties in Achieving These Goals While the aim of the democratically elected government is to bring back the country from its present quagmire to peace and security, these good intentions continue to be hampered due to adverse security conditions. The problem also lies in credible representation in governance. The present government is a representative form of government, but Sunni elements supported by external insurgents and terrorist organisations have considerable say in many regions, especially so in Baghdad, Ninewa, Salahuddin, Anbar, Diyala and Basra. Over 81% of attacks were reported in these provinces during past few years. The terrorist organisations still intimidate vulnerable sections of the society to participate in violent acts against civilians and security forces, attempt to create a civil war like condition, attack country's infrastructure and oil assets etc. Another problem area has been cooperation with multi-national (mainly US) forces, which have been likened by many as occupation forces rather than friendly forces. This aspect is also exploited by insurgents to incite civilian Iraqis to support their cause willingly or unwillingly. Other causes of serious concern remain the ever mounting loss of civilian lives, sense of uncertainty, high levels of sectarian violence and certain serious law and order situations. Implications of US Long Term Deployment or Early Withdrawal A recent US General Accountability Office report stated that the Iraqi government had failed to meet 11 of the 18 benchmarks established by the US regarding authorisation of troop surge recently. The Iraqi government had fully met only three of the legislative, security and economic benchmarks. (Easley, 2007) Only one legislative benchmark regarding rights of minority parties has been met, while only two benchmarks in area of security have been achieved. The government is yet to overcome militia control in certain regions; however there is reduced political interference in military operations, improvement in military capability to conduct independent operations and reduced political claims over military achievements. Economically, only partial implementation of utilisation of funds provided for infrastructural development has been achieved. While the report definitely falls short of expectations, there has been considerable progress in many areas which could not have been possible two years back. Thus, withdrawal of coalition forces at this stage would again reverse these positive developments undesirably. Perhaps, the need of the hour is to give a semblance of legitimacy to international military presence not as an occupation force led by US but as peace keeping or peace enforcing force with a UN mandate. Further, while some sources call democratic experiment as a gigantic failure due to US propped minority Shia government, there is little choice under the circumstances. Eventually, the US has to move away from supporting a particular regime and shift the attention from the central theatres. This would allow for better represented power sharing among all factions in the future. Further, many believe there is a civil war going on in Iraq and what are US forces doing there (Fearon 2007) However, once entered into a serious situation voluntarily and disrupted the whole country in the war against terror, leaving it in turmoil now can have serious implications not only for that country, but for the whole world. Thus, ensuring peace and stability in the region before leaving it remains US responsibility. Irrespective of US forces' decision, South Iraq will continue to be ravaged by civil war like situation. After a period of ethnic cleansing and fighting to draw lines, equilibrium with lower-level, more intermittent sectarian violence will set in, punctuated by larger campaigns financed and aided by foreign powers. (Fearon 2007) Under the circumstances, both the long term US deployment and early troop withdrawal is not likely to make much difference in ground situation. US Options Some of the viable options for the US are discussed in following paragraphs: The coalition could consider building up economically safer zones to carry out development programmes under direct control of Iraqi forces. Operations by coalition forces need to be strictly restricted to other areas, with a view to improving their reputation in civilian law abiding Iraqis and removing the tag of occupation forces, which no self respecting citizen can ever accept. Once Iraqis realise that the coalition forces are actually present for assisting them out of the present quagmire, they might actually come out openly against provocations and incitements from insurgent groups. As is the experience of most affected countries, insurgency cannot take roots without local support and there is no military solution to insurgency. Differences within insurgents must be exploited to the extent possible with support from Iraqi forces and operations should be conducted directly under outwardly visible control of Iraqi government. There is a need to separate moderate Sunni extremist factions from the clutches of international terrorist outfits through generous incentives and future government support in the form of participation, rehabilitation, employment etc. However, even if an increase in the number of U.S. combat troops reduces violence in Baghdad and so buys time for negotiations on power sharing in the current Iraqi government, there is no good reason to expect that subsequent reductions would not revive the violent power struggle. (Fearon, 2007) While this remains true, the need remains to establish effectiveness of Iraqi government and its security apparatus. As long as US props up a particular government, the leverage of US military would remain limited. Moving away from absolute commitment -- for example, by beginning to shift U.S. combat troops out of the central theatres -- would increase U.S. diplomatic and military leverage on all fronts. (Fearon, 2007) This would also improve chances for eventual power sharing in the government among warring factions through acceptable representation. The final aim should be to erect a credible Iraqi defence force and gradually hand over security role to them in both safe zones and dangerous regions through proper equipping. While in the foreseeable future, there is no likelihood of complete withdrawal of the coalition forces from the region, but there is no other alternative but to gradually handover operations and governance independently to Iraqi people. It can only be expected that present violence will continue, and peace shall take more time to come in Iraq. There is no military solution in Iraq and it is not America's war. The earlier we accept this and allow conflicts to settle down with external assistance; it is more likely then that a credible peace shall prevail. References Anthony H. Cordesman August 03 2005, U.S. options in Iraq. Retrieved on 13 Apr 08 from http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/1601. James D. Fearon. Mar/Apr 2007. Iraq's Civil War. Retrieved from http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070301faessay86201/james-d-fearon/iraq-s-civil-war.html. Jason Easley Sep 04, 2007. GAO Report: Iraqi Government Has Failed To Meet Most Benchmarks. Retrieved on 13 Apr 08 from http://www.bloggersnews.net/19931. Government Accountability Office Report: 2007 Retrieved on 13 Apr 08 from http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2007/images/09/04/gao.report.pdf. UN Security Council: 5463rd Meeting Report Retrieved on 13 Apr 08 from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8751.doc.ht. Read More