Prospects for Massive Democratic Reforms in China - Essay Example

According to the CIA fact book, 20% of the world's population live in the People's Republic of China It is also impressive in size as the world's fourth largest country, after Russia, Canada, and the United States.2 China also boasts the world's second largest economy, second only to the United States, although the average Chinese citizen is very poor.3 Chinese history is even more impressive. They have a rich and varied history that stretches back to 2000 BC. The Chinese are credited with everything from inventing gun powder to helping spur, with their spices and silks, the trade and exploration which resulted in the discovery of North and South America. What makes all of this even more amazing is how little the average westerner knows about the lives, economic, social, and political, of 1.6 billion people. Every now and again, we read in the news about how China offers a great vacation, we see a "Free Tibet" sticker on the back of a car, or we notice that our newest gadget or piece of clothing was made in China. If one reads the right newspapers, they might think that Communist China is on the verge of collapse and massive democratic reforms are just a few years away. Upon closer inspection, however, this is clearly not the case. This paper will argue that the prospects for massive democratic reforms in China are very poor. It will do this by arguing that there is very little internal economic or social impetus for political change and Chinese leaders are unlikely to be swayed by Western Nations into instituting democratic reforms. Despite the fact that the Communist Party in China will remain relatively stable into the foreseeable future, there are still many problems that the party needs to address if it is to maintain it's stronghold in China. One of the primary reasons why one may think that the Communist party is likely to become more democratic in the near future is the success of the economic reforms, which began in 1978. According to Tony Saich, the Chinese government did three very important things in 1978 which would allow for future the future growth of the economy and allow for greater interaction with the rest of the world. First, economic modernization was made central to all party work. Ideology and class struggle were down-played and policy-making became more pragmatic, summed up in the slogan 'practice is the sole criterion for testing truth' and corresponding policy line of 'correcting mistakes wherever they are discovered.' Second, despite the plenum's decision to forget about the past and concentrate on the future, the new 'practice' slogan was used both at the plenum and subsequently to reverse a whole series of previous political judgmentsThird, the plenum formed the source for a new policy direction that gradually increased the influence of market forces in the Chinese economy.4 Of course, the economic reforms were very complex and continue to evolve to this day, and include entry into the World Trade Organization. Whole books have been written about this single process, needless to say, the economic reforms have had a major impact. Author Andrew Walder writes that, China's post-Mao economic reforms have generated rapid and sustained economic growth, unprecedented rises in real income and living standards, and have transformed what was once one of the world's most insular economies into a major trading nation.5 In a speech to the Fourth International Investment Forum, Gregory Chow said Since economic reform started in China in 1978, there has been a remarkable growth in GDP, to the order of 9.5 percent per year on average. What accounts for this tremendous success To answer in one sentence, the Chinese government has adopted institutions and policies that enable the resourceful Chinese people and foreign friends to unleash their energy to develop the Chinese economy. The farmers became energetic and productive since the 1979. The township and village enterprises were the most dynamic element for growth in the 1980s and early 1990s. Many private and foreign enterprises flourished. By 1996, state enterprises accounted for only 28.5 percent of total gross industrial output value, while collective-owned, individual-owned, and other types (including foreign) of enterprises accounted for 39.4, 15.5 and 16.5 percent respectively (see China Statistical Yearbook 1997, p.411). The secret of success of China's economic reform is to allow the non-state sectors to develop in the setting of a market economy.6 Needless to say, it is apparent that the reforms have been very successful. According to the CIA World Fact Book, China has a relatively high unemployment rate, with about 20% of the country unemployed.7 This number is misleading, however. In urban areas, the unemployment rate is about 10% with rural people suffering more as a result of unemployment. However, the economic reforms are also addressing this problem through expanding the service sector. Again, the CIA World Fact Book reports that 29% of the population was employed in services. Saich marks that as a prime target for continuing economic expansion. He writes, One route for employment expansion is the services sector, which in China employs a low percentage of employees in comparison with other countries at a similar development level. Hu Angang estimated that allowing foreign investment into this sector could generate a boom of 40-50 million jobs.8 Indeed, China has many opportunities to expand employment, especially in the urban areas, which have been heavily favored by the party leaders in the economic reforms.9 Although the economy to a large extent has been opened up and benefited from policies that more closely mirror a capitalist structure, that should not be taken to mean that the Communist Party is given up control of the economy or is planning on massive democratic reforms in other areas. The party, through its connections to private industry in China is just as powerful now as it was before the reforms. Saich writes, The key problem is that ministries and enterprises often see reform as an invitation to develop monopolies that rely on political connections to ensure privileged access to funding. In addition, many of the larger, genuinely profitable companies are forced to take on smaller companies that would go bankrupt without such protection.10 Party corruption is a huge problem in China and many have linked the corruption to the incomplete economic reforms. Saich reports that in the March 2003 NPC meeting, leaders announced that over the previous 5 years, 207,103 cases of corruption were investigated of which 5,541 cases involved over 1 million yuan and 12,830 officers at the country level or above.11 Saich writes, It is estimated that during the 12-year rule of the former corrupt mayor and later party secretary of Bejing, over 18 billion yuan disappeared from municipal coffers. In 2000 it was discovered that a vice-chair of the NPC had pocketed over 40 million yuan and was found out only when he was recorded gambling in Macao, losing heavily, and not batting an eye over the loses. In a massive smuggling scandal in Xiamen, it is estimated that at least 80 billion yuan had gone missing. By the end of 2000, major cases that reached high in the party had also been unveiled in Shenyang, Shantou, and in the state power company.12 Indeed, all anecdotal evidence points to the idea that although economic gains may have eroded some of the central government's authority13, there are still very few people willing to take a meaningful stand against the party. Indeed, the party has many ways of insuring compliance. Lieberthal writes, "When these three conditions are met14, few local leaders are willing to cross their superiors, and the state is able to function in a very determined, forceful fashion."15 Although many aspects of the economy were democratized, the Communist Party in China still maintains strict control over the economy, both through actual law and policy and through the business connections, legitimate or not, party bosses have with private companies. Although some people look at the economic reforms in China as evidence that the party is giving up control, the fact of the matter is that the primary reason why China chose to liberalize it's markets is because economically stable countries with low unemployment rates and a relatively high standard of living are much less likely to revolt against their own government. There is unlikely to be any massive Democratic reforms on the horizon for China, as a result of this controlled liberalization of the markets in China, Another area where political unrest could force the Chinese government to adopt more democratic policies is the social situation. As the economic data, such as high unemployment, would indicate, there are several major social problems that should cause concern to the Communist Party Leaders. Saich points out that the economic reforms have had a negative impact on Chinese society; especially in that it severely exacerbated the economic and social tensions between the urban and rural population which has its roots in the Mao era.16 Saich writes that the Chinese government faces critical questions when it comes to social welfare, of who will receive it and how much they will receive. How will it be distributed Often times, the rural, who still benefit a great deal from social welfare, move into urban area, where their neighbors have no such benefit. On the other hand, economic development during Mao and since has heavily favored those in urban area, resulting in lower unemployment and a much higher standard of living for city-dwellers.17 President Hi and Premier Wen will have to deal with such inequities if they wish to project the image of serving the interests of the whole nation rather than of a small urban elite. Migrants and those who remain in the countryside need a clear indication from the central leadership as to whether citizenship, in terms of access to social welfare, will be extended to them through a gradual increase of access to social security and insurance schemes or whether they will be left to their own devices, private sector provision and family-based support.18 Besides the social disquiet caused by social welfare and the tensions between urban and rural populations, there are other signs that the Communist Party may be loosening its grip on the private lives of citizens. For example, more and more various social groups are banding together to challenge, usually meekly, the authority of the Communist Party in China. Lieberthal points to the growing number of religious groups in China as evidence of the party leaders backing off a little bit on their demands for complete and total loyalty. Lieberthal writes, The state no longer provides a moral compass for the population. Indeed, one of the striking features of contemporary Chinese Society is the growth of nonstate sources of moral authority and spiritual well-bing. There have, for example, been resurgences of Buddhism and Daoism. Almost all cities contain active temples as well as street vendors hawking spirit money, joss sticks, and other accoutrements necessary to appease the gods and improve one's fortunes. Some traditional secret societies have re-emerged and many local sects of various kinds have sprung up in the countryside.19 Lieberthal also points out that professional groups, sports clubs, and various non-profit/charity organizations have started forming throughout China. However, these groups, though not under the direct purview of the state, can still be disbanded by the state and state officials can play a major role in determining who will hold the top offices in any given private organization. 20 More recently, a major environmental/industrial accident in North Eastern China provoked dissent from the press directed at party leaders, a situation that is very rare as most of the time in China, journalists toe the party line.21 Another development that some may take as a signal that the party is losing its influence among the people is a rise in cynicism towards the party. Saich writes, Urban China is awash with the kinds of jokes, mockery, and cynicism that continue to erode the legitimacy of the party. When students at Beijing University talk of two factions, the ma pai and the tuo pai, they are not referring to the Merxist and Trotskyite factions of party hagiography but to those who play mah-jongg and those who want to pass the TOEFL test in order to go abroad. Even the singing of official, patriotic songs is used to mock the authorities.22 It would be a huge error to deduce from this anecdotal evidence that the Communist Party is anywhere near losing its control over the lives of citizens, although it does seem to be allowing its citizens more in the way of human rights. Lieberthal writes, Reforms have improved the human rights situation in China, almost regardless of which definition of human rights is applied. Average levels of consumption have improved dramatically, and citizens are much freer of political persecution and political violence then they were in the Maoist era.23 This improvement in conditions should not be confused with an improvement in the actual rights enjoyed by citizens. Just because the laws are not being enforced right now is no reason to believe that they will not be enforced again in the future. According to Lieberthal, China still has a large labor-camp and penal system where reports of torture and other kinds of mistreatment are very common. Furthermore, China reserves the right to send its citizens to the reeducation camps, holding citizens for up to three years without "trial or accusation, merely on the grounds that the citizen requires 'reeducation."24 The socio-political structure of China is also not conducive at all to dissent, in other words, even if there were widespread feelings among the people that more democratic reforms should be taken place, there are few places for the effort to take hold because the party regularly 'absorbs' these groups. Saich writes, There is no intention to make the party or the state apparatus genuinely accountable to the citizens of China. It is a tricky policy to follow and it has been impossible for party members to remain immune from the influence of different social groups and for the party organs to channel fully the activities of the new organizations that have sprung up in recent years. The tacit recognition by the party of the existence of other groups in society should not be interpreted as the emergence of a pluralist political system. It is an attempt to finesse self-regulated and autonomously defined political organizations by incorporating those groups the party leadership sees as important into the existing modified power structures and spaces. In this attempt at 'revolution from above' groups are 'created' by the party and state rather than being recognized.25 The fact that the party is allowing more freedom of expression and political dissent should not be a sign that they are going to allow dissent on a wide spread level, as would be evidenced by something like a more open election. There is some evidence that Communist leaders treat political dissent with the same patronizing disdain. For example, Kevin O'Brien, in his paper "Villagers, Elections, and Citizenship in Contemporary China" showed that growing signs of dissent in local politics is by no means a harbinger for increased citizen participation in government, Among notable instances of assertiveness, provincial assemblies have impeached a vice governor in Hunan, rejected Party-sponsered nominees for governor in Guizhou and Zhejiang, and elected a deputy-nominated chief judge over a Party-designated candidate in Jiangsu. It is wrong, however, to interpret this newfound feistiness as a sin of significant growth in citizenship rights. People's congresses have long been negligent in exercising their powers of appointment and recall, and a smattering of new-worthy examples does not mean that business as usual has changed. 26 If change in the role of the government in the lives of its citizens is going to be reformed or changed in any meaningful way, it will more likely take place over the course of many years and not in any sort of dramatic fashion. Because of the power structure in the Communist Party and the government of China with respect to the social situation, there is unlikely to be any massive democratic reforms. There are several groups whose enfranchisement could potentially have a great effect on the way that China is run. One of those is increased participation by women, the other group includes all those people who live in rural areas. The problems between urban and rural people have already been touched upon. The fact of the matter is that resentment runs both ways between the rural and the urban in China. This division dates back to Mao. Lieberthal points out that those people in urban areas had higher incomes and were at a lower risk of suffering the from the economic 'catastrophes' that occurred when Mao's plans didn't work out. Those in rural area and peasants, on the other hand, bore the brunt of the burdens of the economic system and had fewer social protections than city-dwellers.27 Studies cited in Governing China show that the net effect of the reforms in the rural areas has been to increase rural inequality in general and to exacerbate gender differences in rural income; and that urban/rural inequality even in 1988 remained very large and continued to be aggravated by state intervention in favor of urban residents. The survey provides less clear results concerning changes in regional distribution of household incomes28 Despite this there are several important ways in which farmers and peasants are beginning to assert some influence. O'Brien writes that in the countryside, some of the stirrings of political action are beginning to take place. He writes, Although the authorities still work hard to handpick nominees, many voters have apparently decided to take part in imperfect, semi competitive elections to punish corrupt leaders or promote political change. Private, informal campaigning is on the rise, and better educated, well-informed voters are less inclined to boycott elections as a means of showing displeasure with the candidates they are presented. Instead, they sometimes use elections to get rid of or humiliate leaders they don't like.29 Studies bear this out, showing that between 1995 and 1997, turnover in the village council averaged 19%.30 Furthermore, a nationwide survey showed that 17% of villagers had nominated someone to the village council.31 The village councils and other government apparatus in the countryside is a well-established part of the Communist Party in China and supported fully by Beijing. In fact, the response of the government to the enfranchisement of peasants and farmers in the rural areas indicates that it is pleased with the results.32 It is difficult to speculate, but perhaps the party feels that by allowing people to feel as if they have a voice in the policies that direct their lives, the villagers will be much more content with the Party and their place within it. Another group long disenfranchised by the Chinese government is women. From a historical perspective, the Confucism that had dominated Chinese society at the time of the revolution was oppressive towards women. One of the positive things about the revolution was that the status of women was raised substantially. New marriage laws were adopted that made divorce easier and instituted generous maternity leaves. More fundamentally, the collective structures created by the Maoist system significantly weakened the extended families, which had been bastions for male domination. In addition, employment practices that brought women into the labor force-where their wages were paid directly to them rather than to the male head of household-tended to increase the leverage women had in the family.33 However, there are still deep-seated discriminatory practices toward women, especially in rural area. If rural men have it bad, one can say that rural women have it even worse. Women in rural areas have a very difficult time moving from farm labor to more technical positions. According to Lieberthal, rural men have been much more able to earn non-farm income and even when women do get the opportunity to earn non-farm income they are compensated much less then men do.34 Similarly, anecdotal evidence indicates that managers of private companies do not want to hire women because of the high cost of government mandated benefits like child care and maternity leave. 35 From a political perspective, the situation is not much better for rural women. A study published in 1998 showed that only 3% of women in the Chinese countryside had attended a local party meeting recently. In contrast, 13% of men said the same thing.36 Similarly, twice as many men as women reported having contacted a delegate to the county people's congress, township people's congress, or a member of the village council (15% v. 32%). Although the status of women in both rural and urban settings seems to be increasing, it is an interesting quality of Chinese social life that more urban people have not come to the defense of the poor or that more men have not taken up the cause of women's rights. Lieberthal writes, Overall, one's sense in Chinese society as of 1994 is that wealth has become the key to status and that very few people feel the system is providing them with the wealth they deserve-or, more accurately, many feel that too many others are acquiring wealth they do not deserve. Empathy for other groups-like that the urbanites had for peasants at the end of the 1970's-is noticeably lacking. A niggardly mood prevails even in th midst of rapid economic growth. The absence of systematic survey data on these topics, however, makes all such observations highly impressionistic-and undoubtedly skewed to the views of the better-educated residents of coastal cities.37 This lack of empathy and solidarity, if true, could prove to be the primary reason why the Chinese government will not feel any noticible amount of internal political pressure anytime soon to institute massive democratic reforms. It seems as though the Chinese are at a place in their history where an "every-man-for-himself" attitude reigns. If there is even a feeling that democratic reforms should start, the Chinese people would have to set aside their differences and work together to face down a supremely powerful Chinese government. Depending upon the circumstances of any democratic revolution in China, the people of China are unlikely to find any help from the outside world until their victory is assured. Much has been made recently of the United States' decision to oust Saddam Hussein and try to install and democracy in Iraq. Trade embargoes, threats of war and other diplomatic means are commonly used against smaller, less powerful countries to bring their rogue leaders to heel. Such tactics to force the hand of leadership are unlikely to work in China. For one thing, it has already been mentioned that China has the world's second largest economy and is growing at 9% every year. With growth like that it is imaginable that sometime in the not so distant future, China will have the world's largest economy. Any doubt about what that means could be answered by a quick trip to the local Wal-Mart where one can find lots of products made in China. As of September 2005, the United States had imported nearly 150 billion dollars more than it had exported to China just in that year.38 The situation in Europe and Canada is similar, where in 2004, the EU reported a trade deficit with China totaling 78.7 million euros 39 while Canada reported a 17.5 billion dollar (Can) trade deficit with China.40 It would seem that the West relies on cheap products from China as much as China's new economy relies on investment from Europe and the United States. Trade embargoes would likely hurt the West as much as they would hurt China. Military action is also unlikely to be successful, and attempting it would likely result in major lose of life on all sides of the conflict. No only does China have full nuclear capabilities; they also have a well-established regular army. China has a two year compulsory military service requirement. As of 2005, China spent $67.49 billion (US) on their military.41 By contrast the United States 370.7 billion (US) on their completely volunteer military in 2005.42 Even though the United States spends a lot more money on their military, the pool of people from which each prospective country could draw in a military conflict favors China. The CIA fact book estimates that in the United States there are just shy of 110 million people, men and women, aged 18-49 fit for military service.43 In China, that number is nearly 350 million and only includes males.44 It seems apparent then that the UN, US or any other state is in no shape to challenge communist rule in China. This is not to say that there are not challenges and problems that need to be addressed by the party leadership, several of which have already been mentioned. Saich cites corruption as one of the primary challenges that the Communist Party in China will have to face sooner rather than later. The reformers and conservatives in the party are currently placing blame for the wide-spread corruption at the feet of the other faction. Conservatives claim that it is a lack of discipline and exposure to western ideas that are to blame for the corruption while reforms claim that the cause of the corruption is the incomplete economic reforms, claiming that in order to get rid of corruption, more reforms are needed to hold politicians more accountable.45 Saich tends to side with the reformers in his analysis on the origins of the problem. He writes The pursuit of economic riches without genuine marketization and democratization and where power remains hierarchically structured with information dependent on position and party membership lies behind the corruption of party members. This is not a new phenomenon, it is just that now with the increased commercialization and moneterization of the economy there is more to be corrupt about, and the stakes can be higher.46 If there is one area where all Chinese can agree on, it may be the issue of corruption. Saich points out the Chinese people as a whole are not particularly confident in the government's ability to deal effectively with corruption. He points to a December 2000 survey that showed only 12% of the 2000 respondents were confident that the government could stop the corruption while over 40% had little to no faith in the governments attempts to stop corruption.47 Although the Party has rejected the idea of outside monitors, it has given the press a little more leeway in investigating and reporting corruption.48 In addition to this, the government has handed out very harsh sentences for those convicted of corruption. It has also, according to Saich, tried to "improve the quality of judges, to professionalize the civil service, to raise pay for government officials, and to make the financial activites of the local administration more transparent."49 Although these measures may help in the short term, the Chinese government will have to take more drastic measures sooner rather than later in order to maintain credibility with the people. Another challenge that the Chinese government face is increasing exposure to Western ideals and ideas. The internet, combined with satellite and other novel forms of communication are making it increasingly difficult for the Chinese government to control information, from coming into the country or from going out. One major example of this is the SARS cover-up fiasco during the 2002-2003 winter. Another example came early in 2001 when an explsion killed 40 people in Jiangxi province village. Government officials said that the explosion was set by an insane man bent on death and destruction. However, journalists around the word soon discovered that fireworks were stored in the school and that children worked on them to make extra money for the school, and that this, not a mad-man, was the likely cause of the explosion.50 Despite their best efforts at containment, this area, like corruption, that is bound to cause numerous headaches for party leaders. Saich writes, There can be no doubt that a China that is increasingly wired and connected internationally will be more difficult for the CCP to control. The rise of 'virtual communities' that transcend traditional jurisdictions and even sovereign boundaries is difficult for China's current generation of Soviet-trained leaders to contemplate. It is far removed from their notions of modernity where planning, heavy industry, and electricity represented progress.51 The final, and perhaps over-arching, challenge for the Chinese government is that they must find a way to coalesce the reforms and the party ideology into a cohesive idea that they can use to rule. Implementing the reforms has caused a number of unforeseen problems to the remaining Communist structures. It is apparent in everything from the economic structure, an odd mix of state owned and privately held industries to welfare reform in urban areas that a lot of what the Party does simply doesn't make a lot of sense anymore. Before, one could accuse them of being despotic or just plain wrong, but it was logical. Now there seems to be no logical or reason behind what they do. Saich says, Far from making it easier, the shift to less administrative interference and curtailing the direct provision and administration of services makes it more complex. The Chinese state has added to it's old monopoly functions new regulatory roles that are broader and more complex then before, and that will become even more complex as China eases its way into the WTO. The Chinese government needs to dismantle old ministries and organizations, adapt the roles of others while creating new ones to serve the needs of a WTO world. 52 Someday perhaps the conditions will be right for massive democratic reforms in China. However, it is clear from the lack of social and economic impetus from within and its position of prestige in the world that this change is unlikely to take place any time soon. Although China faces many challenges unique to its political ideology, the choices and difficulties that await it are not really more or less daunting than most democratic countries face, they are simply different. .. Bibliography Boorman, H (1960) "The Study of Contemporary Chinese Politics: Some Remarks on Retarded Development." World Politics 12 (4) pgs 585-599. 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