Should the EU focus on acting as a civilian, normative or military power - Essay Example

SHOULD THE EU FOCUS ON ACTING AS A CIVILIAN, NORMATIVE OR MILITARY POWER? The metamorphosis of the EU from a coal and steel Community into a 26 member supranational Union with a significant regional and international economic, legal, and political leverage, evidently brings to the fore the definition (or the redefinition) of the EU’s role in regional and international affairs. Is the leverage that the EU wields one of a civilian, normative, or military power? Should the EU focus on any particular one of these powers? Can the exercise of the EU’s leverage be realistically stratified and demarcated within strict dichotomies of ‘civilian’, ‘normative’ or ‘military’, power or are all these forms of power intertwined and complementary within the exercise of the EU’s regional and international leverage? This essay will attempt to address these pertinent issues that flows from the EU’s burgeoning role in European and in international affairs. Before answering the question whether the EU should focus on being a civilian, normative, or military power, it is important to establish how these different forms of power have historically manifested in the EU’s policies and activities. Conceptualising the terms ‘civilian’, ‘normative’, and ‘military’ are important in any analysis where these terms are used to describe the activities of EU’s. Maull’s (1990) view of a civilian power includes the employment of “solidarity with other societies, and a sense of responsibility for the future of the world – and particularly the global environment”. (p.106) It is important to note that Maull’s analysis of the exercise of civilian power is quite restrictive as it relates to the state or the exercise of national civilian power. Thus using a ‘statist’ perspective of the exercise of civilian power in the context of a supranational EU, would have its possible limitations. Vital lessons can however be drawn from his analysis and can be transposed into the EU’s experience. Manner’s (2002) conception of the EU as a civilian power is interpreted primarily in economic terms. Simply put, civilian power can be said to be the exercise of non-military power and would include “economic, diplomatic and cultural policy instruments.” (Smith, n.d. p.1) Smith’s conception of civilian power would thus exclude any use of the military, even if the military were used in situations of peace-keeping, whether armed or unarmed. To Smith (n.d.) even though the military can be used in unarmed peace-keeping situations, they have also been trained to kill and thus such an activity cannot be said to be civilian. Smith (n.d.) further identifies four core elements in the exercise of civilian power – “means; ends; use of persuasion; and civilian control over foreign (and defence) policymaking”. (p.2) Consequently, in employing civilian policies, the means and the ends of those policies must be non-military, with persuasion (and not coercion) being the main instruments of achieving policy objectives. Based on the above conception of civilian power, Smith (n.d.) has argued in relation to the EU that: “… clinging to the notion of civilian power EU not only stretches the term ‘civilian’ past its breaking point, but also tends to induce excessively rosy-eyed views of the EU as an international actor. ‘Civilian’ often means ‘good’, and deploying the ‘civilian power EU’ argument can close down critical analysis of actual EU foreign policy activities”. (p.1) With regards to concepts of normative power, Manners (2002) views the EU’s normative power as its capacity to mould or influence notions of what constitutes ‘normal’ in politics at the international arena. This exercise of normative power is very evident in the EU’s relationship with Africa. The Council of the European Union has for instance stated that “Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa. Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this.” (quoted by Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007, p.440) The EU’s normative power especially in its relations with Africa can also be seen through economic cooperation under the wider European Union – African Caribbean and Pacific states (EU-ACP) Economic Partnership Agreements. Benefits like economic aid, budgetary support, technical assistance and trade concessions to EU markets have been used by the EU as conditionalities to the practice of good governance in African states. (Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2007) Hence the EU has played key roles in the democratisation of many African countries that were under military rule. The EU’s observer team was for instance present in polling stations in Ghana during the 1992 general elections that returned the country to democratic rule, and the observer team’s verdict that the elections were largely free and fair, helped stabilise the country’s young democracy and served as a model for other West African states to follow. Conceptualising military power on the other hand, as has been said in passing, would involve the use of the military in addressing situations. Also as observed by Smith (n.d.) even the use of the military in peace keeping still constitutes military power and can thus not be conceived of a an exercise of civilian power. It is worthy of note that the use of military power cannot be viewed only in actual terms but also in potential terms. Thus the ominous building of an army, even if there are no stated immediate aims for using it, would be tantamount to building a military power. During the era of the Cold War for instance, the arms race and the building of large armies did not result in the much speculated World War III or a nuclear war. The fact that the U.S. and the Soviet Union did not use their weapons of mass destruction against each other, did not however detract from the fact that they had built enough arsenals to become superpowers. Before proceeding further, an interjection with a panoramic historical view of the EU’s development is deemed necessary, so as to analyse its changing role over time in both regional and international affairs. The beginnings of the EU as a six member European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 can be viewed strictly in economic terms, though the formation of the ECSC was in keeping with the post World War II ethos of building intergovernmental and supranational institutions and cooperation to prevent an outbreak of another world war. Craig and de Burca (2003) have stated that this era of the integration in the history of the EU is a more functionalist form of integration epitomised by a focus on “… discrete economic sectors which could be managed efficiently and technocratically by supranational institutions, away from the fray of politics”. (p.5) The advent of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 marked the next major epoch in the development of the EU. The European Economic Community (EEC) was established and further economic integration achieved with the establishment of the common market and a customs union that removed trade barriers among member states. Other areas like competition policy, the common agriculture policy, and a common commercial policy were also established still showing this stage of development as purely economic and to some extent normative, especially in the EEC’s relationship with former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. However by 1993 when the Treaty on European Union (TEU) came into effect, the focus on purely economic instruments of integration could not be said to be an accurate description of the EU. Far reaching constitutional changes had transformed the EEC into the European Union culminating in a three pillar structure – the European Community pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar, and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar (now Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC)). Article 17(1) of the TEU for instance states that: “The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. (…) The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework. The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.” From the foregoing, it is important to study and take a scrutiny at EU’s military development, especially since the advent of the TEU and by extension, the establishment of the CFSP pillar. Although the EU’s military force is not publicly established as so, the number of overseas operations and missions carried out under the context of its Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is fast increasing. The EU has joined the United States in the fight against terrorism. This increased activity demands recognition. Indeed the EU has taken quite a considerable military focus even though its magnitude is average. The EU’s military presence has been felt locally in conjunction training with Britain’s forces. Their efforts in several activities in deed have been of great help especially in terms of assistance. During disastrous moments, the force together with other governmental institutions enable the clearing scenes during disasters and the transportation of injured persons to medical locations for treatment. Other victims of disaster aided by EU forces are taken for counselling. Their military focus comes out in a comforting basis. The EU forces have also been deployed in Congo, Sierra Leone and other parts of the world where there have been civil conflicts. (Wallace, 2004). Furthermore, the EU’s security culture is said to be of assistance to its members with emphasis on humanitarian efforts, and development of infrastructure. However, this sense of security could be said to be a contributing factor to the growing interests by former Eastern Bloc nations to join the EU. The EU could be seen as offering not only economic security, but also security from future threats by Russia to re-annex or re-occupy some of the Eastern Bloc states that had been under its tutelage during the Cold War Era. In this regard, the EU cannot only focus on building and using civilian and normative power without any serious consideration of building military power. It is evident that even though the EU is not extending to the former Eastern Bloc states in order to seek a military ‘show-down’ with Russia, its extension into former Soviet territories cannot reasonably rely on only civilian and normative power without any serious consideration of building military prowess. Article 51 of the UN Charter for instance states in its relevant part that: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” Thus, in the event of a military attack on a member state of the EU by an external aggressor, resort to collective self-defence is permissible under the UN Charter. Without an institutional framework that ensures the building of a military power, it cannot be envisaged how the EU can embark on a legitimate collective self-defence in the event of an attack on a member state, especially a state from the former Eastern Bloc who may have joined the EU with high expectations of being secured from external aggression. Consequently, Meyer (2005) questions the effectiveness of the institutional setting of the EU to handle any crisis completely. He argues that, while some issues can easily be papered over, postponed or even unfortunately ignored, others can not and as a result, the overload on issues and the large number of members can deter the EU’s final stand on a particular stalemate (Meyer, 2005) hence making an exercise of legitimate collective self-defence an impossibility. Another example Meyer (2005) cites is the likelihood when an EU member state supports a debate there is the tendency for it to pull out later due to pressure, intimidation, slow rate of a policy’s administration or change in interest. This portrays a lack of resolve at the intergovernmental level of the EU and could undermine any steps aimed at building a military power. Furthermore, with regards to whether the EU should focus on being a civilian, normative or military power, it is important to realise that though the EU is distinct in its identity as a regional/international supranational and intergovernmental entity, the Union cannot be viewed in homogeneous terms, because different interests from different influential member states (notably, France, Germany, and the UK) have shaped the policies adopted at the EU level. (Moravcsik, 2001) Critics thus allege that the EU needs to clarify the motivations upon which its operations are based on. Other discourses are in regard to what the EU’s culture definition is, and what is best for the organization since it is a supranational and intergovernmental Union constituted by several states with totally different laws and practices. Examples are Britain and its Atlantism, France’s exceptionalism, and Germany’s passivism and civilianism. These different interests can or might be problematic to the EU in any attempt towards dealing with a threat that requires common intervention. Hence Moravcsik (2001), states that: “Most scholars today view the EU as a series of pragmatic responses to economic and geopolitical interdependence.” (p.117) Moravcsik (2002) further concludes that the EU is not a significant military power and that: “… the EU has no police, military force or significant investogatory capacity – and no realistic prospect of obtaining any of these. Take the military. Even if the most ambitious plans currently on the table in the European defence were fully realized, the EU would control only 2 percent of European NATO forces – and these forces could be employed only for a narrow range of regional peace keeping and peace making tasks.” (p.609) Obviously, though Moravcsik’s observation of the EU’s lack of military might can be said to be true, this observation was made in 2002. Further enlargement of the EU and NATO to Eastern and Central Europe after 2002 would thus significantly increase the percentage of NATO soldiers who are also within the EU. However, the heterogeneity of interests within the EU as especially championed by the U.K., France and Germany shows that deciding on being a specific power – i.e. civilian, normative, or military – may not be workable or even desirable for the EU. Evidently, at its present stage of development, the EU’s power cannot be said to be only civilian and normative in nature. It wields some military power even if this power is not significant enough to rival that of the U.S. or even Russia. It may be argued that by focusing on becoming a military power, the EU should build a military prowess that rivals that of the US and is strong enough to fill the power vacuum created by the demise of the Soviet Union. Becoming a formidable military power does not however need to be a power that necessarily rivals the US. As is already evident, the eastward enlargement of the EU into former Soviet territory is being complemented at the defence level with the eastward enlargement of NATO. Thus though the actual enlargement of the EU does not show any (overt) evidence or resort to militarism, it can be seen to be subtly paving the way for a lot of the former Eastern Bloc nations to join NATO. Obviously, NATO is more European in terms of state membership, and the advancement or enlargement of NATO cannot be seen only as an advancement of American hegemony, but perhaps more importantly, it may connote or lay the foundation for a subsequent EU monopoly of NATO. Thus, the EU can still be a formidable power and be still allied to the U.S. It can use its alliance with the U.S. to influence international affairs through normative power. The above presented argument is not however an endorsement of, or a preference for the EU to focus on being a military power. If the EU can wield all three powers, why focus on just one. Not all situations will require a military intervention. Some may require a civilian or a normative intervention. The US for instance is not only noted for its military power, but also for its economic power. Its normative power is potently felt in the ‘Washington Consensus’ (what Jagdish Bhagwati (1998) calls the ‘Wall Street Treasury Complex’(p.11)) applied by international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank in their propagation of neo-liberal economic norms through the structural adjustment programmes mostly applied in developing countries. It appears though that the EU is more tilted to using civilian and normative power to achieve its ends than military and this may have historical reasons. Obviously, the effects of World War I and II on the European continent has had quite a sobering effect on the kind of policies that the EU would want to pursue hence the notable neutrality and pacificity of states like Germany, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland. (Smith, n.d.) Though building a military power could complement its already established civilian and normative leverage, it is unlikely that the pacific voices within the EU would not lend their support to an activity that gives the EU an overt military look. It however remains to be seen how long the EU can emphasis its civilian and normative power and whether building a military power would become a necessary part of its enlargement and constitutional development. References and Bibliography Bhagwati, Jagdish, (1998) ‘The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars’, Foreign Affairs, May-June Craig, P., and De Búrca, G., (2003) EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press Dehousse, R., ‘European Institutional Architecture after Amsterdam: Parliamentary System or Regulatory Structure?’ CMLR, 35, 1998 Douglas-Scott, S. (2002). Constitutional Law of the European Union, Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2) Maull, H. (1990) ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, Foreign Affairs, 69(5) pp. 92-3 Meyer C, (2005). ‘European Defense: Why Institutional Socialization is not Enough’, Oxford Journal on Good Governance, 2(1), pp-52, 2005 Moravcsik, A., (2002). ‘In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(4) Moravcsik, A., (2001). ‘Despotism in Brussels? Misreading the European Union’, Foreign Affairs, May-June Scheipers, S. and Sicurelli, D. (2007) ‘Normative Power Europe: a Credible Utopia?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 435-457. Smith, Karen E. (2003): European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Cambridge/Oxford/Malden: Polity Press. Smith, Karen E. 2004. “Still Civilian Power EU?”, London School of Economics, http://www.arena.uio.no/cidel/WorkshopOsloSecurity/Smith.pdf Wallace, W. (2004). ‘Not Such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of European Forces’, Survival, 46(2) p.173 Read More