The Loss of Shuttle Columbia - Essay Example

Module The loss of the Shuttle Columbia and its crew members is one of the highlights and turning points of the historyof NASA. Important mechanical, leadership and ethical issues can be observed in the loss of the Shuttle Columbia. The study critically analyzed the major issues and ethical lapses that allowed the incident to occur. The recommended actions include a culture change at NASA, effective leadership, improved communication systems, stronger regulation and better focus on the research and development of space shuttles. The recommendations balance deontological and utilitarian ethics; thus, NASA would achieve better outcomes in terms of research and space exploration. The Loss of the Shuttle Columbia: An Ethical Case Study The 28th flight of the Columbia forming the 113th mission of the Space Shuttle Program ended in loss of the mission and a tragic loss of the crew. The mechanical cause of the loss of the Shuttle Columbia and the seven crew members on board has been reported to be a breach in the spaceship’s Thermal Protection System on the left side-wing resulting from a piece of insulating foam (Niewoehner, Steidle, and Johnson 11). However, the loss of the Shuttle Columbia has attracted different perspectives of analysis, besides the mechanical viewpoint, as to other determinants of the outcomes. Studies into the loss of the Shuttle Columbia are important since a number of lessons can be discerned from the mechanical, leadership and ethical view points. Besides, it helps to generate recommendations for action that would guide space missions and the wider engineering field to avert similar occurrences. This study provides a background on the engineering/technical failure that resulted in the loss of the Shuttle Columbia as reported. An in-depth evaluation of the engineering, management, regulatory and socio-technical issues surrounding the unfortunate incident is undertaken. This is then followed by an analysis of the ethical lapses that contributed to the loss of the Shuttle Columbia, before the generation of recommendations based on an ethical framework. BACKGROUND Engineering Failures: As a prelude, the Space Shuttle Program launched the Columbia in January 28, 1986; a launch had never been undertaken at such cold temperatures. The shuttle exploded after only 7 seconds of launching (Baura 148). Lessons had not been learned when similar oversights occurred seventeen years later with the loss of the Shuttle Columbia on February 1, 2003. Shuttle Columbia was launched on January 16, 2003 for a 16 day mission to orbit the earth and promote science research. The first evidence of engineering failure appeared 81.7 seconds after the launch when Columbia was approximately 65,820 feet above the ground. With the shuttle traveling at about 1650 mph, a large piece of insulating form that was hand-crafted came off the Orbiter-external tank attachment area. The fall-out piece then struck the leading edge of the shuttle’s left wing at 81.9 seconds after the launch. These incidents were not detected immediately either by the on-board crew or by the ground team; rather, they were observed the next day by the ground support team upon detailed analysis of the launch’s videos and pictures. The damage on the lead left wing appeared to have not had any effects on the 16 day space operations of the shuttle as the mission met its space objectives. Reports provide details that the Columbia Shuttle re-entered the earth’s atmosphere with an existing breach to its leading edge of the left wing. The exact position of the breach is reported as proximal to the panel 8 of the RCC (Reinforced Carbon-Carbon). The breach is deemed sufficiently big enough to allow for the penetration of super-heated air – above 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit – into the space behind the RCC panel. The super-heated air was then able to penetrate the left wing and destroy its structural parts such as the insulation and the aluminum wing spur. Detailed analysis of the recordings made by the wing sensors and flight control systems to the changes in the aerodynamic forces clearly revealed that the destruction was due to the super-heated air in the left wing. Amateur videos show pieces of Orbiter shedding off 555 seconds after the shuttle re-entered the earth’s atmosphere. Detailed analysis of the events leading up to the disintegration indicate that the control systems within the shuttle worked hard to keep Columbia in the planned flight profile, but lost the aerodynamic battle as the left wing could not withstand the impacts of the denser atmosphere. Once the left wing gave way, the Orbiter fell out of control at speeds of over 10,000 mph, destroying the shuttle and the lives of the seven crew members. The analysis of the events that took place in the loss of the Columbia Shuttle combine visual images and analysis of the numerous shuttle sensors and the flight control systems to give a reliable account of the mechanical causes of the loss. The communication between the crew and the ground support team also reveals much into the incident; at EI (Entry Interface) + 906 seconds, the crew was informed that there were unusual sensor readings being received and that this were being evaluated. 17 seconds later (EI + 923 seconds), a broken communication was received from the shuttle to the ground support team just as the Columbia Shuttle began to disintegrate (Baura 148). IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE Engineering: The engineering aspects that led to the loss of the Shuttle Columbia revolve around the failure to correct a problem with space-craft due to the perception that such a problem was not serious. According to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2005), foam strikes on space craft were not unknown as they have hit the vessels throughout the history of shuttle programs. Nearly all launches of shuttles have been affected by foam strikes, but this had not been considered a major problem in space maneuvers. Importantly, engineers had already made efforts to re-design spacecraft to deal with the problem of foam strikes, but this had always been considered only a minor aspect of space shuttle programs. This was definitely the case in the Columbia incident where there was knowledge of the foam strike, relegated to the background during the launch and re-entry. In the engineering sense, space missions are extremely serious undertakings and spaceships serve the very crucial function of enabling man to access space. The missions that shuttles undertake are extremely complex and involve extreme environments. Based on these views, the design of the spaceship should be meticulous, ensuring that all the problems are addressed and that no concern should be regarded as minor. Allowing for the minor problem of foam strikes in spaceship design was a failure on the part of the engineers. Management Issues: A number of factors about the organization or management of the Space Shuttle Program clearly contributed to the loss of the Shuttle Columbia. A historical perspective on the management of the space program offers insight into the events that allowed the shuttle to be lost. Importantly, the shuttle was mischaracterized as being operational rather than developmental for most of the earlier existence; hence, important steps in development were skipped. A combination of resource constraints, scheduling pressures and fluctuating vision also contributed to failure in adequate preparation for space missions. Besides, over-reliance on past success by NASA in place of sound engineering practice allowed for small but serious flaws to be accommodated. Socio-technical Issues: An interaction of organizational culture and technical challenges heavily contributed to the loss of the Shuttle Columbia. One of these was the poor communication about the engineering problems that had already been discerned by some of the technical staff. The bureaucratic structures at NASA ensured that the concerns raised by the technical staff were ignored on the premise of not following the proper protocols. There has never been doubt that communication is crucial to organizational success, and the loss of the Shuttle Columbia served to underscore this view. These organizational barriers in communication stifled the relay of important information and insight on safety of the mission and thus, led to the launch of Shuttle Columbia despite some staff members having reservations about the integrity of the mission in terms of technical aspects. NASA was also running as a highly disengaged body rather than a functional unit; for instance, the Safety and Mission Assurance was not deeply engaged into all parts of the space mission and thus, there were allowances for oversight. Ethical Lapses: The central ethical question in the loss of the Shuttle Columbia entails the right actions that NASA should have undertaken and communicated with knowledge about the challenges in re-entry the shuttle would face. Video evidence and evaluation a day after launch clearly indicated that the foam had struck a sensitive area on the shuttle’s structure. An analysis of the roles played by the relevant stakeholders in the incident helps establish the ethical issues. The first stakeholder under analysis is the NASA management who had both the capacity to examine the wing and communicate to the crew the concerns about the shuttle. According to Battin and Mower (4), NASA had four options: do not find out and do not tell; find out but do not tell; do not find out but tell; lastly, find out and tell. NASA decided to go with the first option and take risks on the mission. This action is in stark contrast to utilitarian ethics where decisions/actions are taken for the greater good of the majority. In fact, nobody would benefit from running the Space Shuttle Program in such a manner. The management was also at fault for allowing the tolerance of the foam strike problems rather than seeking to address the issue. Their actions put the lives of the seven astronauts in the path of doom. Thus, the management was completely unethical in its conduct in the loss of the Shuttle Columbia. Another aspect of the ethical issues on the case involve the risks ignored; NASA’s management was also at fault for ignoring engineer concerns about the mission as they had aired their fears about the shuttle. The requests by the engineers about taking pictures of the shuttle while in space due to their concern for the region in which the foam strikes had occurred was denied due to organizational bureaucracy promoted by the management; the engineers were turned away for not following the right protocols. However, the engineers were at fault too for allowing space shuttles with design challenges, albeit minor, to be used operationally rather than developmentally. Ethical questions also arise about the regulatory processes for NASA; the Columbia Shuttle was well beyond its usability. Baura (152) states that at 22 years of service, the Columbia had served more than twice the number of years it was supposed to operate. Many of the sensors in the shuttle were already failing; for instance, 55 out of 181 sensors in the shuttle’s wings had already failed or were producing questionable signals even before the final launch of Columbia. However, federal inquiries and attempts at regulation only occurred after disaster had struck rather than before. This indicates a lack of ethical inclination which ought to be present at all times and not just after ethical cases. For instance, one may argue that without the loss of the Shuttle Columbia, perhaps the space shuttle would still be in use despite its unreliability; the radical actions taken to control NASA may not have been undertaken. This indicates commitment to corrective rather than ethical action. RECOMMENDATIONS The following are the recommendations that may help avert similar occurrences in the future through solving the root problems: The NASA organizational culture of laxity and oblivion to detail ought to be replaced by a more vigilant and safety-conscious one. This would effectively eradicate the accommodation of both minor and major challenges in all aspects of operations. Communication within the organization should be revamped and streamlined with clear chains of command and controls to avoid bureaucracy. This would help avert communication breakdown. Focus on the research and development of space shuttles should be enhanced. Consequently, well-designed and safe shuttles should be allowed to launch in operational terms. An important resource such as NASA should be placed under effective leadership. Such leadership should be able to appreciate the problems/challenges facing missions, the implications and contributions from the relevant stakeholders. An oversight body should be mandated to regulate the activities of NASA, ensuring that the safety, engineering and operational requirements are met during all NASA activities. Evaluation of the Recommendations based on Ethical Frameworks: The two ethical frameworks adopted herein for the evaluation of the recommendations generated are utilitarianism and deontology. According to West (3), utilitarianism entails making decisions or actions to do the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Through change of NASA’s organizational culture, the entire space exploration sector will benefit as the safety of the astronauts will be assured; the engineer’s concerns considered; successful scientific missions among others. Improvement in NASA’s communication also benefits all the stakeholders through encouraging participation, helping highlight challenges and boosting ethics and accountability. Focusing on research and development also enhances the success and safety of the shuttle missions, and thus benefiting all the stakeholders. Deontology involves duty-based ethics where morality is viewed as a matter of duty (Gauss 27). Enhancing the regulation of NASA bases on deontology ethics as the organization will have a duty to promote safety. Further, enhancing leadership also draws from duty-based ethics as the management would have responsibilities of leading the organization in the right direction. CONCLUSION A breach in the spaceship’s Thermal Protection System on the left wing resulting from a piece of insulating foam that started off a process of destruction within the wing. Observations and detailed analysis provide evidence that the mechanical cause of the incident was the foam. The Columbia Shuttle disintegrated seconds upon re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere. From non-mechanical perspectives, the organizational culture in inhibiting communication, poor management and oblivion about the impacts of minor problems for such a complex sector contributed to the Columbia Shuttle loss. Non-observance and non-reporting, ignoring risk concerns, lack of proper regulation and launching of a faulty shuttle are the ethical issues that arise. The recommendations, based on deontology and utilitarianism, include change in management, organizational culture change, better research, design and regulation. Works Cited Battin, Margaret, and Mower Gordon. Case 3.5 – The Columbia Shuttle Disaster. Clarkson. Web. February 28, 2012. Baura, Gail D. Engineering Ethics: An Industrial perspective. USA: Elselvier, 2007. Print. Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. 2003. Web. February 28, 2012. Gaus, Gerald F. “What is Deontology? Part One: Orthodox View.” Journal of Value Inquiry, 35 (2001): 27-42. Print. Niewoehner, Robert, Steidle, Craig, & Eric Johnson. AC 2008-539: The Loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia: Portaging the Leadership Lessons with a Critical Thinking Model. USA. American Society for Engineering Education, 2008. Print. West, Henry R. The Blackwell guide to Mill's Utilitarianism. USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. Print. Read More