The Lewis Spacecraft Mission Failure Investigation Board Report - Term Paper Example

?Outline I. Introduction II. Engineering shortcomings identified by the Investigation Board III. Source of mishap in the development life cycle IV. Actions to counter recurrence of such problems in future V. Conclusion Customer Inserts Name Customer Inserts Professors Name Physics 11 October 2011 Lessons from the Lewis Spacecraft Mission Failure Investigation Board Report The Lewis Spacecraft Mission failure of 1997 brings to the fore the risks inherent in engineering project management in the area of space exploration. NASA hoped to use the project to demonstrate the viability of using smaller satellites for space applications (NRC & NASA 54). After launch and successful insertion into orbit, the spacecraft lost contact with the ground station and later became a total loss. An Investigation Board inquired into the loss and determined that a problem with the Attitude Control System led to the loss (NRC & NASA 54). They also identified several factors that may have contributed to the catastrophic loss in the management and engineering rigor applied in the project. This paper relates to the shortcoming and the lesson that a systems engineer in charge of a similar project can learn from it. The Lewis Spacecraft Mission Failure Investigation Board (LSMFIB) identified two direct factors, and several indirect factors contributing to the mission failure. The first direct factor identified was flawed design and simulation of the Attitude Control System (ACS). The design of the ACS was such that in safe mode, the spacecraft would be in a “power positive orientation” (LSMFIB 9). However, an imbalance in the thrusters caused the spacecraft to face away from the sun in such a way that the sun’s rays hit the edges of the solar panels powering the spacecraft. This led to draining of the batteries at a quick rate because of the “power subsystem and thermal subsystem Safe Mode design” (LSMFIB 9). The problem with the ACS Simulation was that when the ground crew ran tests to determine the position of the spacecraft in safe mode, they received flawed data that did not enable them to detect the attitude problems that the spacecraft was experiencing. They were unable to detect the emergency that was playing out because of the flawed simulations. The second direct factor that led to the loss of the spacecraft was “inadequate space monitoring” (LSMFIB 11). The first reason was that there was pressure on the spacecraft development team to cut costs hence they implemented a single shift. This made the discovery of anomalies very difficult. In fact, the actual problems occurred when no one was on duty. The second reason is that the ground crew failed to declare an emergency even after noting problems that would have justified such a declaration. These problems included the fact that the spacecraft was using the B-side processor when it reached orbit instead of the A-side processor. The second anomaly was that the “solid state recorder would not play back the data previously recorded”, which included the flight data that would have shown the anomalies that affected simulation (LSMFIB 11). The third anomaly was that the ground crew failed to get the space telemetry signal only for the spacecraft to reappear with an “uncontrolled attitude” (LSMFIB 11). The fourth anomaly was that after leaving the spacecraft in safe mode for duration, it took on spinning with the edges of the solar panels facing the sun. Any of these anomalies warranted the declaration of an emergency, which did not happen. The indirect causes of the mishap were actions taken that did not conform to industry standards. If the development teams stuck to the standards, then it is likely that the catastrophic failure would not have occurred. These include project scope creep, cost and schedule pressure, inadequately planned relocation of some production units that affected technical review and testing, frequent changes to the personnel working on the program, and insufficient engineering and management discipline (LSMFIB 12-14). The reasons forwarded by the investigation Board seem credible. They demonstrate that the engineering failures that led to the catastrophic loss of the Lewis spacecraft were systemic. They have identified the direct causes of the failure and the indirect ones showing that the whole process was a disaster in waiting. In this sense, the position of the Board is agreeable. The Board identified factors that span the entire development cycle of the project as contributors to the eventual failure. While the failure occurred at a critical stage after the launch of the spacecraft, the Board showed that a series of decisions drove the mission to this eventuality. The indirect reasons link management decisions and engineering decisions to the eventual catastrophe. The Board also demonstrated that there was regulatory pressure on the mission to work faster and more cost effectively to achieve the objectives of the mission. In this sense, the entire project environment presented such pressure to the mission development team leading to the eventual catastrophe. It is clear that the catastrophe did not emanate from the project design, but in the operational decisions taken in the active phase of the project. It is therefore simplistic to place the occurrence of the failures on any part of the project cycle because the decision-making took place at different times. As a lead systems engineer, there are a number of options available to ensure that the same problems do not recur on a similar program. The first one is to develop and stick to a comprehensive plan for the program. It is easier to plan before engaging in a project because at that moment there is no emotional investment yet. This reduces the chances of making mistakes and it is possible to develop stronger and sounder regulatory measures. Therefore, the main thing is to develop a plan of action and stick to it. This means that there ought to be some limits on the midstream changes unless the benefits are very clear, and come from very good reasoning. The second thing is to identify the critical elements of the project and have those managed differently. In the case of the Lewis program, it would have been difficult to tell which of the elements of the program were critical since it had many innovative technologies. However, there was still the opportunity to identify the critical aspects of the project to determine which ones required more engineering and management rigor to complete successfully. The third issue towards avoiding such a catastrophic failure is the development of stringent risk and emergency response procedures. Such steps would include a list of telltale signs for breakdowns, which would warrant the declaration of an emergency, and an incentive for the people best placed to observe these faults to report them quickly. Finally, there would be need to establish strong technical review structures to ensure that all teams prove the robustness of their contribution to the project. This would eliminate the risk of components with faults going unreported, either intentionally or unintentionally. It is natural that this would include a strong regime of testing of the parts before committing them to the project. The catastrophic loss of the Lewis spacecraft is testament to the dilemma systems engineers find themselves. On one hand, there is immense pressure to produce results to justify the costs of a project; while on the other hand, it takes time to get a perfect product. When these two forces meet, it makes project decision making a very difficult aspect of the process. The race between time and cost makes all the difference between profitability and loss. In fact, the success of many engineering project come down to the profits and the losses, not just the production of a working model. It is clear from this case that while there will always be need to find “faster, cheaper and better” ways of managing projects, there is also the need to ensure that the final product meets all the design criteria and goes on to enjoy a successful operational life (LSMFIB 11). Works Cited LSMFIB. Lewis Spacecraft Mission Failure Investigation Board: Final Report. USA: Lewis Spacecraft Mission Failure Investigation Board: , 1998. NRC & NASA. Assessment of Mission Size Trade-offs for NASA's Earth and Space Science Missions. Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2000. Read More