An Analysis of Jasper Blystones Realm of Humans-as-Persons - Essay Example

An Analysis of Jasper Blystone’s Realm of Humans-as-Persons Introduction Human nature is tackled in various ways in almost all academic disciplines. The ‘human’ perhaps competes with ‘nature’ as the most widely discussed subject matter in universities. However, as argued by Jasper Blystone in his article Reprogramming the Humanities: Realm of Humans-as-Persons philosophers and theologians have embraced, or turned down, one way or another non-ethical and non-theological discussion about the human as ‘persons’ and its role in history and nature. The article enlightens its readers about the need to reform humanities, turning its focus more on the human as a ‘free agent’, and not as a victim of uncontrollable circumstances. Likewise, the author calls for a change in the focus of humanities, from a ‘divine God’ into a ‘God in human history’, that is viewing the concept of God within the perspective of human-as-persons. The exact argument of Blystone is stated below (Blystone 1-2): As a matter of fact, however, the easiest place to find the divine—what we call ‘God’—is in human history itself. How “God” got there is another matter, perhaps the greatest question of all—but the fact is that “God” exists in history. This essay commends and critiques Jasper Blystone’s theory of personalism discussed in his article Realms of Humans-as-Persons. Evaluating Blystone’s Argument In order to illustrate the significance of Blystone’s argument, it would be helpful to suppose an undergraduate student who is interested in understanding human nature. He has been reared in a Christian religion hence he believes that human beings are formed in God’s likeness and image; that God loves everyone; that human beings are sinners or weak toward temptation and answerable to God for their errors; that God, similar to a person, gives orders and commandments that should be obeyed despite negative outcomes; that nature was formed for humans; and that when God arrives there will be judgment and nirvana. In his university he enrolls in liberal arts that introduce him to the depth and breadth of humanities. In time, he enrolls in a subject by a scientist who explains the concept of cosmology on the basis of the big bang explanation of the birth of the universe. In studying biological and cosmological theories he gets exposed to repeated explanations by scientists. In paleoanthropology he studies the findings in East Africa that suggest human evolution from primates. He learns more so-called ‘empirical’ or ‘rational’ knowledge from other disciplines. The questions indirectly raised by Blystone, in relation to the above example, are the following: should the undergraduate student turn down these evaluations and explanations of the human being with regard to her biblical knowledge and beliefs? Or should he conclude that these explanations of the human are credible and truthful, and thus he should abandon his religious beliefs and Christian ethical ideals? Or should he adopt both religious and scientific knowledge to his view of the human? Do they restrict what he can think about the human morally and religiously? Do they offer knowledge that allows him to develop moral and religious beliefs compatible to them and not abandon his Christian ideals? These questions sum up Blystone’s suggestion, which is ‘reprogramming the humanities’. What Blystone suggests is a reflective and open attitude. He portrays the human in a more massive span of space and time and encourages us to look beyond the human in interpersonal interactions and relationships. Blystone is accurate and straightforward in presenting two possible choices when confronted with conflicting ideals within the humanities. On the one hand, unless one stands his/her ground in a Christian doctrine that nature and all creatures were created for human beings—a belief that can be fully located in secular Western, Christian, and biblical doctrines—s/he has to reduce the importance of the human. On the other hand, if the human has developed through time, through neutral natural forces, through random natural occurrences, s/he must think whether a person can keep on talking about the bible or God, or God as intimately attached to every human. Blystone is correct in arguing that the framework in which the human is evaluated or examined has transformed. It is not an explanation of human behavior as individual agents who come up with a decision in particular situations or of persons as part of a close personal relationship or racial group. Everything is the impact or consequence of neutral forces of nature outside the power of the human to dictate. The human is hence described in a different way by Blystone. He views the human from a point of view that gives importance to the outside observer, and, more importantly, to the force of history, not the person who makes decisions and takes actions. The biblical description appears to inform us who we truly are—humans made in the image of God. But this biblical explanation seems incomplete, as Blystone strongly claims, due to lack of historical consideration (Blystone 4): Clearly, we do not yet know what constitutes the Good. That is the problem. Each of the above mentioned philosophical movements entails an answer to that problem for its own practitioners. That is not enough. We have to turn to the total ‘system’ of human nature, we have to study all of its manifestations as they relate to what and who we are and ought to be in terms of how we can better achieve not merely a just social world, not merely a loving global civilization—not merely a ‘humane’ mankind. Agreeably, the human must be explored in its own terms as well, not just a ‘creation’ formed through ‘agape’, or God’s love for humans. Blystone gives strength to the concept of ‘persona’, which is the core of his argument. Persona refers to how a person acts, talks, interacts, and so on, with others that give them a particular impression of that person; or, basically, it is the image that a person shows to others. Blystone advocates such ‘personalism’ in the field of humanities. However, there are also some weaknesses and problems with personalism, which is defined as a philosophy focusing on the importance, uniqueness, and purity of personality. It is certainly unfortunate that Blystone’s personalism became occupied, as its main focus, in the philosophy of religion without regard for numerous serious problems explained to philosophy by social, historical, and scientific occurrences. But a philosophy of religion is definitely a valid, reasonable, and significant philosophical venture, which could become meaningful and valuable model of religious behavior and practice—this is an anticipation philosophers at least cultivate for aesthetics, logic, and ethics. Yet, philosophy can truly fulfill this pragmatic role only by continuing its philosophical nature and tradition. Through the focus of Blystone’s argument on the importance and uniqueness of the human and personality, it has pushed a social recognition of Christianity, competing quite fully against God-centric and quite limitedly against humanized doctrines or religion. Philosophy as well has a tendency to be distorted, tarnished, and disordered by having attributed to a non-philosophical function. The apparent outcome is an obvious thoughtlessness in Blystone’s stated empiricism, and a definite contradiction and changeability in how he used the concept, which is shown in his below statement (Blystone 3): Nevertheless, despite the hegemony of the rationalists and the empiricists in our intellectual tradition—both being endemically anti-humanist and eventually antihuman—the understanding for the truly human has indeed survived in our intellectual culture… From our point of view, the real crux of ideological dispute [empiricism vs. personalism], however, was personalism’s flirtation with theology and philosophical anthropology’s affirmation of the human world of mythology. It seems that Blystone is trying to make a distinction between empiricism and personalism, which, in fact, should not be indifferent from each other. He could have argued for an ‘objective’ position as a solution to the observed conflict between empiricism and personalism; instead, Blystone resorted to the concept of experience to justify his argument. Apparently, it is true that experience can be viewed in a much wider sense. For example, religious experience refers to a person’s experience with regard to God. However, it is not definite here whether Blystone’s reference to God is to be understood as totally within the existing knowledge or understanding or the concept of experience relates to the rational uncertainty of external being. Regardless of his argument, Blystone often claims that experience is personal, and hence includes himself among scholars who form and establish knowledge based on subjective information, simply to be unable to come up with externality; instead, Blystone excludes himself from those who try to identify the underlying reason, and to explain, expand, and distinguish experience through a broader view and examination of the systems identified within it. Such perspective can be defended simply by establishing an unempirical philosophical assumption, and Blystone at times appears to make reference to the egotistical dilemma that the formulation of these assumptions is itself an experiential process. Experience viewed widely as all perception or awareness cannot provide either an investigation of its truth or a system of knowledge. The pragmatic philosophy of personalism is therefore incompatible with empiricism’s subjectivistic perspective. To include epistemological dualism simply confounds the problem, for the perceived link between ‘things’ and ‘thought’ is inherently incompatible with confirmation or proof, because the things themselves should consistently be a creation from the subjective or psychological part. Blystone’s personalism cannot disregard a purposeful nature of cognition or a realistic view of awareness or consciousness, one wherein perceptive understanding and discursive thinking are but two interrelating parts of a similar event of actual uncertainty, apart from inasmuch as the mind continues or advances freely or autonomously to expand its knowledge through theoretical systems in order to acquire a more sufficient understanding of perceptive being or existence. Conclusions Blystone’s argument that the human as persons should be given greater value in the humanities is perfectly agreeable. His personalistic perspective of the humanities points to the fact that the uniqueness of ‘personality’ has long been taken for granted within the discipline. He is not, per se, rejecting the biblical conviction that human beings were created in the likeness and image of God. Blystone is simply advocating a greater emphasis on the human as an individual agent, as a person capable of making decisions for him/herself, and not an automaton with a predetermined fate. However, there are also weaknesses in Blystone’s argument, but these are on a more technical side, such as the use of ‘empirical’ and ‘pragmatic’ in relation to personalism. Personalism, as a philosophical perspective, cannot be separated from empirical because it also asks for objective study or reference. Indeed, personalism and empiricism are two epistemological traditions that are strongly interconnected. The workings of the mind and perception attests to the link between these two traditions. Work Cited Blystone, Jasper. Reprogramming the Humanities: Realm of Humans-as-Persons. Los Angeles, CA: Loyola Marymount University, 2013. Print. Read More