The Experience Machine Argument - Report Example

Affiliation Introduction Robert Nozick was a famous philosopher who came to be broadly referred to as the father of philosophical libertarianism. Nozick drafted a view on how free willpower is very possible. How with no causal determination of any action, an individual could have behaved differently yet does not behave randomly or arbitrarily. Regardless approaching the situation from different directions, Nozick found it so obstinate, so resilient to illuminating solutions, and he was forced to conclude that no one of the tactics is completely satisfactory (Ethem 11) Nozicks experience machine is viewed to make a convincing, if not irrefutable, case against hedonism. In Nozicks experiment, we are summoned to consider the outlook of a fools paradise from given perspective and to choose whether we will prefer the hedonic illusion which the experience machine offers or a hedonically lesser state of doing things. Nozick proposes that we select the latter (Ethem 11). The Experience Machine The experience machine of Robert Nozick, which attacks hedonism, is among the most renowned thought experiments in modern philosophy (Baber). The experience machine has convinced many people that there is more to a sensible value than the feeling quality of peoples experiences. Nevertheless, the experiment has been often misunderstood and very easily dismissed (Baber). What is the experience machine argument? For instance, lets take hedonism that states that whatever that is intrinsically good is nothing but what matters most is the balance of pleasure over the pain experienced. It does not matter how someone understands pleasure, so long as its a non-fictive psychological state (Ethem 11). If an individuals life comprises as much pleasure and as less pain as it is possible for that individual. There exists no way to improve that persons life. It is just the hedonic excellence of experience which eventually matters for prudential value (Ethem 11). Primordial counterexample to hedonism suggests that one is worse off if he falsely believes that his partner is faithful to him (and possibly take pleasure in it) than if his partner is faithful to him. Robertss Experience Machine experiment extracts the same vein (Ethem 11). However, it further generalizes the point and thus eliminating some distractions like the influence of the thought about cheating that will make one feel bad because of that (Baber). The most basic point is because the Experience Machine offers the perfect illusion of living whatever kind of life they desire, while one sails about in a tank (Kodali & Venkata). Nozick brings into table two unlike questions relating to plugging into that machine. In the first question he asks whether one should plug into this kind of machine for life, preprogramming his lifes experiences while he asked in the second question whether one would just plug in. The difference between the two questions is very important, but too often neglected. The former question is a normative question; I believe that it accepts an answer to an evaluative type of question such that if hedonism is quite true, then one should plug in. The latter question is a question involving preferences, instead of what is genuinely valuable. When Robert Nozick asks whether one would plug in (instead of whether it would be somehow better for him to plug in), he is taking the dialectical step against hedonist. This approach is, in some way, a harmless move, as it evades commitment to reactions from people or to allowing an extrapolation from preferences towards evaluative truth. It therefore cannot be refuted by the general skeptical arguments or experimental studies of what individuals in general think (Michael). I think; it is legitimate, to address people in this way when it comes to philosophical argumentations. Nozicks Suggested Experience Machine Argument Encountered by the choice of life such as in the Experience Machine as well as a qualitatively inferior life in reality, most individuals would not prefer the former. Individuals consider preferences to reflect their convictions about value. Individuals consider convictions about value to be more reliable guides to value, and therefore good evidence of what is genuinely valuable (Ethem 11). Henceforth, people have good confirmation of other possessions being more valuable than the quality of hedonic experience. It is uncalled-for to defeat hedonism, and might confuse some individuals, who dismiss the argument for solid reasons (Ethem 11). Criticism of the Experience Machine Argument Top of Form There are different criticisms that have since arisen to negate Nozicks Argumentation. For instance, one of the popular criticisms is the one that makes the case in "Utilitarianism" through pointing out that utility (pleasure/happiness) should not solely be measured by the physical senses since "some types of pleasure are more valuable and desirable than others. The criticism says that an individual of advanced faculties needs more to make him contented. It further states that is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better one to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied (Kodali & Venkata). Other critics argue that engaging into such a machine removes self identity (Ethem 11). Just to draft something out it, at the time one is presented the choice it is central to their sense of self that they are trying to decide how to proceed with the choice. To someone thinking about this choice, becoming a person who is just experiencing the most pleasure they can feels like a personality ending choice (Ethem 11). I think this is analogous to the classic experiment I heard regarding whether you would let yourself lose all memories if you would wake up with much money. In this way, the person says no because they feel that going into the machine kills them; and makes the choice self-harming. Bottom of Form Response to the Criticisms The thought experiment of Robert Nozick is pretty straight forward. Many philosophers are sort of invested in attempting to critique his position for the argument. And of course the more one looks into it, the more they find his argument fairly difficult to reject. That is because pleasure can still be considered to be the motive for choosing not go into the machine and therefore defeat Nozicks argument (Kodali & Venkata). My general strategy is to display that the decision of going in the machine is less pleasurable than the one of not going it into it and living your life in reality. Top of Form The critics are making valid points, but I believe they are just trying to refute Nozicks argument for no strong purpose and the idea that people cannot encounter deeper realities within the machine is part of Nozicks argument. Nozicks Argument was on paper as a case in opposition to hedonism, and he wanted to show that hedonism is faulty because if contentment were, in actual fact, the only inherent value, we all jump into would the experience machine without hesitation. However, Nozick proves that the pleasure is not the only intrinsic value for reasons similar to what you had stated, such as spontaneity (Michael). Analysis of the criticisms and their position in the Argument In my consideration, most of the criticism is nullified by the experience machine. Of course, people could argue that the Experience Machine cannot be applied in reality, however, it inherently makes it worse, that the machine takes away ones knowledge of the falsity of its reality. So individuals who plug-in will not have any knowledge that they are plugged in (Kodali & Venkata). In addition, one have to figure out the response of tailoring machines to have similar life experience today, but people have a different rich culture and family member live to see their old age. In my personal argument concerning the Experience machine, I would argue that the pleasure derived from lifes activities originates from, at least in part, a feature of spontaneity. The development of our personal personalities, psychologies and connections are all the result of chaotic forces and our personal life decisions. To plug into the experience machine, we abandon our identities for a pre-made one. The understanding that the machine is like a super being entity allows us to hypothesize the cores in our life. In essence, it is a way of planning your life out whether you choose to live out your days in the machine. Therefore, human satisfaction, endeavors and pursuit of happiness would be unreal in the machine since they have been pre-designed. Works cited Alpaydin, Ethem. Possible criticisms for Nozecks’s Experience machine. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2010. Print. Harriet Baber. “The Experience Machine Deconstructed,” University of San Diego. August 2008. Internet resource. Top of Form Lakshminarayana, Kodali, and Reddy K. Venkata. The Experience Machine. New Delhi: New Age International Ltd, 2006. Internet resource. Top of Form Top of Form Matthews, Michael. Nozick, Happiness, and the Experience Machine, 2014. Internet resource. Bottom of Form Bottom of Form Bottom of Form Read More