Incompatibilism, Determinism, Meditations - Assignment Example

Incompatibilism, Determinism, Meditations Hume argues that actions that are not causally determined are accidental or random. Is he right, or can the incompatibilist successfully reply to this claim? (Explain with reference to Hume and at least one incompatibilist.) According to Hume, free will and determinism interact because human beings and their actions cannot escape the chain of cause and effect. According to Hume, determinism exists in free will, or free will exists in determinism, because situations, circumstances and inclinations stem from our cravings and desires (“Compatibilism”). In short, these situations are the effect, and our desires and cravings are the cause. In short, we desire things and every time we do this, these desires of ours bring about particular situations. This is deterministic in a sense because there is always cause and effect, and at the same time free will exists because it is us and not the external circumstances that bring about particular situations. Nevertheless, this thinking of Hume may actually be flawed in certain respects. First of all, the problem with compatibilists like Hume is that they believe that they and their desires and decisions are the only ones or the only factors that cause or bring about particular situations. They believe that they are free from constraints of whatever sorts. They also believe that freedom is simply “a matter of not being physically or psychologically forced or compelled to do what one does” (“Compatibilism”). However, according to the incompatibilist Thomas Reid, the so-called power of “free will” that compatibilists believe to absolutely possess is actually “no…independent of the Creator…His hook is in its nose; he can give it line as far as he sees fit, and, when he pleases, can restrain it, or turn it whithersoever he will” (“Thomas Reid”). This means that no matter how powerfully “free” the compatibilists believe they are, they perhaps do not realize the fact – or even just the possibility – that their free will is actually not absolute. They do not realize that perhaps a greater force is the one in command and controlling their very desires and instincts, which are the ones responsible for bringing about the situations that they believe only they themselves have caused. Another incompatibilist Peter van Inwagen believes that compatibilism, such as the one formulated by Hume, is actually not a sound theory. However, while Reid criticized the idea of free will, van Inwagen argued against both free will and determinism, or the deterministic aspect of the compatibilist. According to van Inwagen, in his Consequence Argument, “If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are: Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us” (“Peter van Inwagen”). Thus, for van Inwagen, not only is there no free will – there is also no true cause and effect relationships between what happened in the past and the present situation now. On the concept of free will, perhaps the compatibilist like Hume believes that he has full control and absolute free will although he does not realize that his character, preferences, personality and general motivation may actually have been predetermined by an unknown factor which is NOT him (“Compatibilist”). Therefore, since free will is impossible in these respects, then determinism is also naturally impossible. There was no free will that determined a particular cause and so there cannot be any result or effect that must have been brought about by such a cause. Furthermore, Hume does not consider the possibility that some people may actually be mere slaves to their pasts and thus constantly act from these decisions even at present without even ever realizing it. Perhaps, at a certain time in the past, some actions or decisions may have been freely decided upon by the person. However, perhaps, routine or habit has unconsciously and therefore involuntarily made such actions or decisions not anymore subject to free will. 2. Reid and van Inwagen give arguments for the conclusion that determinism is incompatible with freedom. Which of these arguments is most compelling and why? Can the compatibilist offer a compelling reply? The most compelling argument from those offered by van Inwagen and Reid is the former’s Consequence Argument. According to this argument, “If determinism [were] true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But [the truth is that] it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are,” thus we cannot be responsible for the results of these untoward events (“Peter van Inwagen”). This is actually self-explanatory and in fact, it is closer to the truth than anything else. Perhaps, there have been things that we have consciously willed but most of the things that give us stress or those that surprise us may not have been willed by us. This would include our parents and even the circumstances when we were born. There are some groups like those who believe in the Law of Attraction like we have willed everything even our births and all our circumstances but these lack concrete evidence and are at best mere theories. Moreover, according to van Inwagen, “I conclude that even if an [or one] episode of agent causation is among the causal antecedents of every voluntary human action, these episodes do nothing to undermine the prima facie impossibility of an undetermined free act” (“Peter van Inwagen”). Thus, for van Inwagen, as long as there is at least even just one external cause of any voluntary human action, then there is no way that free will is absolute. Consequently, there may be free will but it is not perfect in that it is still after all externally caused. Somehow, Thomas Reid’s argument on the Liberty of the Moral Agent also reinforces the aforementioned statements of van Inwagen. According to Reid, “The power over the determinations of [a person’s] own will, which belongs to him in ripe years, is limited, as all his powers are [and this includes] every action for which he is accountable” (“Thomas Reid”). This is because “this power [of free will] is given by his Maker, and at [the Maker’s] pleasure…it may be enlarged or diminished, continued or withdrawn” (“Thomas Reid”). Thus, for Reid, although the existence of God is not the one in question here, there is a great possibility that human free will is not free to the extent that it is the human himself who has willed it. The reason is that an external cause known as God may have been behind his human will that willed such a desire. The compatibilist cannot actually offer a very compelling reply to this argument. Perhaps, the compatibilist can say that God should not be included in the discussion. However, this is actually not a logical response to the argument. Therefore, one of the most compelling replies that a compatibilist can make regarding the issue of incompatibilism and the Consequence Argument of van Inwagen is that all human actions may have been actually caused one’s free will both consciously and UNCONSCIOUSLY. This means that the accident that happened and the negative situations that befall us may have actually been brought about by our misuse of the power of our free will. Nevertheless, this idea will simply change the meaning of free will to something that includes even unconscious desires, which are actually neither concrete nor objectively proven. The true meaning of “free will” in philosophy does not include unconscious desires for whatever is unconscious is not in the full knowledge of the doer and is therefore imposed and not free will. 3. What is Descartes’ ontological argument? Critically evaluate the argument and one major objection to it. Do you think the objection is strong enough to refute the argument? Why or why not? Descartes’ ontological argument regarding God’s existence is that God exists because He is perfect. According to Meditations V, “Certainly the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number” (Nolan). This means that God is intelligible to Descartes’ mind as geometric shapes are. Now, if one connects this with the statement prior to this – “if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea of something that entails everything that I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it, is not this a possible basis for another argument to prove the existence of God?” (Nolan). This means that just because Descartes can confidently conceive of things in his mind and be able to exactly mentally consider that these things actually represent real things, then he believes that he can do the same thing with God. God is therefore intelligible to him and God is perfect, so he must therefore exist. If God is not intelligible, how can He be conceived? If God is not perfect, then how can He exist? Thus, God, exists. In short, whatever Descartes perceives is assumed to be true of the thing he perceives. Then, he perceives God’s necessary existence on the premise of perfection. Therefore, God must exist. Nevertheless, one objection to Descartes’ Ontological Argument is similar to the one Gaunilo used against St. Anselm centuries earlier. The objection is that Descartes’ ontological argument seems to “[make] an illicit logical leap from the mental world of concepts to the real world of things” (Nolan). This means that Descartes may simply be presuming too much by assuming the existence of God merely from logical deduction. Therefore, God may not actually exist just because Descartes has logically conceived Him in his mind. It is like thinking out the most logically possible crime that a suspect committed in a given set of circumstances but which he actually may not have committed. Moreover, according to Johannes Caterus, one who objected to the Meditations, “Even if it is granted that a supremely perfect being carries the implication of existence in virtue of its very title, it still does not follow that the existence in question is anything actual in the real world” (Nolan). This means that logical deduction about God is simply not an objective proof of the reality of God. No matter what Descartes may have possibly conceived in his mind about God and no matter how logically it may seem, they are actually still mere thoughts. The point is that nothing, therefore, can actually beat the mere fact that one has really found God in the actual world instead of just deducing His reality from logic. 4. Descartes argues for the distinctness of mind and body in Meditations 6. What other arguments from the Meditations does this proof rely on? Does this proof succeed? Why or why not? Rene Descartes devoted his Meditations VI to the argument that the mind is never identical to the body. Aside from the arguments that Descartes presented in Meditations VI regarding dualism, he also presents another one from Meditations II regarding this topic. The Argument from Doubt, which Descartes states in Meditations II, seeks to prove the validity of dualism. From the proof of the Cogito, one can determine the argument for dualism. Basically, from the point of view of Descartes, one can say, “I can doubt that I have a body,” then “I cannot doubt that I am” simply because I am the one doing the doubting. Therefore, “I exist” but as a mind. Thus, “I who am doubting and who is the mind am not the body which I am doubting.” This means that the mind and the body are different. I can still therefore doubt that I have a body although I am certain that I exist as a mind (Calef). This is indeed somehow logically correct if the attributes of the mind and the body are distinct from each other in reality as they are assumed to be distinct mentally and metaphysically. Nevertheless, this argument does not succeed because of its flaws when applied in reality. If one assumes that the mind and the body are two different terms for two different substances, then the argument is valid. However, in reality, as argued by some monists, there could be two different terms “mind” and “body” but they may actually refer to only one particular substance in reality. For example, if Lois Lane thought that she doubted Superman was a journalist but she did not doubt that Clark Kent was a journalist, she would think that Superman and Clark Kent would be entirely different from each other, by virtue not only of appearance but also of ignorance. Another flaw from the dualistic theory of Descartes is that, using the Superman analogy, Lois Lane might only be using DOUBT as the ultimate basis of existence, which may actually be a poor basis for determining the existence of a thing or the distinction between two concepts. Just because she doubts Superman does not mean Superman does not exist. Moreover, the fact that she doubts Superman and does not doubt Clark Kent does not say anything at all about the nature of Superman or Clark Kent. Thus, if one has to determine the existence of one thing and its distinction from another, one should at least utilize an objective quality of that thing and not merely our own perspective of it. This proof of dualism by Descartes therefore does not succeed because it refers to the idea that doubt is the only basis for whether something exists or not, or how distinct the mind is from the body. Moreover, the proof does not succeed because doubt cannot simply say anything objective about the thing or things being doubted. Lastly, there might actually be the same thing that the “body” and the “mind” refer to but that these two things are actually perceived by the logical mind differently because of the two different terms. Top of Form Bottom of Form Works Cited Calef, Scott. “Dualism and Mind.”  Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014. Web. 16 May 2014. Compatibilism." Free Will. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014. Web. 15 May 2014. Nolan, Lawrence. “Descartes’ Ontological Argument."  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011. Web. 16 May 2014. Peter van Inwagen." Philosophers. The Information Philosopher, 2014. Web. 15 May 2014. Thomas Reid." Philosophers. The Information Philosopher, 2014. Web. 15 May 2014. Read More