Analysis of Hegels Conception of Freedom - Essay Example

Yufei Ma Phil 204 Andrew J. Mitchell Analysis of Hegel’s Conception of Freedom Introduction Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel believes that freedom is not merely an introspective aspect of moral grounds, but arises through one’s social relationship with other people. As argued by Hegel, “Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or ‘recognized’” (Hegel 60). Hegel, in his Philosophy of Right, explains freedom through its particular social perspectives of civil society and family life. The growth of freedom culminates in an individual’s full acceptance of the political rule of the state, because the ideals of mutual recognition are naturally engraved in the constitution of the sovereign state (Hegel 19). In other words, the basic interest or self-identity of every individual is attributed with ethical value in the general legitimacy and wisdom of the state. Hegel hence places the will to freedom in the historically actual agency of the supreme state. Hegel believes that the state represents the realization of social freedom. This essay analyzes the argument of Hegel that freedom is only possible within the state. The Hegelian Idea of Freedom Hegel argues that the final stage of consciousness, which he largely associates with national consciousness, is the acceptance that human beings are naturally free. According to Hegel, it is only through the nation-state—which he defines as a cultural aggregation of people—that freedom is realized. Hegel makes use of the concept ‘rational’ to refer to aspects that advance freedom; in history, the advancement of freedom expresses itself through the nation-state. The importance of a state does not depend on its distinctiveness or individuality that should then be safeguarded at all costs. A nation-state is an institution within which individuals can better attain freedom. Nation-states and their different features are exercised by world spirit to realize an increasingly actual achievement of freedom (Hegel 28). This advancement of freedom, Hegel argues, occurs in phases because different states embody different phases of the realization of freedom. A particular state can merely represent one phase of world history. Once the role of a state in world history has ended, it ceases to be a part of world history. And it also ceases to guarantee individual freedom. According to Hegel, only nation-states can play a role in world history. He argues: “In world history our topic can only be nations that form states. For it must be understood that only a nation that has become a state is the realization of freedom” (Hegel 10, 19). World history is the story of humankind’s movement toward freedom. Hegel believes that the objective of world history is for every individual to attain real freedom. Freedom can only be realized through the state, specifically, in a society where the wellbeing of individuals is embraced but individuals also create their own goals on behalf of the greater good (Hegel 22). Therefore a world-historical nation is an assemblage of culturally connected individuals, enclosed in a state, which further promotes the realization of freedom. According to Hegel, nations that have not played a role in world history have no history in this regard. He then tried to determine whether nations have played a role in the achievement of freedom. Hegel shows how the individual remains autonomous in a state. He uses the concept of recognition as a central ideal for evaluating the legitimacy of the state and other social institutions. Individuals should feel and see that their interests are respected and integrated in their institutions, which consequently strengthens their enthusiasm to relate to and give up certain privileges for the benefit of these institutions (Hegel 18). Hegel identifies in the notion of recognition an essence of ordering a system of social institutions, progressing from situations of unfreedom through a string of negotiations that promote the utmost realization of freedom. Hence recognition signifies not just a system of intersubjectivity but also an evolution where in freedom is increasingly negotiated and attained, proceeding from the family through the law, civil society, and state (Hegel 41). This mechanism progresses toward a growing recognition of freedom and a growing consciousness of freedom. The state is expected to accomplish this progression of recognition and freedom. Because Hegel clearly does not define the state in the ‘usual’ manner political and social scientists do, he is protected from numerous of the criticisms against his idea of freedom and the state. I, personally, agree with Hegel’s emphasis on the state as the site of freedom. The focus of one of the key criticisms has been Hegel’s idea of freedom as submission to the state. This criticism is flawed. For Hegel, a state is not only a political unit but an unusual form of ethical community. Thus the individual realizes his/her freedom in compliance to the state because in an ethical community it is not difficult to specify what an individual should do, the obligations s/he has to carry out in order to be moral and honorable: s/he has to pursue the recognized and clear conditions of his/her situation. It is a saying that “the state in and by itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of freedom” (Hegel 75). Obviously, Hegel views freedom in a unique way, dissimilar from sheer lack of control. That real freedom is to be realized in the state, viewed as a form of ethical community, is an entirely separate idea from the argument that associates freedom with submission to the political state. This argument resembles the theory of the ‘social contract’ where in individuals are given the freedom to enter an agreement with the state. Once an individual agrees to a social contract, s/he is bound to lose a certain extent of his/her natural liberty in order for the state to protect his/her rights to freedom. This is what Hegel is trying to argue. The Hegelian idea of freedom is as intricate in definition as his ideas of the state, and it involves a particular argument which is more often related to Marx than with Hegel himself. This is the argument that in order to truly achieve freedom a community of people should have the resources to structure their relations that they characterize their reasonably embraced ideas of ethical life. This authority people obtain by creating a strongly structured public power, which can promote their ethical values and their specific interests, specifically, by being not just a civil society or ethical community but a political state as well (Hegel 42). However, this power should not only be present, but it should also operate in a particular manner; to be in harmony with freedom, or to characterize freedom within the domain of ethical life. I also believe that it is another misunderstanding that Hegel’s idea of the state requires an absolute obligation to comply with whatever the state dictates. The political state has legal power; whether it also has power in another way-- moral, for instance-- is doubtful. Individuals do usually comply with the idea that legal laws represent ‘rational’ rules, specifically, such as would be thought to be in agreement with ethical life when considered, but Hegel often emphasizes that the rationality of legal laws must never be ignored, and may actually be absent (Hegel 41-42). Although Hegel believes that conformity to laws is in several instances an issue of trust or sentiment instead of informed idea it is the latter which generates strong certainty that, for instance, a public program fulfils ethical standards or promotes the wellbeing of the ethical community (Hegel 70). The fact that the absolute political power holds an asset of sentiment and trust does not imply that it must or will consistently be followed. Hegel explains that when public authority becomes self-centered, dishonest and unprincipled, it forfeits its moral authority. Conclusions Evidently, Hegel believes that freedom can only be achieved through the state because the state possesses the means, such as the process of negotiation, to realize and attain freedom. However, Hegel clearly differentiates his idea of a state from the usual definition of a state as ‘political’ in order to substantiate his claim that individuals are free within a state. A ‘political’ state is one that demands submission of the people to public authority, whereas Hegel’s ‘state’ is one that builds sentiment and trust in order to gain the approval of the people. Work Cited Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Introduction to the Philosophy of History: With Selections from the Philosophy of Right. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 1988. Print. Read More