Marx's Views about Religion - Research Paper Example

In a work d “The German Ideology”, Karl Marx presents an argument which concludes that ‘religion’ is the outcome of the material relations whichdetermine the social structure of society. Rather than understanding religion or religious belief, as a form of consciousness which shapes human existence, he argues for the converse, the material conditions of human existence, determine the spiritual practices concerning religion. Marx writes: “Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness” [Marx, 1997: 245]. It will be argued in the following that this is the guiding thread for his critique of religion. His critique of religion, it will be argued is a critique of metaphysics. His aim in the critique is to refute the idea that history is marked by spiritual progress, and in turn, replace this with a progress defined by a class struggle, and in particular, the material relations surrounding the means of production. Thus, the relationship between his critique of religion and his political economy, is the replacement of spiritual progress with that of the class struggle. Concerning the issue of research methodology, the following analysis will pay careful attention to what is employed by Marx. His approach on this issue, includes textual interpretation. That is, he provides analysis of key texts like the philosopher, Georg Hegel. Second, his methodology in the following is historical interpretation. In particular, he focuses on economic history but also social history. “The German Ideology” is his most decisive criticism of religion. And, while a critique of religion, it is largely a criticism of one of his philosophical predecessors, Georg Hegel, and moreover, criticizing the many students or followers of Hegel in the nineteenth century [Marx, 1997: 342-3].. In his most influential work, The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel maintained that history is defined by a progress where consciousness unfolds in progressive phases toward a form of absolute knowledge. Thus, the reformation can be regarded as a change of consciousness that emancipates the individual consciousness from the determination of the consciousness by the church. In turn, this change of consciousness or of thinking, helps to shape and change history itself. By contrast, Marx outlines the material conditions which determine the social relations manifest in any given culture, and further, these material conditions are the cause of forms of consciousness. Consciousness in this sense, includes also the various forms of belief systems which religion consists of. He describes the ‘priority’ of material conditions against consciousness as a determinant for human behavior and of politics, therefore, in the following: “Men distinguish themselves by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like . . . they . . . distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence . . . by producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life” [Marx, 1997: 341]. Marxs critique of Hegel is central to his critique of religion. It will therefore require some analysis to demonstrate Marxs materialistic interpretation of history over and against Hegels spiritual reading of history. Marx views Hegels philosophy, along with religion, as essentially a “mystical” position [Marx, 1970, p. 27]. By ‘mystical’, it is implied in terms of an argument which is beyond the bounds of reason, and by ‘reason’, it is implied in the material or physical sense of the term. Or, it is implied in terms of something which can be verified empirically or through sense experience. In other words, and in keeping with what was said above, it can be said that the person which Hegel is describing is ‘metaphysical’, and it is ‘metaphysical’ precisely because the person in question is ‘mystical’ or beyond experience and materialism. As Karl Marx asserts, he is ascribing attributes which something which is beyond experience, or something which is mystical when the object where the attributes come from is actually a “concrete thing” [Marx, 1970, p. 27]. In keeping with what has been argued so far, ‘rationality’ is something which belongs to the faculty of a concrete individual, and not to society. Hegel thinks that the “concept” [Marx, 1970, p. 27] can be defined in terms of the progress of reason unfolding itself in the consciousness of society, and Marx explains this dimension in the philosophy of Hegel for most of the body of the text in question. In other words, one of the attributes or qualities which is ascribed to society as a result of the progress of history, is that the whole of society in itself is working toward reason. That is, in the age of the Enlightenment which Hegel regards as the end of the historical epoch in which he is writing, he argues that the rationality of the ‘ethos’ or epoch of history will coincide with the individual realizes. This is the notion that the ‘rational’ is ‘actual’ in the form of the concept as Marx asserts [Marx, 1970, p. 27]. However, Marx also adds to this notion that this is true of the ‘concept’, but not true in reality, so to speak. He maintains that this is true of the ‘concept’, but that this is as far as the ‘status’ of ‘rationality’ goes. That is, reason in relation to history and the individual can be said to be a “concept” as Marx asserts, but that this does not entail that this is manifest in reality or in the real material relations which determine society. Marx is maintaining that there is reason in ‘real’ and “concrete” living individuals, but there cannot be reason in anything as “abstract” as society as a whole or in history. What is implied by this, is that Hegel must be imposing some interpretation upon history. In other words, to create order in the progress or in the changes of history, is not to say that the progress is actually intrinsic to history. Rather, the progress in the above sense, is connected with the ‘interpretation’ of history. It can be said that the ‘themes’ of history vary depending on the interests or the agenda of the individual who is interpreting history. For example, the agenda of Karl Marx is one which maintains that history can be interpreted in terms of the class struggle, and Hegel argues that it can be interpreted in terms of ‘spirit’ or ‘reason’ unfolding. It does not follow that either of these interpretations or readings are correct, that is, history is just a sequence of events. And, if it is just a sequence of events, the claim that there is rationality intrinsic or inherent in this phenomenon, is really just to claim that that it can be interpreted as such. There is no more ‘reason’ in history, than there is in the idea that a rock falls downward because of gravity. There is rationality in the explanation, but there is not rationality in the object which is being explained. Rationality is to be understood only as a product of individual consciousness, and for Marx, society and individual consciousness, is thus determined by the relationship surrounding the means of production [Marx, 1997, p. 331-6]. Consciousness or religious belief systems, must be understood within this relationship. As is generally known, Marx regarded religion as the ‘opiate of the masses’, and thus, religion is situated as legitimating those who own the means of production (aristocratic or bourgeoisie class) over and against those who have to sell their own labour, in order to survive – that is, the proletariat or working class. In this respect, one can see, for example, that religion, as a form of consciousness, if based on a hierarchy – that is, from God to the church to the people. And, such a form of consciousness, typifies the hierarchy in society surrounding the means of production, namely, between owners and workers – those who use others labour to survive (buying, using or selling it) and those who depend upon their own labour for subsistence. If the ‘well-being’ of all, can be understood as eradicating these classes, then, the role of the state for Marx in respect to religion, can be argued to be one where religion is eradicated. In other words, if religion is both a product of material relations and is typified, as Marx states by “phantoms” [Marx, 1997, p. 345] rather than “actual life” processes [Marx, 1997, p. 344], then, what function does it serve in society? Indeed, it serves, according to Marx, the function of legitimating the interests of those in control of the means of production, and in turn, it does so by asserting a form of authority based on a hierarchy, but also, makes the under class believe that the ‘meek shall inherit the earth’ – that is, the idea that justice will be served, not through a revolution that changes the relationships surrounding the means of production (realistic), but through some form of salvation – that is, some form of a ‘phantom’, according to Marx. Thus, the general well being of all, and achieving this through the state, would involve the eradication of traditional religious dogma. In terms of his core theory of political economy, he wants to argue or maintain that the dialectic of history is marked by the class struggle rather than a form of spiritual progress. That is, rather than maintaining that the progress of history can be defined in terms of the metaphysics of the concept or the notion of spirit, that instead, there is a struggle surrounding the means of production. There are those who own their own means of production, and those who have to sell their labour in order to subsist. That is, individuals or the proletariat whose labour is a commodity which can be bought and sold, and which has a market value, so to speak. He argues that this is the core of the basic inequality and unjust nature nature of both history and society, and in this respect, Karl Marx wants to argue that the movements in history are defined in terms of the overcoming of this problem. That is, the notion of ‘natural equality’ will be achieved once the class struggle is overcome, and in turn, society will become defined in terms of communism rather than as a society which has the fundamental quality or attribute of being unequal. Thus, Karl Marx is offering a materialist explanation of the movement of history rather than an idealistic one – that is, with respect to Hegel’s idealism, and this is critical for understanding how he distinguishes his own thought from religion. For Marx there were simply two classes of people in society: those who owned their own means of production which amounted to property which in the above terms represents a commodity and those who had to sell their labour power in order to make a living [Alvineri, 1979, p. 61]. That is, the proletariat who did not own his or her own means of production. A labourer or labour in Marxs sense needs to be qualified here in relation to commodity. The worker in the eyes of an owner according to Marx is a "commodity" [Alvineri, 1979, p. 64]. The question is what sort of commodity? Obviously a worker is not a commodity in the sense of a truck or an office building. As a commodity the worker is defined as a "use-value"[Alvineri, 1979, p. 66] commodity. The capitalist does not buy the product of one of his employees. The capitalist/owner buys the labourers use-value and this use-value is always less than the value of that which the worker creates which in turn creates a surplus-value and therefore a "profit"[Alvineri, 1979, p. 66]. In other terms, the workers use-value is essentially what the owner of a factory pays for the use of the workers time and energy and if for example a worker makes ten dollars an hour and produces goods that will net the company twenty-dollars in that hour of work, then a surplus value or profit is created. (Accounting for of course the use-value of overhead and other expenses.) The surplus value then stands as the most important aspect in the eyes of an owner because it represents profit. Profit as is generally known is what drives most businessmen or capitalists. Consequently the capitalists profit is tied directly to the extent to which he can successfully exploit a worker, that is, the more the owner can make a worker work and for less money the greater the profit. Further, the process of seeking profit leads to accumulation which is generated by the surplus which in turn leads to "the concentration of capital"[Alvineri, 1979, p. 68]. Thus, alienation has to be understand in terms of the process of production itself. Alienation in the very activity of producing a surplus, implies that the work itself is external to the worker. He is not capable of developing himself either mentally or physically, and his labour is not voluntary, but instead, it is coerced. In terms of the prior definition of the satisfaction of need, which Marx thinks as part of human nature, man is cut off from his own nature given that he is a form of "slavery" [Marx, 1964, p. 110] in the activity of selling his labour. For Marx, it is this rational recognition of being cut off from ones own essence that represents the crucible of alienation. That is, it is not so much that this relation surrounding the means of production is alienating, but, the fact that a worker recognizes and feels this sense of estrangement. In a sense, Marx thinks that actual and practical daily life, must be brought into accord with human essence, which as defined above is linked to the process of objectification and the ends of freedom. Thus, he argues that only when objectification in this form is achieved, is alienation and estrangement overcome: nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labour is, therefore, the objectification of mans species life; for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he has created [Marx, 1964, p. 114]. His antidote then, is a social and economic process where man consciously participates, and where he can control and direct the process of objectification for his own benefit. It is important to note at this point that Marx thinks that alienation and estrangement are present not solely in a capitalist economy, but in any market or exchange economy. For example, in his "Comments on Mill", Marx criticizes the general theory of political economy of misunderstanding the natural essence of man[Marx, 1967, p. 272-5]. He does this by providing an outline of the development of a n exchange economy, and focuses ultimately on the dimension of ownership and private property, which he claims as that which facilitates exchange, bartering, and ultimately wage labour: "Exchange or barter, therefore, is the social generic act . . . the externalized generic act" [Marx, 1967, p. 275]. It is the externalization of exchange itself which is alienating-- that is, any exchange where someone is separated from the thing that he or she has produced. The concept of alienation is linked conceptually with the process of `objectification. Marx argues that any product produced by industry is objectified labour, given that labour itself has been embodied in the product or the object. In short, labour has created a product or an object and is therefore tied to it in a relation. In order to create a product, a worker needs nature as the "material" in which the labour itself is realized and acted upon[Marx, 1967, p. 108]. However, objectification in nature for Marx is necessary, and itself cannot be overcome. It is the proper activity of humans in any type of economy, and is described as the "true species of life" [Marx, 1967, p. 112]. That is, the demands of human need and of human nature dictate that the process of objectification occur, and thus the term "objectification" refers to nature as it transforms nature to satisfy human need, and more importantly this accords with the natural aim of achieving "freedom" [Marx, 1967, p. 135; 140-1]. He writes therefore that this entire process is the essence of life, and that it must take place both "consciously" and "purposely"[Marx, 1967, p. 112]. Toward this purposive activity, economies and social relations are developed. And, in the capitalist economy individuals are cut off or estranged from this very process of objectification-- that is, they are cut off from the natural process of transforming nature for the attainment of freedom. Thus, alienation has to be viewed as initially an alienation from nature. For Marx, what a worker needs is nature as an object for the means of his or her own subsistence. And, in an exchange economy or a market economy, nature is transformed through labour into products that result in a loss to the worker. Since the worker is not in control of the product, yet he still has a need for it, he has in turn become a slave to it: the more he produces, the less he possesses [Marx, 1967, p. 109]. It is this concept of a surplus value of a labours work which is a key economic notion of Marxs that has to be explained as it links to the concept of alienation. In conclusion, Marx views religion as distracting and misinforming people from the actual forces of human history. Famously, he called this the opiate of the masses. As a materialist, he argues that it is the fundamental relationships surrounding the means of production that explain how history progresses. Or, the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Therefore, the relationship between his critique of religion and ideology, and political economy, is the idea that what is actual as far as who the owners are and who are those who have to sell their labour in order to subsist. Where Hegel viewed history as a progress of consciousness toward the end of freedom, Marx argued that the progress is illusory because of the fundamental bondage that subsisted for the worker. Philosophy and religion, the therefore argued, were only a way of legitimating the system that persisted through whatever spiritual and philosophical transformations occurred through history. The underlying forces were not intellectual, but material. Moreover, he equates religion and philosophy as ideological. That is, as forces that served to legitimate the fundamental power structures or relations that did actually govern history in a material and therefore, empirically discernible way. His methodologies toward proving this are two-fold, he does philosophical and textual analysis, and he analyses both social and economic history. His critique of Hegel in the German Ideology typifies his philosophical/textual analysis, and his analysis of the class struggle exemplifies his social and economic historical method. Works Cited: Alvineri, Shlomo. The Development of the Thought of Karl Marx (New York: The Free Press, 1979). Marx, Karl. Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’. Edited by Joseph OMalley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). Marx, Karl. “Manifesto of the Communist Party” and “The German Ideology” in Nineteenth-Century Philosophy. Edited by Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufmann. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1997. Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. translated by M. Milligan (New York: International, 1964). Marx, Karl. Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society. edited by L.D. Easton and K.H. Guddat (Garden City: Anchor, 1967). 2. ‘The critique of religion is the foundation of all critique’ (Karl Marx). What is the relationship between religion and political economy in Marx’s critique of ideology? TITLE: Marxs Critique of Religion and its Relationship to his Views on Political Economy. Read More