How Does the Social World Become Meaningful According to Alfred Schutz's Phenomenology - Term Paper Example

What is the social world, and how does it become meaningful according to Alfred Schutzs phenomenology and the social world. The work of Alfred Schutz on phenomenology and social world (in 1932) has been used in order to reflect the views of sociologists in Austria regarding the representation of aspects of life through symbols that are appropriately interpreted. In accordance with Knudsen (2004) the main theme of the specific work of Schutz ‘is that conceptualizations in the social sciences are of a second-order nature, since they build on the conceptualizations already formed by social actors in their everyday lives about other social actors’ (Knudsen, 2004, 45). Other assumptions have been also made regarding the use of phenomenology by Alfred Schutz for the representation of specific social relationships and facts. Schutz has dealt with many different social facts and concepts. Time was an indicative part of the social life which was examined by Schutz; the latter tried to represent time using appropriate concepts, like the concept of meaning. Towards this direction, it is noticed that Schutz highlighted in his work ‘the temporal structure determines the uniqueness of meaning: the latter is a function of lived-through time, of each individuals life-story’ (Muzzetto, 2006, 5). Time is mentioned as an indicative aspect of social life – or else of the social world – that is used in the development of the theory of phenomenology. Phenomenology – as explained by Schutz – has been used in order to interpret a series of social facts and actions including the methods that are appropriate in scientific research and those that are most appropriate in the development of the professional practice. It is for this reason that Wilson (2003) supported that ‘phenomenology offers an integrative philosophical perspective that might also help to resolve the research/practice problems’ (Wilson, 2003, 445). In order to understand the description of social world as is included in the work of Schutz on phenomenology and social world, it should be necessary to refer primarily to the elements of phenomenology – as being used for the explanation of the various aspects of social world. In accordance with a definition published by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ‘phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view; the central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object’ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009). In the above definition phenomenology seems to be related more with the personal perceptions of individuals and less with the aspects of the social world. A similar definition is included in the report published by the Centre for Advance Research on Phenomenology (2009). In the above report it is made clear that phenomenologists are based on specific social concepts and events in order to explain the causes of reactions or the purposes of specific actions (Centre for Advance Research on Phenomenology, 2009, online report). In accordance with the above, phenomenology is depended either on personal beliefs or social ideas. When having to explain a specific social event, the hierarchy by which social and personal perceptions are set is depended not only on the theory used (which can be appropriately customized as in the case of phenomenology) but also on the perceptions of the theorist(s) involved in the specific task. The reference to the concept of social world in the specific study of Schutz is extended. In fact, it is stated that the foundations of phenomenology can be identified in the two following concepts: ‘the social sciences and the Life world’ (Schutz, 1970, 12). These two concepts are characterized by Schutz as the foundations of phenomenology as it is further analyzed and described by the specific theorist. At a next level, the relationship between the above two concepts and the social world is clearly emphasized. More specifically, it is noticed that ‘the life world is a social-world which in turn is pre-structured for the individual’ (Schutz, 1970, 16). In accordance with the above description, social world is the social environment of an individual as this environment influences the various aspects of the individual’s life. At a next level, the social world is related with the community in which an individual lives. It is not made clear whether the views of people in the community – as the latter represents the social world surrounding the individual – can have a major influence on a person’s perceptions. However, even if there is not a direct influence on a person’s perceptions and thoughts, still there can be an indirect dependence on specific social ethics and values. This dependency is based on the fact that the individual considers his environment as being untouched from the interventions of specific social and political powers. For this reason, it is stated that ‘the individual takes the social world for granted as the existence and use or avoidance of natural objects or animals found in his natural environment’ (Schutz, 1970, 16). In accordance with the above, the social world seems to be in stability – no development or change takes place, everything remains the same through the decades; however such a perception cannot be accepted. Even if a person supports the above view, his opinion would be just an assumption reflecting an imaginary – not real – context; this context would be described as phenomenology which is best explained as the concept that reflects the development of assumptions that are based on non-existed facts. At a next level, it is noticed by Schutz that the importance of social world for the explanation of specific social events can be understood only if the above concept is related with the concept of relevances. The latter are characterized by Schutz as the ‘social heritage that is part of any community’ (Schutz, 1970, 24). These relevances are used in order to explain the responses of individual to the events of the social world – as described above. In this context, it is noticed that ‘the individual with all his personal problems and his actual relevances, of course, is found acting in a social world which has already provided these broad domains of relevance, and he will orient himself upon them’ (Schutz, 1970, 24). It is made clear by Schutz that the world to which he refers in all his study is ‘a typified world’ (Schutz, 1970, 24). The above expression could be regarded as similar with the phrase ‘typical world’ although the adjective chosen shows that the world’s characteristics are not pre-set; they are rather formulated under the influence of the social and political framework of its specific era. Under these terms, the views of Schutz should be applicable in all societies around the world – there is no dependency of the concept of social world on specific social or political characteristics. An important characteristic of the theory of Schutz is that no metaphysical explanations of the social events are used or accepted; social world is regarded as a framework based on specific events and processes; the explanation of any event would be based rather on logical arguments and generally accepted theories. Furthermore, no geographic limitation of social world is identified in the work of Schutz. More specifically, social world is ‘accepted as a whole, including the large regions forever beyond the personal experience’ (Schutz, 1970, 40). The experience mentioned above is not the experience (background) of individuals; it is the experience of the specific sociologist as it is influenced by the work of other sociologists as well as the social and political context of the particular period. It is for this reason, that the concept of social world is considered to be related with other social concepts, like the concept of symbol. The latter is being described by ‘an object or event in the outer world’ (Schutz, 1970, 41). In this way there is the following sequence of relationships: the symbol is used in order to represent specific aspects (events) of the social world. The latter can be explained using different perceptions which do not always reflect the actual characteristics of the social world under discussion: phenomenology appears here in order to explain the interpretation of the social world and its influence on a person’s perceptions and reactions. The value of social world for the explanation of the causes of social events – in accordance with the issues presented above – cannot be limited by the fact that certain aspects of social world may be influenced by the personal perceptions of specific individuals. Reference is made to the close social environment of a specific person; in this case, social world is represented by the family or the friends. These individuals are likely to influence a person’s reactions to specific social events; phenomenology in this case is reflected to the views of the individuals – their views may be appropriately justified but there is always the risk that there are driven by their personal perceptions on particular social events/ characteristics. Another issue that is highlighted by Schutz is that the events of life may lead an individual to perceptions that do not reflect the actual social conditions; in this case social world can be used in order to bring the individual back to reality. Towards this direction, it is supported that ‘the realities of the life world assert their imposed relevances and push him out of the realm of his non-pragmatic pursuits; thus he must step back into the life-world’ (Schutz, 1970, 42). The intervention of the social world on a person’s perceptions can be major. There is no explanation given under which conditions an individual can be pushed out from the actual social conditions or perceptions – referring to his thoughts and his aspects on specific social events. It can be concluded that the close social environment – representing the social world – can influence the individual’s views and can lead him to specific reactions that would be interpreted using the concept of phenomenology; the individual would think that his perceptions involve in the actual social conditions but they may involve in non-real social conditions. The work of Schutz has been used by other sociologists in order to develop similar schemes and theories for the explanation of specific social events. In this context, it is noticed by Colllins (1993) that ‘Esser makes a useful contribution in extracting from Schutz a model of the rationality of choosing among projects of action, thereby indicating a second order of rationality in choosing whether to calculate or to stick with an accepted routine’ (Collins, 1993, 58). It is not made clear though which part of the work of Schutz is used for the development of Esser’s model or why the work of Schutz has been chosen among other similar theories in order to support the particular theory. It seems however that the work of Schutz is closely related with the work of Esser in a way that the current concept of phenomenology to be considered as being influenced more from the work of Esser than the work of Schutz. Even in this case, the model of Esser still presents a series of weaknesses. An indicative example is the claim of Esser that ‘institutional norms are the basis of routines’ (Collins, 1993, 58). The above view cannot be accepted without criticism. In this context, Collins (1993) stated that ‘the rational pursuit of interests operates via the flow of emotional energy attached to various courses of action’ (Collins, 1993, 58). The reference to the relationship between the work of Schutz and the work of Esser – and the influence of both of them on phenomenology – is made in order to make clear that social concepts – like phenomenology – even if they are based on specific theoretical models they can be alternated in order to respond to specific social needs; this alternation should not affect the fundamental context/ characteristics of these concepts; rather it should be limited to non-important parts of the models – an example is the explanation given to specific types of social actions (protests, oppositions to the political authorities and so on) using a particular social concept. Other theorists have also referred to the work of Schutz as the basis for the development of theories and concepts for the explanation of various social ideas and events. An indicative example is Costellloe (2004) who noticed that ‘Schutz initiates a scientistic sociology in which the commonsense structures of the natural attitude of everyday life are subverted and replaced by the more rigorous knowledge of the scientific attitude’’ (Costelloe, 2004, 247). The use by Schutz of scientific assumptions in order to explain the development of social events cannot be criticized; society – and therefore the social events and ideas – is closely related with all aspects of science (which is developed within specific social and cultural conditions and beliefs). Therefore any effort to claim the independency of sociology from science would fail even if it was theoretically supported; in this case, the interpretation of theory for the justification of this scheme would be invalid. The applicability of phenomenology in the explanation of social world cannot lead to the assumption that the specific concept does not suffer from weaknesses. In the literature it has been proved that ‘both phenomenology and social constructionism have failed to acknowledge the inherently normative dimension of social and cultural life’ (Baerveldt et al., 2005, 449). In other words, phenomenology – as in all other social concepts – has to be carefully interpreted and applied taking into consideration the intentions of its developers – i.e. the target to the achievement of which this social concept has been initially directed. Moreover, the interaction between all social theories – including phenomenology – has to be highlighted. In other words, all sociologists are likely to be influenced by the work of others; Schutz cannot be the exception. In fact, this interaction is necessary in order for the existing social theories to be improved and further developed. In accordance with Koppl (1997) ‘Alfred Schutz discovered the importance of anonymity in economic analysis and was thus able to make a fundamental contribution to the theory of economic expectations’ (Koppl, 1997, 63). The influence of the work of sociologists from existing social concepts cannot lead to the assumption that each one of them contributes one or more unique parts in sociology. Even if being influenced by the work of other sociologists, Schutz managed to develop a description of phenomenology that is still valid – even if social conditions and political characteristics of countries worldwide have been significantly changed. Generally, the concept of social world – as developed by Schutz – can be used in order to explain the reaction of individuals under specific social conditions; he can be also used in order to explain the inability of the state to enforce the application of specific social rules – when these rules do not reflect the social world – i.e. the local society’s beliefs and culture – they are likely to be rejected by the citizens. It should be also noticed that the work of Schutz is quite important in terms that it highlights the potential interaction between social events and personal perceptions even if this interaction can lead to non-real assumptions; the latter are explained using the concept of phenomenology. Works Cited Baerveldt, C., Voestermans, P. (2005) Culture, Emotion and the Normative Structure of Reality. Theory & Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 4, 449-473 Centre for Advanced Research on Phenomenology, 2009, online report, available from http://www.phenomenologycenter.org/phenom.htm Collins, R. (1993) The Rationality of Avoiding Choice. Rationality and Society, Vol. 5, No. 1, 58-67 Costelloe, T. (2004) Between the subject and sociology: Alfred Schutzs phenomenology of the life-world. Human Studies, Vol. 19, Issue 3, 247-266 Knudsen, C. (2004) Alfred schutz, Austrian Economists and the Knowledge Problem. Rationality and Society, Vol. 16, No. 1, 45-89 Koppl, R. (1997) Mises and Schutz on Ideal Types. Cultural Dynamics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 63-76 Lau, R. (2004) Critical Realism and News Production. Media, Culture & Society, Vol. 26, No. 5, 693-711 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – Alfred Schutz, (2006), available from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schutz/ Schutz, A., Wagner, H. (1970) On phenomenology and social relations: selected writings. Chicago: University of Chicago Press Muzzetto, L. (2006) Time and Meaning in Alfred Schütz. Time & Society, Vol. 15, No. 1, 5-31 Wilson, T. (2003) Philosophical foundations and research relevance: issues for information research. Journal of Information Science, Vol. 29, No. 6, 445-452 Wilson, T. (2002) Alfred Schutz, phenomenology and research methodology for information behaviour research - Fourth International Conference on Information Seeking in Context, Universidade Lusiada, Lisbon, Portugal, September 11 to 13, 2002, available from http://informationr.net/tdw/publ/papers/schutz02.html Read More