The Problem of Mind and Body in Philosophy - Essay Example

Eliminativism is just one of a series of materialist varieties of solutions to the mind/body problem—a problem which has haunted philosophers for hundreds of years ever since Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy. The difference consists of this doctrines’ chief assertion that so-called “commonsense” understandings of the concept of mind are all essentially false, (eliminativism refers to this commonsense understanding as “folk psychology”) and the various mental states that humans can identify, such as feeling sad or happy, do not properly exist. This positivist position on the mind has proven desirable for many analytic philosophers interested in developing a minimalistic position with respect to the mind—an issue is often seen as a dichotomy between objectionable materialism and mystical dualism (Stich, 1998, p. 51). Eliminativists postulate that everyday cognitive concepts like wants and knowledge are so poorly defined that they have no objective neurological basis, and that the neurological basis of cognition will provide stable definitions for these concepts. Eliminativism is a claim specifically related to the mind; however, eliminativism can also denote positions regarding any entity in one’s ontology. Eliminativists argue that the “folk psychology” has failed mankind--eventually needing replacement with descriptions derived from the neurosciences. Such philosophers thus highlight the significance of biological research, as well as recent findings in artificial intelligence to support the theory (Armstrong, 1999, p. 95). There are, however, few rational reasons to support this position in the philosophy of mind, except one’s dogmatic adherence to a completely scientific worldview. In fact, to accept the position, despite the lack of supporting evidence and the strength of the opposing arguments, would be, to some extent, irrational. First, however, it may instructive to give a fair look at how one could support the thesis of eliminative materialism. The most obvious support for such a view consists of support for the primary claim for the theory: the inescapably problematic nature of folk psychology for philosophers (Molnar, Mumford, & Armstrong, 2006, p. 219). Paul Churchland especially finds this line of reasoning most effective. He argues that folk psychology presents an informal yet a mature thesis about human action (Churchland, 1988). Nevertheless, theories made with concepts employed by the folk psychology cannot be scientific theories, until the folk psychology is extensively examined by reflections on the descriptive and analytical power in an investigation into the workings of the body and mind (Goldberg & Pessin, 1997, p. 56). However, they argue, folk psychology is wholly inadequate as it stands anyway. They recognize that typical terms are being analyzed and described formally with neuroscientific language. Among these phenomena are consciousness, memory, mental problems, and dreaming, all of which are becoming not a matter of private, first-hand experience, but of phenomena which can be analyzed scientifically and in the third-person (Heil, 2005, p. 183). Eliminative materialists also point to the argument for scientific anti-realism—the pessimistic meta-induction—to prove their point, but only with respect to the history of scientific theories that rely on folk psychology as proof (Ramsey, 2003). Ancient theories of physics, biology, and psychology based on folk concepts have repeatedly failed; the reason for the continued existence of folk psychology, the eliminativists argue, is because of the inherent usefulness of folk psychological concepts in everyday life, irrespective of time or place in history. However, this is merely because of a self-fulfilling prophecy: that folk psychology is itself a theory that a vast majority of people hold, and they perceive things to match this theory (Churchland, 1988). However, as problematic as folk psychology may be, this is no justification for the construction of an entire theory to address that problem, for there are certain objections to the eliminative materialism that are more devastating than that certain argument for the position (Eckert, 2006, p. 113). An argument that has been launched against many theories of mind, and not just eliminativism, is the argument from qualia, where qualia is a sensation known independently of any physical considerations—or, in other words, the irreducible primaries of subjective experience (Walter, 2007). As qualia exist as mental states, precisely those mental states that eliminativism rejects, they cannot be compatible with the thesis. However, as intuitive as the notion of qualia seem to be, the objection to eliminativism on the basis of qualia has not succeeded. Certain philosophers have taken the well-defended position of an outright rejection of the existence of qualia; the reason for doing so is the argument that the concept of qualia is based upon obsolete metaphysics, and, in particular, a Cartesian notion of the mind (Lockie, 2003). Another objection that does not outright disprove the eliminativist thesis but puts the eliminativist in a tough spot is an objection that asserts that the arguments given by eliminativism regarding the uselessness and unscientific nature of folk psychology are not convincing. This objection can be raised in either of two ways: either by the thought that mental events cannot be described by any physical theory at all, or by the thought that folk psychology actually works (Cunningham, 2000, p. 89). One may use this latter approach, combined with pragmatism, to assert that because folk psychology works reasonably well practically in communication of mental states to others—especially with implementation in only a few words—and such practicality could never be achieved by any neuroscientific or eliminativist language, folk psychology is favorable to all human beings rather than the eliminativist thesis. The philosopher Jerry Fodor, in his Psychosemantics, argues that the eliminativists use the example of mental disorders in their arguments against folk psychology precisely because one cannot ascribe that function to folk psychology (Fodor, 1989). The major line of argument against eliminative materialism, however, consists of the serious intuitive problems with the position. Firstly, it seems that individual human beings have instantaneous and unquestionable access to the content of their minds—their mental states. However, as intuitive as mental states seem to be, eliminativists object that our intuitive notions in philosophy are very often misguided (Searle, 2004). Once again, the eliminativists rely on the pessimistic meta-induction to prove this: the supposedly “intuitive” thought that things fall to the ground because they want to be at the center of the Earth turned out to be wrong with Aristotelian physics. Eliminativists extend this further to the mind to claim that the apparently intuitive thought that there are mental events in addition to physical events is equally false. Nevertheless, the easy restructuring of the objection in response to this eliminativist doubt exploits such easy rejection of mental conditions—that because mental states have such consequence in how human beings view the world, the arguments necessary to disprove them must be all the more convincing, and must not presuppose those things—mental states—that the eliminativists have set out to disprove, lest they be self-contradictory. No eliminativist, it is claimed, has given such a wholly convincing argument, or one that does not pre-suppose the existence of mental states, to overcome this objection. Thus, with like many theories, the evidence to support them is not sufficient, given the large expectations eliminativism gives itself for explanation, for anyone to rationally support the thesis (Rockwell, 2004). By considering both briefly the arguments for eliminative materialism as well as the arguments against the theory in greater detail, we have arrived at the conclusion that the thesis has not been supported by sufficient arguments and evidence for anyone to support it. Nevertheless, this conclusion does not mean that eliminative materialism is wrong by any stretch: it only means that eliminativism is inadequately supported. If, in the future, a philosopher or neuroscientist can present the evidence to fulfill eliminativism’s larger-than-life expectations, then this conclusion will change. But until that day comes, it remains most a matter of the analytic tradition in philosophy’s affinities for materialism and science. Works Cited Armstrong, D. M. (1999). The Mind-body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction. Sydney: Westview Press. Churchland, P. M. (1988). Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Boston: The MIT Press. Cunningham, S. (2000). What is a Mind? An Integrative Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Eckert, M. (2006). Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Chicago: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Fodor, J. (1989). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Boston: The MIT Press. Goldberg, S., & Pessin, A. (1997). Gray Matters: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Chicago: M.E. Sharpe. Heil, J. (2005). From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lockie, R. (2003). Transcendental Arguments Against Eliminativism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 54, No. 4 , 569-583. Molnar, G., Mumford, S., & Armstrong, D. M. (2006). Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ramsey, W. (2003, May 8). Eliminative Materialism. Retrieved November 26, 2008, from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/ Rockwell, T. (2004, May 11). Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind - eliminativism. Retrieved November 26, 2008, from http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/eliminativism.html Searle, J. R. (2004). Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stich, S. P. (1998). Deconstructing the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Walter, S. (2007). Epiphenomenalism. Retrieved November 20, 2008, from Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/epipheno.htm Read More