An Alternative Concept of Knowledge - Article Example

ARTICLE REVIEW: THE DARK SIDE OF KNOWLEDGE David Seidle, Ph.D. This article was written to explore the concepts of knowledge and intelligence within the organizational framework using the perspective of N. Luhmanns theory of social systems. It also uses the contributions of other authorities to reinforce Seidls synthesis of knowledge and non-knowledge insofar as they apply to management in social systems. The writer begins with a discussion of knowledge by providing an alternative concept of what knowledge is – as not merely an accumulable human capital as assets of organizations, where the assumption is that it is better to have more of it rather than less. Seidls alternative is a “sophisticated,” “dialectical” concept that implies the existence of non-knowledge, because knowledge alone, the author asserts, misses the point. Managements of organizations should also focus on non-knowledge as an essential constituent of intelligence. To Seidl, cognition, the act or process of knowing, is not just representation of outside reality but a “creative” - and even “destructive” act – that “produces” the object of cognition. Knowledge, by his conception, “organizes” that creative or destructive act, while non-knowledge organizes the alternative. The author also devises a new meaning for the word “observation” which he views as a system operation or system event, which exists even if if is not observed visually. Observation under this new conception is basic, and from it are derived such concepts as “thing,” “thought,” “action,” “communication,” and so on. In this radical sort of cognition, he attempts to twist around the common understanding about which comes first – the existent, or the agent doing the observation. Spencer-Brown, one of those who subscribe to this mode of thinking, focuses on the observation process as a process of selection, analyzing the observer, asking why the observer observes a particular object and not another. There are two acts of observation: 1) making a distinction (which this researcher would like rephrase as “the act of distinguishing”) and 2) indicating. Distinguishing means demarcating something into two distinct and separated spaces which the author calls “states” or “contents.” Indicating means concentrating on one thing and ignoring the other. The observer cannot focus on both (modern parlance: “cannot multi-task”). Seidl calls this a transition from symmetrical to the asymmetrical where the observer observes only one object. The observed side he calls the “marked” state, and the unobserved side the “unmarked” state. The whole thing observed – the marked and the unmarked states, plus the distinction – is called the “form” of the distinction. Citing Cooper, the author states a paradox: The distinction both distinguishes and unites. What happens when one focuses on one side? You get a “blind spot” on the other side. Simple enough. Once one enters into the one side, the other sort of vanishes, or becomes “latent.” One can see that distinction when one gets out and sees it from outside. More on observation: There is a first-order observation wherein the observer performs the distinguishing, and there is a second-order observation wherein the observer looks at the first observer and sees the blind spot of the first observer and knows why. He also sees that the first observer could have chosen other modes of distinguishing (the fact of contingency). Then there can be a third-order observation and so on, where the previous observer becomes the “first-order” observer from the viewpoint of the current observer. When one observes, something is visible – but this act, the author claims, creates invisibility or unobservability. The above concepts are applied to social systems (from groups to nations). When a decision or anything else is communicated in this context, other communications are shunted aside, ignored, or forgotten. The latter are the unmarked side in the above model of the form of distinction. It is also important to remember that observation is not knowledge. Observation, it may be recalled, is any system in operation, or any system event, even, quite paradoxically, independent of any observer. Knowledge is the structure that guides or orients the system at work. It is the structure of the observing process, it guides and orients the process of distinction or distinguishing. Words of a language provides structure (schema) of observation. What is distinguished depends on the language and the words used. Other structures are communication categories (such as “human being,” mineral”, etc.) Structures that relate system events to others produce meaning. The two structures above comprise the “double” function of knowledge. How does knowledge come about? This duality of structure states: Knowledge determines what observation is produced, but observation in turn influences the production of knowledge. Condensation is generalized distinction. Different concrete observations are stripped of context and “contracted” to form what the layman calls generalization. “Confirmation” proves the condensation through specific concrete instances. Example: coopetition (cooperation among rivals) is condensed from concrete cases, then other concrete cases “confirm” the condensation of coopetition. The author then concludes that knowledge emerges from these two processes. Knowledge generates the structure – the way of approaching the distinction process, the separation of knowledge from non-knowledge.. In distinguishing, the more knowledge possibilities are selected, the lesser the territory of non-knowledge, the more the observed compared to the unobserved. However, once selection is made, we change the set or universe from which we select, creating possibilities that were not present before. The complexity concept explains the process of selection by knowledge. Complexity arises when more possibilities exist than can be “actualized.” We cannot select from ALL possibilities lest we become overburdened, only from a limited set. To reduce complexity, there should be a preselection to reduce complexity into “simple” complexity. It is the structures of knowledge that reduce complexity, a necessary process for organizations, otherwise they cannot self-reproduce (translation: perpetuate) themselves. Possibilities are first general possibilities (that is, all possible operations), then are split into available and unavailable possibilities. The available set is the marked side. When complexity is reduced there is a smaller, more manageable set of possibilities that reduces the “pressure” to select. However, complexity reduction, the author says, “increases” complexity because by doing so new possibilities are created. The author shifts to organizations to apply the knowledge/non-knowledge dichotomy. He states that organizational decisions are organizational observations. Decisions always imply what it does decide and what it does not. The latter is non-knowledge or unobserved. There are two decision structures in organizations: formal decisions and organizational culture. In formal decision structures there is uncertainty absorption and reduction of equivocality. Other possibilities of observation are simply eliminated otherwise the organization cannot perpetuate itself. In common business language, managements utilize what they know, for obtaining all relevant knowledge or even most of them carries prohibitive costs, therefore decisions are made despite limited facts and data and carried out in the face of uncertainty of outcomes. Intelligence is defined as the ability to manage knowledge. Moreover, it is “above” knowledge. Intelligence is observation of knowledge/non-knowledge. Knowledge includes some possibilities and excludes others. He concludes that knowledge includes the excluded. Another argument: By distinguishing, knowledge is created, but at the same time it “creates” non-knowledge or the representation of unobservability. Therefore, he reasons, all operations are based on knowledge. But knowledge is based on non-knowledge. Therefore systems cannot be based on knowledge because it is based on non-knowledge, the unobserved (the dark side?). All observations are chosen blindly with the illusion of sight. Because of such blindness it is necessary to know the unknown (a paradoxical statement). Non-knowledges “re-enters” (paraphrase: fuses with) knowledge. Intelligence enables one to “know” (paraphrase: contemplate) what it does not know. According to Baecker, intelligence is managing the observation according to the known and according to the representation of the unknown. Examples of Organizational intelligence: Inter-organizational network. Each member of that network has its own system structures or distinctions. Knowledge gaps of some correspond to the knowledges of others. Essentially this is the relationship among the organizations in the network. But one member cannot appropriate the knowledge of others without giving up its own, thereby changing old knowledge into non-knowledge. The network integration does not dissolve but instead sharpens the boundaries among the members. Members orient themselves according to their own structures but also according top their mutual relations. They consider the consequences of their decisions on the others. They communicate their non-knowledge and are aware of the limits of their knowledge which are contingent because they could have been different. What they do know about social systems? Nothing except the effects their decisions make on the others. Heterarchy. A temporary or ad hoc hierarchy of knowledge structures. When organizations communicate their orderings, they communicate different ways of distinguishing about knowledge of non-knowledge. A very abstruse concept which the author fails to explain or amplify either by analogy or example is that of “sub-units” or positions and their relations in the domain of non-knowledge, what he designates as “alternative ways of relating sub-units or positions.” All one has to do is communicate the possibilities of relating the sub-units, and – presto! - knowledge results from them, and the knowledge, obtained without possessing that knowledge, can be communicated. By engaging in apparent obfuscation and sophistry, the author is doing the reader a disservice. However, it is believed that whatever he has to say in this respect has little practical value to the serious manager. Organizational interactions. There are two forms of organization, the formal (or organization) and the informal (or organizational interactions). Two systems that operate in different ways. These concepts are familiar to students of organization and management. The author looks at them from different lenses. The organization possesses knowledge but does not know what the organizational interactions know. But it has organizational non-knowledge that corresponds to the knowledge possessed by the organizational interactions. The latter know different things and will decide differently. The organization would be intelligent only if it substitutes its non-knowledge with the knowledge of the organizational interactions. Because organizations depend on the informal organization for their decision making, they, the author asserts, base their calculations on non-knowledge as if it were knowledge. Seidle is a difficult writer to follow because of lack of coherence in his paragraphs and an almost contemptuous reluctance to clarify, apparently trying to impress the reader with the use of paradoxes and oxymorons, without trying properly to illuminate his statements with careful, adequate reasoning. He also lacks variety and precision in his language. The reader can, however, try to obtain whatever insights he can get and whatever his article can suggest for further research. Read More

The whole thing observed – the marked and the unmarked states, plus the distinction – is called the “form” of the distinction. Citing Cooper, the author states a paradox: The distinction both distinguishes and unites. What happens when one focuses on one side? You get a “blind spot” on the other side. Simple enough. Once one enters into the one side, the other sort of vanishes, or becomes “latent.” One can see that distinction when one gets out and sees it from outside. More on observation: There is a first-order observation wherein the observer performs the distinguishing, and there is a second-order observation wherein the observer looks at the first observer and sees the blind spot of the first observer and knows why.

He also sees that the first observer could have chosen other modes of distinguishing (the fact of contingency). Then there can be a third-order observation and so on, where the previous observer becomes the “first-order” observer from the viewpoint of the current observer. When one observes, something is visible – but this act, the author claims, creates invisibility or unobservability. The above concepts are applied to social systems (from groups to nations). When a decision or anything else is communicated in this context, other communications are shunted aside, ignored, or forgotten.

The latter are the unmarked side in the above model of the form of distinction. It is also important to remember that observation is not knowledge. Observation, it may be recalled, is any system in operation, or any system event, even, quite paradoxically, independent of any observer. Knowledge is the structure that guides or orients the system at work. It is the structure of the observing process, it guides and orients the process of distinction or distinguishing. Words of a language provides structure (schema) of observation.

What is distinguished depends on the language and the words used. Other structures are communication categories (such as “human being,” mineral”, etc.) Structures that relate system events to others produce meaning. The two structures above comprise the “double” function of knowledge. How does knowledge come about? This duality of structure states: Knowledge determines what observation is produced, but observation in turn influences the production of knowledge. Condensation is generalized distinction.

Different concrete observations are stripped of context and “contracted” to form what the layman calls generalization. “Confirmation” proves the condensation through specific concrete instances. Example: coopetition (cooperation among rivals) is condensed from concrete cases, then other concrete cases “confirm” the condensation of coopetition. The author then concludes that knowledge emerges from these two processes. Knowledge generates the structure – the way of approaching the distinction process, the separation of knowledge from non-knowledge.. In distinguishing, the more knowledge possibilities are selected, the lesser the territory of non-knowledge, the more the observed compared to the unobserved.

However, once selection is made, we change the set or universe from which we select, creating possibilities that were not present before. The complexity concept explains the process of selection by knowledge. Complexity arises when more possibilities exist than can be “actualized.” We cannot select from ALL possibilities lest we become overburdened, only from a limited set. To reduce complexity, there should be a preselection to reduce complexity into “simple” complexity. It is the structures of knowledge that reduce complexity, a necessary process for organizations, otherwise they cannot self-reproduce (translation: perpetuate) themselves.

Possibilities are first general possibilities (that is, all possible operations), then are split into available and unavailable possibilities. The available set is the marked side. When complexity is reduced there is a smaller, more manageable set of possibilities that reduces the “pressure” to select.

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