Kantian Ethics:A Comparative Analysis of Kant's Moral Theory - Essay Example

Running Head: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF KANTS MORAL THEORY Kantian Ethics: A Comparative Analysis of Kants Moral Theory s Name) Kantian Ethics: A Comparative Analysis of Kant’s Moral Theory Introduction This essay deals with the identification of any possible element of Kant’s work in moral philosophy which can be used as a substantial theoretical source for the support of other theories of justification. Thus, it is necessary to compare Kant’s views about moral judgements with each of the theorists discussed below, and identify the similarities and differences each theory have in light of Kant’s. This paper will focus on the strategies used for justifying moral theories, as this is generally where the theorists go their separate ways in constructing the supreme principle of morality. As such each theory may yield different answers to the three questions raised under morality: 1) Authoritative question: Why ought I be moral? 2) Substantive question: Which interest ought I to take favourable account of? 3) Distributive question: Whose interest ought I to take favourable account of? In order to achieve the above task the paper has been divided in four parts. Firstly it is important to identify the methods of justification used by Kant in Groundwork of Metaphysics of Moral. A general overview is also made regarding the value of Kant’s work for the researchers in the area of moral philosophy. From that the second part of this essay refers to the theories of justification used by other philosophers, namely Rawls and Hare. This essay would argue that although many of Kant’s concepts are used, the extent to which they served as models of theory justification is rather some degree of. The idea of (preference) utilitarianism is also presented in this part in order to explain the stages of development of moral theory in the history. Part Three evaluates the possible relation between the methods of justification used by Kant and those applied by D. Gauthier and A. Gewirth. It is submitted that both share some similarities with Kant’s view that all rational being must reason morally, but differ in their ways of justifying such claim, and ultimately yield a different conclusion as to Kant’s. (i.e. a different supreme principle of morality) Finally, it is critical to summarise the views presented in the above two parts in an effort to identify the possible relation between Kant’s moral theory and those by other theorists in the area of moral philosophy. As this paper deals with the Kantian Moral Theory, it is very important to have a clear idea of the ‘Moral Theory’. Firstly, morality concerns conduct. It is about what a person ought to do, and how one’s actions reflect morality. Nevertheless, this does not distinguish morality from other types of knowledge, for mathematics and law also concern with our conduct. Secondly, moral problems are normative, i.e. they relates to a typical standard or rules by affirming how things should or ought to be and how to value them. This is in sharp contrast with descriptive theory, which pertains to describing reality. Thirdly, even normative problems concern what ought to be done, not all normative problems can be described as normal. As a result, the task is to make a distinction moral problems from non-moral normative problems. With this foundational idea of morality in mind, we can now give a definition of morality in order to evaluate how ‘moral’ the theories to be discussed are. Something is ‘morally ought to be’ if and only if the ‘ought to be’ is propounded as 1. Action-guiding – X intends this to guide action. 2. Other-addressing – addresses to somebody other than the one saying it (X). 3. Other-regarding – this is the reason why it is ought to be because some outer element is involved to others than X. 4. Co natively independent – independent of desire, i.e. one has to do it whether he wants to or not. 5. Categorically binding – overrides all prescription that is not within one. to 4., i.e. moral ought to’s override other kinds of ought to’s. The two focus elements of this paper in analysing each moral theory shall pertain to the following three questions; 1. Authoritative Question: ‘Why ought I to be moral?’ In other words, why my actions ought to be guided by moral principles, or accept the five conditions of morality? 2. Substantive Question: ‘Which interest ought I to take favourable account of?’ 3. Distributive Question: ‘Whose interest ought I to take favourable account of?’ This paper is a discussion of meta-ethical theories (as opposed to normative moral theories), where each theory may differ depending on how they define morality; analyse key moral concepts, e.g. ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘rights’, ‘duties’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, and more importantly, how they answer the authoritative question. Hence, this paper shall discuss only the first question, as this paper focuses on the question of whether rational agents must reason morally, by looking at Kant’s Groundwork and comparing his theory with others to find out. Kant was born on April 22, 1724, in the Prussian city of KSnigsberg (today Kaliningrad, Russia), the fourth of six children.( Borowski, 1969) After attending the Collegium Fridericianum from 1732 to 1740, he enrolled at the University of KSnigsberg in the faculty of philosophy. Kant, in his Groundwork, has employed two justificatory methods with the ‘sole aim’ of to ‘seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality’ (or indeed, of practical reasoning). But before moving on to these two entirely different methods, it should be noted that Kant repeatedly insists that the premise must remain a priori, that is, any knowledge gained must be without appealing to any experience. Courage or justice are always shaping and inspiring actions a person choose to do because they are just or courageous, but they are there imperfectly, as images or imitations. If a person seek to do what someone be aware of to be right, someone seek something whose presence and power cannot be fully active in ordinary things, in a battle or a code of laws, say, but only for thought. This paper shall discuss the Kantian Moral Theory in the light of the various other similar theories presented by other philosophers during and after Kant’s time. Discussion Part One – Kant’s Moral Theory Kant begins the substantive discussion of morality in his most widely read practical work, the Groundwork, by claiming that our common view is that only a good will could be considered good without limitation.( Mary, 1996) All other goods, even virtues, can be misused; even complete satisfaction can produce arrogance. This means that the good will and nothing else must be the heart of moral duty, because our everyday view is that moral duty is obligatory, and allows no exceptions. Is it not true, however, that we often say commonsensical that a good will without talent or equipment is feckless, that uninformed good will can be uselessly meddlesome, that good will together with poor judgment is harmful, and that the road to hell is paved with good intentions? If the standard for judging what is good is the result, that is to say, or if the standard is our usual unanalyzed conglomeration of intention and result, the good will is not altogether good. We can put this problem in another way by saying that the goodness of a good will is not commonsensical separable from its object, from what it wills or intends. (Regis) Can the will or intention to be moderate in pursuing pleasure, for example, be divorced from understanding and experiencing what the attraction of pleasure or appropriate pleasure is? At the least, some grasp of an abstract sense or content of good is needed to make the "good" that the good will is willing intelligible: ordinarily, the goodness of the good will apart from its objects cannot in fact be described meaningfully without implicitly accepting some notion of the goodness of its object. (Beyleveld) As Kant develops his argument beyond this first commonsensical beginning, he attempts to make truly moral commands as self-enclosed as possible, in the sense that the propriety of the command loses any reference to something outside the command itself. The mere universal form of the maxim that recommends an action, he argues, is what guarantees that following it is moral, apart from the end or goals that the maxim originally was intended to reach or bring about.( Mary, 1996) In this sense, the starting point of his argument--that only a good will is altogether good--remains fundamental and is even radicalized. Ultimately, Kant attempts to grasp the goodness of the good will, its morality, in terms built up solely from the free, universalizable incentive of will itself. This, however, leaves a serious question whether the understanding on which Kant settles about what is choice worthy or good is not too narrow or, finally, unintelligible, or, at the least, whether he implicitly has in mind some notion of goodness that in fact is not meaningful apart from the objects they will chooses or intends, just as we commonsensical cannot in fact say what we mean by a good intention without at some point having in mind a view of the goodness of what we are trying to bring about, so, too, would Kants radical defence of the goodness of free will seem to be similarly dependent. It is not clear, in other words, that Kants view of moral intention correctly grasps the common framework of goodness and choice worthiness that it explicates. (Borowski, 1969) The heart of Kants actual understanding of morality revolves around several thoughts and concepts that he often fails to describe at any length: form, end, causality, freedom, and universality. Kants view is that a moral action must be chosen for a moral reason. A moral reason is one in which the maxim recommending the action is completely universalizable. If it is completely universalizable, it is purely formal and reasonable, and could--or, indeed, must--be selected by any simply reasonable being, such as God. No material end, on the other hand, can be certainly desirable. (Korsgaard, Ch 1-4) To determine or cause oneself by a universalized maxim, moreover, is to determine one freely. More precisely, it is not to be determined by what is outside oneself, by natural causes or laws of motion. It is to determine ones own actions, to push oneself along as ones own efficient cause. ( Borowski, 1969; Evdokimov, 1986) The scholarly controversy concerns whether by free action Kant means only moral action, action in accord with a successfully universalized maxim, or whether he believes there is a "free choice" (Wilbur) that precedes moral choice and is governed either by moral choice or by maxims rooted in calculation determined by our attraction to what might satisfy our desires.(Paul, 1998) One reason this question is hard to decide is because Kant says little about freedom generally, and what he does say is mostly in the context of describing moral choice. Freedom is negative if we are not determined by desires, and positive if we are self-determined morally. Negative freedom is not different from positive freedom, but only how positive freedom looks in terms of desires that do not determine it. Clearly, Kant does not intend freedom to mean arbitrariness because it is legislating the moral law for oneself, that is, allowing it to determine ones choice or making it the law for oneself by successfully universalizing the maxim that commands ones action. (Bernard) Freedom is not creating the law or acting lawlessly. However, the exact status of self-determination or self-control in general is unclear: if it means nothing other than moral determination, then we are indeed free only when we are moral and there is, strictly, no other freedom. If self-determination is a wider concept, however, Kant has said nothing about what it might be or mean in "free choice," what the possibilities are that need to be considered, and so on. Positively, that is to say, Kant has not differentiated it from arbitrariness or, indeed, given it any intelligible status at all. This issue also faces us if we look at freedom not as self-determination but simply as being undetermined or unchained, that is, if we do not look from the standpoint of control or initiating movement but see freedom as being unbound or unhindered. (Mary, 1991) For Kant gives no substantive description of this state or situation such that we could understand how, qua free choice, it stands undetermined (between morality and immorality, say, or simply standing) nor, therefore, how it could control or direct itself or be controlled or directed. Here too Kant does not discuss the range of possibilities, nor does he clarify if this language of freedom as not being hindered or controlled, not being held back or pushed forward, as it were, is the full way to grasp freedom. In his long discussion of evil in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, the one thing Kant never makes precisely dear is how the free choice of evil is possible in terms of freedom (or how it is determined by freedom), only that it happens. These issues are important to Kants moral thought because if freedom is present outside moral choice, a central ground for Kants arguing that his view alone captures morality because it alone captures the freedom that moral action must have would be untrue, or, at least, insufficiently demonstrated. Some of Kants power would be dissipated. (Paton) Beyond this, of course, the possibility of moral choice would need to be explicated or grasped in terms of the other broader areas that make freedom more generally intelligible. If free choice is arbitrary, and morality can (or cannot) be freely chosen, morality may at root be arbitrary. If morality rests on other grounds of freedom, of not being controlled or hindered, and is not arbitrary, moral reason would nonetheless incompletely determine our freedom; moral choice would not be the only self-determination. (Vallentyne) If morality can retain its universal obligatory character within free choice which is a process or act that in some way is neither arbitrary nor moral by being, or being grounded in, another set of reasons, this too needs explicating. If, however, Kant in fact means that freedom strictly is moral choice and nothing else, that the appearance of free choice simply is just that, an appearance rooted in moral purity, then questions about our responsibility for choosing immorally remain difficult. How can we freely will evil if the only true freedom is moral choice?( Kant, 1998) Related issues cloud Kants analysis of the reason, formality and causality involved in morality. These issues are pertinent to the freedom of moral choice itself, whatever our questions about freedom in Kant more broadly. Kant argues that the self-determination of moral freedom is self-causality. Causality is efficient causality operating according to universal laws. However, is this alone what causality is? Traditionally, one speaks of formal, final, and material, as well as of efficient causality. Might moral causality be of another kind, or also of another kind? One might reply that we are ignoring here Kants critique of pure reason. Obviously, we are far from fully exploring each element of Kants thought. Our point is simply that he does not himself explore alternate ways to consider form, reason, freedom, ends, and their connection, and that important alternatives exist. Part Two – Hare and Rawls Like Kant, Hare and Rawls both support rational non-cognistivism. However, unlike Kant, both are weak rationalists, i.e. the authoritative question is not being answered by either Hare or Rawls, while Kant did so in Chapter III. Hare shows similarities by using the conceptual analysis of morality as Kant did in Chapter I and II (criteria of rationality – pure logic). However, this is not enough for him to be claimed as a Kantian. His theory is teleological, while Kant’s is Deontological. Moral ‘ought’ will be explained here, particularly its universailability, prescriptively and overridingness. The third element, which distinguishes morality, does not any play part in Hare’s justification while Kant did so by saying it is categorically binding. In addition, the logical principle of universalizability will be introduced. It is concluded that Hare’s theory is what Kant tends to utilise in Chapter I and II, but with Hare having a different strategy, which leads to a different conclusion and a different set of principles. (Although both have the issue of impartiality, which will be discussed in Part three.) Hare is best described as a preference utilitarian and this is where utilitarianism will be compared with Kant. (Daniels) This part will also examine the question of whether Kant could have been a utilitarian. Hare contended that although Kant is not a utilitarian ultimately, he could have become one. If this is so, then Hare and Kant may not have differed much after all. Rawls is one of the most characteristic cases of Kant’s influence which accepts the issue of ‘morality’ as expressed by Kant supporting particularly the value of ‘individual morality’ which interacts continuously with the social justice. More specifically in accordance with Rawls ‘a society united on a reasonable form of utilitarianism, or on the reasonable liberalisms of Kant, would likewise require the sanctions of state power to remain so’ (Rawls, 1996, 38). Rawls’s theory contains an impartial viewpoint, requiring agents to consider the interests of others. These moral constraints are imposed on agents because of the original position we have to put ourselves in. However, he does not provide a reason for adopting his moral viewpoint. This makes him a weak rationalist by ignoring the authoritative question, which Kant justifies in Chapter 3. It is argued that the use of an entirely and deliberately artificial device means he did not justify his principles by conceptual analysis of the moral viewpoint (as Kant did in Chapter 1 and two), but moral contractarianism. A number of Rawlss religious critics have taken him to task for his idea of public reason, arguing either that it "excludes the religious by drawing the boundaries of public reason so that comprehensive religious doctrines fall outside them for the most part" or that the bifurcation of public and private reason marginalizes those "for whom it is a matter of religions conviction that they ought to strive for a religiously integrated existence."(Philip, Weithman, ed., and Nicholas) In his later essay, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," Rawls moves toward an accommodation of these critics, conceding that "reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons--and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines--are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support."( Rawls) However, the ultimate recourse to public reason remains a moral duty, not simply a matter of prudential political strategy. Those moved primarily by religious reasons must still be prepared to express themselves in terms of public reason. (Beyleveld, Ch. 5) Through his emphasis on those in formal positions of political authority, Rawls also, to some degree, excuses citizens from the requirement that their personal political deliberations be conducted in terms of public reason as well.( Rawls, 133-136) There remain problems, even with Rawlss modified and more accommodating conception of public reason. Whether part of Rawlss intention or not, the strictures of the public arena--the implicit or explicit claim that it is backward or impermissible or in bad taste to advance religious claims or arguments in public(Rorty, 1999)--run the risk of undermining the vitality and profundity of religious discourse.( Wolterstorff, 178, 179) What is authoritative in the public arena may well become authoritative in many or most aspects of our lives. In addition, if what is authoritative is as thin as Rawlss political conception, we run the risk of greatly impoverishing our intellectual and moral lives as individuals, members of associations, and citizens. Part Three – Gauthier and Gewirth Gauthier (as well as Locke, Kant, and Nozick) offers only a partial justification of private ownership. Not only does Gauthier never consider the possibility that other forms of ownership might have the same results as private ownership but, indeed, there are other forms of ownership, which do have the same result. That Gauthier must ground private ownership upon a state-of-nature original appropriation is integral to his method as he sees it. Gauthier considers morality to be the product of agreement for cooperative interaction which is required to remedy the (essential) imperfections of the free market.( David, p. 84, 1986) Both the free market, as a morally free zone, and cooperative agreements to internalize external costs presuppose an impartial (but not equal) initial bargaining position of factor endowments.( David, p. 86 & p.130, 1986) This is to say that markets presuppose people own something to exchange in the market and that bargaining presupposes that people start at some position of strength or weakness from which they may assess the value of various possible agreements. Gauthier argues that in order for the outputs from the free market and from agreements to be "moralized," the inputs--i.e., the initial position--must be proven impartial. Gauthier rejects an equal initial position, such as John Rawlss, because it permits free riders.( David, p. 151 and p. 201, 1986) Original, impartial private appropriation is the necessary moral foundation, which Gauthier believes he needs in order to "moralize" the outputs of the free market and of cooperative agreements. (Rawls) Gewirth holds that human action is both voluntary and purposive. In respect of its purposiveness, the agent sees the goal of the action as some good and this good as ultimately justifying the action. Therefore, Gewirths first claim is that from the agents point of view his purpose justifies his action. His second claim is that, ipso facto, the agent implicitly claims that, at least-prima facie, he has a right to do the action. Besides the reasons integral to Gauthiers theory, it must be noticed that (in general) gift, bequest, and exchange are incomplete as criteria of title. Each presupposes some additional criterion of title, which would originally distribute legitimate title over things so that individuals could then transfer title by gift, bequest, or exchange. Social contract theorists have solved the problem of original distribution in two different ways. Some have made the distribution prior to the contract, while others have made the distribution part of the contract. Rawls and Hobbes make the distribution a result of the social contract. (Smart and Williams) In the Leviathan, Hobbess contract empowers the sovereign to make original distribution as well as to make the rules governing subsequent transfers.( Thomas, 1950) Rawls makes the communal ownership of talents and abilities part of the contract. By contrast, Hume and Locke locate the original distribution in what exist prior to the convention or contract. For Hume, "present possession" at the time of the convention is "the natural expedient" for making the original distribution.( David, 1964) Locke, as is well known, employs labour on what is unwonted as the criterion for his initial distribution. Gauthier, like Hume and Locke, adopts the precontract rather than the contract-dependent methodology. Gauthiers justification of private ownership rests upon the following illustration. Imagine that several persons inhabit an island where the land and resources, in effect, constitute a commons available to all. Use is in dividable, each family provides primarily for its own needs, and interaction is non-cooperative. Suppose that Eve, the head of one of the families, is aware that planned, intensive cultivation would make the land more productive, so that she proposes to take a certain area of the island for her exclusive use in order that her family may benefit by maximizing its productivity. She seeks, therefore, an exclusive right to a certain portion of the island. Eve seeks the security of tenure which market compensation, rather than full compensation, confers. (Gauthier) Full compensation, according to Gauthier, is compensation, which leaves a person without any net loss in utility. Market compensation would be compensation at the market price she might realize through exchange. Eve seeks the more comprehensive protection which a right in the product of her labour would realize.(Gauthier, pp. 63-65, 1974) Eve intends to better her familys situation through a system of rights that determine her endowment for prospective market and cooperative interaction. Gauthier argues that Eves appropriation need not be brought about by worsening the situation of the other islanders. (Guyer, Ch.6) While Eve might seek to appropriate a too-large portion of the island, which would violate the Locke and proviso against worsening the situation of others, there might be sufficiently abundant land such that she need not worsen the situation of others. (Gewirth) Eves appropriation might be small enough and her increased productivity might be sufficiently large so that her fellow islanders might be better off through exchanges with her than they were before she privately appropriated her plot of land. Gauthier concludes his derivation by showing that if Eve gives up her rights to the remaining commons and if Eves increased, productivity would be beneficial to her as well as to others, then her exclusive rights of possession are justified: others may benefit themselves, and Eve is, in Gauthiers words, "the great benefactress of human kind."( Gauthier, pp. 214-17, 1989) That Karl, Rosa, and Friedrich agree to cooperate does not violate Gauthiers assumptions about human motivation. Gauthier defends a subjective theory of value. A persons considered preferences determine her reasons for choice and action. Even though Gauthiers basic motivational assumption is the subjective theory of value, he sometimes describes his assumptions about the rationality of choices as "self-interested" or "nontuistic." Several commentators have noted that Gauthiers descriptions are not equivalent.( Baler, pp. 35-44; 1988 and Laurence, pp. 160-70) A subjective theory of value does not logically limit a persons motivation only to choices that are self-interested or non-touristic. Someone may prefer to advance the interests of others--e.g., the interests of friends and loved-ones. Self-interest and non-truism, of course, limit the content of preferences. Gauthier has recently said that his self-interest assumption is to prevent "double-counting" in utility calculations; such a practice would count some preferences twice and thus upset Pareto optimality.( Gauthier, p. 214.) Gauthiers reply does not explain why the decision by Karl, Rosa, and Friedrich to cooperate need violate his assumption, whether it is described as the subjective theory of value or as self-interested. (Hare) If Karl, Rosa, and Friedrich prefer to cooperate, then there is no incompatibility with a subjective theory of value. Karls, Rosas, and Friedrichs choice to cooperate also need not violate either the assumption of self-interest or of non-truism. Cooperation can be beneficial. Rational, self-interested people can individually benefit from cooperation. Gauthiers argument in Morals by Agreement depends upon this. Gauthiers decision to base the initial position upon a private appropriation is therefore one plausible choice, but it is not the only logical or best one. Private ownership and exchange is one way individuals may benefit, but it is not the only way. Working together and sharing the increased productivity is another. Cooperation is not incompatible with assumptions about self-interest or non-truism. Any moral justification of a form of ownership grounded upon an original act of appropriation in a state of nature must show not only that the particular form is thus grounded, but also that no other form can be so grounded. Using private ownership as an example, it is not sufficient to show that private ownership can be grounded on original appropriation in a state of nature; the argument must also show that no other form of ownership, such as communal ownership, can also fulfil the relevant standard of justification. Suppose that a Gauthier or a Locke tries to prove that private ownership based upon original private appropriation produces more utility or benefit to each individual than the state of nature in which land and resources in effect constitute a commons available to all. While this argument may seem to justify private ownership, the argument does not show that only private ownership is morally justified. (Guyer, Ch.10) There may be other forms of ownership, such as cooperative collective ownership or private usufruct, which also produce more utility or benefit than a state of nature in which land and resources are a commons available to all. If the standard of justification is the production of greater benefit or utility for each than the state-of-nature commons, then private ownership, private usufruct, and collective cooperative ownership may be morally justified. The problem is that this state-of-nature justification shows all three to be justified, which means that this state-of-nature argument cannot be used to decide which of the three is morally preferable. A complete justification would have to show that private ownership and only private ownership fulfils the standard of justification. Other forms of ownership must therefore be examined and shown not to fulfil the standards. Arguments which show that private ownership (or any other form) is grounded upon original appropriation, but which fail to show that only private ownership (or some other form) is so grounded, therefore one shall call partial justifications. The result of this amalgamating of efficient, final, and formal cause is that the other elements of causality, (or, if causality seems to us always to mean efficient causality, of living within and for grounds) are not discussed independently. Form as Plato or Hegel means it, for example, does not enter the discussion. Consider, for example, the Platonic argument that "form" is always present in my actions because these are guided by my discourse or opinion, but present imperfectly or incompletely. Someone seek justice, is oriented to it, is formed by it, and freely act on it as a person reasonably but imperfectly grasp it. Form of this sort is not universal as it is in Kant, but it is hardly unintelligible. If freedom means seeing the reason in something and acting for that reason and nothing else, it is unclear why this formality is any less clear than the universal moral shaping that Kant has in mind. Conclusion Therefore, it cannot be concluded that nor can Kant argue that cooperation between Karl, Friedrich, and Rosa is excluded because it would be a contract before the social contract. First, as critics remarked earlier, social contract theorists have dealt with the problem of initial distribution by both pre-contract and contract-dependent methodologies. Nothing in the idea of a social contract necessitates a pre-contract methodology, rather than a contract-dependent one. Second, Gauthiers own method must permit pre-contract agreements and cooperation, both of which are presupposed by the free market which Gauthier believes exists prior to and is the reason for morals by agreement Gauthiers attempt at justifying private ownership from an original appropriation in the state of nature fails to produce a complete justification of private ownership, which shows that private ownership, and only private ownership is morally justifiable. His justification is partial because his arguments fail to exclude other possible forms of ownership. Gauthier is not unique in this respect. Critics know of no major philosopher who has carefully compared the implications of different forms of ownership in state of nature conditions. It is not a sufficient proof to establish merely that private ownership is an improvement upon the state of nature. A complete justification must actually show that no other possible form of ownership can do as well. References Avon, T. Foundation of risk analysis, a knowledge and decision-oriented perspective, Wiley, New York (2003). Benjamin, J.R. and Cornell, A. Probability, statistics, decisions for civil engineers, McGraw-Hill, Inc, New York, USA (1970). Bernard, W Utilitariansim and Beyond Beyleveld, D Dialectical Necessity of Morality Beyleveld, D Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw Ch.5 Borowski LE, Jachmann RB, Wasianski EACh. Immanuel Kant. Sein Leben in Darstellungen von Zeitgenossen. 1912. 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