History of Western Philosophy: Modern Period - Report Example

Gilbert Ryle argues that Descartes philosophy is deeply flawed because it commits what he calls a "category mistake." Explain Ryles reasoning for this conclusion. Do you think Ryles argument is successful? Why or why not? The Cartesian explanation that proposes that the nature and place of the mind and body that every human being possesses, with the obvious exceptions of infants and the mentally challenged, are different and separate from each other is what Ryle considers to be the Official Doctrine. Descartes proposed that while the former is private and internal, the latter is of public domain and is external. This is explained by the theory that the body occupies space and is observable by the senses just like other external entities (like a chair, another person or a dog). The mind, on the other hand, does not occupy space and cannot be ascertained by any other individual aside from the self. For instance, a person can see whether the other person next to him is wearing a jacket or not. The observations gathered by the senses are situated in space and is open for everybody else to perceive. But the mind and its processes are kept totally in confidential from other people. However, it is through the physical that another human being can indirectly affect and communicate with the mind of another. Thus, it can be concluded that a person has two separate and different states of being—the mental and physical existence. Having presented what Ryle considers to be the Official Doctrine, I will now present what I think is his strongest argument against it. He stated that a category mistake has been made by Descartes and other dualists that make dualism totally absurd. In order to fully understand Ryle’s argument, it is imperative to define what a category mistake is according to him. Simply put, it is the act of wrongly placing, labeling, and treating two things as if they both belong in a common category due to the inability to attach the appropriate meanings into words and concepts. To illustrate this, Ryle cited a very simple yet clear example of committing a category mistake. Towards the end of a military parade where a certain division is marching on the street and have been labeled as battalions, batteries, and squadrons, the child then asked “Where is the division?” This is a category mistake as the child unknowingly placed the division in the same category as the battalions, batteries and squadrons, when in fact; those three comprise the division. Ryle argued that this is what Descartes and the other dualists have done in a sense that they have classified the mind and body as two different and separate entities in the same category—parts of a human being—when in fact it should not be. The first two arguments of Ryle I believe are the strongest in their simplicity. The first one states that since no one knows the workings of one mind, but the owner and mental processes are undisclosed, then it cannot be assumed that it is governed by non-mechanical laws as opposed to the mechanical laws governing the body. No one is privy to how the minds of another works so there is no way for anyone to formulate a general principle regarding it, which is what Descartes did when he assumed that the mind is governed by non-mechanical laws. In line with this, Ryle makes his second point. He explained that assuming that the mind is governed by non-mechanical laws is tantamount to saying that it runs through the same rigid deterministic system like mechanical laws do. This then is in conflict with the concept of Free Will as it characterizes the mind, just like the body, as determined in nature. The body cannot help but go through the different processes of the body (i.e. secretion and menstruation) for it is needed for it to function normally. However, this is not the case with the mind. The mind is in control of the nature of Free Will and it is not deterministic in nature. Again, since nobody knows for sure the inner workings of another’s mind, then no generalities could be drawn. Therefore, the mind cannot be considered as having the same characteristics as the body and they should not be treated like two different sides of a coin. This is because the mind and body are not separate entities in which the ghost independently operates the machine. The mind and body are one and the former should be treated as a means of explaining and understanding the actions of the latter. With the two arguments presented, it is clear that a category mistake was committed in creating the theory of dualism. Although Ryle presented other more complex arguments moving towards his conclusion, these two very simple points that he made I believe are the most successful. One does not have to be a theorist or a philosopher to be able to understand them. And I would have to agree with Ryle that it is only but logical to discredit the theory of dualism. Explain in your own words Russells distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Apply the distinction to the knowledge that one might possess of the existence of a chair, for example. Bertrand Russell proposed that knowledge can be classified into two: the knowledge of things and the knowledge of truths. On the one hand, knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description are the two kinds of knowledge of things. Russell explained that the former is a lot simpler than the latter in that knowledge by acquaintance consists of what we perceive through our senses—what we are acquainted with that we can immediately become aware of—and is the foundation of all our knowledge. For instance, when presented with a chair, I become acquainted with its color, shape, and texture—the sense-data that make up the chair. Sense-data is not the only basis for all knowledge by acquaintance. There is also acquaintance by memory, which is the source of all our knowledge about what has already happened—what is in the past. We remember whatever we have experienced and perceived through our senses and we keep them in our memory to use them as points of inference when making sense of the descriptions of an object. Acquaintance by introspection is another type and this pertains to the knowledge that we have in being aware that we are aware of things. For instance, I am aware that I am seeing a chair. Russell posits that this self-consciousness of our thoughts and feelings is the basis for our knowledge of mental things. Hence, there are two things that I am acquainted with upon seeing the chair: the sense-date that is presented by the chair made possible through my outer senses and my knowledge of myself as the one seeing the chair through my inner senses. In relation to this, Russell adds that we are also acquainted with universals—abstract ideas like motherhood, blackness, and uniformity. However, my knowledge that this chair, as a physical and separate thing, exists is knowledge by description. It is our knowledge of the thing itself that we have perceived in that there is this exact physical and external object which causes the sense-data. For instance, I know that George W. Bush is the President of the United States. By replacing Bush’s name with his characteristics as a president, I am drawing upon knowledge by description in knowing that President Bush exists even though I have not met him personally and I only have an abstract description (greatness, braveness, and leadership) of him being a great and brave leader. In this sense, Russell explains that knowledge by description consists of knowledge of truths as “we know a description, and we know that there is just one object to which this description applies, though the object itself is not directly known to us.” We can see here that knowledge by description draws from what we are acquainted with. Explain Moores proof of the external world. Explain why or why not Moore would agree with the claim that he also needs to prove the premise of his argument. G. E. Moore’s proof of the external world, that is, objects outside the self, relies on his own two hands—literally. He explained that if he can generate two hands just by raising and moving them, then it can be logically concluded that two hands exist. He then explained that the existence of hands alone is a proof that an external world exists, assuming that the hands are part of the external world. However there is much opposition to his argument. One is that Moore’s theory draws only on sensory data. He did not even consider on his senses as significant to the argument in that it should be clarified if the senses are gathering data correctly and truthfully, without deception as reflected by Descartes. He assumed that his senses were correct and not deceptive in perceiving the existence of his two hands. However, I believe the most crucial contention against Moore’s theory is the fact that, like Descartes, he presented an argument that can be characterized as circular in that he based the truth of the proof of the existence of the external world upon the knowledge that there are objects outside of the self. It creates an Epistemic Circle in that the premise of his argument is the thing itself that he is trying to prove. Stating that the hands are objects outside the self that can prove the existence of the external world is the same as stating that we know there is an external world because we know there is an external world. In this case, Moore then needs to prove the premise of his argument in order to prove the point of the argument as both are just one and the same. For Moore, there are certain truisms that everyone knows as true and can be considered general knowledge. For instance, everyone knows that the earth has existed far longer that before we were born—I know this; you know this; and I know that you know this. The general knowledge of these truisms and their truths are considered by Moore as common-sense. Hence, even with the glaring exposition that Moore has created a circular argument, I believe that he would still argue that he would not need to prove the premise of his argument because it would be just “common-sense” to believe that hands do exist and that therefore, it follows that an external world also exists. Read More

Sense-data is not the only basis for all knowledge by acquaintance. There is also acquaintance by memory, which is the source of all our knowledge about what has already happened—what is in the past. We remember whatever we have experienced and perceived through our senses and we keep them in our memory to use them as points of inference when making sense of the descriptions of an object. Acquaintance by introspection is another type and this pertains to the knowledge that we have in being aware that we are aware of things.

For instance, I am aware that I am seeing a chair. Russell posits that this self-consciousness of our thoughts and feelings is the basis for our knowledge of mental things. Hence, there are two things that I am acquainted with upon seeing the chair: the sense-date that is presented by the chair made possible through my outer senses and my knowledge of myself as the one seeing the chair through my inner senses. In relation to this, Russell adds that we are also acquainted with universals—abstract ideas like motherhood, blackness, and uniformity.

However, my knowledge that this chair, as a physical and separate thing, exists is knowledge by description. It is our knowledge of the thing itself that we have perceived in that there is this exact physical and external object which causes the sense-data. For instance, I know that George W. Bush is the President of the United States. By replacing Bush’s name with his characteristics as a president, I am drawing upon knowledge by description in knowing that President Bush exists even though I have not met him personally and I only have an abstract description (greatness, braveness, and leadership) of him being a great and brave leader.

In this sense, Russell explains that knowledge by description consists of knowledge of truths as “we know a description, and we know that there is just one object to which this description applies, though the object itself is not directly known to us.” We can see here that knowledge by description draws from what we are acquainted with. Explain Moores proof of the external world. Explain why or why not Moore would agree with the claim that he also needs to prove the premise of his argument. G. E.

Moore’s proof of the external world, that is, objects outside the self, relies on his own two hands—literally. He explained that if he can generate two hands just by raising and moving them, then it can be logically concluded that two hands exist. He then explained that the existence of hands alone is a proof that an external world exists, assuming that the hands are part of the external world. However there is much opposition to his argument. One is that Moore’s theory draws only on sensory data.

He did not even consider on his senses as significant to the argument in that it should be clarified if the senses are gathering data correctly and truthfully, without deception as reflected by Descartes. He assumed that his senses were correct and not deceptive in perceiving the existence of his two hands. However, I believe the most crucial contention against Moore’s theory is the fact that, like Descartes, he presented an argument that can be characterized as circular in that he based the truth of the proof of the existence of the external world upon the knowledge that there are objects outside of the self.

It creates an Epistemic Circle in that the premise of his argument is the thing itself that he is trying to prove. Stating that the hands are objects outside the self that can prove the existence of the external world is the same as stating that we know there is an external world because we know there is an external world. In this case, Moore then needs to prove the premise of his argument in order to prove the point of the argument as both are just one and the same. For Moore, there are certain truisms that everyone knows as true and can be considered general knowledge.

For instance, everyone knows that the earth has existed far longer that before we were born—I know this; you know this; and I know that you know this.

Read More